Tribunal decisions

The decision

UT Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKUT 00150 (IAC)

AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Heard at Field House

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard on 15 to 18 September 2025
Additional written submissions on 24 & 31 October 2025
Promulgated on 14 April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

AK
AH
AJ
(ANONYMITY ORDERS MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representationi:

For the Appellant AK: Mr D Bazini of Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves
Ms M Cleghorn of Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves (on 15 and 16 September 2025 only)

For the Appellant AH: Mr Harjot Singh, Solicitor at Twinwood Law Practice
Mr R de Mello of Counsel, instructed by Twinwood Law Practice (on 16 to 18 September 2025 only)
Mr R Ahmed of Counsel, instructed by Twinwood Law Practice (on 16 and 18 September 2025 only)

For the Appellant AJ: Ms L Brakaj, Solicitor at Iris Law LLP

For the Respondent: Mr C Thomann KC, instructed by the Government Legal Department

Orders Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants and any members of their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants and any members of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

This decision replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq. Sections A, D and E of the following were previously contained in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) (“SMO2”) and remain substantively unchanged. Sections B and C have been updated, with some parts remaining unamended from SMO2 in relation to travel to and within Federal Iraq.

A. INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE IN IRAQ: ARTICLE 15(C) OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
1. There continues to be an internal armed conflict in certain parts of Iraq, involving government forces, various militia and the remnants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Following the military defeat of ISIL at the end of 2017 and the resulting reduction in levels of direct and indirect violence, however, the intensity of that conflict is not such that, as a general matter, there are substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned to Iraq, solely on account of his presence there, faces a real risk of being subjected to indiscriminate violence amounting to serious harm within the scope of Article 15(c) QD.
2. The only exception to the general conclusion above is in respect of the small mountainous area north of Baiji in Salah al-Din, which is marked on the map at Annex D. ISIL continues to exercise doctrinal control over that area and the risk of indiscriminate violence there is such as to engage Article 15(c) as a general matter.
3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact-sensitive, “sliding scale” assessment to which the following matters are relevant.
4. Those with an actual or perceived association with ISIL are likely to be at enhanced risk throughout Iraq. In those areas in which ISIL retains an active presence, those who have a current personal association with local or national government or the security apparatus are likely to be at enhanced risk.
5. The impact of any of the personal characteristics listed immediately below must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area. Within the framework of such an analysis, the other personal characteristics which are capable of being relevant, individually and cumulatively, to the sliding scale analysis required by Article 15(c) are as follows:
(i) Opposition to or criticism of the Government of Iraq (GOI), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or local security actors;
(ii) Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;
(iii) LGBTI individuals, those not conforming to Islamic mores and wealthy or Westernised individuals;
(iv) Humanitarian or medical staff and those associated with Western organisations or security forces;
(v) Women and children without genuine family support; and
(vi) Individuals with disabilities.
6. The living conditions in Iraq as a whole, including the Formerly Contested Areas, are unlikely to give rise to a breach of Article 3 ECHR or (therefore) to necessitate subsidiary protection under Article 15(b) QD. Where it is asserted that return to a particular part of Iraq would give rise to such a breach, however, it is to be recalled that the minimum level of severity required is relative, according to the personal circumstances of the individual concerned. Any such circumstances require individualised assessment in the context of the conditions of the area in question.
B. DOCUMENTATION FOR AND FEASIBILITY OF RETURN TO IRAQ
7. Up to September 2025, return of former residents of the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI – previously more commonly referred to as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region or IKR) was to the KRI; all other Iraqis were returned to Baghdad. A new agreement dated 19 August 2025 would permit return of former residents originating from the Disputed Territories to either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports in the KRI, but this route had not yet been utilised as at September 2025. The Respondent must specify the location of return.
8. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport, or a laissez-passer. No Iraqi national will be returnable to Iraq if not in possession of one of these documents.
9. In the light of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in HJ (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1726, an international protection claim made by an Iraqi national cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a laissez-passer, if the Tribunal finds that the person’s return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.
10. Where P is returned to Iraq on a laissez-passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport.
C. IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
Replacement of Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) by the Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (INID)
11. The CSID is no longer issued in Iraq (or elsewhere) and has been replaced with a biometric INID. A CSID is no longer valid in Iraq; however, it will continue to have some limited utility in (i) establishing a person’s identity, alone or in combination with other documents; and (ii) an application for an INID. The utility of a CSID has diminished in recent years as the roll-out of the INID has gathered pace and will continue to diminish further as that process is completed.
Necessity of an INID
12. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
INID application requirements
13. Applications for an INID can be made (i) with all of the required standard documents; (ii) with alternatives to the standard documents; and (iii) using processes to obtain the required standard documents or information.
14. The standard documents required for an INID application: An application for an INID must include bio-data for the applicant (an iris scan, photograph and fingerprints) which must be taken in person. The standard documents required for an INID application are a CSID (or existing INID for a renewal application), an Iraqi Nationality Card (INC) and a residence card. An Iraqi passport is optional.
15. Alternatives to the standard documents required for an INID application: The absence of one or more of the required identity documents is not fatal to an application for an INID. In particular, (a) if the applicant’s INC is not available, the INC of a male relative could be used instead, and (b) a residence card may not be available or needed at all for those who are not or have not been resident in Iraq at the time of application.
16. Ways to obtain the standard required documents for an INID application: A person may be able to obtain the required documents or information, including:
(i) obtaining such documents left in Iraq from family members or other contacts there;
(ii) obtaining a Surat Qaid from their local Civil Status Affairs (CSA) office in Iraq;
(iii) using copies of a previous ID document and/or documents of a close male relative to identify the relevant family register page of the Family Book;
(iv) making an application to the Court in Iraq for registration, which requires knowledge of the family register page of the Family Book and two witnesses who know the applicant.
Use of other identity documents and information
17. Family Book details: Given the importance of the information in the Family Book, some Iraqi citizens are likely to recall it. Others are not. Whether an individual is likely to recall that information is a question of fact, to be considered against the factual matrix of the individual case and taking into account the background evidence. The Family Book details may also be obtained from family members on the father’s side (because the registration system is patrilineal). A CSID and/or an INID of a male relative will contain family registration details which link to other relatives and it is now very likely that any male relatives in Iraq will have an INID card.
18. 1957 Registration Document: The 1957 Registration Document has been in use in Iraq for many years. It contains a copy of the details found in the Family Books. It is available in either an individual or family version, containing respectively the details of the requesting individual or the family record as a whole. Where an otherwise undocumented asylum seeker is in contact with their family in Iraq, they may be able to obtain the family version of the 1957 Registration Document via those family members. An otherwise undocumented asylum seeker who cannot call on the assistance of family in Iraq is unlikely to be able to obtain the individual version of the 1957 Registration Document by the use of a proxy.
19. The 1957 Registration Document is not a recognised identity document for the purposes of air or land travel within Iraq. Given the information recorded on the 1957 Registration Document, the fact that an individual is likely to be able to obtain one is potentially relevant to that individual’s ability to obtain an INID, CSID or a passport. Whether possession of a 1957 Registration Document is likely to be of any assistance in that regard is to be considered in light of the remaining facts of the case, including their place of registration. The likelihood of an individual obtaining a 1957 Registration Document prior to their return to Iraq is not, without more, a basis for finding that the return of an otherwise undocumented individual would not be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
20. Electronic Personal Registry Record: The evidence in respect of the Electronic Personal Registry Record (or Electronic Registration Document) remains unclear. It is not clear how that document is applied for or how the data it contains is gathered or provided. The existence of this document and the records upon which it is based is not a material consideration in the evaluation of an Iraqi protection claim, nor is it of any identified relevance to an application for an INID.
Where an INID application can be made
21A. Applications for an INID in Iraq: Once in Iraq, it remains the case that a person is expected to attend their local CSA office in person in order to obtain an INID. All CSA offices have now re-opened. There is insufficient evidence as yet to establish that applications could be made in other registration centres outside a person’s home area.
21B. Although procedures exist for a person to establish their identity within Iraq through the Courts there, it is unlikely that a person will be able to do this within a reasonable period on return to Iraq with no family or other support.
21C. An individual returnee to Baghdad who is not from there is not likely to be able to obtain a replacement document in Baghdad, and certainly not within a reasonable time. Neither the Central Archive nor the assistance facilities for IDPs are likely to render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee.
21D. Applications for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London: The general process and standard requirements for an application for an INID are essentially the same as if an application were made at a CSA office in Iraq, save that a person will only need proof of address in the United Kingdom rather than an Iraqi residence card. The Iraqi Embassy in London has the facilities to obtain an applicant’s bio-data. Where a person is completely undocumented, is unable to remember his Family Book details and does not have the assistance of any male relatives in Iraq; they are unlikely to be able to make a successful application for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London.
Identity document requirements for arrival in the KRI and internal travel in the KRI and Disputed Territories
22A. Where a person is returned to Iraq on a laissez-passer, they may request and keep a copy of the same after arrival, which will show their recent arrival from the United Kingdom. Procedures are in place at both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports for those who return to the KRI without a CSID or INID and such persons will not be prevented from leaving either airport for this reason. Prior to departure, a person will be given an authorisation letter setting out their name and contact details of the issuing authority, valid for five days, within which a person is expected to return to their home area to start the redocumentation process.
22B. A person may be able to travel from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports in the KRI to their home area in the KRI or Disputed Territories without needing to pass through any checkpoints other than the ones at the perimeter of the airports, at which there is no real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The burden is on an individual to establish that they would need to pass through any further checkpoints for the purposes of establishing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. A fact sensitive assessment of an available route to an individual’s home area may be required.
22C. If a person does have to pass through any further checkpoint, this may require a check on their identity and assessment of whether they present a security risk, e.g. because their name is on a security list available at the checkpoint. However, it is not established that every person is stopped at every checkpoint. If they are, the checks undertaken range from an informal conversation to the requirement to present formal identity document(s).
22D. If a person has an INID, that would normally be sufficient for an individual to pass a checkpoint, absent identification of that person on a security list. If a person does not have an INID, they will need to establish their identity by other means or otherwise establish that they do not present a security risk. Alone, neither a valid Iraqi passport nor a laissez-passer, nor a 1957 Registration Document is likely to be sufficient to establish a person’s identity as these are not universally recognised by the variety of actors who control checkpoints in the same way that an INID is.
22E. There is no standard or consistent practice at checkpoints, however, the following documents are likely to assist an individual in establishing their identity so as to reduce or avoid a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, particularly in combination if more than one is available:
- An Iraqi driving licence
- A CSID, even if expired (for a further limited period of time)
- A CSID with a cut corner together with confirmation of an application for an INID
- Within the KRI only, an authorisation letter from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airport containing the individual’s personal details with a request to facilitate them.
22F. In addition, a combination of these or other documents, or copies of the same, and/or attendance by someone who can vouch for a person (a family member, local Mukhtar or high-ranking official); is also likely to be sufficient. Overall, the greater the number of identity documents or copies available to a person and greater the influence of a person attending, the less the risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 at a checkpoint.
22G. A person with either a document from the airport at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah; some form of identification and/or assistance from a family member, local Mukhtar or ranking official is likely to be able to pass through a checkpoint without risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 if they (i) return to Erbil and travel to their home area within the same governorate or to Dohuk governorate (under the same political control); or (ii) return to Sulaymaniyah and travel to their home area within that same governorate. It is expected that a person will be returned to the airport closest to their home area, so for those originating from the Sulaymaniyah governorate, it will be to Sulaymaniyah airport and for those originating from the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil, it will be to Erbil airport.
22H. The position is different for travel from an airport in the KRI to the Disputed Territories. Many of the checkpoints in Federal Iraq are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or INID to pass.
D. INTERNAL RELOCATION WITHIN GOI-CONTROLLED IRAQ
23. Where internal relocation is raised in the Iraqi context, it is necessary to consider not only the safety and reasonableness of relocation but also the feasibility of that course, in light of sponsorship and residency requirements in operation in various parts of the country. Individuals who seek to relocate within the country may not be admitted to a potential safe haven or may not be permitted to remain there.
24. Relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas. With the exception of the small area identified in section A, the general conditions within the Formerly Contested Areas do not engage Article 15 QD(b) or (c) or Article 3 ECHR and relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas may obviate a risk which exists in an individual’s home area. Where relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas is under contemplation, however, the ethnic and political composition of the home area and the place of relocation will be particularly relevant. In particular, an individual who lived in a former ISIL stronghold for some time may fall under suspicion in a place of relocation. Tribal and ethnic differences may preclude such relocation, given the significant presence and control of largely Shia militia in these areas. Even where it is safe for an individual to relocate within the Formerly Contested Areas, however, it is unlikely to be either feasible or reasonable without a prior connection to, and a support structure within, the area in question.
25. Relocation to Baghdad. Baghdad is generally safe for ordinary civilians but whether it is safe for a particular returnee is a question of fact in the individual case. There are no on-entry sponsorship requirements for Baghdad but there are sponsorship requirements for residency. A documented individual of working age is likely to be able to satisfy those requirements. Relocation to Baghdad is likely to be reasonable for Arab Shia and Sunni single, able-bodied men and married couples of working age without children and without specific vulnerabilities. Other individuals are likely to require external support, ie a support network of members of his or her family, extended family or tribe, who are willing and able to provide genuine support. Whether such a support network is available is to be considered with reference to the collectivist nature of Iraqi society, as considered in AAH (Iraqi Kurds – internal relocation) CG [2018] UKUT 212.
E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION
26. There are regular direct flights from the UK to the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR – now more commonly referred to as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or the KRI) and returns might be to Baghdad or to that region. It is for the respondent to state whether she intends to remove to Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
Kurds
27. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID), the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
28. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID, an INID or a valid passport. If P has one of those documents, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by air is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
29. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.
30. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
32. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.
33. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
34. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.
Non-Kurdish Returnees
35. The ability of non-Kurdish returnees to relocate to the IKR is to be distinguished. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, although single Arab and Turkmen citizens require regular employment in order to secure residency. Arabs from former conflict areas and Turkmen from Tal Afar are subject to sponsorship requirements to enter or reside in Dohuk. Although Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are accessible for such individuals, particular care must be taken in evaluating whether internal relocation to the IKR for a non-Kurd would be reasonable. Given the economic and humanitarian conditions in the IKR at present, an Arab with no viable support network in the IKR is likely to experience unduly harsh conditions upon relocation there.

DECISION AND REASONS

SECTION A - INTRODUCTION
1 – 6 Introduction
7 – 14 The individual Appellants
15 – 19 Current Country Guidance
20 Scope of the appeals

SECTION B – BACKGROUND MATERIAL & EVIDENCE
21 – 22 Introduction
23 - 30 General comments – background country evidence
31 - 39 General comments – Ms Peronius’ evidence
40 - 56 General comments – Dr Fatah’s evidence
57 (i) Returns to the KRI
58 - 63 Who can be returned to the KRI?
64 - 66 What documents are required for return to the KRI?
67 - 82 Procedures on arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports
83 - 84 (ii) Internal travel within the KRI and to the Disputed Territories
85 - 90 Journeys from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to the KRI and Disputed Territories: checkpoints
91 - 98 Who operates the checkpoints and how?
99 - 108 What is required to pass through a checkpoint
109 – 122 Risks at a checkpoint
123 (iii) Issue and use of Iraqi identity documentation (CSID and INID)
124 – 127 Current status of the CSID card
128 – 133 Roll-out of the INID card generally
134 – 139 Application process for an INID card
140 – 147 Application process for an INID card without all of the required documentation
148 – 163 INID applications at the Iraqi Embassy in London

SECTION C - SUBMISSIONS
164 – 167 Submissions for the Secretary of State for the Home Department
168 – 169 Submissions for the appellants

SECTION D – LEGAL FRAMEWORK
170 – 173 Departure from extant Country Guidance

SECTION E – ANALYSIS – RETURNS TO THE KRI
174 Introduction
175 – 180 Who can be returned to the KRI?
181 What documents are required for return to the KRI?
182 – 200 Procedures on arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports

SECTION F – ANALYSIS – INTERNAL TRAVEL WITHIN THE KRI AND DISPUTED TERRITORIES
201 Introduction
202 – 245 Is there a real risk of treatment in contravention of Article 3 at a checkpoint?
246 – 256 Internal travel from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to destinations within the KRI
257 – 268 Internal travel from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to destinations in the Disputed Territories

SECTION G – ANALYSIS – IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
269 Introduction
270 Current status of the CSID card & roll-out of the INID card
271 - 291 Application process for an INID card
292 – 309 INID applications at the Iraqi Embassy in London

SECTION H – COUNTRY GUIDANCE
310 Introduction
311 Amended Country Guidance

SECTION I – THE INDIVIDUAL APPEALS
312 Introduction
313 – 332 AK
333 – 374 AH
375 – 390 AJ

ANNEXES
Annex A Disputed Territories map
Annex B AA (Iraq) CG [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC) guidance, as amended on appeal – [2017] EWCA Civ 944 - and supplemented in AAH (Iraq) CG [2018] UKUT 212 (IAC)
Annex C English translations of authorisation letters
Annex D Extract from EUAA Country Guidance Iraq: Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024
Annex E List of sources

Glossary

Authorisation letter Document given to returnees at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports authorising their onward travel for a specified period (English translation of examples at Annex C)
CPIN Home Office Country Information and Policy Note
CSA Civil Status Affairs
CSID Civil Status Identity Document
Disputed Territories Land to which the Government of Iraq and the KRI both lay claim (map at Annex A)
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
Family Book The official record of a person’s entry in the Iraqi civil registry held by CSA offices, containing a family register page for persons within the locality of that particular CSA office.
FAS Failed asylum seeker
FNO Foreign national offender
Formerly Contested Areas Those areas previously under ISIL control (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din)
IKR Iraqi Kurdistan Region (now more commonly referred to as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or KRI)
INC Iraqi Nationality Card
INID Iraqi Nationality Identity Document
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
Mukhtar Local official
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq (previously more commonly referred to as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region or IKR)
PMF/PMU Popular Mobilisation Forces/Popular Mobilisation Units (Iraqi state-sponsored armed groups and militias under the command of the Iraqi Prime Minister).
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Surat Qaid An approved copy of the family register page from the Family Book. (Also spelt Surat Qayd).
SMO1 SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 00400 (IAC)
SMO2 SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC)

SECTION A - INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellants are three Iraqi malesii who are all from the Disputed Territoriesiii in Iraq and whom the Respondent is seeking to return to Iraq via the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyahiv in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (the “KRI”). The availability of and need for Iraqi identity documentation is the primary issue for all Appellants.
2. In directions issued on 29 November 2024, the appeals in UI-2021-001948, AK and UI-2021-001982, AH were consolidated to be heard together and designated as country guidance appeals in the Upper Tribunal. In directions issued on 7 January 2025, appeal UI-2024-004075, AJ, was joined with the two existing appeals and also designated as a country guidance appeal.
3. These appeals were selected for revisiting the country guidance given primarily in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) (“SMO2”) in relation to identity documentation (both for and after return) and the risk of breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) without such identity documentation; with a focus on the returns route to the KRI airports of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and onward travel within the KRI and to the disputed territories, rather than the returns route from Baghdad which was considered in previous country guidance.
4. The precise terminology used in relation to Iraq (in particular to geographical areas and groups operating there) has changed over time, such that there are differences in what was more commonly in use at the time of SMO2 and that more commonly in use now; and in the terms used in different sources. This decision necessarily reflects those differences when quoting from various sources (using the terminology they have used), including SMO2 but where we have considered particular matters, we have adopted the current common usage.
5. We highlight two usages of terminology in particular in this decision. First, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) are one and the same place geographically, it was previously more commonly referred to as the IKR which is the term used in SMO2, however the KRI is now the more common usage and term used in this decision. Secondly, the terms Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are used somewhat interchangeably by different sources but our understanding is that both commonly refer to the same broad ideology and groups and we see no substantive distinction between them for the purposes of this appeal. We refer to ISIL throughout this decision (as was the case in SMO2) and refer only to ISIS where that term is used in the sources referred to.
6. This is the decision of the Upper Tribunal panel, to which all Judges have contributed.
The individual Appellants
7. The First Appellant, AK, is a male citizen of Iraq, he is a Sunni Kurd. He was born in 1986 in Rowalehv, belonging to Baqrit, Mosul (within the Disputed Territories) and his local Civil Status Affairs (“CSA”) office is Makhmour, in Mosul. AK claims to have left Iraq in June 2018 and arrived in the United Kingdom on 29 June 2018, following which he claimed asylum. The Respondent refused his claim on 24 January 2019 and his appeal against that refusal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 24 June 2019. That decision included a finding that AK’s CSID card had been destroyed in 2014 and that he would be required to obtain a new one, which he could do with the assistance of a male relative, including by obtaining information as to the volume and page number of his Family Book entry from his father (which the Appellant would likely have forgotten himself).
8. AK made further submissions in support of a protection claim on 21 January 2020 raising various grounds, including his lack of identity documentation and inability to obtain a replacement. The Respondent rejected those further submissions on 23 September 2020 and AK’s further appeal against that decision was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 29 April 2021.
9. In a decision promulgated by the Upper Tribunal on 12 September 2023, an error of law was found on the sole issue of whether AK could obtain a replacement CSID card with his father’s assistance. The decision was set aside only to the extent of the finding that AK’s father had obtained a new CSID since his was likely to have also been destroyed in 2014 (at the same time AK’s documents were destroyed by ISISvi) and as such could use this to obtain a new CSID card for AK. The remainder of the findings, including adverse credibility findings as to the core of AK’s claim and that he had not lost contact with his father were all preserved.
10. The Second Appellant, AH, is a male citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, born in 1973. His home area is Baqrid, near Makmur in Mosul province, part of the Disputed Territories. AH has a wife and four children (three of whom are now adults, born in 2000, 2001 and 2005; and one is a child aged 15 years) with whom he arrived and continues to live with in the United Kingdom. Whilst they appeared to be listed as dependents on AH’s claim originally, the Respondent’s decision and subsequent appeal is in respect of AH alone. AH’s wife and children are also all Iraqi nationals of Kurdish ethnicity from the same area. The family speak Kurdish Sorani; AH also speaks Arabic and other family members speak English. AH and his family arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 August 2017 and claimed asylum the same day, having left Iraq on 7 August 2014 for Turkey (where the family lived for two to three years) and from where they travelled through a number of European countries before arriving in the United Kingdom.
11. The Respondent refused AH’s protection and human rights claim on 16 November 2020 and the appeal against that refusal was dismissed on 14 September 2021. In a decision promulgated on 28 August 2024, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, setting it aside with preserved findings of fact, primarily that AH’s account of past events in Iraq was not credible and that he has family in Iraq, albeit they can not access AH’s CSID card. The sole issue remaining to be determined in relation to AH was in relation to documentation on return to Iraq. In relation to AH’s human rights appeal, the findings in relation to Article 8 of the ECHR would stand as found by the First-tier Tribunal as to the family circumstances as at 14 September 2021. The Appellant was at liberty to rely on further updating evidence as to any material change in his family circumstances since that date.
12. By the time of the hearing before us, there were material changes in AH’s personal circumstances, namely that he had suffered from a stroke in late 2024, leading to a deterioration in his health. AH now relies on this in a number of different ways. First, as a new matter, with the consent of the Respondent, that he is at risk on return to Iraq as a disabled person (a member of a particular social group) and/or that he and his family are at risk on return on the basis that his wife would now be a female head of household due to his disability. Secondly, as a new matter, also with the consent of the Respondent, that AH’s removal would be a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR because this would lead to a real risk that AH would be exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in his life expectancy, contrary to AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17. Finally, the medical evidence in relation to AH forms part of a broader update as to his family circumstances since September 2021 and their ability to reintegrate in Iraq for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR.
13. The Third Appellant, AJ, is a male citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, born in 2000. He speaks Kurdish Sorani. His home area is Kirkuk city. AJ claims to have left Iraq on 15 February 2019, travelling through Turkey and other countries before arriving in the United Kingdom on an unknown date; following which he claimed asylum on 9 March 2019. On 22 December 2021, the Respondent refused AJ’s asylum and human rights claim and his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was dismissed on 8 May 2024. AJ’s claim was not found to be credible and overall, it was found that AJ would not be at risk on return. In any event the authorities in the KRI would not be unable or unwilling to provide AJ with protection on return. AJ’s human rights claims were also dismissed, including on the basis that there would be no disproportionate interference with respect for his private life on return to Iraq contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR.
14. In a decision promulgated on 3 December 2024, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on one point only in relation to redocumentation and set aside that decision with all other findings preserved. The sole issue outstanding to redetermine is whether AJ is able to obtain an Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (“INID”) (or Civil Status Identity Document, “CSID”) without first encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.
Current Country guidance
15. There has been relatively frequent country guidance given in relation to Iraq, including specifically on issues of internal relocation and identity documentation. A fuller history is given in the cases of SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) (“SMO1”) and SMO2 and need not be repeated here. In this decision, we focus on the latter of those two decisions which replaced and/or incorporated earlier country guidance, including that given in AAH (Iraqi Kurds – internal relocation) Iraq CG [2018] UKUT 212 (IAC) and in SMO1.
16. The latest country guidance is contained in SMO2 promulgated on 16 March 2022. So far as is relevant to the present appeals, it provides as follows:
B. DOCUMENTATION AND FEASIBILITY OF RETURN (EXCLUDING IKR)
7. Return of former residents of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) will be to the IKR and all other Iraqis will be to Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport relating to P, or a Laissez Passer.
8. No Iraqi national will be returnable to Baghdad if not in possession of one of these documents.
9. In the light of the Court of Appeal's judgment in HF (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a Laissez passer, if the Tribunal finds that P's return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.
10. Where P is returned to Iraq on a Laissez Passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport.
C. CIVIL STATUS IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
11. The CSID is being replaced with a new biometric Iraqi National Identity Card – the INID. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have one of these two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Many of the checkpoints in the country are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass.
12. In order to obtain an INID, an individual must personally attend the Civil Status Affairs (“CSA”) office at which they are registered to enrol their biometrics, including fingerprints and iris scans. The CSA offices in which INID terminals have been installed are unlikely – as a result of the phased replacement of the CSID system – to issue a CSID, whether to an individual in person or to a proxy. The reducing number of CSA offices in which INID terminals have not been installed will continue to issue CSIDs to individuals and their proxies upon production of the necessary information.
13. Notwithstanding the phased transition to the INID within Iraq, replacement CSIDs remain available through Iraqi Consular facilities but only for those Iraqi nationals who are registered at a CSA office which has not transferred to the digital INID system. Where an appellant is able to provide the Secretary of State with the details of the specific CSA office at which he is registered, the Secretary of State is prepared to make enquiries with the Iraqi authorities in order to ascertain whether the CSA office in question has transferred to the INID system.
14. Whether an individual will be able to obtain a replacement CSID whilst in the UK also depends on the documents available and, critically, the availability of the volume and page reference of the entry in the Family Book in Iraq, which system continues to underpin the Civil Status Identity process. Given the importance of that information, some Iraqi citizens are likely to recall it. Others are not. Whether an individual is likely to recall that information is a question of fact, to be considered against the factual matrix of the individual case and taking account of the background evidence. The Family Book details may also be obtained from family members, although it is necessary to consider whether such relatives are on the father’s or the mother’s side because the registration system is patrilineal.
15. Once in Iraq, it remains the case that an individual is expected to attend their local CSA office in order to obtain a replacement document. All CSA offices have now re-opened, although the extent to which records have been destroyed by the conflict with ISIL is unclear, and is likely to vary significantly depending on the extent and intensity of the conflict in the area in question.
16. An individual returnee who is not from Baghdad is not likely to be able to obtain a replacement document there, and certainly not within a reasonable time. Neither the Central Archive nor the assistance facilities for IDPs are likely to render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee.
17. A valid Iraqi passport is not recognised as acceptable proof of identity for internal travel by land.
18. Laissez Passers are confiscated on arrival and will not, for that reason, assist a returnee who seeks to travel from Baghdad to the IKR by air without a passport, INID or CSID. The Laissez Passer is not a recognised identity document for the purpose of internal travel by land.
19. There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence or utility of the ‘certification letter’ or ‘supporting letter’ which is said to be issued to undocumented returnees by the authorities at Baghdad International Airport.
20. The 1957 Registration Document has been in use in Iraq for many years. It contains a copy of the details found in the Family Books. It is available in either an individual or family version, containing respectively the details of the requesting individual or the family record as a whole. Where an otherwise undocumented asylum seeker is in contact with their family in Iraq, they may be able to obtain the family version of the 1957 Registration Document via those family members. An otherwise undocumented asylum seeker who cannot call on the assistance of family in Iraq is unlikely to be able to obtain the individual version of the 1957 Registration Document by the use of a proxy.
21. The 1957 Registration Document is not a recognised identity document for the purposes of air or land travel within Iraq. Given the information recorded on the 1957 Registration Document, the fact that an individual is likely to be able to obtain one is potentially relevant to that individual’s ability to obtain an INID, CSID or a passport. Whether possession of a 1957 Registration Document is likely to be of any assistance in that regard is to be considered in light of the remaining facts of the case, including their place of registration. The likelihood of an individual obtaining a 1957 Registration Document prior to their return to Iraq is not, without more, a basis for finding that the return of an otherwise undocumented individual would not be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
22. The evidence in respect of the Electronic Personal Registry Record (or Electronic Registration Document) is presently unclear. It is not clear how that document is applied for or how the data it contains is gathered or provided. On the state of the evidence as it presently stands, the existence of this document and the records upon which it is based is not a material consideration in the evaluation of an Iraqi protection claim.
…
E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION
26. There are regular direct flights from the UK to the Iraqi Kurdish Region and returns might be to Baghdad or to that region. It is for the respondent to state whether she intends to remove to Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
Kurds
27. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID), the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
28. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID, an INID or a valid passport. If P has one of those documents, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by air is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
29. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.
30. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
32. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.
33. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
34. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.
17. At the time that the present appeals were designated as country guidance cases, the Respondent’s position was that there had been three specific changes in country conditions since the decision in SMO2; specifically that (1) the Respondent has been able to remove ethnic Kurds from the KRI directly to the KRI via Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports and other ethnic Kurds voluntarily to the same airportsvii; (2) that the INID roll-out was completed in 2023 and CSIDs were no longer being issued; and (3) that in October 2024 the Iraq Embassy in London began issuing INIDs on application to the Embassy on a trial basis.
18. The Respondent’s position was that a departure from the previous country guidance in SMO2 was now appropriate in relation to the return of undocumented ethnic Kurds to the KRI (via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports) from where they can return to their home areas; including ethnic Kurds previously resident in the KRI and those from the Disputed Territories. The passages set out above from SMO2 are included for completeness for the wider context to these appeals. However, the Respondent is not inviting the Upper Tribunal to amend the country guidance in all of these sections.
19. Broadly, the Appellants’ position has consistently remained that there is insufficient evidence of durable change to justify departure from the current country guidance as proposed by the Respondent or otherwise. We note that the Appellants have also not sought to suggest that on any wider issue the situation for returnees is other than as set out in current country guidance.
Scope of the appeals
20. Prior to the hearing, the parties agreed the following broad areas for consideration in these country guidance cases as:
(i) The ability of Iraqi nationals who are ethnic Kurds to return directly to the KRI, via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports and whose previous residence was in the KRI or the Disputed Territories, (those areas of Federal Iraq bordering the KRI). The requirements of documentation or redocumentation upon or shortly after return and on overland journeys to the home areas within the KRI and in the Disputed Territories.
(ii) Further/progress and/or completion of the roll-out by the Iraqi authorities of the biometric INID as a replacement for the non-biometric CSID and cessation of the production and issuing of CSIDS.
(iii) The evidence of the commencement, in October 2024, by the Iraqi Embassy in London, on a trial basis, of issuing INIDs on application to the Embassy.
(iv) The reasonableness of internal relocation to, and within, the KRI, by ethnic Kurds who do not originate from the KRI. The requirements for such relocation to the KRI.
(v) Whether male relatives or tribal/village leaders can accompany and vouch for undocumented returnees at security checkpoints.
(vi) The extent to which, since 1 March 2024, CSIDs continue to be accepted as valid documentation in Iraq.

SECTION B – BACKGROUND MATERIAL & EVIDENCE
21. On the main country guidance issues in these appeals, the evidence consisted primarily of background country information; written and oral evidence from Ms Mairead Peronius (for the Respondent); and written and oral evidence from Dr Rebwah Fatah, country expert. In what follows, we deal with the evidence in that order simply as a matter of convenient structure and not as any indication of the relative weight or importance of the evidence. We set out below in summary the evidence before us in three main themes; (i) returns to the KRI; (ii) internal travel within the KRI and to the Disputed Territories; (iii) issue and use of Iraqi identity documentation (CSID and INID). The nature of the evidence is such that there is some overlap between the subsections, which is not repeated even if it could also fall within a different subsection. We deal separately with the specific evidence in relation to the discrete issues relating to AH’s health at the end of this decision when considering the individual appeals as these discrete issues do not form part of the wider country guidance.
22. Before turning to the specific evidence before us in each of these areas, we make some general comments on the sources of evidence available, their background and general information; as well as any issues which affect the weight to be given to parts of the evidence. These are set out broadly and we return below to specific examples where needed when evaluating specific parts of the evidence.
General comments – background country evidence
23. In relation to the background country evidence, we note that the majority of this is contained within the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Notes (“CPIN”) and/or Country of Origin Reports (“COI Report”) and in comparison with earlier Iraqi country guidance cases, with one or two exceptions, there is little up to date background country evidence available from other external sources. We note however that other sources are quoted throughout the CPINs and COI Reports.
24. Shortly after the conclusion of the oral hearing in these appeals, on 26 September 2025, the Respondent published a new version 15 of the Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (“Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025”). At first sight, the contents of which were in at least two respects, at odds with the Respondent’s evidence and submissions before us in these appeals; such that directions were issued to the parties for the Respondent to clarify her position and for the Appellants to respond if so advised.
25. In the Respondent’s written submissions dated 24 October 2025, it was said that the above CPIN was amended on a “non-routine” and “urgent” basis to correct the position in relation to returns to the KRI for ethnic Kurds, as was done before us on 15 September 2025 (see paragraph 17 above and end note vii) in two places within the document. No other parts of the CPIN were amended from the version published in October 2023 on the basis that to do so may pre-empt any new country guidance resulting from these appeals. The Respondent intends to update the CPIN in full following promulgation of this decision.
26. The first difference between the Respondent’s published position and that submitted to us was in relation to paragraphs 3.6.6 and 3.6.7; wherein the current CPIN states that a person returning to Iraq without a CSID or INID (and cannot obtain one via a family member) and who would be required to travel internally to a CSA office to obtain one would be at risk of encountering treatment contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the ECHRviii. The Respondent’s case before us (set out in more detail below) is that travel from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports to a CSA office in the KRI or Disputed Territories would not breach Article 3 of the ECHR. The Respondent’s position is that there is no inconsistency as such, because read in context, these paragraphs simply reflect the country guidance in SMO2, set out at the beginning of this section of the CPIN and in any event, relate specifically to travel between Baghdad and the KRI.
27. The second difference between the Respondent’s published position and that submitted to us was in relation to paragraph 3.7.9, concerning the issue of INID cards outside of Iraq. This paragraph begins “At the time of publication, INIDs cannot be obtained while a person is in the UK”. The Respondent’s position is simply that there has been no amendment from the previous version pending the decision in these appeals. The difficulty in relation to this is the express statement of the position at date of publication, which is now September 2025 and by which time the Respondent submits the position has changed significantly.
28. On behalf of AK, written submissions were received on 31 October 2025, which in summary made the following points. First, there was no supporting evidence of this update being urgent or non-routine. Secondly, contrary to the Respondent’s assertion that she did not want to pre-empt this country guidance; CPINs are routinely updated with new evidence if considered to be of such a nature to have a bearing on previous country guidance. In this case, the amendment to reflect the new returns agreement would also pre-empt any new country guidance so it is inconsistent to amend only this part and not others. Thirdly, the reason given for the urgent correction was not clear on the face of the CPIN with only a minor amendment and disclaimer added which failed to explain the position clearly. Fourthly, the point above as to information at date of publication is made. Overall, AK invites us to find that in whole or in part, the reason for maintaining the material position in the CPIN is due to the Respondent not having sufficient confidence in the evidence relied upon in these appeals to establish material changes to the country guidance.
29. Overall, we consider the publication of a new CPIN, without notice or explanation to the Upper Tribunal or the Appellants so shortly after the oral hearing concluded, and seemingly without careful consideration of the unamended wording on the two issues identified as against the evidence and submissions in these appeals, to be unhelpful. It had the clear potential both to cause confusion and to undermine the Respondent’s position before us, including on evidence which was not, at a basic level, controversial or disputed (i.e. that INIDs were being issued from the Iraqi Embassy in London to at least some Iraqi nationals here).
30. However, we understand the Respondent’s need to update the part of the CPIN which was accepted to be factually inaccurate and the need for that to be corrected relatively urgently. We also understand the intention not to pre-empt the outcome of these appeals with wider amendments. It is unfortunate that the intention to do so or anticipated publication so shortly after the hearing was not identified to the Upper Tribunal in advance or at the time. Whilst we consider that the Respondent’s aims could have been achieved in a way which did not create an obvious tension with her position in these appeals; we do not find that this in fact undermines the evidence before us which we have considered in full in any event. There is no basis upon which we could find, as suggested by AK, that there was any lack of confidence by the Respondent in her position as the reason why wider amendments were not made, it seems to us more likely that there was just a lack of care or consideration as to the impact of not making clear or consequential amendments in a new version. As per the Respondent’s submissions, we would expect a further revision to the Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 following this decision in any event, in which all relevant matters can be clarified and updated properly.
General comments – Ms Peronius’ evidence
31. Ms Peronius, a Senior Executive Officer and Country Manager, Middle East team 3, in Returns Logistic Operations in the Home Office gave five written statements relied upon in these appeals. The first written statement is contained within Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025ix. The remaining five statements prepared specifically for these appeals were dated 28 January 2025; 1 April 2025; 30 June 2025; 29 August 2025 and 15 September 2025.
32. Ms Peronius’s role for the Respondent is to facilitate the provision of travel documentation through diplomatic engagement with the country of nationality where a person has failed to provide the normal travel and identity documentation. As part of her team (of four people), she is involved with shaping and co-ordinating country focused returns strategies for various countries; which involves working relationships with Embassies and High Commissions in the UK, including the Iraqi Embassy in London. Ms Peronius has worked within returns logistics for six years, the first three in relation to Africa and the last three in relation to the Middle East. The role involves liaising with the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office and engaging with Embassies to agree processes for nationals of those countries to be returned. The contact with Embassies and other authorities was originally regularly with online communication but is now more ad hoc. Ms Peronius generally described having strong relationships and trustworthy sources within the Embassies and as such had no reason to doubt information that had been provided to her by those officials. Given the close working relationship with officials and the need to build and maintain the same, Ms Peronius acknowledged that it was sometimes difficult to ask further questions or request specific evidence from other officials. However, some example documents have been provided on request.
33. Ms Peronius attended the hearing and gave oral evidence.
34. In relation to Ms Peronius’ evidence, whilst we generally found her evidence to be truthful, we have a number of broad concerns with the nature and content of the evidence given which affects the weight to be attached to it. These concerns are not necessarily any personal criticism of Ms Peronius who we accept gave evidence, particularly her oral evidence, to the best of her knowledge and belief; but are more concerns as to the lack of further inquiry both of her sources and the Respondent’s own records and the way in which her evidence had been sought and presented.
35. First, we were concerned by the late correction and clarification only on the first day of the hearing as to the statements both in earlier written evidence and the Respondent’s published position that in fact, no returns of any persons originating from the Disputed Territories had been made to the KRI; albeit the late evidence was that that was about to change following a new agreement from August 2025. There was a lack of explanation as to how or why the position had been misrepresented over an extended period of time and specifically as to the Respondent’s position for these country guidance appeals which changed, at least in part, as a result.
36. Secondly, the approach in the written statements as to information from Iraqi officials was to summarise this from another source rather than to exhibit the original communication. Whilst we appreciate that there are diplomatic considerations which hinder or even prevent Iraqi officials from giving direct written and oral evidence themselves; we see no reason why the information provided, including that which we were told was an ‘agreed form of words to use’ could not have been submitted to the Upper Tribunal as the original document rather than being paraphrased by Ms Peronius.
37. Thirdly, there were specific inconsistencies on the face of the written statements by Ms Peronius (which we return to below) which were not addressed until specifically raised with her in cross-examination and upon which the evidence seemed to us to be, at best, incomplete.
38. Fourthly, there was a lack of detail in much of the evidence in the written statements in particular and a lack of specific examples of individuals who had used the processes described or had been returned to the KRI. The explanation given in oral evidence for at least some of the gaps was that Ms Peronius had not been asked to include additional information, even if it related to something within records accessible to her. Whilst not all questions in cross-examination could have been expected and prepared for, there were at least some obvious areas where more detailed information would be relevant and of assistance to the Upper Tribunal in a country guidance case to include.
39. Finally, Mr de Mello appeared to submit that less weight should be attached to Ms Peronius’ evidence because in various ways it did not comply with Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008. We find this criticism of Ms Peronius’ evidence without any foundation. The Common EU Guidelines are not directly applicable to witness evidence prepared in the course of country guidance appeals and there is no expectation that the same methodology should be applicable to such evidence given its different nature and context.
General comments – Dr Fatah’s evidence
40. Dr Rebwar Fatah is a Middle East and North Africa specialist who has provided over 3000 expert witness reports since 2000 in relation to a variety of issues for different countries in this region (including over a 1000 on Iraq); including, but not limited to, geopolitical issues, political and judicial systems. Dr Fatah grew up in the region and is a native speaker of Kurdish Sorani, also being familiar with Kurdish and Arabic dialects. In addition, Dr Fatah has provided consultation responses for various country reports and has published over a hundred scientific, technical, commercial and conference papers; as well as contributing to conferences, training events and media all internationally. Dr Fatah has regular contact with partners in Iraq and most recently, he has personally visited the KRI in 2020, 2022 and 2024, as well as Federal Iraq in 2023.
41. Dr Fatah’s main report for these appeals was dated 26 August 2025; to which we received an addendum report on the first morning of the hearings dated 14 September 2025 and a separate commentary on Embassy correspondence regarding returns to Iraq (undated and unsigned). Dr Fatah attended the hearing and gave oral evidence.
42. In relation to Dr Fatah’s evidence, we do not repeat the many statements endorsing his credibility given by the Upper Tribunal over many years in relation to evidence he has given in previous country guidance cases and individual appeals. His expertise is well-established. However, we do have a number of broad concerns about his evidence to us in the course of these specific appeals which are relevant to the weight to be attached to it.
43. First, Dr Fatah acknowledges himself that information he has included in his expert report, particularly that given by individuals, may carry certain limitations. Specifically, he states:
“This information can reflect highly localized practices, personal interpretations, or institutional pressures. In some cases, individuals may knowingly misrepresent procedures, or present information in a way that protects their role or affirms that they are fulfilling their duties appropriately.”
44. Although Dr Fatah expressly recognises this difficulty, together with his lack of personal knowledge of aspects of information he has been given; there appears generally to have been little if any specific follow up or attempt to check or cross-reference such information to test it or its reliability. For example, in places Dr Fatah has simply stated that he does not know whether information given is accurate or not, without more. It may well be that this is practically difficult to do in Iraq, where systems and record keeping are very different to what one may be familiar with and expect in countries such as the United Kingdom, but it does present a difficulty for us as to weight to be attached to this evidence. We also note that the Appellants specifically made similar criticisms of Ms Peronius’ evidence without recognising that similar issues and concerns arise in relation also to Dr Fatah’s evidence from third party sources.
45. Secondly, in a similar way, we are concerned that Dr Fatah remains cautious about certain parts of the evidence before us primarily because he has not had personal experience of a particular matter, nor has he spoken to any individuals that have; as opposed to having any directly contradictory experience, nor any specific contact or research about the point. There is a lack of detail as to whether any efforts were made to find out more about these matters and they are often ones in which it would not necessarily be expected that Dr Fatah would have, in the natural course of things for an expert living outside of Iraq (albeit with relevant experience, time spent there and contacts there) to have come in to contact with such people who may know more. By way of example, there is no self-evident way in which Dr Fatah could or would have been in contact with anyone who had returned to the KRI with a laissez-passer or been given a particular document upon arrival at the airport in the ordinary course of things. We accept that there may also be no way for Dr Fatah to be able to identify such people to investigate further, but that of itself does not appear to be a good reason to doubt whether such things have happened or do happen.
46. Thirdly, on first morning of the hearing, we received an addendum report from Dr Fatah; which in the main contained amendments to his original report. No explanation was given for the amendments or the timing of them and a composite amended report would have been much more helpful to the Upper Tribunal rather than having to read both documents side-by-side to identify the differences – some of which add additional details to the original report, some amend the original text in material ways and some appear to simply be correcting typographical errors. Some of the amendments, for example in relation to the issue of INIDs by the Iraqi Embassy in London, are starkly different to that in the original report prepared only a matter of weeks before. The lack of explanation for such differences raises a question as to what research was done before both the original report and the addendum to result in quite different information and views.
47. Also, on the same morning at the hearing, we received a separate un- headed document from Dr Fatah which included commentary on the correspondence from the Iraqi Embassy regarding returns to Iraq. It is unclear as to why this was produced and why it did not form part of any formal report and it does not include any of the formal statements that are required and would be expected within a formal report.
48. Fourthly, there were a number of inconsistencies in Dr Fatah’s evidence, particularly with evidence given in other forums and cases; but also with different accounts given within the same written report (such as two different accounts as to identification procedures on return to Erbil airport which appear in two different places in the report), or from the main written report to the addendum; or between written and oral evidence. We will return to specific examples as needed below, but give some by way of example here.
49. There was a lack of consistency in Dr Fatah’s evidence about whether he had knowledge or not of particular matters, for example as to whether any documents (the translated versions of which appear at Annex C) were issued at airports in the KRI – at times he said he had no knowledge of these, at times he had heard of them and/or was aware of them but not seen any, at one point that he had seen one previously and then also referred to differing information from officials as to whether such letters existed but without any assessment directly of those sources or conclusion about the letters either way. Although we note his evidence on this and generally we accept that there are no set or consistent procedures, and practice may differ in different locations, much of the inconsistent answers were in relation to Sulaymaniyah airport specifically and were not therefore explained by a different practice in a different location.
50. We note that whilst many of the inconsistencies were relatively minor points of detail and some simply reflected differing information from different sources; some were more fundamental as to whether certain documents or procedures existed at all.
51. Fifthly, whilst we appreciate that Dr Fatah has extensive experience of conditions in Iraq and contacts there from which he can draw information and opinions, there are a number of relatively detailed parts of his written report as to specific procedures (such as at checkpoints in the KRI and at the Iraqi Embassy in London) which do not identify the source of any of the information given. Given Dr Fatah’s own identified limitations set out above; his general comments about the difficulty in there being no unified authority structure or single person/entity that can speak to the general position even within the KRI, and his own statement in oral evidence that he is not an expert in documentation at checkpoints; the lack of identified sources makes it much more difficult to assess the weight to be attached to the evidence as it is not known whether this comes from any official source or which sources or whether it is based on personal experience (or that of contacts who reside locally) or a combination thereof.
52. We make one final observation on the evidence from both Ms Peronius and Dr Fatah in that there was at least one mutual source of information for them both in Dr Hemn Meranyx who is Director General of Diwan within the Ministry of Interior, KRI; but with differing responses to both on a particular point about the new returns agreement from August 2025. Ms Peronius explained in her oral evidence that further to Dr Fatah’s comments on this, she had spoken to Dr Merany earlier that day. He told her that he had not spoken to Dr Fatah directly, but to a student who he had not spoken to before, such that he only gave a generic answer as he was not sure where the information was going to; but clarified that he had not stated that returns under the new agreement would only be to Baghdad and not to the KRI. We would therefore add to the first point above as to Dr Fatah’s identified limitations to evidence from individuals that the information they give may also be tailored depending on the person asking the question, if they knew why the question was asked or where the answer may be shared and depending on whether they had any pre-existing relationship. Again, this creates difficulties in assessing the weight to be given to such evidence.
53. On a separate note, although we have little direct evidence from any Iraqi authorities before us on the specific issues in these appeals, we note the concerns raised about the weight to be attached to such evidence previously in both SMO1 and SMO2, in particular as to some statements being aspirational in nature rather than being evidenced in practice.
54. In light of the issues identified above as general comments as to the evidence before us; we have, so far as possible in this decision, sought to identify areas of broad agreement and consistency between the various sources as matters upon which we are able to place greater weight.
55. We turn now to the summary of the evidence in the themes identified above. In relation to matters which are not in dispute or not within the scope of these country guidance appeals, we note some points for context as basic background information without adding to the length of this decision by citing specific sources for it. There are also a number of points covered in the background evidence which are not in dispute and covered by extant country guidance, such as the need for identity documents in Iraq to participate in public and private life and as to options for internal relocation (including any entrance requirements to the KRI or residence requirements generally) and we do not include them in any detail (if at all) in the summary below.
56. We have also taken into account the detailed information in Dr Fatah’s report as to the political system in Iraq and the history of the KRI and the Disputed Territories in particular, but do not repeat it when dealing with specific themes save where it is necessary for context.
(i) Returns to the KRI
57. In this section we summarise the evidence before us as to the practicalities of a return to the KRI, via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports; in terms of those who can do so; the documentation required (much of which is for context and comparison to other forms of Iraq documentation which may be required after return) and procedures on arrival.
Who can be returned to the KRI?
58. In terms of who can return to the KRI, the evidence before us was consistent that ethnic Kurds who were formally resident in the KRI can and have been returned there via Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports since around 2020. In her written statement contained within the Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025xi, Ms Peronius stated that; “Between 30/09/2020 and 05/10/2022 the Home Office successfully enforced the removal of 8 Iraqi nationals to Erbil and 9 to Sulaymaniah. There were no flights between the UK and Iraq from 17/03/2020 to March 2021 due to the Covid pandemic.” These figures were updated in Ms Peronius’ written statement dated 1 April 2025 that between 6 October 2022 and 31 March 2025, there were 47 enforced removals of Iraqi nationals to Erbil and 5 to Sulaymaniyah; with enforced returnees also removeable to Baghdad airport.
59. Although the Respondent’s previous position was that ethnic Kurds from the Disputed Territories could also be returned to Erbil and Sulaymaniyahxii; that was corrected on the first day of the hearing. As at the date of hearing, there was no evidence of any Iraqis from the Disputed Territories having been returned to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports, at that point, such returns were only to Baghdad. Although in cross-examination, Ms Peronius referred to having organised flights from Baghdad to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah for enforced returns; there are no published statistics on the final destination of Kurds to Iraq (only for the whole of Iraq without differentiation by internal destination).
60. In terms of the actual returns, Ms Peronius did not have the information available for enforced returns in 2023 to identify how many of the enforced removals were compliant, how many were foreign national offenders, how many were overstayers, how many were part of the Facilitated Assistance Scheme; or what documents any of the returnees had. Overall, there have now been 66 returns in total since 6 October 2022, of which sixty-one were to Erbil and 5 were to Sulaymaniyah; and of which 22 were compliant with removal and 39 were foreign national offenders. Ms Peronius did not have information on whether any of those returned had a CSID or INID, but all were returned on a mixture of documents including Iraqi passports and laissez-passers. No numbers were available for individuals given any type of document at the airport on return, but Ms Peronius understood that all those without family meeting them at the airport would be given a document.
61. In her final written statement dated 15 September 2025 and oral evidence, Ms Peronius stated that a new returns agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and the Central Government of Iraq which provides for individuals from the Disputed Territories to be returned to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah (whichever is closest to their home area) following verification of identity by the Iraqi embassy in London and production of a laissez-passer. No further detail of the agreement and no copy of it could be submitted to the Upper Tribunal because of the stated need to preserve international relations.
62. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that returns under the new agreement were now in progress, with the first return under it to Baghdad planned for 21 September 2025 and two individuals from Kirkuk had been verified by the Iraqi Embassy for removal to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah soon. She stated that it was early days for the agreement, but she was confident it would be used as expected. In relation to the agreement itself, Ms Peronius knew about it, but was not involved with the negotiations or it being signed.
63. At the date of hearing, it appears for primarily logistical reasons, no returns of Iraqi nationals can or have been made to the airport at Kirkuk and therefore the only other possible destination for returns outside of the KRI is to Baghdad; as to which the country guidance in SMO2 remains and issues specific to returns to Federal Iraq are outside of the scope of the present appeals.
What documents are required for return to the KRI?
64. An Iraqi national requires either an Iraqi passport or a laissez-passer for international travel to an airport in the KRI. The procedure and requirements for a laissez-passer are set out in the Respondent’s Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025, as follows in section 3.4:
“Obtaining Laissez Passers
3.4.5 Laissez Passers are also known as ‘Pass Doc’, ‘Passport Laissez’ or simply ‘Passport’.
3.4.6 The UT in SMO1 held that a person ‘must simply be able to establish their nationality in order to obtain a Laissez Passer’. (Para 375).
3.4.7 An application for a Laissez Passer is considered on a case-by-case basis by the Iraqi Embassy in London. For the enforced return of a failed asylum seeker (FAS) there is no interview requirement providing they hold at least one of the following (copy or original, valid or expired) [a telephone interview may be requested by the Embassy in certain cases]:
• Passport
• Birth certificate
• Marriage certificate
• Civil Status ID (CSID)
• Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC)
• Iraqi National Identity Card (INID)
• Iraq Citizenship certificate
• Iraq residency card
• Registration Document (1957)
3.4.8 For those without supporting documents, a mandatory embassy interview is required. The embassy verification process tends to take 10-14 days. All categories of voluntary cases will be considered (including those without documents) but will usually require an interview face to face or by phone.
3.4.9 The information obtained from Returns Logistics (see Annex B) further stated that family members in Iraq can present any of the documentation listed in the paragraph above to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iraq in order to help prove the person’s nationality. Additionally, phone numbers or signed affidavits (a written statement of evidence) from family members in Iraq is also useful to the verification process. Once a person’s verification in Iraq is complete it is sent to the Iraqi Embassy in London to issue a laissez-passer, however straightforward verification of documents can be done locally at the Embassy in London. Verification takes between 10-14 days if done locally, however if enquiries are required in-country it could take up to 30+ days.”
65. In response to our questions, Ms Peronius stated that all applications for a laissez-passer are processed by the Iraqi Embassy in London, regardless of where in Iraq the person originated from. The new returns agreement does not affect the laissez-passer issued, it just sets out an improved process and timescales for applying for and obtaining one for a person. In terms of the laissez-passer itself, it is valid for 30 days and if there are delays in its use for any reason (such as further submissions being made or a further decision required), sometimes it can be used again, or a fresh document is applied for.
66. To make the application, an individual is required to supply their bio-data; a photograph and any supporting documents they have. These are then reviewed by the Iraqi Embassy, who may also ask for an interview and the findings are sent back to Baghdad for a decision on whether a person is an Iraqi national. Decisions can be made on this without specific documents to establish a person’s nationality through reference to databases in Iraq, verification of a person’s details and assessment of their language. If a person is accepted as an Iraqi national, a document will be issued. There are many possible reasons why a person may not be accepted, including that they have given false or incomplete information, including about all three of their names and full family details. Interviews can be used to establish further information to resolve such issues. In Ms Peronius’ experience, in the majority of applications a person’s nationality is successfully verified.
Procedures on arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports
67. In this section we focus on those who arrive at an airport in the KRI primarily with a laissez-passer and without other Iraqi identity documentation.
68. In the Inspection Report on Country of Origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma) undertaken by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI), published June 2023 - Dr Fatah stated:
“If a failed asylum seeker is returned to Iraq without an ID document, they will be detained at the airport.
a) The returnee will then be interviewed to give some indication of whether they are from their claimed governate or region (through dialect, accent etc.). From the returnee’s Kurdish or Arabic dialect, the officer will be able to tell whether the returnee is from Iraq or not.
b) At this time, the returnee’s claimed name and address will also be cross referenced against suspect names in possession of the security forces.
c) Next, the returnee will be asked to phone their immediate family to bring their ID.
d) If they claim to have no immediate family, the returnee will be asked to contact a paternal uncle or cousin for their ID.
e) If this is negative too, another relative will come to the airport with their own IDs to act as a guarantor for the returnee. This would allow the returnee a seven-day residency permit pending proof of identity.
f) During this period, the returnee needs to obtain their own ID or provide evidence that they are in the process of obtaining an ID – such as a letter from the nationality department to show that their ID is pending via the usual procedure.
g) If the returnee has no such luck, they must find a local Mukhtar [local chief or village elder] by the seventh day who can provide a letter in exchange for a small fee which states that the person is who they say that they are, that they are from the claimed neighbourhood, and that they are in the process of obtaining an ID.
h) If the Mukhtar cannot identify the returnee, they will need two witnesses to come forward who know them and can provide evidence on their identity.
i) The returnee then needs to apply in writing to the nationality department. Here, they will be interviewed by the chief and the witnesses will ned [sic] to give evidence under oath, stating how they know the returnee.
Once the chief has been convinced, the process of obtaining the ID will start. Once these steps have been completed, the returnee needs to communicate back to the security services at the airport, or their guarantor will face legal consequences.”…
69. The above is in line with information from other countries in the Response to an Information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, 23 January 2025, that various documents can be used to establish a person’s Iraqi nationality for a laissez-passer to be issued; with applications dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
70. In her written statement dated 28 January 2025, Ms Peronius stated that she works regularly with Razaq Al Mashkoor, Counsellor at the Iraqi Embassy on returns matters and details meetings and correspondence with him. The latter involved a form of words that could be used to clarify the position of the Iraqi authorities on the return of Iraqi nationals, including those who were undocumented. This was in the alternative to a written statement given that as a diplomat, Razaq Al Mashkoor would be unable to attend court to give oral evidence or attest to a formal written statement.
71. In relation to undocumented returnees, Razaq al Mashkoor stated that on arrival at the airport, they may retain their laissez-passer on request; something which happens regularly with requests for this from individuals being met. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that once a person is verified as an Iraqi national and a laissez-passer is issued, a covering letter is also attached to the document which states that the individual has been verified by the Iraqi Embassy as an Iraqi national.
72. Ms Peronius referred to forms received from Dr Hemn Merany who is Director General of Diwan within Ministry of Interior, KRI and exhibited the same (English translation reproduced at Annex C). These forms are given to returnees on arrival in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and are valid for five days to enable returnees to transit through checkpoints to their home destination where they can apply for an INID card. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that the blank forms were from 2022 because that is when examples were previously requested and that she did have a further example from a return the week before but thought it was too late for it to be admitted. Ms Peronius was unable to explain the various blank sections in the document or the meaning of phrases such as ‘carrier of’ and what is to be facilitated. The number of such documents issued was also unknown and the details about these forms were outside the scope of Ms Peronius’ role within the Home Office.
73. In addition, forms are completed on arrival which provide the state authorities with general details of a person’s family members. Dr Merany provided two completed questionnaires from returnees who had not been provided with a form to transit through checkpoints as they had family members who met them at the airport with relevant documentation.
74. There were two examples of forms headed ‘Residence and Passport Centre of Erbil International Airport, Information of citizens who are returning to the Kurdistan Region from abroad’ which contained the following details: name; date of birth; gender; passport or Leesa pass; original full name; date and place of birth; details of return (including from which country, duration of stay, reason for return, return date, airline and contact details for country of return); address information in the Kurdistan Region (including the province, town, district, neighbourhood and nearest known place to their residence) and information about family (including full name, occupation, mobile number and where they live for father, mother, brother and sister).
75. One record of an interview was exhibited to Ms Peronius’ written statement, completed on 3 November 2024 with a person who had arrived at Erbil airport with a laissez-passer, which was not returned by border staff, and who had no other documentation. The person travelled alone by taxi to Kirkuk, passing though checkpoints on the way but was not asked any questions nor was he asked to provide any evidence of his nationality and had no difficulties travelling to Kirkuk. As to his current situation, the person had an INID card held by his parents and has not as yet travelled out of Kirkuk or sought employment so as to need it himself.
76. In relation to assistance with documentation on return and arrival at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports, Dr Fatah stated in his written report that if an individual returns to a KRI airport with no ID, they will undergo a security check there but can not be issued with ID documentation, for that they will have to return to their local nationality office. The security check is to see if the person has been involved in any criminal activity, which includes adverse political activities and not just criminal offences. He sets out the process described by an Iraqi government official in the Erbil nationality department in June 2020 (stating that not much has changed) in a way consistent with his response contained in the Inspection Report on Country of Origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma), June 2023 and set out in paragraph 688 above. In cross-examination Dr Fatah confirmed this was the information about the process given to him and he has no information either way as to its accuracy. He noted that the reference to immediate and wider family was relevant as other male relatives will have their details on the same Family Book page.
77. A slightly different, but similar account is recorded later in Dr Fatah’s written report based on a conversation with an official in the security department of Erbil airport in July 2025, in which the following process is recorded for a failed asylum seeker without documents following arrival at the airport:
(i) Initial processing: Firstly, the returnee would be asked to provide detailed information about their place of residence, identifying their specific administration unit. The returnee would also need to confirm whether their intended address is the same as the one they lived at before leaving the IKR.
(ii) Verification and personal details: In order to verify their identity and background, the individual must provide the full names (first name, father’s name, and grandfather’s name), addresses, and telephone numbers of three individuals who know them well (such as close relatives). These individuals must be willing to provide information about the returnee to the authorities.
(iii) Security reporting and background check: The returnee will then be instructed to report to their local security office to provide detailed personal information including their political affiliation (any political groups or parties that they support or are members of) and tribal affiliation (their tribal association or family name if it differs from their official documents).
(iv) Investigation of activities abroad: The returnee’s file will be checked for any involvement in political activities during their time abroad. Actions such as throwing eggs or tomatoes at prominent figures like the Prime Minister of Kurdistan would be viewed as a grave insult to tribal honour and thus considered a serious offense. Furthermore, accusing officials of crimes such as corruption, murder, or smuggling; or continuously campaigning against ruling political groups, factions, or individuals are also treated as serious crimes.
(v) Documentation: If the returnee passes the security screening, they will be given a security code. If they are the head of a family, they will also be provided with a Karti Zaniyari (information card). This card is specific to a family and verifies all of their information, including their place of residence. In Iraq-proper this card is referred to as a residence card or Hawiat Sakan.
78. Dr Fatah added that if a returnee has information on their ID, such as a photocopy, the above process is slightly simpler but a guarantor would still be required. In relation to the process, Dr Fatah’s opinion was that the procedure may be more complicated on the ground than set out by the government official; as it may depend on the political and security situation at the time and because there is no central authority in control. In his view, there may also be differences between the approach at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports (with the possibility at the latter that someone can organise their return in advance with them) and depending on how well connected a person may be. The process for identifying a person is the same regardless of whether they are a Kurd from the KRI, a Kurd from outside the KRI (including the Disputed Territories) or a person returned under foreign escort or supervision.
79. In September 2025, Dr Fatah spoke to the Director of Media and Public Relations at Sulaymaniyah airport who stated that unaccompanied returnees to the airport arrive with a laissez-passer, which is taken from them but a photocopy can be provided if requested. A person is checked on arrival and any form of Iraqi ID is helpful for this. No documents are provided to returnees to pass through checkpoints as that would not be within the airport’s jurisdiction. In July 2025, an official at the Security Department at Erbil airport stated that a laissez-passer will be confiscated when someone returns and the person would be subject to extensive questioning.
80. In a separate part of his written report, Dr Fatah states that “An Iraqi Kurd from the Disputed Territories could return to Iraq via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airport. If they are undocumented, they would be furnished with a paper to return to their home area to redocument themselves.”
81. In oral evidence, Dr Fatah was asked about the documents available to or given to returnees to the KRI. He stated that he had never heard of any covering letter or certificate given to a person with a laissez-passer and that the latter could not be retained on arrival, although a photocopy could be. Dr Fatah had not heard of any document called a ‘certificate to travel’ and was not aware of any document for travel issued to a person and valid for five days. However, he had been told in the course of the previous country guidance that there was such a letter issued in Sulaymaniyah valid for seven days, but he had not seen one himself and that as above, the Director of Media and Public Relations at the airport, said no such document exists. When asked specifically if he had any reason to doubt the existence or use of the documents at Annex C, Dr Fatah stated that he did not doubt them, but did not know what they were used for and then said that he thought that he had seen the one referring to five days validity before. When asked about these documents a final time in re-examination, Dr Fatah said again he had never heard of any permit letter being issued at an airport.
82. In Dr Fatah’s view, there were contradictions in the accounts he had heard from different people on this point which shows that there is no uniform procedure or law for returnees and the approach may differ between different airports and places.
(ii) Internal travel within the KRI and to the Disputed Territories;
83. We deal in this section with the evidence in relation to internal travel from the airport to a person’s home area, on the assumption that a person is returning without an INID and will need to make such a journey to obtain one on return. There is no dispute that an INID is a fundamental requirement for a person to be able to participate in public and private life in Iraq (for travel, for access to employment, accommodation, healthcare, education and so on). Further, there is no dispute that if a person does have an INID on return, there would (a) be no need for their immediate return to their home area to obtain one; and (b) there is in general no Article 3 risk to them in undertaking any overland travel throughout the KRI or Iraq due to a lack of identity documentation.
84. We deal specifically with the evidence in relation to the following areas: the existence of checkpoints for journeys between the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to destinations within the KRI and within the Disputed Territories; who operates these checkpoints and how; what does passing through a checkpoint require; and what risks are there to a person at a checkpoint. The nature of the evidence before us is such that some of it overlaps between these subsections, which need to be read as a whole to avoid unnecessary duplication.
Journeys from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to the KRI and Disputed Territories: checkpoints
85. The Response to an information request: Iraq: Checkpoints in the KRI and surrounding areas, January 2025, records the outcome of a study to locate checkpoints across the whole of the KRI and surrounding area, extending 50km from the border. The document identified 184 checkpoints in KRI and surrounding areas, 77 of them within KRI. The study accepted that it was highly likely some checkpoints were not captured, e.g. because they may be temporary, informal or lack significant infrastructure to identify them with satellite imagery. Some checkpoints operate only one-way but this was difficult to verify; as was the function of the checkpoint, not all of which may be for security checks. The analysis focused on the city centres of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul, and major roads and routes connecting them; but there may be other secondary routes and rural areas in which checkpoints were not identified. Finally, some checkpoints originally found were no longer evident on the most recent satellite images available when the study concluded. The document includes a number of photographs of checkpoints and their locations, particularly for the airports.
86. The same document also refers to mapped possible routes that bypass checkpoints between the cities of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul (subject to the caveats in the study set out above). These routes can be viewed through a GeoPDF file, or a more accurate KML project file. We have been provided with the GeoPDF files with routes for Dokan-Sulaymaniyah; Dokan-Kirkuk; Erbil-Dokan and Erbil-Mosul (which when pieced together would show routes from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to both Mosul and Kirkuk) which avoid checkpoints. The study notes that these GeoPDF maps may appear to show routes passing through checkpoints due to the limited zoom functionality, with the implication that they do not in fact do so. We have not been provided with any KML project files to access the more accurate version of the mapped routes.
87. Dr Fatah stated that primarily, checkpoints serve as ID checks to see who an individual is and whether they are a wanted individual; for which checkpoints have a list of individuals which will be cross-checked against. Checkpoints between governorates are very well enforced. Moreover, the checkpoints between the IKR and the Disputed Territories, and the Disputed Territories and Iraq-proper are more controlled. While the process is arbitrary, it is likely that an individual would be checked for an ID between these points. The same can be said for within the IKR. For example, if an individual were to go from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil, they would likely be stopped and asked to show their ID. This is because both areas are ruled by two different political groups.
88. In his written report, Dr Fatah considers three particular routes, (i) from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil via Kirkuk; (ii) from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil via Tasluja; and (iii) from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil via Garawan. For each he sets out the specific checkpoints that would be encountered on a route customarily taken for each journey and the authority controlling them. These range from three to five checkpoints for these journeys, primarily controlled by either the PUK or the KDP. Separately, Dr Fatah shows the changes in the checkpoints in the route from Kirkuk to Baghdad, which although outside of the scope of these appeals is noted as it shows an improvement in the situation since 2018 with the removal of many of the previous checkpoints such that there are now only six on this route, compared to a previous 18. In oral evidence he referred to there being around 900 checkpoints in Iraq in 2018, which have since reduced in number, but he could not comment on whether the Ambassador was correct (below) in January 2025 to say there were now only 254.
89. In relation to the checkpoints themselves, Dr Fatah did not personally know about all of the ones on the maps provided by the Respondent, but accepted that the yellow circles were the main ones, with possibly additional checkpoints around Mosul. Dr Fatah was able to describe the type and location of some particular checkpoints and confirmed that both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports had checkpoints for entry and exit. It is not possible to leave either airport without passing through a checkpoint, but ID is not always required to do so; the more stringent checks are for those seeking to enter the airport and for whom permission is needed beforehand to enter. In terms of leaving the airport to go to other areas, Dr Fatah said that for some places there could be a choice of between one and three routes that could be taken, so there are alternatives to avoid passing through checkpoints or at least particular checkpoints.
90. In cross-examination, Dr Fatah gave evidence about journey times from the KRI airports to various destinations. The journey from Erbil to Kirkuk is about 60 miles and would take around 90 minutes, or faster if there were no stops. The journey from Erbil to Makhmour is about 40 miles and would take 70-80 minutes. The journey from Erbil to Mosul is about 50 miles and would take about 90 minutes.
Who operates the checkpoints and how?
91. As above, given that checkpoints have a key function in relation to security, we set out for background the main security apparatus/actors by way of introduction before specifically setting out evidence in relation to who operates which checkpoints.
92. In the Respondent’s CPIN “Iraq: Actors of Protection” version 2.0, September 2025, this is summarised as follows:
2.1.4 The state security apparatus in federal Iraq includes the armed forces, the police, the Emergency Response Division, Provincial Emergency Police Battalions, Border Guards, the Counter-Terrorism Service, the National Security Service and the Population Mobilisation Forces (PMF), among other entities. … The PMF, a state-sponsored grouping of dozens of militias and the dominant security actor in certain areas of the country, is estimated to comprise at least 200,000 personnel. Although the PMF officially falls under the command of the Prime Minister, the government is unable to control it. The PMF is accused of numerous human rights abuses. CPIT was unable to find information indicating that the PMF is present in the KRI (…).
2.1.5 The main state security actors in the KRI are the Peshmerga (the armed forces), the Asayish (the internal security services) and the police. These actors are not unified across the KRI because of the influence of party politics. The two main parties, the … KDP and the … PUK, each have their own security apparatus. Different units and factions within the security forces, including the police, are usually affiliated with one of the two parties. The Peshmerga is estimated to have a total of around 150,000 personnel. Information on the size of other security actors was not available. Sources indicate that security forces in the KRI are generally better trained, funded and equipped than their counterparts in federal Iraq but are compromised by corruption and the influence of party politics (…).
93. The same CPIN contains much greater detail about the various security actors referred to above which we have taken into account, but do not repeat here in any fuller detail.
94. A letter from the Ambassador in the British Embassy in Baghdad dated 29 January 2025 includes details of checkpoints as follows:
“At the Embassy, we are aware of 254 official checkpoints across both Federal Iraq and the KRI. For checkpoints in Federal Iraq, almost all have been assessed to be run by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the army or police forces. These ISF, army and police checkpoints, which are permanent structures, are usually located on Iraq’s main arterial routes at the municipal boundaries of towns and cities. … In the KRI, checkpoints are run by either ISF, Asayish (the domestic security service of the KRI) and the Peshmerga. There are instances, however, where militia groups may establish impromptu and unofficial checkpoints, which make it more challenging to assess the risks and so all checkpoints and in-country travel requires regular assessment.
We have evidence that at these official checkpoints, while some do not require individuals to identify themselves at all, others may require individuals to stop and prove their identity by showing either their Iraqi National ID (INID) or another form of appropriate photographic ID, like a driving licence. We know on occasion some checkpoints may also require more thorough checks, including INID, passport and vehicle permit checks.
A more specific breakdown of known checkpoints is below:
• Around Baghdad, …
• …
• In Mosul, we know that some checkpoints are run by ISF and some militia groups. Along the Mosul to Erbil route, checkpoints are run by the Asayish, Peshmerga, ISF and militia groups. Specifically, we have some information that Munazzama Badr, Ketaib Iman Ali, Hamdaniya and Saraya Salam are four of the known militia groups operating checkpoints in North Mosul and along the route between Mosul and Erbil. Many of the checkpoints in North Mosul request thorough checks, such as a passport and paperwork check, including examination of permits and car registry. There are reports that some of these checkpoints video record engagements between checkpoint personnel and individuals who are stopped.
• Along the Kirkuk to Erbil route, checkpoints consist of ISF, Peshmerga and Asayish. There are also checkpoints which have multiple forces running them, including both ISF and Peshmerga, and ISF and Asayish. Checkpoints along this route request thorough checks, such as passport and paperwork checks (permit and residency checks), and a rationale for travel.
• Along both the Erbil to Dohuk and Erbil to Sulaymaniah routes, we have information to suggest all checkpoints are jointly managed by both Peshmerga and Asayish. Identity checks on vehicles and occupants are standard but thoroughness varies.”
95. As to who mans the checkpoints, Dr Fatah noted that checkpoints are not manned by centrally-appointed security forces. There is no specific training for manning checkpoints. The groups manning checkpoints in a given area will primarily be the group that has control in the area, so, for example, within a PUK controlled area, the checkpoints would be mainly run by the PUK. Within Iraq, there are many such forces: The federal Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the various Shia militia groups, and the Kurdish Asayish – PUK and KDP. Within the KRI, the checkpoints are manned by Asayish.
96. In cross-examination, when asked about the details in the Ambassador’s letter (above), Dr Fatah said that he was unaware of any checkpoints in the KRI being operated by the ISF; these were only manned by the KDP and PUK Asayish. He agreed that ad hoc checkpoints may be set up, for example around movement of high ranking officials and these may be by the army or militia groups, which are not formally part of the ISF but are paid directly by a ministry in Iraq. Such groups are linked to Shia Imams. Each group tends to protect their own interests rather than working for a national interest. Dr Fatah did not agree that a checkpoint manned by a militia group would present any greater danger than one run by the Peshmerga; but personally, he would avoid them as he does not know their views on British nationals. Dr Fatah also agreed specifically with the Ambassador’s reference to checkpoints being jointly managed on the route from Erbil to Dohuk and Erbil to Sulaymaniyah. At some checkpoints there is collaboration between different groups and attempts to normalise travel between Federal Iraq and the KRI.
97. The process at checkpoints in the KRI is set out by Dr Fatah in his written report as follows:
“When travelling between governorates within the … KRI, individuals, even KRI residents, are subject to questioning at checkpoints. Officers often engage passers-by in informal discussions, inquiring about their origin and destination. The primary purpose of these conversations is to discern the individual’s accent and dialect, which allows officers to ascertain their residential location.
This process is largely informal, lacking a written script or strict procedure, and is highly dependent on the discretion and demeanour of the specific officer. Often, officers are guided by intelligence, looking for specific profiles that may include dialect as a key indicator linked to a particular place of residence. By identifying a person’s accent and dialect, officers can infer their hometown and act upon relevant intelligence.
Routine identity checks involve officers requesting to view one’s ID. For KRI residences, further action is typically only taken if the name on the ID matches or is like a name of interest from intelligence briefings.
However, if an individual presents an ID from a governorate outside the KRI, they are routinely directed to the “information section” of the checkpoint. These information sections are commonly found at the entrances to administrative units such as cities, towns and districts, as well as near sensitive locations like government institutions, residences of influential figures, and major companies. At these points, both the individual and their identification documents are subjected to more thorough security checks.”
98. In response to our questions, Dr Fatah stated that the main checkpoints have computer facilities through which they can check a person’s ID, specifically the INID which is linked to a central database and is machine-read. Not all checkpoints have computer facilities, such as those in the mountainous areas and they are more likely to stop people for an informal chat rather than ask for ID. If a checkpoint does not have computer facilities, Dr Fatah was unable to say how they checked a person’s ID for security or any other purposes.
What is required to pass through a checkpoint
99. In the Response to an information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, 23 January 2025, the basic requirements for proving a person’s identity at a checkpoint and the risks if they do not do so are set out as follows:
1.3.3 …“Individuals who do not hold identity or civil documentation face restrictions in freedom of movement, in accessing basic services and social security benefits, and are at higher risk of being arbitrarily arrested.
… In order to pass checkpoints and be admitted to the area they intend to enter, individuals are required to hold valid civil documentation (i.e. Civil Status ID card/Unified ID card, nationality certificate, or passport). Security screenings in the country remain in place at governorate, district, and city entrance checkpoints. The risk of being arbitrarily detained and arrested at checkpoints increases for people who do not hold such documentation.”
1.5.1 … “Iraqi citizens travelling within Iraq must be able to prove their identity with an official document at checkpoints. According to humanitarian organisations, people who do not have such documents are at greater risk of arbitrary arrest and detention at checkpoints. The sources consulted did not explicitly indicate which documents could be used to prove identity at checkpoints. One source [a confidential source who provided the information on 27 March 2023] indicated that, in most cases, ID cards were not specifically asked for at checkpoints. According to this source, although the ability to show a driving licence, a copy of an ID card or similar document would be sufficient in most situations, it ultimately depends on the people staffing the checkpoint at the relevant time.”
100. In the Respondent’s Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 at paragraph 3.3.4, it is stated that although CSIDs are no longer produced in Iraq, they are still accepted as forms of identification at checkpoints.
101. In Ms Peronius’s written statement dated 28 January 2025, she stated that in relation to undocumented returnees, Razaq al Mashkoor stated that a valid laissez-passer is an official document in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 8 of the Iraqi Passport Law No. 32 (2015). The Iraqi Embassy in London also issue a certification/supporting letter to the undocumented returnee. These two documents together are sufficient to pass through any security checkpoint on the overland journey between an airport in the KRI and a person’s home area. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that she had never been told by the Iraqi authorities or anyone in post in Iraq of any problems with an Iraqi national returning using a laissez-passer and then using this together with any cover letter to pass through check points. Given what she has been told about the laissez-passer being a legal document, she would not expect there to be any problems.
102. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that she was aware from the previous country guidance that laissez-passers and passports were not acceptable for use at a checkpoint, but was not surprised that colleagues at the Iraqi Embassy had said that it was acceptable given that it is an official document issued by a foreign government which has the same legal effect as a passport and carries a photograph of the individual. She was not aware of the process for applying for or use of a driving licence as a form of identification at a checkpoint.
103. Dr Fatah’s evidence was that if a person was stopped at a checkpoint and asked for identification, they could use any of the following documents: INID card, driving licence, professional ID or trade union card. Copies of such documents on a person’s phone or a photocopy can sometimes be acceptable as well as the originals, but this depends on the person checking them on the day. A person could also use a CSID card which may be accepted, but is likely to be viewed with suspicion as there is no reason why a person in Iraq would not have applied for an INID.
104. However, when a person applies for an INID, their CSID card is returned to them with the corner cut and this, together with confirmation of an INID application is sufficient documentation to use at a checkpoint to prove that person’s identity. In his addendum report, Dr Fatah provides an example of a temporary document/receipt issued upon application for an INID. In cross examination Dr Fatah also referred to a person being able to use a confirmation of an appointment to apply for an INID in combination with another document to pass a checkpoint.
105. A laissez-passer would not, even if kept after return travel, be sufficient proof of identity to pass through a checkpoint as the security personnel manning such checkpoints would not be trained to recognise this as a form of ID.
106. Dr Fatah referred to the discretion available to security officers at checkpoints and the ability to detain anyone who appeared suspicious. For example, a person without documentation may be detained until they are able to provide their documentation or have somebody vouch for them. A person would need to be influential with the authorities to vouch for a person at a checkpoint, such as a high-ranking member of a political party and not just a local Mukhtar. When we asked Dr Fatah for the basis of this statement, he said that essentially no one would interfere with a party official as they have influence, similarly no one would interfere with a group of peshmerga or soldiers who attended to vouch for a person.
107. In cross-examination, Dr Fatah stated that a person could give names of his relatives to vouch for who he is and could phone a relative to bring their documents to establish their identity; including possibly photocopies. There may however be a difficulty in how a person establishes a relationship with another person without any identity documentation, absent using someone with power to vouch for them. Dr Fatah did not think that it was possible to generalise that in all cases, a person would be able to pass a checkpoint if someone came to vouch for them. Dr Fatah also said that if a returnee has an official document from abroad/the airport that they can take to a checkpoint showing their information, name and a contact number; then they would also be able to call on male relatives who were documented to pass through a checkpoint.
108. In terms of what documents are required at checkpoints, Dr Fatah did state that he does not know exactly what papers will be accepted as he is not an expert in that and there may be issues with forged papers and uncertainty about what checkpoints have been instructed to check.
Risks at a checkpoint
109. In the Respondent’s CPIN “Iraq: Actors of Protection” version 2.0, September 2025, there are a number of references to risks of abuses from security forces, either generally or specifically in relation to activities at checkpoints. We have focused below on the more direct references to checkpoints and groups at particular risk; but have taken into account more broadly (with less detail included below) the wider references particularly in section 9 of the document as to human rights abuses by security forces.
5.4.3 ‘…
‘… Whilst the state budget allocates salaries to the PMF for their role as security agents, PMF members have sought to increase their gains by engaging in extra legal and illegal activities, such as creating military enterprises, seizing properties, imposing arbitrary taxes at checkpoints, smuggling goods such as oil, trading in scrap metal, kidnapping and extortion.’
9.1.1 The January 2023 DFAT report stated:
‘There are consistent and credible reports of torture in Iraq, including by government forces and Popular Mobilisation Forces. Methods include beatings, stress positions, electric shocks, burns, and sexual humiliation. Sunni men and boys are particularly targeted on the basis of their perceived affiliation with Da’esh. Torture takes place during arrest, pre-trial detention and after conviction. It occurs in facilities run by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and those under KRG control, as well as facilities operated by PMFs. …
…
‘According to the US Department of State, most reports of arbitrary or unlawful detention involve Sunni Arabs, particularly those with a perceived affiliation to Da’esh. There are also reports of Iranian-aligned militias arbitrarily arresting or detaining Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk, and Christians and other minorities in western Ninewah and the Ninewah Plains. Prisoners in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq are often held for extensive periods in pretrial detention. …
9.1.2 In March 2023, Freedom House published a report entitled ‘Freedom in the World 2023’, covering the year 2022 (March 2023 Freedom House report). The section on Iraq stated: ‘The use of torture to obtain confessions is widespread across Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, … Detainees are often held in harsh, overcrowded conditions, and forced disappearances, particularly of suspected IS fighters, have been reported.’
9.1.4 The April 2024 USSD report stated:
‘…
‘… There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest or unlawful detention by government forces, including by ISF, NSS, PMF and Asayish security forces. There were no reliable statistics available regarding the total number of such acts or the length of detentions. …
‘…
‘… Lengthy pre-trail detentions were particularly common in areas liberated from ISIS, where the large number of ISIS-related detainees and use of makeshift facilities led to significant overcrowding and inadequate services. There were reports of detention beyond judicial release dates and unlawful releases. …
9.2.3 The January 2024 UNCHR report stated:
‘Arbitrary arrests remain common, mostly for suspicions of Da’esh affiliation under the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2005, and occur frequently at checkpoints, during house searches and military operations. Various security agencies are reported to be involved in arbitrary arrests and detention, including the Federal Police, the National Security Service (NSS), and various PMF factions. At times, family members are arrested in lieu of wanted persons.
‘Persons of other profiles, including in particular journalists and media professionals, civil society activities, human rights defenders and others perceived to be critical of the government are also subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, including under the 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law. PMF factions are also reported to arbitrarily arrest and detain members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Ninewa Governorate.
‘…
‘There are “persistent allegations to the existence” of secret detention facilities, including to hold suspected Da’esh affiliates without due process or judicial review. …
9.2.4 Amnesty’s April 2024 report claimed ‘Iraqi security and intelligence forces, including the PMU, continued to forcibly disappear men and boys taken from checkpoints, homes and streets. Human rights organizations and activists in a number of governorates, notably Salah al-din, Anbar, Ninewa and Basra, continued to report instances of enforced disappearances at the hands of factions of the PMU that had a presence in these areas.’
110. The EUAA (European Union Agency for Asylum) Country Guidance: Iraq. Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024 provides a similar account of security forces, including:
2.1 The Iraqi Federal State actors
…
The ISF have been involved in committing a wide range of human rights violations against different categories of individuals. For example, ISF have been reported to have conducted unlawful killings, forced disappearance, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, forced confessions against individuals with perceived ISIL affiliation (…). Individuals with perceived ISIL affiliation and their family members (…) were also prevented from accessing civil documents necessary to access basis services and were restricted in their freedom of movement. Furthermore, persons critical of the authorities, such as political activists, protesters and journalists (…) have been subjected to different forms of mistreatment. …
2.2 Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)
…
Members of the PMF have reportedly committed various human rights violations, such as unlawful killings, disappearances, revenge attacks, abuses and torture during arrests and pre-trial detention, against persons perceived to be affiliated with ISIL (…). PMF have also engaged in violence against ethnic and religious minorities (…). Furthermore, PMF and other militias have targeted individuals perceived to transgress moral or religious codes and have reportedly also committed other abuses, such as violence against protesters (…). The involvement of the PMF in criminal activities, such as smuggling goods and extortions has also been reported (…).
2.3 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities
…
The KRG forces have been accused of committing a wide range of human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture and other forms of ill-treatment of individuals with perceived ISIL affiliation (…). There were also reports of discrimination and harassment by the KRG of certain ethnic minorities (…) as well as reports of arbitrary detention of political opponents and journalists and violent suppression of demonstrations (…).
111. The same report, by reference to a number of other EUAA COI reports (cited collectively as the source information rather than this report itself), summarises its guidance on the profile of perceived affiliation with ISIL as follows:
Perceived affiliation with ISIL is mainly driven by family connections through a relative, even a distant relative who is actively involved with ISIL. Suspicion of affiliation with ISIL can also arise out of a broad range of other circumstances, such as being men or boys of fighting age, being Sunni who lived in areas under ISIL’s rule, similarity of name to an individual on the ‘wanted list’, alleged affiliation with a tribe perceived to have provided support to ISIL, false accusations. The suspicion of being ISIL-affiliated by both security actors and the communities might increase for a Sunni who did not return to their place of origin for a long period of time following the liberation from ISIL. …
Estimates of the number of individuals perceived, correctly or incorrectly, to be affiliated with ISIL in Iraq range from 250 000 to 300 000 according to sources.
112. The report continues with a section on family members of individuals with perceived ISIL affiliation, which we note includes factors which may impact on risk for those such as family status and gender (with female-headed households or those with foreign ISIL-affiliated spouses being at greater risk); tribal affiliation and home area, particularly in ISIL-controlled areas, such as Anbar, Dohuk, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah-al-din governorates.
113. Finally, in section 6.3, the same report deals with safe and legal travel to gain admittance in a particular location. This includes that, “To pass checkpoints and regularise their stay in a certain location, individuals are required to hold valid civil documentation. The risk of being arbitrarily detained and arrested at checkpoints increases for people who do not hold such documentation.”. Similar references are made in section 6.4.2 in relation to civil documentation and adds that, “individuals perceived to be affiliated with ISIL encounter extra administrative and security barriers to obtaining civil documentation.”.
114. In his evidence, Dr Fatah gives a range of possible scenarios as to what may happen at a checkpoint and the factors that may influence that. In particular, he stated the following in his written report:
“There is no guarantee that an individual who is not carrying ID will be stopped and refused entry through a checkpoint. It depends on the security level on that day (i.e., if there is heightened security due to a known threat), and the individuals manning the checkpoint. It is arbitrary. It is possible that the security officer could question the individual and decide to let them through with a warning to carry their ID next time. Moreover, on some occasions, individuals may not be stopped and questioned. For example, if a family is in a car and the security is low, they may just wave the car through. However, there is also a possibility that an individual without ID could be stopped, questioned, and detained. This is particularly the case if there is heightened security on the day.”
115. Dr Fatah referred to local intelligence services stopping everyone at particular times in response to a specific incident, such as a bomb threat or suspect fleeing from a recent crime; and a heightened risk for those speaking a different dialect to those in the governorate and at checkpoints in close proximity to government or political buildings. However, in cross-examination he also stated that if a person is speaking a local dialect, this may help if there is no other security risk.
116. In his oral evidence, Dr Fatah referred to there being two main security concerns in the KRI. First, the risk from outsiders such as ISIS; and secondly, the competition between the two main parties in the KRI, in particular the movement of high profile criminals between the areas and tribal disputes between the KDP and the PUK. Those who have a profile for an ISIS risk and those with a political or journalistic profile critical of the KRI authorities would be more at risk of lengthy detention at a checkpoint. Dr Fatah also added that age may be a factor in the risk of being stopped and his experience is that he gets stopped a lot less now that he is older.
117. In his addendum report, Dr Fatah refers to an interview in September 2025 with the Director of Media and Public Relations, Sulaymaniyah airport. For those returning on a laissez-passer “The Director stated that the ability for these individuals to pass through internal checkpoints falls outside of the airport’s jurisdiction. However, within Sulaymaniyah itself, movement is generally not problematic. The Director did confirm that travel from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil (which is under the control of a different political authority – the KDP) could present difficulties. When I asked the Director about travel from Sulaymaniyah to Kirkuk, he simply stated: “We do not advise”.”.
118. As to the nature and type of risk that a person may be faced with at a checkpoint, Dr Fatah’s written report refers generally to reports of human rights organisations and government reports, including of unlawful arrests; arbitrary detention (for weeks or months); harassment of ethnic and religious groups (particularly Sunni Arabs and Turkmen) with delays to passing through; political harassment and intimidation of journalists, human rights activists and individuals critical of the government; violence, abuse and torture during arrest and pre-trial detention; restrictions on freedom of movement; killing; kidnapping and extortion. A number of specific examples are given of incidents over the last ten years.
119. In relation to the risk of detention at a checkpoint, Dr Fatah stated that a person may be held in a room at a checkpoint until they have satisfied someone as to who they are and that they are not a risk, and only if not satisfied, he would presume that person would be moved to a main detention centre.
120. In re-examination, Dr Fatah confirmed again that not everyone who arrives at a checkpoint is stopped or asked for ID. He referred to it as a mild risk of being questioned and then allowed to pass if a person was not considered to be important. If the risk is considered to be serious and the person has no documents, he could be put in detention or prison but Dr Fatah did not know how long that may be for. It would only be for those against whom there were serious suspicions or an identifiable threat. Dr Fatah confirmed that he did not have any experience of what would happen if a family member is called to vouch for a person at a checkpoint or how they would establish the family link. He also questioned how a person would establish that they had recently returned from the United Kingdom to satisfy any security concerns about where they have come from.
121. Dr Fatah stated that it would be normal for everyone in Iraq to carry their ID, although did not say that it would be rare not to and there were times where a person may not need to carry it, particularly as they are not always stopped or asked for it. In some situations it is more important, which may depend on who a person is travelling with.
122. Finally in relation to risk and activities at checkpoints, Dr Fatah confirmed that there are no statistics or data available for the number of people stopped at checkpoints or what happens to them, including no evidence of numbers who are detained, where or for how long. He stated that there is no single person to whom questions could be asked about this who would have knowledge of what happened outside of their specific area.
(iii) Issue and use of Iraqi identity documentation (CSID and INID)
123. In this section we summarise the evidence before us as to the current status of the CSID card; the roll-out of the INID card generally (including any general difficulties with this); the standard application process for an INID card; the application process for those without all of the required documentation for an INID card; and INID applications at the Iraqi Embassy in London.
Current status of the CSID card
124. Paragraph 6.8.1 of Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 refers to the February 2019 EASO report that CSIDs are:
‘… [I]ssued in the district where a person is registered and on the basis of information in the person’s family register. Family registers (also known as family book, or family census or sijilla al-qayd or sijil al ahwal al-shakhsiyya) are kept manually and created locally in approximately 300 civil status registration offices across Iraq and information is updated with birth, death, marriages, and changes to civil status. Landinfo stated that “the family register forms the basis for the issuing of national ID cards and nationality certificates, which in turn form the basis for the issuing of passports”.’
125. The following paragraph lists the data that a CSID must include, from the Landinfo report published in December 2015 as follows:

• Personal name
• Name of father and paternal grandfather
• Surname
• Name of mother and maternal grandfather
• Gender
• Signature of authorised representative
• Date of issue
• Signature of issuer
• Full name of issuer
• Date of birth in digits and letters
• Place of birth
• Marital status
• Name of Spouse
• Religious affiliation
‘The right-hand side of the card’s front page contains the name of the issuing regional office, a register number indicating the number of the family book in which the person is registered, as well as the page number in the family book. The serial number is entered on the top left-hand side. …’
126. In the Executive Summary of the same CPIN, it is stated that the CSID has been replaced by the INID, but remains a valid ID document for legal and administrative purposes whilst the INID roll-out continues. Iraqi nationals are no longer able to apply for CSIDs in Iraq or from abroad and at paragraph 3.3.4, it is stated that there are no longer any CSA offices in Iraq issuing CSIDs.
127. Dr Fatah refers to the slow introduction of INID cards in Iraq, with shortages of the cards previously creating delay. In the KRI, CSIDs were no longer issued from September 2022, but the document remained valid for all legal and administrative purposes whilst individuals were waiting to receive their INID. As of March 2024, the Iraqi Interior Ministry have confirmed that both CSIDs and Nationality Certificates are no longer valid and only an INID is accepted.
Roll-out of the INID card generally
128. The Respondent’s Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025, states in section 6.7 that INIDs started to be issued in Iraq in September 2015. The new INID was intended to replace the civil status ID and make the nationality certificate and ultimately the residency card obsolete, so Iraqi’s eventually would only have one official ID document. The INID is valid for 10 years and must then be renewed, but must be renewed sooner if a person’s civil status changes, e.g. through marriage or divorce and can be renewed if lost. At paragraph 6.7.9, the process for renewing an INID which had been lost is set out and from January 2023 could be commenced from the Iraqi Embassy in London but a new card would have to be collected from Iraq by a person acting as power of attorney for a person in the United Kingdom.
129. In paragraph 6.7.5 of the same CPIN, the DFAT report published in January 2023 was quoted as follows as to the INID card itself:
‘The Iraqi National ID card is an electronic biometric card issued by the Ministry of Interior, which holders are required to carry at all times. The National ID card is a credit card-sized plastic card with an embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) chip. It is covered with multi-coloured guillochés (an ornamental pattern formed of two or more curved bands that interlace to repeat a circular design). All information on the card is in Arabic and Kurdish. The front side of the card shows the coat of arms of Iraq and the words “Republic of Iraq”, “Ministry of Interior” and “General Directorate of Nationality”. It also contains the photograph of the holder, the holder’s 12- digit national identification number, the 9-alphanumeric digit access number for the RFID chip, the holder’s given name, father’s, mother’s and paternal grandfather’s names, tribe and the holder’s sex and blood type. The rear side contains the issuing authority, dates of issue and expiry, date and place of birth (city or town), 18-alphanumeric digit family number, and machine-readable zone.
130. In the same CPIN at paragraph 6.7.7, it is stated that by March 2023, 85-90% of people in the KRI had obtained a new INID; although figures were not available for the take up in Federal Iraq. In the Response to an information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, 23 January 2025, at paragraph 1.1 it is stated that as at December 2024, over 42 million people had registered for INID out of an estimated population of 45.4 million (which includes non-Iraqi nationals not eligible for an INID).
131. Dr Fatah’s report sets out the introduction of the INID pursuant to the Iraqi Nationality Card Law of 2016 which was an effort to modernise and secure civil documentation in Iraq, consolidating various older identity documents into one comprehensive card and simplifying civil documentation. He identifies a number of challenges to the roll-out of the INID, including (i) geographic dependency, in that a person must return to their place of registration in order to obtain an INID and although efforts have been made to make the system geographically independent, Dr Fatah did not know of anyone who had successfully obtained an INID from outside their governorate of registration; (ii) for divorced women and their children, unless they have the co—operation of the male/father; (iii) Yezidi women and children born of violence from ISIS, for whom there is no legal recognition to allow for registration of such children or for any form of identification to be issued to them; and (iv) for Faili Kurds who were previously forcibly deported to Iran by the Ba’ath regime under Sadam Hussain.
132. The INID card is referred to by Dr Fatah as a very important document as it provides all the essential information about an individual, such as their place in the civil record, the file and page number of the civil record and is a small representation of the information given about an Iraqi citizen in his civil register. The card is machine read, meaning that this information can be checked via the Iraqi Civil System (a centralised database of information for record-keeping) and used for access to any public or private services, as well as being an important document for identification and security processes. The card is also linked to a person’s biometric data. The INID card itself contains several security features to prevent any counterfeits. The main focus of the INID is now about security, not just because of the threat from ISIS, but historically from other insurgent groups as well.
133. In terms of the information contained on the face of the INID, Dr Fatah’s report is consistent with that set out above in paragraph 129. In particular we note that it contains an 18-digit alphanumeric number on the back of the card which is the holder’s family number and can be used by registered family members to access data on others in the system. That is separate to the 12-digit national identification number for the individual, which starts with the first four digits as the year of the birth of the holder.
Application process for an INID card
134. The Respondent’s Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 includes in section 6.7.2, by reference to sources in the EASO report in November 2021, the application process for an INID as follows:
‘… Individuals applying for the unified national card had to book an appointment with the local office via the website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs and download an application form, which had to be completed and taken to the appointment. In addition, they had to submit their civil status ID and their nationality certificate. The website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs also requested applicants to submit their residence card with the application and it stated that the original documents needed to be presented.
‘… It is mandatory for applicants to appear in person to submit their application, because a photo, an iris scan and fingerprints will be taken. Subsequently, the application is sent to a central office in Baghdad together with the biometrics, where the information is checked. …
‘… With a few deviations, the aforementioned procedure applies for the KRI. According to Abdulrahman Ismael Azaz, Director of the Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status in Erbil, which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior of the KRG, interviewed in 2018 by Landinfo and DIS [Danish Immigration Service], in Erbil, people did not need to make an appointment via the website, because many people did not have internet access. Applicants needed to present their civil status ID, their nationality certificate and their residency card with the application. The documents handed in were first checked at the Directorate for Nationality and Civil Status and only after the document check was finished, they were sent to the main servers in Baghdad, where the personal identification number was produced. According to Director Azaz, the applicants’ fingerprints of all ten fingers had to be taken as well.
‘… The card was valid for ten years but, when the civil status changed, e.g., through marriage or divorce, a renewal was required by submitting a new application for the issuance of a new unified national card.’
135. In paragraph 6.7.5 of the same, the DFAT report published in January 2023 was quoted as follows:
‘The process to obtain a new electronic ID card involves first making an appointment with the local civil status office via the website of the directorate for national ID cards. The applicant can download an application form from the same website and must complete it before meeting the local civil status office. The applicant must bring their current ID card, proof of citizenship, proof of residence, ration card, and the IQD 5,000 (approximately AUD 6) [£2.92 GBP28] fee. The civil status office will retain these documents, which will be invalidated when the new card is issued. All applicants must attend the office in person for the photo, iris scan and fingerprint registration. The local civil status office sends the application form and biometric data to the central office in Baghdad where the information is checked and the card personalised before being returned to the local civil status office.’
136. The same CPIN includes at paragraph 6.7.6 a reference to ‘eRegulations Baghdad’, a website providing step-by-step guides on administrative procedures in Iraq. The link provided to the website includes a page on obtaining a new INID, which itself sets out 10 steps; the following of which are relevant for our purposes as to requirements for the application:
(i) The first is to obtain an appointment, the listed requirement for which is ‘ID’ – “Civil registration no. (mentioned on the top right of the ID) needs to be entered in the electronic form (without letters) to obtain the appointment.”.
(ii) The second stage is to generate and fill in the application form, with requirements listed as ID, Certificate of Nationality and Residence Card. A passport is listed as an optional requirement.
(iii) The fourth stage, ‘Get revision of nationality certificate’ includes additional information stating: “In case the certificate of nationality is not available, the citizen shall bring the certificate of nationality of his father or brother along with ID to prove his Iraqi nationality.”.
(iv) The sixth stage, ‘Provide data entry’ contains the same additional information about the certificate of nationality and refers to collection of biometric data and if this can not be obtained, the case will be raised with the director of department.
(v) The seventh stage, ‘verify application’ includes additional information: “If any problem might occur, administrative action shall be taken in order to solve the problem by the competent parties (director of department, health departments, competent courts, and other).”.
(vi) The ninth stage, ‘obtain approval and appointment for retrieving INID’ states in the additional information: “Any identity proof is considered in case of missing ID or certificate of nationality.”.
(vii) The final stage, ‘get INID’ lists the requirements as receipt for retrieving INID, ID, Certificate of Nationality, or Judicial notice (all original) of lost ID or certification of nationality.
137. Dr Fatah sets out the process for obtaining an INID for those who have their previous Iraqi documents as follows:
(i) The applicant must go to the local Office of Civil Status/General Directorate of Citizenship, having made a written request in person.
(ii) The applicant must go to the scribe there and provide their details, and provide their CSID, INC and Residency Card. The documentation of close male relatives may also be used, as they display the same registration information.
(iii) The documents will be checked and if satisfactory, the papers will be signed and stamped. The scribe will direct the application form to the relevant office. The scribe will also print a copy of the form for the applicant. The applicant’s INC and CSID will be returned to them, with the corner of the CSID cut to indicate an INID has been issued to replace them.
(iv) The applicant is then taken to have a photograph, iris scan, and thumb- and fingerprints taken.
(v) The applicant should wait for two weeks for the National ID Card to become available.
138. The INID can be collected by a proxy (which can be specified in the application), but not applied for one because of the need for biometric data to be taken.
139. In October 2022, Dr Fatah visited Iraq and applied for his INID, which was a straightforward process. He had to provide his British passport but not his KRI Information Card showing residency as he had not been in Iraq for longer than a month. In cross-examination, Dr Fatah was unable to state what the residency card requirement would be for a recent arrival to Iraq.
Application process for an INID card without all of the required documentation
140. In the Response to an information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, 23 January 2025, section 1.4 details support given to internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) in Iraq to obtain civil documentation. By reference to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (“UNOCHA”) report on Iraq from June 2024, it is stated that during 2023, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (“UNHCR”) provided services to 51,300 IDPs to access civil documentation, including 5,691 individuals with complex cases (which included those with perceived affiliation to extremist groups or missing key supporting documents); leading to some 45,600 civil documents being secured that year.
141. The Respondent’s Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 sets out in section 6.17 how documents can be issued by proxy:
6.17.1 The Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs website noted the process of issuing documents by power of attorney:
‘Iraqi documents required –
• Original Iraqi personal ID (Hawyat El Ahwal) and Iraqi citizenship certificate (Shahdit el Jensia) or unified card (Bitaka el mwahada) and colour copies of all of them (for the principal).
• A copy of the Iraqi personal ID (Hawyat el Ahwal) and Iraqi citizenship certificate (Shahdit el Jensia) or unified card (Bitaka el mwahada), nationality certificate or unified card (for the attorney)
• Personal photos of the principal, 4 photos
• Personal photos of the attorney, 4 photos
• Fees […]
6.17.2 Dr Fatah in a review of the previous CPIN on civil documentation and returns stated:
‘Based on the above information it is unlikely that an individual would be able to obtain a CSID from the Iraqi embassy. However, even if they could, they would need to apply via proxy. In April 2021, my associate was informed by the Iraqi consulate in London that at least two Iraqi documents are required to grant somebody the power of attorney. As such, somebody without documentation abroad would not be able to grant somebody power of attorney in order to obtain documentation. Iraqis abroad may grant somebody in Iraq the power of attorney so that the person would be able to access the local Civil Status Office on their behalf. However, it is not likely that an Iraqi abroad would be able to grant somebody in Iraq the power of attorney if they are not in possession of documentation.’
‘In order to grant power of attorney from the UK, if the person is from the IKR, they can do so by visiting the KRG office in London. They would need some sort of ID and the details of the person that they want to represent them in the IKR. The representatives ID details are not required. The application will then be approved by the KRG public relations office before being taken to court for another approve. Only then will the power of attorney be granted, and it will only be valid inside the IKR. However, if the application takes place in the Iraqi consulate in London, it can be used throughout Iraq. Again, the person would need some form of ID, British or Iraqi, and the details of the person that they wish to represent them.’
142. In her written statement dated 30 June 2025, Ms Peronius refers to a further visit to the Iraqi Embassy on 24 April 2025, during which an official also outlined to her the process for a Power of Attorney for those without supporting evidence which was as follows:
• Individual asks for the Power of Attorney (POA) form from the Embassy
• 5 photos required by the applicant
• Copy of ID (Applicant to contact his family in Iraq if needed)
• Name of the person listed as the power of attorney (this person must be 18+, ideally a family member, long term friend or lawyer)
• 3 photos of the person listed as POA (The cost for the process to the applicant is £30).
• Once the above has been provided to the Embassy, the forms and ID should be sent to Baghdad. The nominated POA in Baghdad will then go to an INID office, collect the registration document which will then be sent back to the applicant in the UK.
• This registration form can then be used to apply for the INID or passport.
143. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius was asked about the power of attorney process. She stated that this could have been put more clearly in her statement having re-read it and clarified that the ID required was for the person to be a power of attorney in Iraq, because if the person in the UK had this, then they would not need a power of attorney at all. If the Iraqi authorities are not satisfied that a person is who they say they are in the United Kingdom, no power of attorney would be granted. However, records can be checked in Baghdad to establish this.
144. Dr Fatah’s written evidence was that if a person attempts to obtain an INID but no longer has their CSID, they would be sent to their local CSA office to obtain a Surat Qaid, an approved version of the family page in the main register as the first step for obtaining further documentation.
145. In cross-examination, Dr Fatah stated that both photocopies of an ID document and documents of a close male relative would assist as both would identify a person’s family register page. If a person knew that information but did not have a male relative, then with two witnesses he could apply to the Court in Iraq for registration. A Mukhtar would be able to state that he knew a person.
146. In terms of family member details, Dr Fatah stated that the CSID and INID were very different but that the family system has not changed; so a person’s family registration would still be needed for the latter. From a CSID card, a male relative’s details could be traced, but Dr Fatah was unsure whether the same could be said for an INID.
147. Dr Fatah is familiar with the process for obtaining documents needed for a CSID card and in Iraq, which was well established and a person could attend their local CSA office with a family member or with their 1975 Registration Document, or a male relative’s INC; which would provide necessary information. A power of attorney was available to use to obtain a CSID, which just required some form of identity document linking a person to Iraq. For Dr Fatah, he could obtain a power of attorney for someone using his INC and his British passport. In his view, a British passport alone would not be sufficient as it would not link a person to Iraq, although there may be a way to reverse engineer this for Iraqi ID as some documents would have been required for an Iraqi national to obtain a British passport; but he is not sure of the process. Although these procedures were established for a CSID, Dr Fatah is not aware of what can be used or how a power of attorney for an INID application would work, particularly from outside of Iraq and it could not be used to provide biometric data.
INID applications at the Iraqi Embassy in London
148. In an announcement dated 15 October 2024 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“MOFA”) in Iraq; it was stated that the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in the United Kingdom was the first to issue an INID outside of Iraq. The announcement stated that for members of the Iraqi community residing in the United Kingdom, on a trial basis the National Card System in the consular section of the embassy in London was opening. Details of how to apply and book an appointment were to be announced later.
149. An announcement on 17 October 2024 from the same source stated that appointments would be available for applying for the National Card in a trial phase from 21 October 2024. The following were listed as ‘Required Documents’:
• Completion of the National Card application form.
• Iraqi nationality certificate in the applicant’s name, or presentation of an Iraqi nationality certificate or National Card supporting document (father, mother, brother, sister, paternal grandfather, uncle).
• Civil status identity card.
• Iraqi passport.
• Proof of identity (if no document is provided in the applicant’s name).
• Proof of address.
• Additionally, please fill out the online form for the National Card by visiting the official website of the National Card Affairs Directorate [… link provided together with details of how to book an appointment or make inquiries].
150. A further announcement was made on 11 November 2024 from the same source for the establishment of procedures for a portable system for issuing the National ID card. There is a portable system (VIP) upon request by an Iraqi citizen or their legal representative to the Ambassador, Consul or their designated representative for which a visit would be made to the personal residence of a person to input their personal information and biometrics; with a nominated family member or representative to follow up on remaining procedures and collect the card. A second portable system (NPK) is for citizens who are hospitalized and submit a personal request supported by medical evidence; which thereafter works in a similar way to the first portable system (VIP).
151. In the Respondent’s Response to an information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, 23 January 2025, at paragraph 1.2.3, an article from the Iraqi News Agency dated 5 January 2025 is quoted as follows:
‘The Ministry of Interior announced today, Sunday, the registration of about 9 million people in the national card system during the year 2024. It also indicated that the “Your Card at Home” service will soon be activated and will be available to all Iraqis.
The Director General of the Unified National Card Department, Major General Ahmad Al-Maamouri, told the Iraqi News Agency …: “… the year 2024 witnessed the opening of central registration sites in Baghdad and all other governorates, meaning that there are now 19 registration centres”.
He confirmed that “these centres will allow citizen to register for the National Card and update their own families’ personal details regardless of their place of residence or place of registration”. He pointed out that “this measure has effectively put an end to the need to transfer citizens’ registration records between governorates and has reduced the effort and financial burden required of citizens who previously had to travel to the governorate where they were registered”.
‘He said that “there is no need to transfer citizens’ registration records between governorates, since these registration sites have been opened in all the governorates in Iraq”. He pointed out that “the ‘Your Card at Home’ service will be activated this year [2025], meaning that citizens who do not wish to travel to the department where they are registered can have their National Card sent to their home”.
‘He stated that “this service will be activated this year and will be available to all citizens”. He also explained that the mobile [National Card] service, which was launched in 2024, has served 23,247 citizens, as well as 7,823 citizens who are in hospitals, shelters, social care homes, homes for the elderly, and orphanages”.
152. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius stated that she had been informed prior to the start of the trial that there were plans to roll out the issue of INID cards in 10 cities across the world, starting in London. There was no indication as to how long the trial in London would last, but it has now ended with a fully operational system in place. She was not aware of whether this had now been rolled out to any other cities.
153. In her written statement dated 1 April 2025, Ms Peronius records her experience of a visit to the Iraqi Embassy on 27 January 2025 and refers to the MOFA announcements (set out directly above) and what is needed for an application. Ms Peronius found the INID service to be up and running at the Iraqi Embassy, with several booths dealing exclusively with INID applications and where fingerprints, iris scans and photographs are taken. She did not engage with any individual applicants during the visit. Ms Peronius was told that the application process involves officials in Baghdad approving the submitted documents in real time whilst an applicant is at the Embassy; which can be checked within 15 to 20 minutes. Once approval is granted, the INID is issued in Baghdad, taking between one and two months for this to be done and delivered to the Embassy in London.
154. In relation to documentation required, Ms Peronius was told that the Iraqi Nationality Certificate is essential, but an Iraqi passport was not necessarily needed. If the Iraqi Nationality Certificate is not available, one belonging to their nuclear family or a paternal relative can be provided instead. A person can not undergo an interview as an alternative to providing documents.
155. An Iraqi official told Ms Peronius that since the INID service was launched in October 2024, 3000 applications had been processed and at the time of the visit, there were 40-60 INID applications per day, with a two month wait for an appointment to make the application.
156. Ms Peronius further visited the Iraqi Embassy on 25 March 2025, seeking clarification about applying for an INID without supporting evidence. The Iraqi official told her that if a person did not have any supporting evidence, they would need to contact a family member in Iraq to obtain a power of attorney to enable them to make an INID application. It was further stated that the current service at the Embassy was only for renewal of existing expired INID cards and not for brand new applications.
157. In her written statement dated 30 June 2025, Ms Peronius stated that on a further visit to the Iraqi Embassy on 24 April 2025, an official advised her that the INID rollout was possible both for existing expired cards and new applications. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius confirmed that she had been told of the change to issue new INID cards a month later than the first information and questioned whether it may be an interpretation issue with a new official from the previous information, but did not clarify this or when new applications were accepted with the official.
158. In her written statement dated 29 August 2025, Ms Peronius set out information from the Iraq Embassy on 8 July 2025 following her request for the same. The response stated that between 14 October 2024 and 8 July 2025, 6,567 INID applications have been processed, of which 5,582 were new applications and 985 were replacements to existing cards. In cross-examination, Ms Peronius was asked about the numbers given for applications. She did not receive any further statistical information, just the numbers in her written statement. The latter figures showed a lower number of replacement INID applications than her earlier statement had given as a total (at a time when new INID applications were not accepted). Ms Peronius assumed that new applications for an INID must have been available from the outset for these latest figures and had no reason to believe the data was incorrect, particularly as she personally witnessed the process working at the Embassy. As to renewal applications, Ms Peronius was not aware of how long INID cards were valid for and stated that there could be lots of reasons why a person would need to renew their card, including that theirs had been lost.
159. In his initial written report, Dr Fatah does not support statements from the Iraqi Embassy that INID cards could be issued through them and he was not aware of anyone having been issued with an INID outside of Iraq. This was supported by a statement from an officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Erbil in August 2025 who stated that no INID can be issued outside of the KRI or Iraq. Dr Fatah does cite the Iraqi announcement dated 15 October 2024 and details given therein for the process of applying in London, but in his view, the process is not for undocumented asylum seekers but for members of the diaspora living in the UK and their offspring.
160. However, in his addendum report, Dr Fatah states that he is aware of one person who has successfully applied and received their INID through the Iraqi Embassy in London and one who has applied but not yet received it. A contact with the KRG Office of International Relations stated that whilst it is technically possible to obtain an INID through the Iraqi Embassy or Consulate in the UK, it is so time consuming that most people prefer to apply in Iraq.
161. In the addendum report, Dr Fatah also sets out three paragraphs with details of how an INID can be applied for at the Iraqi Embassy, including as to appointments, documents required, biometrics, fee and collection. There is no source given for this detailed information. Dr Fatah’s conclusion remained that this process is not for undocumented asylum seekers and it is highly unlikely that they would be able to obtain an INID in the UK, particularly as if any of the required documents are missing, the Embassy will not proceed with the application.
162. In relation to the portable system for applying for an ID where a home visit is made for biometrics to be taken, Dr Fatah notes that this is reportedly in place in the United Kingdom but not in Iraq, although he gives one example of an elderly seriously ill man in Iraq who was visited at home by a team to obtain his INID; which was an exceptional and compassionate circumstances case and not likely to be a widespread service.
163. In relation to the numbers quoted by Ms Peronius for processed INID applications by the Iraqi Embassy in London, Dr Fatah in cross examination thought that these were a bit high as he had been told that they were processing only 50 a month and because the Embassy is only open for three hours a day on weekdays. He also questioned why so many renewals would be required for INIDs that would have only relatively recently been issued with a ten year validity. However, Dr Fatah confirmed that he had had no direct contact with the Iraqi Embassy in the last 18 months and that he had no direct information himself as to the numbers. In cross-examination he also stated that the person who told him it was only 50 a month may not know the numbers either.

SECTION C – SUBMISSIONS
164. We are grateful to all the advocates for their detailed skeleton arguments and submissions for these appeals, which we set out only in summary form in this decision. In this section we deal with the submissions in relation to the general matters of country guidance before us; with the specific submissions in relation to the individual appeals later in Section I.
165. The headline position of the Respondent is that ethnic Kurds, whose previous residence was in the KRI or the Disputed Territories would be likely to be able to return to airports in the KRI and travel to their home area provided that they have a CSID or INID, or are otherwise able to prove their identity with assistance upon arrival at the airport from family members. Such a person would be able to obtain a new INID from their home area. Conversely, the Respondent accepts that a person returning to the KRI without family support and without a means of establishing their identity and/or obtaining an INID is at risk of enduring conditions contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. However, the Respondent did not concede that either lengthy questioning or short periods of detention at a checkpoint whilst a person satisfies the authorities of their identity would amount to serious harm or risk breaching Article 3 of the ECHR; the latter would only be if there was a much longer or indefinite period of detention.
166. In relation to the issues set out above in paragraph 20; the Respondent’s position (albeit differently structured into five issues) is:
(i) Ethnic Kurds from the KRI have been returned directly to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports since October 2022, including enforced and compliant returns. As of August 2025, ethnic Kurds from the Disputed Territories can also be returned directly to the KRI, with two individuals from Kirkuk identified for imminent return to the KRIxiii. The Respondent however accepts that it is ‘early days’ for such arrangements and would reconsider her position if removal to the KRI is not agreed for any particular ethnic Kurd not originating from the KRI (including the Appellants in these appeals).
(ii) The INID rollout is now essentially complete with CSID cards no longer issued in Iraq and not valid in Iraq as of March 2024. However, CSID cards continue to have utility for the INID process and as a well-established means of identity, although the latter will wane over time following the rollout of INID cards. It remains the case that an INID card is generally necessary for a person to be able to access most private and public services, including financial assistance, employment, housing and healthcare.
(iii) An ethnic Kurd will be able to transit through an airport in the KRI if documented (even if by family members on arrival) and if un-documented, will be able to re-document on return; with an established process for those who arrive at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports, to establish and verify their identity (with assistance from family if needed) and undergo security checks. A residency permit is issued for five or seven days for a person to travel to their home area to complete the re-documentation procedures and communicate their completion to the security services at the airport.
As to travel from the airport to a person’s home area, the Respondent relies on evidence as to where known checkpoints are located and that there are a range of situations a person may face at a checkpoint depending on the local security situation on the day, ranging from not being stopped or asked for identity documentation, to informal conversation, to requiring formal ID, to up to serious risks to a person if they are unable to verify their identity and are seen as a security risk. To verify identity, a person without a CSID or INID card could be assisted by use of a driving licence, a professional ID, documents from the airport or by someone who could vouch for them, such as a male relative or village leader. The Respondent accepts that a laissez-passer would not alone be sufficient to establish a person’s identity at a checkpoint; however a copy of this would likely still assist given that for it to be issued and for a person to leave the airport, their identity must have been verified at least twice and in addition, it would assist in establishing recent return from the United Kingdom.
The Respondent refers to the individualised risk assessment required for a person’s journey to their home area, with reference to the well-established risk factors of (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL; (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL; and (iii) being a single male of fighting age - as per SMO1 which added that a person is likely to be able to evidence a recent return from the United Kingdom to dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
The Respondent accepts that there are examples of alleged incidents of abuse and discrimination at checkpoints, particularly in relation to journalists, activists and due to political conflict.
For re-documentation, there is evidence that all CSA offices in Iraq have reopened and the application process for an INID is straightforward for those in possession of identity documents with a new INID being available in about two weeks. There are processes in place, beginning with obtaining a Suraint Quaid (the family page in the register) or for those whose records were destroyed by ISIS activity, for information to be obtained for the application for an INID to be made. Such information may have already been reconstructed by other family members applying for their INID in Iraq; such that the information may already be more readily available through family. The processes for a person without current identity documents may take several weeks before they can obtain an INID.
(iv) A person is now able to make an application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London either to make a first application following expiry of their CSID, or to replace an existing INID that has been lost or damaged. There are processes in place, as there were for CSID applications, for a power of attorney to be used by a person in the United Kingdom to obtain relevant documentation or information for an application to be made for an INID; with a different process in Federal Iraq and in the KRI for this.
(v) There is no change to the position in respect of the reasonableness of internal relocation to the KRI for returnees of Kurdish ethnicity, as set out previously in AA, AAH and SMO1.
167. The Respondent reiterated that the Upper Tribunal was not being invited to reconsider the country guidance in SMO1 or SMO2 as to the risks of travel by land from Baghdad to northern Iraq without a CSID (or now INID). As to whether there were qualitative differences between a journey from Baghdad and a journey from either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports to a home area in the KRI or Disputed Territories, Mr Thomann KC relied on a number of points of distinction, whilst noting that the previous country guidance specifically did not consider such journeys as at that time, and returns had only recently become practically possible to the KRI. First, the distance and therefore length of journey required from a KRI airport is much shorter, with fewer checkpoints on route. Secondly, family members in the home area will be much more local to an airport in the KRI (within 40 – 60 miles for these Appellants) or to any checkpoints on route to the home area. That means that it would be more likely that family members (or others) would be able to travel to meet an individual on return or on route to vouch for them and to do so more quickly (thus reducing any time a person may be held whilst seeking to verify their identity). This is compared to a journey of over 200 miles from Baghdad airport to northern Iraq or the KRI. Thirdly, the checkpoints in the KRI in particular are likely to be of a more consistent quality and manned either by Peshmerga or Asayish from either the KDP or PUK; rather than a much wider variety of security actors that a person may encounter on a longer journey through federal Iraq. Fourthly, one factor used to help ascertain and verify an individual’s identity is their accent or dialect; which is more likely to be recognisable closer to their home area (as airports in the KRI are, even to those from the Disputed Territories) and a person will have better local knowledge if questioned. Finally, a person’s ethnic background is less likely to be a risk factor if they arrive and travel more within their local area as opposed to a longer journey through Federal Iraq.
168. The Appellants were all separately legally represented; with Mr Bazini (instructed on behalf of AK) taking the lead in the general submissions on country guidance issues, with which the others agreed with supplementary points as needed. We refer collectively to the Appellants’ submissions to encompass all of the general submission points. Individual submissions were made in respect of the outcome of each individual appeal, set out in Section I below.
169. In summary, the Appellants’ headline position is that there is insufficient evidence for this Tribunal to depart from most of the country guidance given in SMO2; the exception being in relation to the completion of the rollout of the INID card to replace the CSID card. In relation to the issues set out in paragraph 20 above, the Appellants’ position is as follows:
(i) Overall, the Appellants’ position is that the Respondent’s evidence in support of any change to the country guidance in relation to the ability of ethnic Kurds to return to the KRI via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports and redocument in their home area is too weak, too vague, unsupported and/or unsourced. There is an almost total lack of relevant examples or case studies to support the Respondent’s propositions.
In particular, first, there is a lack of detail even of the very small number of enforced removals to the KRI since March 2021, with no information about where those individuals were from or what documentation they had (if any) and no information about what barriers they were to higher numbers of removals.
Secondly, much of the same evidence was considered in SMO2 and rejected in that case as not amounting to sufficient cogent evidence to depart from the previous country guidance at that stage. During oral submissions we were taken to the detailed paragraphs in SMO1 and SMO2 which recorded the evidence before the Upper Tribunal at that time; which we refer to as necessary below.
Thirdly, although a procedure for undocumented returnees is set out, there are a lack of examples of this being applied in practice and Dr Fatah’s opinion is that in practice this is not consistent or so straightforward and would depend on the personnel undertaking checks on the day.
Fourthly, the information from Razaq al Mashkoor is unreliable in the absence of any supporting official documentation or statistical evidence and in the absence of further details about the source.
Fifthly, there is a lack of evidence that a laissez-passer can routinely be kept and nothing to support this being used as a form of ID to pass through a checkpoint without risk.
Sixthly, there are inconsistencies in the limited evidence that is available, for example as to the duration of validity of any letters given at the airport, said to be 5, 7 or even 30 days and as to numbers of INIDs issued by the Iraqi Embassy in London.
Separately, the Respondent has not provided any evidence to show any objective differences between the risk at checkpoints from Baghdad to northern Iraq for an undocumented returnee, which are accepted in accordance with the extant country guidance to be an Article 3 risk; and those a person would need to pass through from an airport in the KRI to a home area within the KRI or the Disputed Territories. For the latter, there will be checkpoints within Federal Iraq operated by different parties, including the ISF and PMFs.
(ii) The Appellants accept there is strong, cogent evidence from numerous sources that the INID card has now been fully rolled out and that CSIDs are no longer available for issue. As such, it is accepted that the country guidance in SMO2 should be updated to reflect this.
(iii) The Appellants question the availability of INIDs from the Iraqi Embassy in London; on which the limited evidence from the Embassy itself shows that this is a trial and not a durable change. Dr Fatah’s opinion is that in any event, the process is for members of the diaspora living in the United Kingdom and not for undocumented failed asylum seekers. Further, there is no cogent evidence of any possible process for using a power of attorney to assist a person to obtain an INID given that a power of attorney would also require a person to have some proof of identity and not a single example of anyone being able to use any such process successfully has been provided.
(iv) The Appellants also agree that there is no basis to depart from the country guidance in SMO2 in relation to the reasonableness of internal relocation to the KRI for ethnic Kurds.
(v) In relation to whether male relatives or tribal/village leaders can accompany and vouch for undocumented returnees at checkpoints, the Appellants see no reason to depart from the existing country guidance on this point.
(vi) The Appellants’ position in relation to CSID cards is that they are no longer a valid form of ID in Iraq and if a person attempts to pass through a checkpoint using one, they may be questioned; may be viewed with suspicion and may not be allowed to pass. In any event, an INID is essential for a person to live in Iraq.

SECTION D – LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Departure from extant Country Guidance
170. Direction 12 of the Practice Directions (Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal) dated 10 February 2010 provides as follows:
“12.1 Reported determinations of the Tribunal, the AIT and the IAT which are “starred” shall be treated by the Tribunal as authoritative in respect of the matter to which the “starring” relates, unless inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal.
12.2 A reported determination of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT bearing the letters ‘CG’ shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issues identified in the determination, based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determine the appeal. As a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any later ‘CG’ determination, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal: -
(a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and
(b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.
…
12.4 Because of the principle that like cases should be treated in like manner, any failure to follow a clear, apparently applicable country guidance case or to show why it does not apply to the case in question is likely to be regarded as grounds of appeal on a point of law.
171. There is no dispute between the parties that the requirements for any change to country guidance in a fresh country guidance case (as opposed to consideration of departure from country guidance in an individual appeal) are that (i) material circumstances in the country have changed; and (ii) that such changes are well established and durable (EM & ors (returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC)). The previous country guidance will remain the starting point.
172. Article 3 of the ECHR provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There is no dispute between the parties as to the application of Article 3 to these appeals or the country guidance matters more generally.
173. We deal separately with the relevant legal framework for the issues specific to AH’s new claims in relation to his health and generally his/his family’s Article 8 claims below when considering his individual appeal.

SECTION E – ANALYSIS – RETURNS TO THE KRI
174. In this section we set out our findings on matters relating to returns to the KRI up to and including arrival at the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; following the themes used in section B when setting out the background material and evidence in relation to (i) returns to the KRI.
Who can be returned to the KRI?
175. At the time of the decisions in SMO1 and SMO2, there was insufficient evidence of any direct returns of Iraqi nationals to any airport in the KRI and therefore the country guidance issued in those cases focused solely on returns to Baghdad; albeit in SMO2, Section B stated that return of former residents to the KRI will be to the KRI; which remains the case.
176. Since those appeals, although the numbers of returns are relatively low, there is sufficient evidence before us of returns from the United Kingdom of Iraqi Kurds who were formally resident in the KRI being returned to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports. There was no dispute between the parties as to the Respondent’s figures for returns in the last five years and it is irrelevant to the fact of such returns what the profile of those returned was beyond their Kurdish ethnicity and former residence in the KRI.
177. We find however that the position is different in relation to ethnic Kurds from the Disputed Territories. Up to the point of the first day of the hearing, the Respondent’s published position was that such persons were returnable to the airports in the KRI of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. That was corrected at the hearing and the Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025 was amended shortly thereafter; that in fact, no returns of anyone from the Disputed Territories had been to the KRI; all were returned to Baghdad. Although we were not given a full explanation for this error or why such returns had not been happening, it appears that there was a lack of agreement with the relevant authorities in Federal Iraq (and possibly in the KRI) to facilitate such returns; meaning a practical rather than legal impediment so far as we can infer.
178. The Respondent’s position is that a new agreement signed in August 2025 now permits and facilitates returns to the KRI of ethnic Kurds from the Disputed Territories; but as at the date of hearing (September 2025), no such removals had as yet taken place. We were not provided with a copy of the agreement, nor even any details contained within it as to the circumstances or practicalities of a return of an ethnic Kurd from the Disputed Territories to the KRI; nor whether these would in substance be any different than for an ethnic Kurd. Whilst we understand the potentially sensitive nature of international relations, the lack of detail as to the agreement or how it will operate; with no evidence of it being used so far; leaves us unable to conclude that there is at the present time sufficient evidence to find that such persons can or will be returned to the KRI rather than Baghdad. As such, there is insufficient evidence of any durable change as yet to the location of returns to those who were not former residents of the KRI to amend Section B of the country guidance to state that ethnic Kurds from the Disputed Territories will be returned to the KRI, or to the nearest airport to their home area.
179. As set out below, we have in any event considered and made findings on the onward journey from the KRI to the Disputed Territories should that become relevant for any individual. We find that there is no reason in principle why an ethnic Kurd from the Disputed Territories would be in any different position to an ethnic Kurd from the KRI on arrival to either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah and none was suggested by either party; nor did any such notion appear in any of the evidence before us.
180. In these circumstances, going forward, it is not necessary to be prescriptive in country guidance as to where a person will be returned based on their former residence in the Disputed Territories. As in paragraph 20 of the country guidance in SMO2, it remains for the Respondent to state whether she intends to remove an individual to Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah and we note the stated intention to remove individuals to the airport closes to their home area and in relation to the KRI, to the airport within the same governorate (or same authority in the case of Dohuk governorate). In the first instance, it is a matter for the Respondent to ensure the practicality of the destination an individual basis; thereafter making the appropriate assessment of whether the person would be at risk of conditions breaching Article 3 of the ECHR following arrival at that specified destination in accordance with what is set out below.
What documents are required for return to the KRI?
181. We were not invited to, nor was there any evidence before us to suggest any change to the position as to what documents are required for a return to the KRI; which remain either an Iraqi passport of a laissez-passer. The latter is on application on a case-by-case basis through the Iraqi Embassy in London to establish that a person is an Iraqi national. There was no real dispute before us as to the process followed, set out above in the background evidence.
Procedures on arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports
182. There are three separate issues raised before us in relation to what happens on a person’s arrival at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports; the first is as to what happens to the laissez-passer; the second is the procedure before a person is able to leave the airport and the final issue is what documents, if any, a person will be given at the airport for their onward journey.
183. First, in relation to the laissez-passer, the evidence before us is consistent that a person will not be able to keep the original document and of itself it would be little use to a person to do so in any event as it is not recognised as an identity document in the KRI or Federal Iraq. We note in particular that the Respondent did not invite us to depart from the previous country guidance on this point; nor did any of the Appellants invite us to depart from the previous country guidance that returning on a laissez-passer did not of itself put a person at risk at the point of return at the airport.
184. However, there was evidence before us from different sources, including from Ms Peronius and Dr Fatah (and their own sources from the Iraqi authorities); that a person would be able to keep a copy of their laissez-passer on request – a point not expressly considered in previous country guidance (which focused on whether the original could be retained for onward travel by land or by air). The only possible difference from what was broadly consistent evidence of a person being able to keep a copy of their laissez-passer was from an official at the Security Department at Erbil airport who stated in July 2025 that a laissez-passer will be confiscated on return; albeit that evidence did not expressly deal with whether a copy could be taken beforehand and does not therefore directly contradict the other sources on this more specific point; there being no dispute that the original can not be retained by a person.
185. In her evidence, Ms Peronius also referred to a cover letter being provided with a laissez-passer which confirms that a person has been verified by the Iraqi Embassy as an Iraqi national. No example of any such letter has been submitted to the Upper Tribunal and in any event, we are not persuaded that even if such a letter was commonly provided, that it would add anything of value to a person with a copy of their laissez-passer; the issue of which itself indicates that a person has been found to be an Iraqi national and as below; additional checks are made on a person’s identity on arrival in any event.
186. The second issue is the procedure on arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports for a returnee arriving without identity documentation beyond a laissez-passer. The evidence before us was broadly consistent that such a person (i) would be interviewed and required to give personal and family details, as well as details about where they were from; (ii) would undergo a security check; (iii) would be asked to phone someone to bring their ID to the airport or vouch for them (starting with an immediate family member; then another paternal family member; then any other relative); (iv) be issued with a residency permit pending proof of identity; and finally (v) would then be able to leave the airport, with conditions for redocumentation and confirmation of the same.
187. This is, in broad terms, the process set out by Dr Fatah in both his latest expert report from information obtained from the authorities in Iraq in 2020 which he states has not changed and his statement set out in the Inspection Report on Country of Origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma) under taken by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI), June 2023. There is a slightly different process set out by Dr Fatah later in the same expert report following information given by a security official at Erbil airport in July 2025, but which in essence still follows the same broad requirements of gathering information about a person, their family and residence; a security check (which would include a check on involvement in political activities abroad). The main difference between the first two accounts and the latter one is as to the level of detail about contact with others to obtain or confirm identity; and as to documentation given to an individual for when they leave the airport (the latter indicating more documentation may now be given than before). We do not consider there are any fundamental differences or changes between the accounts that would undermine the broad process applied when an undocumented person arrives at either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports.
188. Dr Fatah’s evidence was that the process set out on arrival may be more straightforward if a person had any Iraqi documentation, even a photocopy of the same, available to them. That would be entirely expected as such documentation is likely to contain at least some of the information, particularly family details, that a person may otherwise be asked to provide. As a general matter, we consider in all of the issues covered in these appeals; the more information and documentation a person has, even if copies, the easier any of the processes will be for a person.
189. To the contrary, Dr Fatah also suggested that the process may be more complicated than set out, depending on the particular day and local security situation or the individuals involved. He also suggested that there may be differences between practices at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports, with the latter having the possibility of a person organising their return in advance. There were however no sources given for any of these additional comments and no examples of what the differences may be or in what specific circumstances. The comments are, in our view, in line with a general theme of Dr Fatah’s evidence that much of what happens in Iraq does not follow a set or standard procedure and can be arbitrary. However, the comments are not sufficiently detailed for us to doubt the much clearer and consistent evidence he (and others) have given over an extended period of time about the broad procedures followed on arrival at both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports for an undocumented returnee.
190. In relation to the information sought from an individual, the Respondent submitted two examples of forms from the ‘Residence and Passport Centre of Erbil International Airport, Information of citizens who are returning to the Kurdistan Region from abroad’ which sets out the list of information gathered. There was no information as to whether these forms were for internal use or whether a copy was given to the returnee as well; but in any event, given it contains only information given by the returnee it is doubtful whether keeping a copy of such a form would be of any use as it simply records information gathered, we presume to assist the authorities at the airport in satisfying themselves of a person’s identity and for security checks to be undertaken (which may include checks on family members for any ISIL links). These forms are also broadly consistent with Dr Fatah’s evidence of what is required from a person on arrival to assist with establishing a person’s identity and to assist with the security check undertaken.
191. There was no suggestion in any of the evidence before us that there was any risk to an undocumented person on return to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports; nor that ultimately, any risk that such a person would be detained for any unreasonable period of time at the airport or risk that they would be subjected to ill-treatment; even if they had not been able to produce any form of identity documentation beyond the laissez-passer that they travelled on, and had no family member or other person available to vouch for them on arrival.
192. The third issue is as to what, if any documents (beyond a copy of their laissez-passer), a person is given at either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports before leaving the airport. As above, there is insufficient evidence before us of any covering letter to a laissez-passer being issued, let alone given to a person when they leave the airport. The main issue is as to whether any kind of authorisation, permit or other certificate is issued. We deal in this section only with whether such a document is given; rather than of what use it may be to a person, which we deal with below when considering internal travel from the airport to a person’s home area. We refer in general terms to an ‘authorisation letter’ as before us there were references to various different names or descriptions for what we consider most likely to refer, in different ways, to the same, single type of document given at the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The references include a residency permit, a ‘do not interfere’ letter, a permit to travel, an authorisation letter and a certification letter.
193. There is separate reference by Dr Fatah to information from an official in the security department of Erbil airport in July 2025 of a person being given a security code and, if they are the head of a family, a residence card as well. We had no further information on either of these things, the first of which at least we consider is of a different nature to the authorisation letter we are considering here; and although the residence card may be similar, this seems more akin to the formal residence card used throughout Iraq and considered in previous country guidance decisions. There is insufficient evidence before us as to the precise nature of these documents. We cannot say that they are issued routinely or in a consistent manner. In any event, there was nothing to suggest that any such documents would be of any assistance to a person on their onward journey to their home area.
194. The Respondent’s evidence, through sources in Iraq and examples of such documents(the English translations are at Annex C) is that an undocumented person is given an authorisation letter at both Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports which sets out their basic details and a period of time (usually five days) for which it is valid to enable a person, on its face, to travel back to their home area to redocument themselves as needed.
195. The Respondent’s evidence lacked further detail as to what all of the specific sections of the authorisation letter meant or what it was intended for; however at least some of the document was self-explanatory. The examples submitted were also templates from 2022, without any completed examples being available. However, we do not consider that this of itself detracts from the authorisation letters which have been submitted and completed examples would add little to our consideration of whether such an authorisation letter existed and was used.
196. Dr Fatah’s evidence in relation to whether such an authorisation letter existed or was given out at the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah was contradictory and unclear; without any express conclusion or explanation for the wide differences in his evidence on this. We do not accept that the differences were due to contradictions in accounts given to Dr Fatah given the way his evidence was presented on this issue, which did not identify or explain inconsistencies in sources of information he refers to. The inconsistencies were within his own evidence or when set against the sources he relies upon elsewhere. Dr Fatah’s evidence both over time and in the course of present proceedings varied significantly between never having heard of such an authorisation letter and not accepting it existed; to having heard of one but not seen one; to clear statements of authorisation letters being used and given to people at these locations. We note, as above when making general points as to the evidence, that there was both a lack of detailed inquiry on this issue and that it would not necessarily be expected (or likely) that Dr Fatah or even his associates in Iraq would have had any personal experience of such documentation that they could draw upon.
197. Overall, although there were significant variations in Dr Fatah’s evidence on whether an authorisation letter was issued at an airport in the KRI, we find that on balance, his evidence contained more examples of an authorisation letter existing and being given to an undocumented person than not. We do not consider that his lack of any personal experience of or having seen an authorisation letter detracts from the variety of other accounts of such a document that he has given over a lengthy period of time.
198. We note that Dr Fatah first referred to an authorisation letter given at the airports in the KRI in his evidence to the Upper Tribunal in SMO2 (which he also referred to in oral evidence before us). That decision, when considering whether such a document was issued at Baghdad airport, includes the following:
“100. In frank recognition of these difficulties, the respondent relied on Dr Fatah’s evidence that he had learned of the authorities at Erbil airport issuing something which he had heard described as a ‘do not interfere’ letter. In his report, he stated that the document indicated that the returnee had been through an official investigation process and that they were free to resettle in Iraq. The document was valid for a certain period of time until Iraqi documentation had been obtained. Mr Thomann asked Dr Fatah a number of questions about this, in answer to which he emphasised that what he had been told was specific to Kurdistan and that he had never heard of a comparable process in government-controlled Iraq. Nor, it seems, have any of the international actors on the ground in Baghdad. In the circumstances, we decline to draw any inference from the process which Dr Fatah described in Erbil. If there was such a thing as a supporting letter which was issued at Baghdad International Airport to those without acceptable documentation, we consider that a specimen of that document would have been provided and that we would have been told something about those who have previously relied on it for onward travel. As it stands, we have no specimen and the only evidence of this document existing in government-controlled Iraq is from the Iraqi authorities themselves. There is, in sum, no cogent evidence which justifies departure from the conclusions we reached in our first decision.
199. We pause to note that we are not considering any departure from the country guidance in SMO2 on the issue of an authorisation letter at an airport in the KRI given that that case only considered and made findings on the procedures on arrival and departure from Baghdad airport and expressly did not consider the same for arrivals in the KRI given at that time, there was insufficient evidence of returns to there having taken place.
200. Dr Fatah’s evidence describing the process for undocumented returns at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, in all three versions set out above, referred to a person being given a document described as a residency permit, which is time limited pending proof of their identity. Elsewhere in his expert report, Dr Fatah also states that an undocumented Iraqi Kurd from the Disputed Territories would be given a paper on return at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airport to return to their home area to redocument themselves. When asked specifically if he had any reason to doubt the existence of an authorisation letter from airports in the KRI, Dr Fatah stated that he did not doubt them, only questioned their use. The instances of Dr Fatah denying the existence of an authorisation letter were far less frequent, less detailed and lacked reasoning and we therefore prefer the evidence that authorisation letters do exist and is routinely given to returnees at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports; which is also consistent with the Respondent’s evidence and documentary examples of it.

SECTION F – ANALYSIS – INTERNAL TRAVEL WITHIN THE KRI AND TO THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES
201. In this section we first set out our findings on whether there is a risk of treatment which would contravene Article 3 to a returnee at a checkpoint; and then on matters relating more specifically to internal travel within the KRI and to the Disputed Territories from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports. At the outset, we note that in terms of the extant country guidance in SMO2, this relates only to internal travel in Federal Iraq from Baghdad airport and not to any internal travel within or from the KRI. To this extent, it is only in relation to travel outside of the KRI and into the Disputed Territories that we will need to consider whether there are sufficient grounds for departure from the country guidance in SMO2.
Is there a real risk of treatment in contravention of Article 3 at a checkpoint?
202. Before turning to the different areas of travel which may be required for a person to return to their home area, we set out our findings in general on what the risks of treatment in contravention of Article 3 at a checkpoint may be; with or without an INID or other similarly acceptable form of identity documentation or verification. We note at the outset that this may differ between checkpoints operated by different actors and that there are both factual differences and a difference in the test we need to apply as between findings in relation to checkpoints in the KRI (upon which there is no extant country guidance) and those in the Disputed Territories which are within Federal Iraq (currently covered by the country guidance in SMO2).
203. In relation to any checkpoints either in the KRI or in Federal Iraq, the position of all parties is that there is no such Article 3 risk to a returnee who is travelling with their INID; which is an acceptable form of identification for passing through checkpoints. We consider below whether there are any suitable alternative means available to a person to establish their identity at a checkpoint to reduce or avoid any such Article 3 risk.
204. Although the parties’ accept that a person with an INID or equivalent accepted identity document would not face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 travelling in the KRI or Federal Iraq, that does not in our view detract in any way from the country guidance in SMO2 in section A as to the “sliding scale” assessment required to determine whether a person is generally at risk on return for the purposes of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive and/or Article 3 of the ECHR; with such risks in our view remaining present at checkpoints whether or not a person has an INID or can otherwise establish their identity, in the same way as they would in Iraq more generally.
205. In particular, we would emphasise the evidence before us of the focus on identification for security purposes (for which the INID is a more secure document for identity purposes) at checkpoints; with one of the main security concerns being in relation to ISIL and whether a person has an actual or perceived association with ISIL (the other concerns being criminality and political opposition); which is consistent with paragraph 31 of the country guidance in SMO2, which states:
“31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional facts that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.”
206. These factors were accepted more generally by the Respondent as continuing to be the relevant assessment for whether a person would be considered to pose a security risk when stopped at a checkpoint.
207. On the last point about a person being able to evidence recent arrival from the United Kingdom, it is here that we find that (i) a copy of a laissez-passer may assist a person in evidencing this, even if it is not recognised as a valid identity document, it will have a validity date for travel from the United Kingdom to Iraq to show a recent return and (ii) the document issued at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports will also contain a return date to the KRI, which will also evidence a recent return. This should assist in dispelling any concern that a person is travelling directly from an area associated with ISIL.
208. Separately, although not specifically relied upon by any of the parties; we also take into account some limited background country evidence that was before the Upper Tribunal in SMO1xiv and the EUAA Country Guidance: Iraq. Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024 before us; that there may be difficulties (extra administrative and security barriers) in obtaining civil documentation for those with actual or perceived ISIL affiliation. The lack of an INID itself may also therefore give rise to suspicion of a person having an actual or perceived ISIL affiliation. However, we consider it likely that a person can dispel any such suspicions for this reason again by showing recent travel from outside of Iraq and an intended return to their home area to obtain an INID. Further, we note that in the EUAA Country Guidance: Iraq. Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024, that the lack of identity documentation was not listed as a driver for perceived affiliation with ISIL.
209. In terms of whether there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 at a checkpoint for a person otherwise unable to establish their identity; we did question at the hearing the basis for any finding that there was, given in particular the lack of specific evidence before us as to the nature of activities at checkpoints, how many people are stopped, how many are detained and/or ill-treated, which people were stopped, detained or ill-treated (i.e. was this only those who did not have acceptable identification, or was it particular groups, such as political opponents; those with actual or perceived ISIL affiliation; journalists and so on); which would give an indication of whether there was a real risk for a particular individual by reason of a lack of sufficient identity documentation or verification.
210. We also questioned this given the evidence from the Ambassador to the British Embassy in Iraq and Dr Fatah that not everyone is even stopped at a checkpoint or if they are stopped, not everyone is asked for ID nor prevented from passing through the checkpoint without it.
211. We do however acknowledge background country evidence (as set out above and not repeated here), including that referred to in previous country guidance decisions; which give examples of ill-treatment and arbitrary detention, often of particular groups both generally in the KRI and Federal Iraq, albeit the focus of these are not on those without identity documentation per se but more on groups such as journalists, human rights activities, protestors and those with actual or perceived ISIL affiliation. There are very limited examples in relation to checkpoints specifically. However, there is little dispute in the background country evidence that ill-treatment occurs and no dispute that the risks of this increase for people without acceptable identity documentation (albeit with no evidence at all of the scale of it happening, particularly at checkpoints).
212. On behalf of the Respondent, it was not conceded that there was in general an Article 3 risk at every checkpoint, for every person without a specific acceptable form of identity documentation such as an INID; with more of a sliding scale assessment being required. That is consistent with Dr Fatah’s evidence in particular that (i) what happens at checkpoints does not follow any standard practice and can depend on the individuals involved; the day to day security situation and can be arbitrary; and (ii) not everyone is stopped at checkpoints; if they are stopped, not everyone is asked for identity documentation and even if such documentation is not available, not everyone is prevented from passing through the checkpoint even after questioning.
213. Further, specifically, it was not conceded by the Respondent that either lengthy questioning or short periods of detention at a checkpoint would meet the Article 3 threshold. However, it was accepted that if a person was detained for a much longer or indefinite period; that would meet the threshold of a real risk of a breach of Article 3.
214. In the absence of any evidence before us as to the point at which a person may (or may not) be likely to be detained for an unspecified longer or indefinite period of detention at a checkpoint such as to risk a breach of Article 3; or any actual examples of the circumstances where this has happened (particularly for undocumented returnees) and the fluctuating and arbitrary nature of operations at checkpoints, we are bound to accept in general terms that there remains, at some point, a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 at a checkpoint for a person who is unable to establish their identity. The actual likelihood of this can not be quantified on the very limited evidence before us.
215. We do however consider factors which are likely to impact upon whether a person can establish their identity even without an INID such that there would be a reduced or no risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3; which may differ as between checkpoints in the KRI and the Disputed Territories and as between checkpoints manned by different actors and in different areas, such as borders between governorates and between the KRI and Federal Iraq. Where we consider there to be a difference, we address that explicitly; in all other cases, we consider the same conclusions are reached generally for checkpoints regardless of their locations. In particular, we note that Dr Fatah’s evidence was in the main in general terms rather than specific to particular checkpoints, actors manning them or geographical areas.
216. First, we consider whether any other identity documents can be used to establish a person’s identity at a checkpoint.
217. We have to no reason to doubt the consistent evidence of both the Ambassador in the British Embassy in Baghdad and Dr Fatah that an Iraqi driving licence would also be an acceptable form of identification for passing through checkpoints, although we note that this has been raised in evidence in previous country guidance appeals but without any clear findings of its use. We think it likely to be an acceptable form of identification at a checkpoint given that a driving licence is a document that we would expect to be a familiar one to anyone manning a checkpoint at a roadside (even ill-trained militia who were the primary concern in previous country guidance). However, there is no direct evidence before us of examples of a driving licence being used successfully at checkpoints and no specificity in the evidence before us as to whether this must be a valid driving licence or a particular type of driving licence (having seen reference in the background material to a newer digital driving licence) and as such, there is insufficient evidence before us to find with certainty that driving licences would be acceptable as a substitute for an INID.
218. In the absence of an INID; Dr Fatah’s evidence was that a professional ID or trade union card may in the alternative be acceptable. However, there were no recent examples of either being acceptable, nor any that show this would be standard practice across checkpoints or any group of actors manning checkpoints. In any event, given Dr Fatah’s evidence that such a document would not be valid after a person leaves the relevant employment; it would in our view be unlikely that any otherwise undocumented returnees from the United Kingdom would have a valid professional ID on return to Iraq to use as an alternative identity document.
219. There was no dispute between the parties, nor any invitation to us to reconsider previous country guidance findings that neither an Iraqi passport; a laissez-passer, nor a 1957 Registration Document would be acceptable forms of identification akin to an INID to enable a person to establish their identity to pass through a checkpoint.
220. Historically, prior to the introduction of INID cards, a CSID was the primary accepted form of identification for a person at a checkpoint and that continued for at least some time since the introduction of the INID in 2015 or 2016 to remain valid and used for this purpose. However, as of 1 March 2024 CSID cards are no longer a valid form of identification in Iraq, having been replaced by the INID. The issue is whether in any event, a person could still use a CSID at a checkpoint to verify their identity.
221. The Respondent’s position is that a person with a CSID could still use that as acceptable identification at a checkpoint, albeit she recognises that such use is likely to continue to diminish over time as the INID roll out progresses to completion. That is consistent with what was in the Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns CPIN 2025, albeit no external sources are cited for this information.
222. Dr Fatah’s evidence as to the continuing ability to use a CSID was more equivocal, that it may be accepted, but that a person doing so is likely to be viewed with suspicion as there is no reason why a person in Iraq would not have applied for an INID. As above, we consider that such suspicion could be dispelled by a person showing that they had recently returned to Iraq and intended to apply for an INID at their local CSA office on return. A person who has their CSID card could also use the number on this to book an appointment to apply for an INID in advance of travel and if a confirmation has been received of such an appointment, may also be able to therefore show the same to further dispel concerns about why they do not yet have an INID and their intention to obtain one.
223. We find that as at the date of hearing and likely for a further, limited, period of time, although the CSID card is no longer a valid identity document for general purposes in Iraq; that it would be of assistance to a person at a checkpoint to establish their identity shortly after their return to Iraq. It is a well recognised document in Iraq containing sufficient personal information for a name and family details to be checked against any relevant security list or databases and any returnee will be able to explain why he has not yet obtained an INID having recently returned to Iraq.
224. We agree with the Respondent that the continuing acceptance of a CSID for these purposes will diminish over time as the roll out of the INID is completed. The latest figures before us were that at the end of 2024, over 42 million people have registered for an INID card out of an estimated population of 45.4 million (not all of whom are Iraqi nationals eligible for an INID card). It would be reasonable to expect that figure to now be higher and for the end of the roll-out to be near completion, although it is not possible to predict at what point that will be considered complete and there could still be a further, albeit short period of time after which CSID cards may have this limited utility for an otherwise undocumented returnee.
225. Dr Fatah also stated that when a person applies for an INID, their CSID is returned to them while the application is being processed with the corner cut and a person will also be given a temporary document/receipt to show their INID application (with an example provided). In these circumstances, we accept his evidence that these two things together would provide sufficient confirmation of a person’s identity at a checkpoint and would be a process that would be familiar in Iraq for anyone manning a checkpoint to recognise.
226. Finally, Dr Fatah’s evidence, consistent with the information in the Respondent’s Response to an information request, Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, January 2025, is that copies of identity documents (either available on a phone or in photocopy format) may also be sufficient for a person to use to establish their identity at a checkpoint. However, both sources stated that the ability to use copies would ultimately depend on who is manning a particular checkpoint at the relevant time. We find copies of documents may reduce any risk to a person not otherwise able to establish their identity at a checkpoint, but there is insufficient evidence before us to find that alone, copies would be sufficient to remove such a risk on a consistent basis.
227. Secondly, we consider whether the authorisation letter given at the airports in Erbil or Sulaymaniyah (the English translations of which are at Annex C) will assist a person at a checkpoint.
228. As above, we have found that authorisation letters are routinely issued to returnees at the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The two examples we have (at Annex C) differ slightly, but common features of both are that they are issued by the relevant authorities in each governorate and contain contact details which we would infer could be used by anyone presented with such an authorisation letter to check its authenticity. The authorisation letter will show the date upon which a person returned to the KRI and be valid for, on its face for 5 days. As an official letter from the authorities, we find that it does indicate that there would have been checks on the identity of the person named in the letter before it was issued and before they were permitted to leave the airport.
229. The two example authorisation letters at Annex C (which contains the English translations) both have blank spaces to fill in for ‘citizen’, ‘carrier of’ and for the one from Sulaymaniyah and addition space for ‘with number’. There was no specific evidence before us as to what, in particular ‘carrier of’ referred to; but we consider it sufficiently clear on its face that these parts are simply to identify the name of the individual and any documentation they may hold (and its reference number for the document from Sulaymaniyah airport).
230. The uncertainty in relation to the authorisation letters is what the references to ‘please facilitate him’ mean and more specifically, whether this document can be used at a checkpoint to assist a person.
231. From the procedures we have found to apply at the airport, it seems likely that these authorisation letters are issued to facilitate a person’s return to their home area to redocument themselves as needed, which is likely to include a need to obtain an INID but may also be for things like the residency permit that a person needs to apply for or other registration in their local area for a similar purpose. The procedure at the airport envisages that a person will need to return to their local CSA office to obtain an INID and that in some cases, a family member or local Mukhtar would act as guarantor for them to do so; with a return date to show that this has been done or at least the process started to obtain the relevant other documentation needed for such an application. This latter process indicates to us that there must be some confidence when the authorities issue an authorisation letter that it will assist a person being able to both return to their home area and at least start the re-documentation process; and be able to travel back to the airport to evidence it, in less than a week.
232. The document issued at Sulaymaniyah airport specifically requests that the person is allowed to travel within the provinces of the Kurdistan Region and we would infer that the validity of the document issued from Erbil airport would have the same geographical reach given that both are essentially issued under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional Government which has authority only in respect of the KRI and not in Federal Iraq.
233. There was limited evidence before us as to the use of the authorisation letters issued at the airports in the KRI and Dr Fatah stated that he had no personal knowledge of the use of such a document, a point which we would not, as already considered, find surprising given the relatively low number of returns to the KRI in recent years and that there would be no obvious reason why Dr Fatah would be able to identity or have contact with any such returnees to find actual examples. Similarly, we have no completed examples or case studies from the Respondent of the use of an authorisation letter (who would have details of those actually returned), even indirectly from the authorities in the KRI.
234. However, in all of the circumstances, we consider that an authorisation letter would be sufficient for a person to establish their identity at a checkpoint in the KRI shortly after their arrival such that there would not be a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on their return to their home area within the KRI to redocument. In particular, we rely on these being formal documents, issued by relevant authorities in the KRI, following a detailed identity and security check on all returnees and which contain contact details for any person presented with it to verify the information contained on it. Further, that within the KRI, the same political authorities will be those responsible for issuing the letters in a particular governorate and manning the checkpoints in the same governorate (or in Dohuk, the same authorities as those at Erbil airport).
235. However, we do not consider that an authorisation letter would be sufficient outside of the territory of the KRI and in the Disputed Territories (or Federal Iraq more widely). In particular, there is nothing before us to suggest that documents issued by the authorities in the KRI, particularly the one that on its face expressly refers to travel within the KRI, would be recognised by the wider variety of different actors who may man checkpoints in Federal Iraq, which would include local militia and ISF. Reliance on such a document said to be issued by the authorities at Baghdad airport for overland travel in Federal Iraq was expressly rejected by the Upper Tribunal in SMO2 and there is essentially no evidence before us to warrant even a consideration of departing from that in the present case in relation to use of an authorisation letter at checkpoints in the Disputed Territories or Federal Iraq more generally.
236. Thirdly, we consider whether another person can attend a checkpoint with their own identity documents to vouch for a person’s identity.
237. There was little in the way of evidence before us as to whether a person could vouch for someone at a checkpoint if they were otherwise unable to establish their identity themselves; none directly from the Respondent and nothing of detail in the background country evidence. The primary source of evidence on this point is therefore from Dr Fatah, but that was not entirely consistent or clear as to who or in what circumstances this may be sufficient; nor if it may vary between different checkpoints or different actors manning them (subject to his overall evidence of a lack of consistency and a degree of arbitrariness at checkpoints).
238. Dr Fatah was consistent in his evidence that if a high-ranking member of a political party attended a checkpoint to vouch for a person, that would be sufficient for them to pass without difficulty. This was on the basis that no one would interfere with the influence of a party official and in a similar way, a group of peshmerga or soldiers would also likely to be persuasive on behalf of a person.
239. As to whether a local Mukhtar or family member would be sufficient to vouch for a person at a checkpoint, Dr Fatah was less clear before us that they would have sufficient influence; although it may be possible for a family member to bring documents to a person at a checkpoint or to vouch for them in combination with some other documents such as one from the airport in Erbil or Sulaymaniyah. However, we note that this is inconsistent with his evidence in the past, going back as far as that given in AAH, that a person who was unable to produce an acceptable form of ID will be detained and that normally what happens next is that the soldiers will call a member of the person’s family to bring their documents and/or vouch for them.
240. We find it possible, but probably unlikely, that a family member from within a relatively local area (in the KRI in particular and even from the Disputed Territories) would attend a checkpoint in support of a person to bring that person’s documents but would not already have been contacted and done the same at the airport given the likely contact that would be made with them at that initial stage and benefit of that person travelling with such documentation from the outset.
241. Although we understand Dr Fatah’s reasoning as to why a high-ranking official would be of more assistance than a local Mukhtar or family member at a checkpoint; it is difficult to see why the latter would be acceptable for the authorities at the airport to vouch for a person’s identity to allow them to leave there; but would not be acceptable at a checkpoint, particularly in the KRI where, as we have referred above and below, the same authorities would be involved in both in a particular governorate.
242. We also consider that Dr Fatah’s evidence is, at least in respect of checkpoints in the Disputed Territories (and any wider in Federal Iraq), at odds both with his previous evidence and more importantly, at odds with the country guidance in paragraph 29 of SMO2 which states as follows:
“29. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.”
243. Overall, we do not consider that there is sufficiently clear and cogent evidence of any change in position from that country guidance in respect of travel within Federal Iraq to depart from that guidance as to the availability and use of a male family member or someone else with connections (be that a Mukhtar or higher ranking official) to verify a person’s identity at a checkpoint in the Disputed Territories (save for those manned by Shia militia pursuant to paragraph 11 of SMO2), in conjunction with the availability of some form of identity document (as per our findings above). We note in particular that no such departure or change was sought by the Appellants either. We see no reason to consider that the position would be any different at checkpoints in the KRI and there was no clear or specific evidence before us to support any different finding in respect of checkpoints in that region.
244. Finally, Dr Fatah referred to individuals at a checkpoint being subjected to questions to identify a person’s accent and dialect to determine their home area and form part of a security risk assessment. Whilst we have no reason to doubt that this can be part of the process and checks on an individual, we find it unlikely that alone this would be sufficient to satisfy all but the very remote local checkpoints (such as those referred to by Dr Fatah in the mountainous regions) as to a person’s identity or whether they posed a security risk.
245. In conclusion, we find in general terms that there are a number of other documents and ways in which a person can sufficiently satisfactorily establish their identity at a checkpoint, particularly in the KRI, so as to reduce, if not avoid the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3; particularly bearing in mind the variable level of stops and scrutiny that may occur, if at all. These are individually, an Iraqi driving licence; a CSID; a CSID with a cut corner and a letter confirming an INID application; and within the KRI only, a document issued by the authorities at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports. In addition, a combination of these or other documents, or copies of the same, and/or attendance by someone who can vouch for a person (a family member, local Mukhtar or high-ranking official); is also likely to be sufficient. Overall, the greater the number of identity documents or copies available to a person and greater the influence of a person attending, the less the risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 at a checkpoint.
Internal travel from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to destinations within the KRI
246. At the outset, given the focus on the risk to a person at a checkpoint travelling overland from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports to destinations within the KRI, we consider first what, if any checkpoints they will need to pass to return to a home area within the KRI.
247. In the evidence before us from both parties, from the maps provided by the Respondent as to locations of checkpoints and the evidence from Dr Fatah; we find that there are checkpoints on the perimeter of both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports which a person must pass through to leave the airport, there being no alternative routes available to do so. However, we do not consider that there is any real risk to a person on seeking to pass through such checkpoints, even without an acceptable form of identity documentation for two main reasons.
248. First, we accept Dr Fatah’s evidence both generally that not everyone will be stopped and asked for ID (which is consistent with the Respondent’s evidence, particularly from the Ambassador to the British Embassy in Iraq) and specifically at these checkpoints, ID is not always required and the more stringent checks are for those seeking to enter the airport rather than leave it.
249. Secondly, any checkpoint at the perimeter of the airport is, in accordance with the consistent evidence before us as to checkpoints being manned by those locally in power in the KRI, going to be manned by the same groups as those authorities in control at the airport itself – namely the KDP in Erbil or the PUK in Sulaymaniyah. If a person has been permitted to leave the airport following a second confirmation of their identity as an Iraqi national (the first being for the issue of their laissez-passer for travel or Iraqi passport to have reached the airport at all) and having not been assessed as a security threat through the processes set out above at the airport; there is no reason why the same controlling authorities would, immediately thereafter and with the benefit of a document confirming their identity from the authorities inside the airport, not reach the same conclusion that a person is who they say they are and does not pose any security threat such that they should not pass without any risk of ill-treatment.
250. After leaving the vicinity of the airport, there is then the question of what, if any checkpoints a person will need to pass through to get to their home area within the KRI. In the present appeals, none of the individual Appellants is from the KRI and therefore we do not consider any specific routes to destinations solely within the KRI and instead deal with the generalities of overland travel within the KRI.
251. As a starting point, it is common ground that a person is likely to be returned to the airport closest to their home area, so for those originating from the Sulaymaniyah governorate, it will be to Sulaymaniyah airport and for those originating from the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil, it will be to Erbil airport. As such, a person returning to their home area in the KRI is likely only to have to travel either within a single governorate (Sulaymaniyah) or within two governorates (Erbil and Dohuk) and in each case the area would fall under the same political control.
252. We have considered carefully the maps submitted by the Respondent and the specific analysis of the location of checkpoints (with the caveats expressly given to those); with which Dr Fatah broadly agreed as to the location of the checkpoints (albeit without personal knowledge of all of them). In relation to travel from Sulaymaniyah airport, we note that there are no checkpoints after the airport to travel into the city itself; that there are relatively few checkpoints on routes to the east, south and west of the airport; and that there are relatively more to the north and north-west. We also take into account that the Respondent has set out a proposed route from Sulaymaniyah city travelling to the north and north-east to Dukan (and then on to Erbil and Kirkuk) which would not require a person to go through any checkpoints. In the absence of any specific destinations within Sulaymaniyah relevant to the appeals before us, we go no further than finding that on the evidence before us, there are likely to be numerous destinations within that governorate which individuals could return to without having to pass any checkpoints at all after leaving the vicinity of the airport.
253. In relation to travel from Erbil airport, it is more difficult to make similar general observations as to checkpoints given the larger geographical area of the governorates of Erbil and Dohuk; although we note variations in the number of checkpoints in different areas and directions, with some clusters of checkpoints and some areas with relatively few. As with travel from Sulaymaniyah city, the Respondent has provided two routes from Erbil to Mosul (although in the Disputed Territories, the beginning of the route is in the same governorate) and towards Dukan which, given the evidence before us, do not require a person to pass through any checkpoint. As above, however, we find it likely that there are numerous destinations within Erbil and Dohuk governorates to which individuals can travel from the vicinity of Erbil airport without having to pass any checkpoints at all.
254. The evidence before us is not sufficiently specific or detailed to be able to find that there will always be routes for travel within the KRI which do not require a person to pass through a checkpoint at all and we do not need to consider any specific destinations in the KRI for the purposes of these appeals. However, we note from the detailed map evidence that it is possible that a person may be able to travel within the KRI avoiding the need to pass through any checkpoints after leaving the vicinity of the airport. That is also consistent with Dr Fatah’s evidence of there being a number of possible routes that a person can take for destinations which can avoid checkpoints. For any proposed returnees to the KRI, a fact sensitive assessment, potentially requiring a mapped route, may be required to determine whether a person will need to pass a checkpoint at all to return to their home area. The burden is on an individual to establish that they would need to pass through any further checkpoints for the purposes of establishing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. If a person does not need to pass any checkpoints after the one at the perimeter of the airport, then that will avoid any potential Article 3 risk.
255. In any event, we find that even for a person who does not have an INID or equivalent means of establish their identity; that there is no real risk of ill-treatment to breach Article 3 if they need to pass through a checkpoint in the KRI. In reaching this conclusion we take into account our findings above in relation to alternative means of establishing identity and the following:
(i) The checkpoints in the KRI are manned by the Peshmerga or Asayish of the controlling political authority – the PUK in Sulaymaniyah and the KDP in Erbil and Dohuk. Apart from the Ambassador’s letter, there is nothing to suggest the ISF have any role in security in the KRI let alone at checkpoints; nor any evidence of PMUs operating within the KRI and we prefer the evidence of Dr Fatah in this respect which is in line with the governance arrangements in the KRI. There is also likely to be more consistency in approach between checkpoints run by the same authority in power in a particular governorate or governorates (in the case of Erbil and Dohuk); and as between the approach of the authorities at the airports and at checkpoints within the same governorate or governorates.
(ii) A person returned to their most local airport will not need to cross into another governorate controlled by a different political authority and would not need to cross the border between the KRI and the Disputed Territories at which the evidence is more consistent that more stringent checks are required at checkpoints.
(iii) Depending on the specific destination, journey times would be relatively shortxv and there are relatively few checkpoints within the KRI which a person would need to pass through. As above, there may be route options which reduce this number as well. The shorter journey time would make it easier for a person to attend a checkpoint to vouch for a person’s identity if available and reduce the time they may be held there whilst this happens.
(iv) For a person travelling within their own governorate from the airport or relatively nearby (for those in Dohuk), it is more likely that on questioning at a checkpoint a person will be identified by their local accent and local knowledge to support information establishing their home area as part of the overall security assessment.
256. Our overall conclusions as to travel within the KRI are consistent with Dr Fatah’s evidence about a person being able to return to their home area there and specifically, his evidence from the Director of Media and Public Relations at Sulaymaniyah airport that “within Sulaymaniyah itself, movement is generally not problematic”. We consider the same would apply within Erbil and Dohuk.
Internal travel from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to destinations in the Disputed Territories
257. As with internal travel from the airports to destinations within the KRI, we first consider what, if any checkpoints a person will need to pass to reach their home area within the Disputed Territories. We repeat our conclusions in paragraphs 247 to 249 above as to the checkpoints at the perimeter of both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports that a person will have to pass to leave the vicinity of the airport; but without any real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in doing so. Those conclusions are entirely unaffected by a person’s final destination being in the Disputed Territories rather than within the KRI.
258. After leaving the vicinity of the airport, there is then the question of what, if any checkpoints a person will need to pass through to get to their home area within the Disputed Territories. In the present appeals, two of the Appellants would be returning to Makhmour as their home area and the third Appellant is from Kirkuk city. The Respondent’s evidence deals with a potential route to Kirkuk, but not expressly to Makhmour and Dr Fatah does not expressly deal with any relevant routes for these particular Appellants, or even to the main cities of Mosul and Kirkuk in the Disputed Territories.
259. As above, we have carefully considered the maps provided by the Respondent and analysis of checkpoints and mapping of potential routes that would avoid checkpoints, including ones from both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports to Kirkuk city. Dr Fatah’s evidence was also that a person is likely to have the options of different routes, including those that avoid checkpoints or at least particular checkpoints on route to the Disputed Territories; but that on familiar routes, a person is likely to have to pass through a relatively small number of checkpoints (to the destinations considered by Dr Fatah, around five checkpoints).
260. As above, the evidence before us is not sufficiently specific or detailed to be able to find that there are generally routes available for travel from the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to all destinations within the Disputed Territories which do not require a person to pass through a checkpoint at all; although this does seem possible to particular destinations, including to Kirkuk city. For any proposed returnees to the KRI who need to return to their home area in the Disputed Territories, a fact sensitive assessment, potentially requiring a mapped route, may be required to determine whether a person will need to pass a checkpoint at all to return to their home area in the Disputed Territories. As above, the burden is on an individual to establish that they would need to pass through any further checkpoints for the purposes of establishing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. If a person does not need to pass any checkpoints after the one at the perimeter of the airport, then that will avoid any potential Article 3 risk.
261. In any event, we consider whether a person would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 for a person without an INID or equivalent means of establishing their identity. On this we reach a different conclusion to that for travel only internally within the KRI for the following reasons.
262. First, for travel within Federal Iraq (which the Disputed Territories are), we have to consider whether there is sufficient cogent evidence to depart form the existing country guidance in SMO2 that if a person has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of a person being detained at a checkpoint until their identity can be verified [paragraph 29] and that many of the checkpoints in Federal Iraq are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the Government of Iraq and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass [paragraph 11]. In this case, we do not consider that there is such sufficient evidence before us to depart from those conclusions in relation to travel to the Disputed Territories from an airport in the KRI.
263. Secondly, the evidence before us is broadly consistent from both Dr Fatah and from the Ambassador that there are more stringent checks at checkpoints between the KRI and the Disputed Territories (as well as between governorates and between the Disputed Territories and the rest of Federal Iraq) as security concerns are higher at these points. We were also given examples of checkpoints at these locations being manned by multiple different actors or multiple checkpoints in close vicinity to each other manned by different actors. The more stringent the checks, the more likely only formal identity documents such as an INID or CSID (for the time being in accordance with our finding in paragraph 223 above and including a CSID for the time being with a cut corner following an INID application, in accordance with our finding in paragraph 225 above), will be accepted for a person to establish their identity and the less likely other means, or copies will be sufficient.
264. Thirdly, the actors manning checkpoints in the Disputed Territories are different from those in the KRI and involve both ISF and PMUs, including Shia militia. Although Dr Fatah did not necessarily agree that in broad terms a checkpoint manned by a militia group would be more risky than one manned by the Peshmerga in the KRI; his evidence was also that he would personally avoid them because he was unsure of the risk (albeit in relation to him as a British citizen). The background country evidence set out above, remains in line with paragraph 11 of the country guidance in SMO2 that although there are examples of ill-treatment by all groups/actors involved, the greater weight of those examples, particularly at checkpoints, is from militia groups and the PMUs, for whom only an INID or CSID (as immediately above) would be an acceptable form of identity documentation to pass their checkpoint.
265. Fourthly, the authorisation letters issued at the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are not likely to be recognised outside of the KRI.
266. Fifthly, there are longer distances involved in travel from the KRI airports to the Disputed Territories (although much shorter than journeys from Baghdad airport to the Disputed Territories) and likely to include a greater number of checkpoints that may need to be passed through on a journey to there compared to a journey solely within the KRI.
267. Whilst Mr Thomann KC sought to distinguish travel between Baghdad airport and northern Iraq and travel between an airport in the KRI and the Disputed Territories, by means of distance, number of checkpoints, proximity of family members to vouch for a person; we do not consider that this is sufficiently material to alter the risk at any particular checkpoint in Federal Iraq from the country guidance in SMO2.
268. Overall, for the general reasons we give there are factors that are likely to reduce the risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 at checkpoints at the border to or within the Disputed Territories, there is insufficient cogent evidence before us to depart from the existing country guidance in SMO2 to find that there would be no such real risk using those measures, specifically given the existence of checkpoints manned by Shia militia (which there is insufficient evidence before us to identity which these would be or for any particular route of return) who are not trained or regulated officials.

SECTION G – ANALYSIS – IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
269. In this section we set out our findings on matters relating to identity documents.
Current status of the CSID card & roll-out of the INID card
270. There is no dispute on the evidence nor between the parties that CSID cards are no longer issued in Iraq (or elsewhere) and have been replaced with a biometric INID. A CSID is no longer valid in Iraq; subject to their continuing limited utility set out in paragraphs 223 and 224 above in (i) establishing a person’s identity, alone or in combination with other documents; and in paragraph 272 below in (ii) an application for an INID. The utility of a CSID has diminished in recent years as the roll-out of the INID has gathered pace and will continue to diminish further as the roll-out of the INID becomes complete in Iraq. As at the end of 2024, 42 million INID cards had been issued, which was over 92% of the population (including those not eligible at all for cards) and likely now to be even higher; such that the vast majority of the population in Iraq will now have an INID card.
Application process for an INID card
271. The application process for an INID card is also set out largely consistently within the background country evidence and that of Dr Fatah, with some minor differences such as between locations as to whether an appointment needs to be made online beforehand (not in the KRI due to limited internet access to do so) and some differences, on paper and in practice as to precisely what documentation is required for the application. In essence, a person needs to complete an application form, pay a fee, have their biometric data taken and provide proof of their identity.
272. There are two key differences between the application process previously for a CSID and that now for an INID. First, an application for an INID must include bio-data for the applicant (an iris scan, photograph and fingerprints) which has to be taken in person; and secondly, an application for an INID includes as a required document, the CSID. The key similarity between the applications is the personal information required, including the person’s name, family details, date of birth and so on; the route of which for both applications stems from a person’s entry in the Family Book in the civil registry to establish their identity.
273. A CSID card includes on its face the name of the issuing regional office, a register number indicating the number of the Family Book in which the person is registered, as well as the page number in the Family Book. Similarly, the INID includes on its face an 18 digit alphanumeric family number. Dr Fatah refers to the INID card as providing all essential information about a person, including their place in the civil register, the file and page number of the civil record and as the card is machine read, all of this information can be checked via the Iraqi Civil System (a centralised database).
274. As to the location of the application, it was common ground before us that once in Iraq, a person is expected to attend the local CSA office which holds their Family Book details to make their application for an INID in person (we deal separately below with the possibility of an application at the Iraqi Embassy in London) and all CSA offices have now re-opened. Although there was evidence before us of an announcement by the Ministry of Interior in Iraq in January 2025 of a new ‘Your Card at Home’ service soon to be available and the opening in 2024 of 19 registration centres throughout Iraq which would allow for a person to register for an INID regardless of their place of residence or place of registration; the Respondent accepts that there is no evidence of this happening in practice as at the date of hearing. As such, it remains the case that an application must be made in person at the CSA office where they were initially registered as there is insufficient evidence as yet to establish that applications could be made in other registration centres outside of a person’s home area
275. As to the bio-data requirements, there is no dispute that these have to be taken in person and there is no alternative to the provision of this information which is compulsory for an application. There was evidence before us as to some form of mobile or portable provision for the taking of such bio-data outside of a CSA (or the Iraqi Embassy in London) either at home or within a hospital or care setting; with numbers given for this (over 30,000 since the launch of the services in 2024) and a few limited examples of this happening, including from Dr Fatah. There was no real challenge to the evidence of a portable service existing, although where this was available was not entirely clear. Dr Fatah suggested this was only in the United Kingdom, but from the numbers given, we would infer that this must be primarily available in Iraq (it seems highly improbable that there were over 30,000 Iraqi nationals in the United Kingdom eligible for such a service and which would be significantly in excess of the INIDs applied for at the Embassy in London) and Dr Fatah gave one example of an elderly seriously ill man in Iraq who used this service. To the contrary, there was no evidence of this being available at all in the United Kingdom and given the trial applications for INIDs from the Embassy in London only from late 2024, it seems highly unlikely that this service is available in the United Kingdom.
276. As to the identity documents required for an INID application, the common requirements set out in the evidence before us are that these are:
(i) a current ID card (their CSID or INID if they are submitting a new application due to a change in civil status, e.g. marriage or divorce, or renewing their INID card);
(ii) an Iraqi nationality certificate; and
(iii) an Iraqi residence card.
277. There is both background country evidence and anecdotal evidence from Dr Fatah as to not all of these requirements being compulsory for an INID to be issued and as to what alternatives may be used if the originals of these documents are not available. As to documentation, Dr Fatah’s evidence is that documentation of close male relatives may be used as it displays the same registration information (from which we take to mean the Family Book details and/or family reference number).
278. In relation specifically to the Iraqi nationality certificate, the advertised information on the eRegulations website is that if this is not available, the person shall bring the certificate of nationality of his father or brother along with ID to prove his Iraqi nationality. This is consistent with Dr Fatah’s evidence generally of the utility of the identity documentation of a male relative as it contains the relevant information as to the family registration, from which a person’s own details can be sourced because they will appear on the same page (or if married, a new page will be created for them with a cross-reference to the original).
279. In relation to the residence card specifically, Dr Fatah’s own experience in applying for an INID is that he was not required to provide this (which he does not have as he is not resident in Iraq) and instead provided his British passport. He did not have any experience of what may otherwise happen if a person did not have a residence card.
280. More generally, the eRegulations website also refers to (i) any identity proof being considered in the case of missing ID or certificate of nationality; and (ii) administrative action being taken to solve any problem that may occur when the application is being verified, although no further details of what problems or what solutions may be available are given; albeit there is separate notice of use of Judicial notice of a lost ID or certification of nationality.
281. Finally, an Iraqi passport is referred to in various places as an optional requirement for an INID application and does not appear to form a compulsory requirement. There was also a suggestion from the DFAT report in January 2023 that a person would need submit their ration card for an INID application, but there is no reference to that in any of the other evidence before us and we do not consider this to be a compulsory part of the application process.
282. Although previously there were delays in the roll-out of the INID card and applications could take months for a card to be issued, the evidence before us is now is that a card will be available to someone in as little as two weeks in Iraq following a successful application for it. Dr Fatah’s evidence was also that there was an option during the application process for a person to be nominated to collect the new INID when available; otherwise, a person would be expected to return to their CSA office to collect their INID.
283. In conclusion, we find that the standard process of applying for an INID is for a person to attend their CSA office, complete an application form and pay a fee; provide their bio-data and proof of their identity by means of producing their current ID (CSID or INID), Iraqi nationality certificate and residence card. However, if any of these documents are missing, there are alternative options available, particularly for the Iraqi nationality certificate by producing that of a male relative instead and residence card, which may not be available for those who are not or who have not been resident in Iraq at the time of application. We do not find that the absence of one or more of the required identity documents would necessarily be fatal to an application for an INID. However, if a person has none of the required documents and no male family member who can attend and provide their own identity documents in support of an application; we find the standard process would be unlikely to be successful without further steps being taken to obtain missing documentation.
284. We consider next what, if any, means a person has of obtaining the required documents or information for an INID application if they do not currently have them available. First, and most obviously, a person may obtain such documents left in Iraq from family members or other contacts there.
285. In relation to a person who does not have a CSID card, Dr Fatah’s evidence is that they would be sent to their local CSA office to obtain a Surat Qaid¸ an approved version of the family page in the main register as the first step to obtaining further documentation. Both copies of a previous ID document and/or documents of a close male relative would assist to identify the relevant family register page. We find the information on either a CSID and/or an INID of a male relative, both of which contain family registration details, to be of use to identify the necessary Family Book entry. We further find that given the vast majority of the Iraqi population now has an INID card (over 92% as at the end of 2024 and likely higher now) that it is very likely that any male relatives in Iraq will have an INID that can be used for this purpose; also particularly given the necessity of having an INID card in Iraq to go about their daily lives.
286. In the alternative, Dr Fatah states that a person could apply to the Court in Iraq for registration with knowledge of their family register page and two witnesses, one of which may include a Mukhtar to confirm they knew the applicant. As to whether a person will know the volume and page reference of the entry in the Family Book in Iraq, this issue was considered extensively in SMO2 and we have no reason to (nor were we invited to) depart from the country guidance given therein that:
“14. … Given the importance of that information, some Iraqi citizens are likely to recall it. Others are not. Whether an individual is likely to recall that information is a question of fact, to be considered against the factual matrix of the individual case and taking account of the background evidence. …”
287. The country guidance given in SMO2 also considered whether other means may be available to establish a person’s identity or obtain a replacement document, such as use of the Central Archive in Baghdad and again, subject to the point directly below, we have no reason to depart from the guidance in relation to those matters.
288. There is one difference in the evidence before us compared to that in SMO2 as to whether assistance facilities for IDPs may render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee to Baghdad (who is not from there). In the UNOCHA report on Iraq from June 2024, it was stated that documentary assistance from the UNHCR in 2023 was given to 51,300 IDPs to access civil documentation, which included complex cases and led to some 45,600 civil documents being secured that year. Given the source of this evidence, generally accepted to be a reliable source of information, we have no reason to doubt that there is some assistance available to IDPs in terms of obtaining missing documents and civil documentation. However, we have no further information as to the types of people assisted, with what documents specifically or within what timescales. In these circumstances, whilst this is potentially an option for a person to use in the absence of any other means of redocumenting themselves on return, there is nothing to suggest that such assistance would be within a reasonable time. As such, there is not sufficient cogent evidence before us to depart from the overall guidance in paragraph 16 of SMO2.
289. The final option to obtain replacement documentation needed for an INID application we consider is whether any of this can be obtained using a power of attorney. At the outset, it is not in dispute that this could not be used for a person to obtain a replacement CSID card as these are no longer issued anywhere, so it could potentially only be to obtain the underlying information or other documentation required. Further, as a matter of logic, it is unclear that this process would have any real utility inside of Iraq over and above the procedures already set out above for a person to obtain confirmation of their Family Book entry or other details through family members or the Iraqi courts; which if present in Iraq, they would be able to do in person without any need for a power of attorney. As such, we consider this primarily from the perspective of a person outside of Iraq seeking information and documentation for an INID application either outside of Iraq or in preparation for such an application on their return to home area in Iraq.
290. The process for setting up a power of attorney by an Iraqi national in the United Kingdom for a person to act on their behalf in Iraq has been set out in a number of slightly different ways, by Ms Peronius and by Dr Fatah (differing slightly in different documents at different times). However, the basic components of all of the processes set out are for a person needing to (i) make an application and fill out a form for a power of attorney), (ii) provide evidence of their identity; (iii) provide information and potentially evidence of the identity of the proposed power of attorney; and (iv) photographs of both parties. As to the evidence of the person’s identity in the United Kingdom, the evidence varied as to whether this required a CSID or INID (or copy thereof) and an Iraqi nationality card (“INC”); or just two Iraqi identity documents; or in the KRI some sort of identity documentation which could be British or Iraqi. Dr Fatah raised concerns specifically about the ability of a person to appoint a power of attorney if they had no valid Iraqi documentation as they would not be able to establish any link to Iraq to have such an application accepted. We agree with the findings in SMO2 on this point that it is entirely logical that a power of attorney is only likely to be granted by the Iraqi authorities on production of an acceptable form of identity document such as a CSID, INID or Iraqi nationality certificate. As such, a truly undocumented individual without contactable family members in Iraq is unlikely to obtain a power of attorney in Iraq to obtain information or documentation for him or her. In the alternative, a person with such documentation or contacts is unlikely to need a power of attorney.
291. We find that whilst a power of attorney has in the past been available to a person to obtain a CSID card in Iraq (with relevant documentation available, but is no longer a possibility for an INID because of the bio-data requirements) and may still be available now to authorise a person to collect an INID card following approval of an application at a CSA office in Iraq; it is unlikely to be available to a person in other circumstances from the United Kingdom to obtain missing documentation. There was a complete lack of evidence before us of this being available or used by anyone in the United Kingdom to obtain missing documentation for an INID application.
INID applications at the Iraqi Embassy in London
292. Although initially questioned by Dr Fatah in his initial written report, by the time of the hearing before us there was no real dispute between the parties or on the evidence that the Iraqi Embassy in London can take and process applications for INID cards, including having the facilities required to obtain the necessary bio-data required (albeit the precise nature of who can apply and the volume of such applications was in dispute, which we consider below). That process began as a trial in 2024 and continues to date, with nothing to suggest this will not continue into the future.
293. The general application process set out from various sources is consistent as to the forms, data and initial checks being undertaken at the Embassy; following which the same is transferred to Baghdad for processing and issue of the INID card itself which would then be sent to the Embassy. This is in essence, the same as the process undertaken locally by a CSA office in Iraq, where the application is processed and then transferred to Baghdad to finalise it and issue the INID card itself.
294. The conclusions we have reached above in relation to the standard requirements for applying for an INID card in the main we find also apply to applications made at the Iraqi Embassy in London, subject to one difference which is that there is no requirement for a person to produce an Iraqi residence card (unsurprisingly for a person not resident in Iraq) and instead a simple proof of address is required. We consider below whether there are differences for applications made to the Iraqi Embassy in London where not all of the standard documents are available or whether the same alternatives may be used as in Iraq.
295. In his addendum report, Dr Fatah states that an applicant for an INID must bring to the Iraqi Embassy in London their CSID, INC, British passport and their father’s ID. The latter two documents do not feature in any of the other evidence before us as to the application process and no source is given for any of this information. In circumstances where it would also seem implausible that an Iraqi national living in the United Kingdom would always have a British passport and/or access to their father’s ID (unless they are also living in the United Kingdom) and which would in any event be superfluous if the applicant had his own CSID and INC; we not do find that either of these are established, let alone compulsory requirements.
296. There were three areas of dispute and inconsistency in the evidence before us as to applications to the Iraqi Embassy in London for an INID. First, whether applications could be made for new INID or only replacement INID cards; secondly, the volume of applications made and INID cards issued and thirdly, whether this process was open to undocumented Iraqi nationals and/or failed asylum seekers or restricted to documented members of the Iraqi diaspora living in the United Kingdom. On the latter, we would have been assisted by more detailed evidence from both parties, including examples of such applications by a person without all of the required documentation and details of whether or not it was successful. At the very least, we question why none of the individual Appellants in this case have attempted such an application which could have given an insight in to any difficulties in the process or options available. However, in the absence of such evidence, we consider and make findings on what was before us.
297. We consider the first two issues together as they overlap. The only evidence on both points comes from Ms Peronius and was unsatisfactory as it was, on its face, inconsistent between two of her written statements as to how many applications had been issued and whether these were for renewals and/or new applications (as set out in paragraph 158 above).
298. Dr Fatah also questioned the numbers as being very high compared to the stated opening hours of the Embassy and likely need for applications within the United Kingdom, particularly for renewals (as set out in paragraph 163 above).
299. We do not share Dr Fatah’s concerns about the volume of renewal applications for a replacement INID in London given that such applications have been available to be made for nearly a year and renewal applications would include both replacements for lost cards and for any whose civil status had changed (for example through marriage or divorce); even if renewals due to expiry after 10 years would not yet likely be needed. There is however a significant problem on the face of Ms Peronius’ evidence that the number of renewals reduced from the earlier statement to the latter without any explanation at all in the written statements. The explanation given by Ms Peronius in oral evidence that there may have, in hindsight, been a translation problem with the initial figures being only for renewal applications or that simply in fact, new applications had always been possible, gives little confidence as to the accuracy of the information obtained via the Embassy as no actual checks were made when it should have been obvious that there was a significant discrepancy or problem with the two sets of figures and information given.
300. We are left in the position that we have insufficient evidence to draw any clear findings as to the volume of applications for INIDs made to and processed by the Iraqi Embassy in London. However, that does not detract from the key finding that such applications have been made since late 2024 with INID cards issued. As to whether new or only replacement applications can be made, we find that both are available. Despite the inconsistencies in Ms Peronius’ evidence, the published information as to the application process does not differentiate between new or renewal applications (and if only renewal applications, we would have expected this to be clear from the announcements made and from documentation required being an INID not a CSID card) and Dr Fatah’s evidence does not distinguish applications in this way either (and refers in his addendum report at least to first-time applicants, which must be for new INID cards).
301. The final area of dispute between the parties was whether the process for applying for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London was only for members of the Iraqi diaspora and their offspring living in the United Kingdom or whether it could also be used by undocumented Iraqis, including failed asylum seekers. By undocumented Iraqis, we mean those who are truly undocumented as opposed to those for whom family members or associates in Iraq can send the relevant documents to them in the United Kingdom to use for an application, such as where a CSID or INC were left behind when they travelled to the United Kingdom. If such documents are available by that route, it is expected that a person would obtain them and be able to make successful application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London.
302. Dr Fatah was of the view that it was open only to the former group as the latter would have to prove their Iraqi citizenship and provide details of their Family Book, which may require going through the process of redocumentation at their local CSA office. Whilst we take into account Dr Fatah’s opinion as an experienced expert in relation to these matters, we place little weight on it in this particular instance as we note that there is again no source identified as the basis for these comments and no reference to this information being from any Iraqi authority or from any examples of personal experience (in itself unlikely given that up until only a few weeks before the hearing Dr Fatah’s written report said no INIDs were issued at all from the Iraqi Embassy in London). It also appears to us to be a matter of practicality for applicants rather than any matter of principle or exclusion in the actual process for an application for an INID.
303. Whilst we accept that it may be, in accordance with our findings already set out above, necessary for a person to go through the procedures in Iraq to obtain relevant information and documentation for an application; this would only be as a last resort and there are a number of other ways a person may be able to provide sufficient information for their application without needing to do so. There is no reason in principle why, for example, a person may not be able to remember their Family Book details or obtain these from a male relative in Iraq in the same way that they had been able to do in the past for any application for a CSID card (including from the Iraqi Embassy in London).
304. Further, we do not find any reason in principle as to why the same findings as to alternative documentation set out in the section above would not apply to applications made at the Iraqi Embassy in London, given that ultimately all applications are processed and INID cards issued centrally from Baghdad, where the same checks can be made on an application as for those who applied for one at a CSA within Iraq.
305. However, we do find that there may be fewer options available to a person to obtain alternative documents whilst in the United Kingdom as opposed to from within Iraq given they could not physically present themselves (at all or with a male relative) at a CSA office or Court and may need to use a power of attorney instead (which itself is likely to require at least some form of Iraqi identification as per our findings on this process in paragraphs 289 to 291 above).
306. Whilst we have considered these issues in principle, we take into account the lack of evidence before us of any examples of a person in the United Kingdom without all of the required documentation for an INID application to the Iraqi Embassy being able either to (i) successfully obtain alternative documentation from Iraq to use; or (ii) make an application using their Family Book details, those containing the core information ultimately required.
307. In these circumstances, we are unable to find that there is sufficient evidence before us at present that a person will always be able to use their Family Book information or obtain alternative identity documentation to make a successful application for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London. We do however consider that the onus is on an individual to make all reasonable efforts to do so and we would expect a person to evidence the same if they are unable to obtain such documents or otherwise make a successful application.
308. If a person is completely undocumented, is unable to remember his Family Book details and does not have the assistance of any male relatives in Iraq; we accept that such people are unlikely to be able to make a successful application for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London (either by obtaining alternative documentation or because they are not able to obtain their Family Book details). As above in paragraphs 289 to 291 above, the power of attorney process for obtaining necessary documents in the absence of male family support in Iraq or any identity documentation is not sufficiently established in evidence before us to find that this would be available as an alternative to a truly undocumented individual.
309. For those that make a successful application for an INID card from the Iraqi Embassy in London, they would be expected to collect the same from there when available. Although we have no evidence before us of the likely timescales within which an application would be processed and an INID card issued, we can infer that this would likely be longer than for applications made in Iraq due the practicality of distance involved at least for distribution of INID cards and we infer this from Dr Fatah’s evidence from the KRI that most return to Iraq to apply for their INID as it is quicker.

SECTION H – COUNTRY GUIDANCE
310. As set out early in this decision, we were not asked to revisit all extant country guidance in relation to Iraq. In particular, Parts A, D, and E of the country guidance in SMO2 remains unamended; none of which we were invited to revisit. However, as a result of the findings above, Part B (to a minor extent) and Part C (to a greater extent) of SMO2 require revision. We have retained in full some parts of Part C which relate to issues upon which we heard no further evidence and were not invited to revisit, including, for example in relation to the 1957 Registration Document and in relation to returns to Baghdad.
311. For clarity, the header to this decision sets out the entire country guidance to replace that in SMO2 so that it is all contained in a single place (including Parts A, D and E which remain without amendment). The amended guidance in full in relation only to parts B and C, is set out belowxvi:
B. DOCUMENTATION FOR AND FEASIBILITY OF RETURN TO IRAQ
7. Up to September 2025, return of former residents of the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI – previously more commonly referred to as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region or IKR) was to the KRI; all other Iraqis were returned to Baghdad. A new agreement dated 19 August 2025 would permit return of former residents originating from the Disputed Territories to either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports in the KRI, but this route had not yet been utilised as at September 2025. The Respondent must specify the location of return.
8. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport, or a laissez-passer. No Iraqi national will be returnable to Iraq if not in possession of one of these documents.
9. In the light of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in HJ (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1726, an international protection claim made by an Iraqi national cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a laissez-passer, if the Tribunal finds that the person’s return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.
10. Where P is returned to Iraq on a laissez-passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport.
C. IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
Replacement of Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) by the Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (INID)
11. The CSID is no longer issued in Iraq (or elsewhere) and has been replaced with a biometric INID. A CSID is no longer valid in Iraq; however, it will continue to have some limited utility in (i) establishing a person’s identity, alone or in combination with other documents; and (ii) an application for an INID. The utility of a CSID has diminished in recent years as the roll-out of the INID has gathered pace and will continue to diminish further as that process is completed.
Necessity of an INID
12. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
INID application requirements
13. Applications for an INID can be made (i) with all of the required standard documents; (ii) with alternatives to the standard documents; and (iii) using processes to obtain the required standard documents or information.
14. The standard documents required for an INID application: An application for an INID must include bio-data for the applicant (an iris scan, photograph and fingerprints) which must be taken in person. The standard documents required for an INID application are a CSID (or existing INID for a renewal application), an Iraqi Nationality Card (INC) and a residence card. An Iraqi passport is optional.
15. Alternatives to the standard documents required for an INID application: The absence of one or more of the required identity documents is not fatal to an application for an INID. In particular, (a) if the applicant’s INC is not available, the INC of a male relative could be used instead, and (b) a residence card may not be available or needed at all for those who are not or have not been resident in Iraq at the time of application.
16. Ways to obtain the standard required documents for an INID application: A person may be able to obtain the required documents or information, including:
(i) obtaining such documents left in Iraq from family members or other contacts there;
(ii) obtaining a Surat Qaid from their local Civil Status Affairs (CSA) office in Iraq;
(iii) using copies of a previous ID document and/or documents of a close male relative to identify the relevant family register page of the Family Book;
(iv) making an application to the Court in Iraq for registration, which requires knowledge of the family register page of the Family Book and two witnesses who know the applicant.
Use of other identity documents and information
17. Family Book details: Given the importance of the information in the Family Book, some Iraqi citizens are likely to recall it. Others are not. Whether an individual is likely to recall that information is a question of fact, to be considered against the factual matrix of the individual case and taking into account the background evidence. The Family Book details may also be obtained from family members on the father’s side (because the registration system is patrilineal). A CSID and/or an INID of a male relative will contain family registration details which link to other relatives and it is now very likely that any male relatives in Iraq will have an INID card.
18. 1957 Registration Document: The 1957 Registration Document has been in use in Iraq for many years. It contains a copy of the details found in the Family Books. It is available in either an individual or family version, containing respectively the details of the requesting individual or the family record as a whole. Where an otherwise undocumented asylum seeker is in contact with their family in Iraq, they may be able to obtain the family version of the 1957 Registration Document via those family members. An otherwise undocumented asylum seeker who cannot call on the assistance of family in Iraq is unlikely to be able to obtain the individual version of the 1957 Registration Document by the use of a proxy.
19. The 1957 Registration Document is not a recognised identity document for the purposes of air or land travel within Iraq. Given the information recorded on the 1957 Registration Document, the fact that an individual is likely to be able to obtain one is potentially relevant to that individual’s ability to obtain an INID, CSID or a passport. Whether possession of a 1957 Registration Document is likely to be of any assistance in that regard is to be considered in light of the remaining facts of the case, including their place of registration. The likelihood of an individual obtaining a 1957 Registration Document prior to their return to Iraq is not, without more, a basis for finding that the return of an otherwise undocumented individual would not be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
20. Electronic Personal Registry Record: The evidence in respect of the Electronic Personal Registry Record (or Electronic Registration Document) remains unclear. It is not clear how that document is applied for or how the data it contains is gathered or provided. The existence of this document and the records upon which it is based is not a material consideration in the evaluation of an Iraqi protection claim, nor is it of any identified relevance to an application for an INID.
Where an INID application can be made
21A. Applications for an INID in Iraq: Once in Iraq, it remains the case that a person is expected to attend their local CSA office in person in order to obtain an INID. All CSA offices have now re-opened. There is insufficient evidence as yet to establish that applications could be made in other registration centres outside a person’s home area.
21B. Although procedures exist for a person to establish their identity within Iraq through the Courts there, it is unlikely that a person will be able to do this within a reasonable period on return to Iraq with no family or other support.
21C. An individual returnee to Baghdad who is not from there is not likely to be able to obtain a replacement document in Baghdad, and certainly not within a reasonable time. Neither the Central Archive nor the assistance facilities for IDPs are likely to render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee.
21D. Applications for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London: The general process and standard requirements for an application for an INID are essentially the same as if an application were made at a CSA office in Iraq, save that a person will only need proof of address in the United Kingdom rather than an Iraqi residence card. The Iraqi Embassy in London has the facilities to obtain an applicant’s bio-data. Where a person is completely undocumented, is unable to remember his Family Book details and does not have the assistance of any male relatives in Iraq; they are unlikely to be able to make a successful application for an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London.
Identity document requirements for arrival in the KRI and internal travel in the KRI and Disputed Territories
22A. Where a person is returned to Iraq on a laissez-passer, they may request and keep a copy of the same after arrival, which will show their recent arrival from the United Kingdom. Procedures are in place at both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports for those who return to the KRI without a CSID or INID and such persons will not be prevented from leaving either airport for this reason. Prior to departure, a person will be given an authorisation letter setting out their name and contact details of the issuing authority, valid for five days, within which a person is expected to return to their home area to start the redocumentation process.
22B. A person may be able to travel from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airports in the KRI to their home area in the KRI or Disputed Territories without needing to pass through any checkpoints other than the ones at the perimeter of the airports, at which there is no real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The burden is on an individual to establish that they would need to pass through any further checkpoints for the purposes of establishing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. A fact sensitive assessment of an available route to an individual’s home area may be required.
22C. If a person does have to pass through any further checkpoint, this may require a check on their identity and assessment of whether they present a security risk, e.g. because their name is on a security list available at the checkpoint. However, it is not established that every person is stopped at every checkpoint. If they are, the checks undertaken range from an informal conversation to the requirement to present formal identity document(s).
22D. If a person has an INID, that would normally be sufficient for an individual to pass a checkpoint, absent identification of that person on a security list. If a person does not have an INID, they will need to establish their identity by other means or otherwise establish that they do not present a security risk. Alone, neither a valid Iraqi passport nor a laissez-passer, nor a 1957 Registration Document is likely to be sufficient to establish a person’s identity as these are not universally recognised by the variety of actors who control checkpoints in the same way that an INID is.
22E. There is no standard or consistent practice at checkpoints, however, the following documents are likely to assist an individual in establishing their identity so as to reduce or avoid a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, particularly in combination if more than one is available:
- An Iraqi driving licence
- A CSID, even if expired (for a further limited period of time)
- A CSID with a cut corner together with confirmation of an application for an INID
- Within the KRI only, an authorisation letter from Erbil or Sulaymaniyah airport containing the individual’s personal details with a request to facilitate them.
22F. In addition, a combination of these or other documents, or copies of the same, and/or attendance by someone who can vouch for a person (a family member, local Mukhtar or high-ranking official); is also likely to be sufficient. Overall, the greater the number of identity documents or copies available to a person and greater the influence of a person attending, the less the risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 at a checkpoint.
22G. A person with either a document from the airport at Erbil or Sulaymaniyah; some form of identification and/or assistance from a family member, local Mukhtar or ranking official is likely to be able to pass through a checkpoint without risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 if they (i) return to Erbil and travel to their home area within the same governorate or to Dohuk governorate (under the same political control); or (ii) return to Sulaymaniyah and travel to their home area within that same governorate. It is expected that a person will be returned to the airport closest to their home area, so for those originating from the Sulaymaniyah governorate, it will be to Sulaymaniyah airport and for those originating from the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil, it will be to Erbil airport.
22H. The position is different for travel from an airport in the KRI to the Disputed Territories. Many of the checkpoints in Federal Iraq are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or INID to pass.

SECTION I – THE INDIVIDUAL APPEALS
312. We turn finally to the individual appeals, applying our findings as set out above in relation to each Appellant.

AK
313. AK’s protection and human rights claims have been dismissed, save for the only outstanding issue as to whether he is at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if he is unable to re-document himself with an INID within a reasonable time. On all other points, there are preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal and upon which there is no invitation to us to revisit. We note those preserved findings also include adverse credibility findings against AK.
314. In his latest witness statement dated 8 October 2024, AK states that he previously had a CSID and INC kept at his family home but all of his documents were destroyed by ISIS when his village was attacked and his home was burnt down; all of which was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal together with a finding that AK would likely have forgotten his Family Book details. AK maintained that he has no contact with his father (or anyone else in Iraq) and has been unable to trace him through the Red Cross; there is however a preserved finding of fact to the contrary that he is in contact with or would be able to contact his father in Iraq.
315. In his written statement, AK maintains that he would not be able to obtain ID to return to Iraq (a previous attempt in 2019 at the Iraqi Embassy in Manchester was unsuccessful) and he has no contact with anyone in Iraq to assist him. Further, that he would be arrested at the airport on return to Iraq because he has no identity documents or anyone to meet him to vouch for him and he would not in any event be able to enter the KRI with a CSID card.
316. The Respondent sought AK’s attendance at the oral hearing to be cross-examined, but he declined to do so. As such, we have not had the benefit of hearing from AK and are limited to considering his relatively brief written statements, the last of which was nearly a year old by the date of hearing. No explanation was given as to why AK did not attend and we find we are entitled to draw an adverse inference from his refusal to do so.
317. The Respondent’s position on AK’s appeal in summary is that he would be returned to Erbil from where he could return to his home village near Makhmour, approximately 55 miles away. Although accepted that his CSID was destroyed by ISIS in 2014, AK has been found to be in contact with his father, or able to contact his father who can assist him with support and with the redocumentation process on return. The Respondent submits that it is not credible that the AK’s father could have remained in Iraq wholly undocumented since 2014 and as such would have available documents relating to his identity and family register entry in the Family Book to use to assist AK. Overall, AK’s application for an INID should, for these reasons, be a straightforward one and measured in a matter of weeks.
318. On behalf of AK, Mr Bazini submitted in essence is that in accordance with SMO2, AK can not be safely returned to Baghdad (which is the destination considered in the Respondent’s refusal letter) and as yet there is no practical returns route established for him to be returned to Erbil. If the latter is proposed, it was submitted that the Respondent has moved the goalposts, this not having been clear in the present proceedings and that there should in these circumstances be a further hearing and a further opportunity for AK to give evidence. No further detailed submissions were made as to whether AK could obtain an INID either from the Iraqi Embassy in London or following return to his home area.
319. We do not consider that there has been any recent ‘moving of the goalposts’ in AK’s appeal, nor that there is any requirement, as a matter of fairness or otherwise, to adjourn final consideration of his appeal to give him a yet further opportunity to submit more evidence when he has declined opportunities to do so prior to the final hearing. In particular, we have taken into account that (i) there is only a single, relatively narrow point outstanding to determine in AK’s appeal which can be determined in accordance with the country guidance set out above; (ii) the Respondent’s position on the country guidance issues has been set out at the latest from January 2025 when her position statement and initial further evidence was filed and served; which included that AK would be returned to the KRI (one of the main focuses of this country guidance being on returns to the KRI) and that INID applications could be made to the Iraqi Embassy in London; (iii) the Respondent expressly invited AK to provide further evidence of his current circumstances and directions dated 25 March 2025 permitted AK to file and serve all written statements and other evidence upon he wished to rely no later than 30 June 2025 (no further evidence being submitted at that time, nor by a subsequent deadline of 6 August 2025); and (iv) the Respondent expressly sought AK’s attendance at the hearing to be cross-examined, which he declined to do, without any reason. There has been ample opportunity for AK to understand the issues to be determined in his appeal, the Respondent’s position on them and for him to file and serve any evidence he wished to rely on. The burden is on him to do so in a protection appeal and no reasons have been put forward as to why he was unable to file any further evidence, or attend the hearing to give oral evidence; nor has he identified what further evidence now may be available or relevant. In all of the circumstances, we can and do make a final decision in AK’s appeal now on the basis of all of the evidence before us.
320. The first issue is whether AK could successfully apply for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, if so, he would face no risks on return to Iraq and would be able to travel freely to his home area or elsewhere on return and live within Iraq with access to all aspects of public and private life there. There are preserved findings dismissing AK’s protection claim in substance, with re-documentation for the purposes of Article 3 the only outstanding issue.
321. As to an application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, we take into account the preserved findings of fact that AK previously had a CSID which was destroyed by ISIS in 2014 and his own evidence that he also previously had an INC which was also destroyed by ISIS at the same time; as well as the finding that AK had forgotten his Family Book details. There is nothing to suggest that at present, AK has any Iraqi identity documentation immediately available to him in the United Kingdom.
322. In terms of an INID application, AK would not therefore meet the standard application requirements for a CSID (or INID) and an INC, although it would be expected that he could show proof of residence in the United Kingdom. The preserved findings of fact also include that AK remains in touch with his father in Iraq, or could make contact with him. In accordance with the country guidance set out above, in particular that the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens in Iraq now have an INID and that it is essential for a person to have such a document to live and travel within Iraq, we find that it is now highly likely that AK’s father in Iraq has obtained an INID. There are procedures available to him which would have enabled him to provide his identity for such an application, even in circumstances where it was likely his CSID was also destroyed in 2014. We do recognise that the First-tier Tribunal finding to the same effect back in 2019 was found to be an error of law, but are satisfied that circumstances have now moved on significantly since that date in terms of the INID roll-out and that it is highly unlikely that the AK’s father would remain without documentation now for over eleven years given the necessity of this for daily life. With an INID, there is no reason to think that AK’s father would not also have an INC.
323. Returning to the documentary requirements for AK to make an INID application, we find that he would be able to (i) establish his identity without a CSID (or existing INID) by reference to the family register page of the Family Book which his father would have had access to for his own INID application, and/or be able to obtain a Surat Qaid with these details on from his local CSA office (which would include AK as a member of his father’ family), and/or be identifiable from the family reference on AK’s father’s own INID; and (ii) use his father’s INC card in the absence of AK’s own INC.
324. The burden is on AK to establish that he is unable to obtain an INID and there is no evidence before us that he has made any attempt to do so through the Iraqi Embassy in London (who have the facilities in place to take the required bio-data and process an application and with information and documentation that can be obtained from or through his father), nor anything to support an assertion that such an application would be refused if he did so.
325. In all of the circumstances, we find that AK has not established that he is unable to obtain an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London. As such, he would be returning to Iraq as a documented person with an INID. There would be no reason as to why a laissez-passer could not be obtained for his travel and with his INID he would be able to pass through the airport and any checkpoints thereafter to return to his home area of Rowaleh (where it has already been found he is not at risk on return) or to relocate within the KRI.
326. In any event, if we are wrong about that, we go on to consider in the alternative whether AK would be able obtain an INID on return to Iraq from his local CSA office without encountering treatment contrary to Article 3.
327. In accordance with the country guidance given above, we find that AK (i) would be able to obtain a laissez-passer for his travel to Iraq; (ii) would not be at risk on return to either Erbil (or Sulaymaniyah) airport and would be permitted to leave either airport; and (iii) would be able to pass through the first checkpoint at the perimeter of either airport without risk. The Respondent has indicated that she would return AK to Erbil airport as the closest one to his home area, and as above, whilst at the date of hearing such returns had not been made, the Respondent was confident that this would be practically possible in the very near future. If for any reason AK can not be returned to the KRI, as per the findings in SMO2, a return to Baghdad (absent obtaining in INID in London) would be a breach of Article 3.
328. The next question is whether AK would face any risk on the journey after leaving the perimeter of Erbil airport to his home area of Baqrit, a journey of some 55 miles passing from the KRI in to the Disputed Territories. In accordance with the country guidance findings above, it is for AK to establish that he would need to pass through any further checkpoint after leaving the perimeter of the airport and in this case, he has not done so. To the contrary, the Respondent has identified various routes from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports which avoid checkpoints, albeit none specifically which deal with the route to AK’s specific home area (rather than Mosul itself). We find it possible that AK could therefore avoid this risk, but in any event consider whether he could safely pass through any checkpoints.
329. First, we find that AK could travel from Erbil airport to the border with the Disputed Territories without any Article 3 risk in accordance with the country guidance above. There are a number of factors which may reduce any risk at further checkpoints between the border and his home area. These include that AK could be accompanied on his journey by his father or his father would have a relatively short journey to attend a checkpoint; at which AK’s father could vouch for him and would have his own INID and Family Book details to assist AK establishing his identity. Secondly, AK could retain a copy of his laissez-passer to show his recent return to Iraq to dispel any concerns about travel from an ISIL area or as to why he does not yet have an INID (in the alternative that he was not able to obtain one from the Iraqi Embassy in London prior to his return). However, if AK is required to pass through a checkpoint, we find that there would still be an Article 3 risk, in particular from Shia militia armed checkpoints which are unlikely to let AK pass without an INID or CSID.
330. The final question is whether AK would be able to successfully apply for an INID on return to his home area. For the same reasons as above in relation to an application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, we find that with the assistance of his father he would be able to provide sufficient information to successfully make such an application at his local CSA and that the process would be relatively straightforward. In addition, once in Iraq, there are also further ways in which AK could establish his identity even without the direct assistance of his father (or using his father’s documentation), by attending his local CSA office himself; through the local Mukhtar and/or witnesses as to his identity and through the Iraqi Courts. Although the latter would take longer, given the preserved finding that AK is or could be in touch with his father, there is nothing to suggest that he would not have any family support during the process. We therefore find that AK could obtain an INID on return to his home area, within a reasonable time and/or with family support such that he would not face a real risk of breach of Article 3 on return for this reason either.
331. For all of these reasons, we find that AK would not face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on his return to Iraq as he would be able to obtain an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London before his return. With an INID, he would be able to freely live and travel in Iraq and would face no real risk at the airport. Further, in the alternative, AK would not face any risk on return to Erbil airport or leaving the perimeter of it; nor any real risk travelling through the KRI. He would only face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if he had to pass through further checkpoints at the border with or inside Federal Iraq without an INID; which he has not established he would have to do to reach his home area or local CSA office to re-document. Once in his local area, AK would be able to successfully obtain an INID (if he had not already done so from the Iraqi Embassy in London) within a reasonable period of time and/or with family support from his father.
332. The remainder of AK’s protection and human rights grounds of appeal are dismissed in line with the preserved findings from the First-tier Tribunal.

AH
333. AH’s primary protection and human rights claims have been dismissed, with preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal that his account of past events in Iraq were not credible such that he was not at risk on return for those reasons. There are however a number of distinct issues to determine in relation to AH’s appeal given the new matters raised since his last hearing which the Respondent has consented to us dealing with as such in the course of this appeal; as well as the key country guidance issues outstanding from the error of law decision in the Upper Tribunal. We deal in turn with (i) whether he is at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if he is (or his family are) unable to re-document himself (or themselves) with an INID within a reasonable time; (ii) whether he is at real risk of persecution on return as a member of a particular social group due to his disability and/or because the family would be returning with AH’s wife as the head of the household; (iii) whether AH’s removal would be in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR because of a real risk that doing so would expose him to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in his life expectancy; and (iv) whether the removal of AH and his family members would be in breach of their right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR, taking into account the best interests of the child of the family.
334. Separately, the skeleton argument submitted on behalf of AH raises an issue as to the reasonableness of return to Iraq for AH given the deterioration in his health. This appears to be in the context of internal relocation to the KRI, however, given the preserved findings of fact that AH is not at risk on return to his home area, the issue simply does not arise in the present appeal and we give it no further consideration.
335. As a general point before we consider each of the separate issues in relation to AH and his family, we note that the Respondent sought AH’s attendance at the oral hearing to be cross-examined, but he declined to do so. Although there was no specific medical evidence relied upon to show that AH was unable to give oral evidence (or that any adjustments could be put in place for him to do so, a matter canvassed in earlier case management hearings), we appreciate that AH is in poor health and has some communication difficulties. As we have not had the benefit of hearing from AH, we are limited to considering his relatively brief written statements, but in all of the circumstances we draw no adverse inferences from AH’s refusal to attend to be cross-examined.
336. In addition, we have written statements from AH’s wife (whom we shall refer to as AHW) and children. AHW also attended the hearing to give oral evidence, through a court appointed interpreter. We refer to the relevant parts of the witness evidence in relation to each issue below.
(i) Risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if unable to re-document
337. In his first written statement dated 14 April 2021, AH states (in relation to the remaining live issues in his appeal) that he has no contact with any family or friends in Iraq. He further states that he has no CSID card with him as the family left all of their belongings in Iraq.
338. In her written statement dated 11 August 2025, AHW states that she left her CSID and all other Iraqi documentation in Iraq, together with all of her belongings in Iraq and she has not been able to recover any of them. At present, she has no form of identification and without this it is impossible for her to apply for a CSID or INID. AHW has no relatives or friends in Iraq and she has not had any communication with family since the day the family fled Iraq, nor does not know if any family members are still living in Iraq.
339. AHW attended the oral hearing, adopted her written statements and gave oral evidence through a court appointed Kurdish Sorani interpreter. AHW was asked in cross-examination about family members in Iraq. In summary, she stated that she has no family there, her parents are deceased and neither she nor AH have any extended family members in Iraq. AH’s brother is missing, the family being separated when the war started. The last contact with him was when they were living in the same area in Iraq and they do not know if he is still alive.
340. AHW stated that no effort has been made to contact AH’s brother. The family were also last in contact with AH’s mother (or foster mother) and their daughter when they all lived in the same local area in Iraq and no effort has been made to try to find them or contact them either. When it was suggested to AHW that it was not credible that no attempt had been made to contact her daughter or AH’s brother; she stated that there had been an attempt to search social media using their name and photo but it had not been successful and she explained the difference in her answer that she thought the first question was whether contact had been made. When asked further if AHW wanted to say anything else on searches for family members, she stated that she had given her final answer and that her daughter had been murdered in front of her. AHW thought this had been stated in evidence in AH’s appeal before the First-tier Tribunal but perhaps it had not been recorded.
341. In relation to identity documentation, AHW stated that neither she nor AH have made any attempts to obtain a new or replacement identity document for Iraq; because they have no one to contact to get documents or evidence from to do so.
342. AH’s position in this appeal in relation to the broader Article 3 risk is essentially that neither he nor any of his family members in the United Kingdom have any Iraqi identity documentation nor access to their old documents left behind in Iraq. Further, they have no family in Iraq to assist the with re-documentation; nor any family that would provide them with any support on return. As such, they would not be able to obtain an INID or safely return to their home area.
343. The Respondent’s position on this issue is that AH and his family retain wider family support in Iraq in accordance with the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal and they have not established a real risk that they would not be able to obtain new INIDs, nor establish their identity on return to Erbil airport, nor return to their home area to re-document there if necessary.
344. The first issue is whether AH (and his family members) could successfully apply for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, if so, they would face no risks on return to Iraq and would be able to live and travel freely there on return. For an application at the Iraqi Embassy in London, we take into account the preserved findings that AH previously had a CSID which was left in Iraq and that he does not have access to it now. We make the same finding in relation to AHW and together, there is nothing to suggest that at present, AH or any of his family have any Iraqi documentation immediately available to them in the United Kingdom. As such, they would not have the standard documents required for an INID application, although it would be expected that they could show proof of residence in the United Kingdom.
345. The next consideration is whether AH has any alternative means of providing documents or sufficient information about his identity to make a successful application for an INID. The preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal are clear in that there were significant adverse credibility findings both generally and specifically as to family in Iraq who could assist with re-documentation and an express finding that it was reasonably likely that AH and his wife have family remaining in Iraq with whom they are in contact [paragraphs 46 to 51 of the First-tier Tribunal decision]. AH’s evidence as to family was found to be vague and contradictory.
346. In AH’s appeal, the First-tier Tribunal found that AH’s evidence was not credible and it was not accepted that he has no family remaining in Iraq; to the contrary that it was found to be reasonably likely that AH and his wife have family remaining there with whom they are in contact. In paragraphs 46 to 50 of the First-tier Tribunal decision, AH’s evidence about his family going back to his first asylum interview were set out; including that his daughter was missing to which he had later added that she had been taken by Daesh; that the mother who he referred to as missing was not his biological mother but a foster mother and that he had not tried to trace his missing brother. The evidence was found to be vague and contradictory. We further note that evidence in relation to the deaths of AH’s father and also a brother and/or uncle formed the basis of his protection appeal which was entirely rejected by the First-tier Tribunal as well.
347. Before us, it was maintained on AH’s behalf and expressly by AHW that there were no remaining family members in Iraq and no contact with anyone since they left. However, we do not find any basis upon which we should depart from the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on this point. In particular, we found AHW’s oral evidence on these points to lack any credibility. Her evidence was inconsistent about what, if any, attempts had been made to contact or trace immediate family members, including her own daughter and AH’s brother and then for the first time at the hearing she claimed that her own daughter had been murdered in her presence before they left Iraq. This was a significant claim which had not been made before by AH at any point in his asylum interviews, written statements or evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and it is wholly incredible that if this was true, it would not have been said before. To the contrary, AH had consistently stated only that she was missing. We do not attach any weight to AHW’s evidence that there are no remaining family members in Iraq or that they are not in touch with any, nor unable to re-establish contact with any.
348. Whilst we accept, as did the First-tier Tribunal, that AH and his family’s identity documents can not be sent to him from Iraq; we find that either he has the required information about his Family Book details (given the findings in paragraph 56 of the First-tier Tribunal decision on his background and the importance of this information, and with no medical evidence before us to suggest that his memory has been impacted by his more recent stroke and health problems) or he could obtain it from family members. Given the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens in Iraq now have an INID card, we find that they would have a family reference and Family Book details available to share to assist AH and his family to re-document with an INID.
349. The burden is on AH to establish that he is unable to obtain an INID and there is no evidence that any of the family has made any attempt to do so through the Iraqi Embassy in London (who have the facilities in place to take the required bio-data and process an application and with information that can be obtained from or through family members in Iraq), nor anything to support an assertion that any such applications would be refused if they did so.
350. In all of the circumstances, we find that AH has not established that neither he nor his family members are unable to obtain an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London. As such, they would be returning to Iraq as documented persons with INIDs. We accept that AH has never had an Iraqi passport but there is no reason as to why laissez-passers could not be obtained for AH and his family members for their return travel to Iraq and with INIDs they would thereafter be able to return to their home area (as per the First-tier Tribunal findings, which included the availability of internal relocation as well in the alternative). In any event, if we are wrong about that, we go on to consider in the alternative whether AH and his family would be able to obtain an INID on return to Iraq from their local CSA office without encountering treatment contrary to Article 3.
351. In accordance with the country guidance given above, we find that AH and his family (i) would be able to obtain a laissez-passer for their travel to Iraq; (ii) would not be at risk on return to either Erbil airport and would be permitted to leave either airport; and (iii) would be able to pass through the first checkpoint at the perimeter of either airport without risk. The Respondent has indicated that she would return AH and his family to Erbil airport as the closest one to his home area, and as above, whilst at the date of hearing such returns had not been made, the Respondent was confident that this would be practically possible in the very near future.
352. The next question is whether AH and his family would face any risk on the journey after leaving Erbil to his home area of Baqrit. As to which, we repeat the findings in paragraphs 328 to 329 in relation to AK given the return to the same home area, save for in AH’s case, the reference to ‘father’ would be to ‘other family members in Iraq’. We would add in addition a further mitigating factor to reduce the risk at any checkpoints that AH and his family would be travelling together based on Dr Fatah’s evidence that family groups are less likely to be stopped or arouse adverse suspicion at checkpoints. However, that does not detract from the final conclusion that if required to pass through a checkpoint in Federal Iraq, there remains an Article 3 risk, in particular from Shia militia armed checkpoints which are unlikely to let AH and his family pass without an INID or CSID.
353. The final question is whether AH and his family would be able to successfully apply for an INID on return to his home area. For the same reasons as above in relation to an application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, we find that with the assistance of their family in Iraq, they would be able to provide sufficient information to successfully make such an application at their local CSA office in Mosul and that the process would be relatively straightforward. In addition, once in Iraq, there are also further ways in which AH and his family could establish their identity even without the direct assistance of other family members, by attending the local CSA office themselves; through the local Mukhtar and/or witnesses as to their identity and through the Iraqi Courts. Although the latter would take longer, given the preserved finding that AH has wider family in Iraq, there is nothing to suggest that he would not have any family support during the process. We therefore find that AH and his family could obtain an INID on return to his home area, within a reasonable time and/or with family support such that they would not face a real risk of breach of Article 3 on return for this reason either.
354. For all of these reasons, we find that neither AH nor his family would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on their return to Iraq as they would be able to obtain an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London before their return. With an INID, they would be able to freely live and travel in Iraq and would face no real risk at the airport. Further, in the alternative, AH and his family would not face any risk on return to Erbil airport or leaving the perimeter of it; nor any real risk travelling through the KRI. They would only face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if they had to pass through further checkpoints at the border with or inside Federal Iraq without an INID; which they have not established they would have to do to reach their home area or local CSA office to re-document. Once in their local area, AH and his family would be able to successfully obtain an INID (if he had not already done so from the Iraqi Embassy in London) within a reasonable period of time and/or with family support from other family in Iraq.
(ii) Real risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group
355. The test for whether a person is a member of particular social group and entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention as such is set out in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex p Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629, followed by Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46. In essence, a group shall be considered to be a particular social group where (i) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and (ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. There is then a separate test of causation as to whether there is a real risk of persecution because of membership of that particular social group. Whether or not a person is at real risk as a member of a particular social group is a mixed question of fact and law.
356. In DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal found that depending on the facts, a ‘person living with a disability or mental ill-health’ may qualify as a member of a particular social group either as (i) sharing an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or (ii) because they may be perceived as being different by the surrounding society and thus have a distinct identity in their country of origin. It is a fact specific assessment, with the key issue being how an individual is viewed in the eyes of a potential persecutor.
357. In the present case, AH claims that he is a member of a particular social group as a disabled person and/or that he and his family are part of a particular social group as they would be returning as a female headed household. We reject the latter entirely given that they would be returning as a family and there is no evidence at all to suggest that if the male head of the household, in this case AH, is ill or disabled he would no longer be considered as such. We find as a fact that this family would not be returning as a female headed household and, in any event, contains three adult males as well.
358. As to whether there is a particular social group formed of those with disabilities (or perceived disabilities) which would give rise to a real risk of persecution for that reason, AH relies on the EUAA Country Guidance Iraq: Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024, the relevant part of which, section 3.13, we set out in full in Annex D. There is no further or separate evidence relied upon to establish that disabled people form a particular social group in Iraq and of itself, we find that the section in the EUAA Country Guidance in Iraq falls significantly short of doing so.
359. At its highest, it appears to suggest that the ground of persecution may (not will) be for reasons of a particular social group but fails to cite any evidence in support of that and in any event, refers primarily to societal discrimination and only in exceptional cases could there be a reasonable degree of likelihood of facing persecution for this reason. There is an almost complete absence of evidence as to how disabled people as a group are treated in Iraq (beyond brief and generic assertions) whether generally or specifically those with or perceived to have a mental illness and with no specific examples given at all. We do not find that the Appellant falls within any of the risk categories identified (including age, those with mental illnesses and those without a support network).
360. Although we accept even on the very limited evidence available that AH may face discrimination due to his health conditions and difficulties with speech; this falls very far short of establishing a real risk of persecution on return for this reason. AH has failed to establish even to the low threshold applicable in protection claims or Article 3 claims that he is at real risk of persecution in Iraq because of his medical conditions and resulting difficulties with speech (for which there is also no evidence of this of itself being perceived as a mental disability). We consider possible discrimination and the practical impact of AH’s conditions, including on access to employment, within the wider Article 8 assessment below.
(iii) Risk of breach of Article 3 on health grounds
361. The test for a breach of Article 3 on health grounds is set out by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and helpfully distilled following this and the case of Sarvan v Denmark (application no. 57467/15) by the Upper Tribunal in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) as follows:

1. In Article 3 health cases two questions in relation to the initial threshold test emerge from the recent authorities of AM (Zimbabwe) … and Savran v Denmark …:
(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has P adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:
(i) “on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,
(ii) of being exposed
(a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
(b) to a significant reduction in life expectancy”?
2. The first question is relatively straightforward issue and will generally require clear and cogent medical evidence from treating physicians in the UK.
3. The second question is multi-layered. In relation to (2)(ii)(a) above, it is insufficient for P to merely establish that his or her condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects. What is required is “intense suffering”. The nature and extent of the evidence that is necessary will depend on the facts of the case. Generally speaking, whilst medical experts in the UK may be able to assist in this assessment, many cases are likely to turn on the availability of and access to treatment in the receiving state. Such evidence is more likely to be found in reports by reputable organisations and/or clinicians and/or country experts with contemporary knowledge of or expertise in medical treatment and related country conditions in the receiving state. Clinicians directly involved in providing relevant treatment and services in the country of return and with knowledge of treatment options in the public and private sectors, are likely to be particularly helpful.
4. It is only after the threshold has been met and thus Article 3 is applicable, that the returning state’s obligations summarised at [130] of Savran become of relevance – see [135] of Savran.
362. We have not been assisted in this case by the absence of a medical report summarising AH’s conditions and treatment; nor even a summary of the current position or how it is said to meet the relevant test in the skeleton argument submitted on AH’s behalf. Instead, what we have is several hundred pages of medical records from a subject access request (not all of which are clearly legible and a number of which have the patient’s name and details redacted, from which we can only infer they relate to AH from the substance of the letter), supplemented by a few additional NHS letters. From those, we discern that AH has a number of active problems recorded between 2022 and 2025, including dyspnoea on exertion; occluded left internal carotid artery; total anterior cerebral circulation infarction (a stroke in November 2024); hypercholesterolaemia; steatosis of liver and is pre-diabetic. A number of other conditions are referred to in the records, including a nerve block and scoliosis, as well as other more minor ailments over the years. In terms of treatment, this appears to be in the form of ongoing rehabilitation from a Clinical Specialist Speech and Language Therapist (having been discharged from the Brain Injury Specialist Clinic in July 2025 following his stroke) and medication (including repeat prescriptions for sumatriptan, lansaoprazole, ezetimibe, emocozin, diclofenac diethyfammonium, atorvastatin, pregabalin, cosmocol plain oral power, clopidogrel and desunin). There is no clear information as to what each of these medications is for and whether or not they are required long-term.
363. The most up to date summary of AHs presentation is from a Clinical Specialist Speech and Language Therapist dated 11 September 2025, following AH being seen in the rehabilitation service following his stroke. It includes the following:
“… Since the stroke, [AH] has experienced significant communication difficulties affecting both spoken and written language in English, Kurdish and Arabic. These impairments have contributed to social isolation and a noticeable decline in mood. He is also experiencing pain and weakness in his right side, increased fatigue and difficulties with sleep.
Despite these challenges, [AH] has shown consistent engagement with rehabilitation and demonstrates clear potential to improve his independence, activity levels and ability to participate in community life.
It is important to note that the ongoing asylum process has introduced additional psychological stress, which may adversely affect [AH’s] recovery. The uncertainty and emotional burden associated with his legal situation have compounded his vulnerability, particularly given his communication difficulties.
In our professional opinion, [AH] would benefit from a stable and supportive environment to continue his rehabilitation and maximise his recovery outcomes. His current progress suggests that, with appropriate support, he can make meaningful improvements in his quality of life and community integration.”
364. In oral evidence, AHW was also asked about AH’s current health. She confirmed that he had had mobility issues for some time; had a stroke in November 2024 and since has received various therapies. At the date of hearing, he was receiving therapy twice a week, was under the care of a doctor and had had a procedure to implant a device in to his heart which would last for three years. AHW was not sure what the device was called, but said that it sends heart readings to AH’s doctor. AHW agreed with the summary in the letter dated 11 September 2025 in relation to AH’s communication difficulties, social isolation, low mood, pain, weakness and difficulties sleeping; with the potential for improvement. However, she stated that even with support there was not likely to be further meaningful improvement given AH still has a lot of difficulty with speech, eating and frustration; as well as breathlessness. AH is supported day to day by AHW, helping him to wash, feed and dress. AH is well cared for with good medical support in the United Kingdom and if he is unable to take his medication on return to Iraq, his condition would worsen.
365. In the present case, we find AH falls very far short of meeting the Article 3 threshold on health grounds. Whilst we have been presented with a significant volume of medical records in relation to AH we can find nothing at all within that to suggest that he is a “seriously ill person” or that there are “substantial grounds” that he would “face a real risk” of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy. There is simply no assessment at all of the impact of removal to Iraq on AH’s health or life expectancy and no evidence at all as to what treatment may be available to him on return to Iraqxvii. Overall, there is simply insufficient evidence from which we could possibly conclude that the threshold is met in this case and we find that there is no real risk of a breach of Article 3 on health grounds.
(iv) Article 8
366. Finally, we turn to Article 8 of the ECHR in relation to AH. Although this may include reference to and consideration of the circumstances of his wife and children, we note that there is no live appeal in relation to them individually, nor was the original Respondent’s decision under appeal made by reference to them specifically As such, we have no jurisdiction to formally consider human rights appeals in relation to them individually.
367. Although AH did not expressly rely on paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules (nor Appendix: Private Life which replaced it) and neither he nor the Respondent made any submissions on it, we consider given the focus of AH’s Article 8 claim it is an appropriate starting point before we go on to consider more broadly whether the removal of AH and his family would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8.
368. In relation the Immigration Rules, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant did not meet any of the requirements in paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules and in relation to Article 8 it was found that there would be no breach if he (or his family) were removed to Iraq. However, given that decision was now over four years ago, there have been a number of changes in the family circumstances and much wider evidence now before us as to the same; we consider the matter afresh.
369. The relevant provision in the Immigration Rules is that contained in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) which refers to an applicant who has lived in the United Kingdom for less than 20 years and “there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country of return”. Integration was explained in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 as follows:
“14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he would be deported … is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal to simply direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
370. The very significant obstacles requirement was considered by the Court of Appeal in Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, who in paragraph 9 held:
“9. … It is fair enough to observe that the words “very significant” connote an “elevated” threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by “mere inconvenience or upheaval”. But I am not sure that saying that “mere” hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not “generally” suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
371. AH has spent the majority of his life in Iraq, living there until he was 40 years old and during which time he attended school and worked as an electrician. AH married in Iraq and had five children there (including the daughter that did not travel with them to the United Kingdom) and has been found to have wider family remaining in Iraq. Although he has been away from Iraq for a number of years, we do not find that he would have lost all ties with Iraq, its language or culture; nor that on return he would not be enough of an insider to understand how life in that country is carried on.
372. Although the medical evidence before us in relation to AH is disorganised and there is no proper up to date summary or assessment of his health to provide an overview, there is no dispute as to some key features, which include that AH had a stroke in late 2024 which has left him with pain, weakness and difficulty with speech (in Kurdish, Arabic and English) and has continued to be under investigation for other issues as well as having a cardiac device fitted. We note in particular from some of the medical evidence that even one of AH’s own sons has difficulty understanding some of his speech when he has attended medical appointments to interpret for him; even with specialist speech and language support.
373. Whilst we have not found that AH’s removal would be in breach of Article 3 on medical grounds, we do consider that overall, his physical health and more importantly his communication difficulties are such that he would not have the capacity to participate in society in Iraq or operate there on a day-to-day basis to build up a variety of human relationships; even with family support and assistance. We further take into account (i) the possibility of discrimination (albeit not persecution) on the grounds of disability and (ii) even in the absence of specific evidence on the point, it is reasonable to infer that AH would not realistically be able to obtain employment on return to Iraq because of his disability and/or discrimination on this basis.
374. In all of the circumstances, which have materially changed since the First-tier Tribunal decision, we find that AH would face very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Iraq such that he meets the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules. In accordance with the decision in TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, this is of itself sufficient to allow AH’s appeal on Article 8 grounds as there is no public interest in the removal of a person who satisfies a provision in the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain.

AJ
375. AJ’s protection and human rights claims have been dismissed, save for the only outstanding issue as to whether he is at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if he is unable to re-document himself with an INID within a reasonable time. On all other points, there are preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal and upon which there is no invitation to us to revisit. We note those preserved findings also include adverse credibility findings against AJ.
376. In essence, AJ’s claim is that he has never had a CSID card or Iraqi passport, but stated in his asylum interview that he had an INC. There is a preserved finding of fact from the First-tier Tribunal that it was not credible that AJ had never had a CSID card and that if he was not able to access his CSID, he was in touch with his grandfather (and had his address) who would be able to assist AJ in re-documenting using his own identity documents. In addition, AJ’s evidence is that he has two paternal uncles in Kirkuk and a paternal aunt in Sulaymaniyah, as well as a maternal aunt and two maternal uncles in Kirkuk; albeit he claims not to be in contact with any of them.
377. The Respondent sought AJ’s attendance at the oral hearing to be cross-examined, but he declined to do soxviii. As such, we have not had the benefit of hearing from AJ and are limited to considering his relatively brief written statements, the last of which was around eighteen months old by the date of hearing. No explanation was given as to why AJ did not attend to give evidence (despite a previous indication during a case management hearing that he would) and we find we are entitled to draw an adverse inference from his refusal to do so.
378. The Respondent’s position on AJ’s claim is, in essence, that one of his relatives in Iraq could post his CSID card to him in the United Kingdom or that they could meet him at Erbil airport to provide the same and assist him with establishing his identity on return. On either basis, AJ would be able to safely return to his home area and redocument himself there.
379. On behalf of AJ, Ms Brakaj submitted that the issue in this case is not whether AJ had access to his original CSID but whether he could obtain an INID or his ability to live in Iraq without one. Whilst AJ disputes the findings as to contact with family in Iraq, Ms Brakaj accepted that the Upper Tribunal were bound by the findings. However, in the absence of AJ’s grandfather having any senior links to the relevant authorities in Iraq, it was submitted that AJ would not be able to safely pass through a checkpoint to return to his home area without an INID. He would further be at risk as a single male of fighting age returning to Kirkuk, a place of previous conflict, he would be at suspicion of having an ISIL affiliation even if he can evidence the time he has spent in the United Kingdom.
380. The first issue is whether AJ would be able to apply for and obtain an INID through the Iraqi Embassy in London prior to his return to Iraq. In paragraph 74 of the First-tier Tribunal decision, it was found that AJ “is in contact with his grandfather who would be able to provide him with details from his CSID or national identity certificate to take to the Iraqi Embassy. …”. This finding was not subject to appeal nor was it affected by the error of law found, the focus of which was the lack of findings as to how AJ would be able to reach his local CSA on return to Iraq. Although not expressly stated that AJ’s grandfather had AJ’s CSID and/or INC, the inference from this finding must be that he has, or at least has a copy of one or both documents, or the relevant information contained on one or both of the documents to be able to provide it to AJ. In respect of the INC, that is also consistent with AJ’s answers in interview that he left his INC at home.
381. In these circumstances, we find that AJ can obtain his CSID and/or INC from his grandfather in Iraq (whom it has been found he remains in contact with and has his address), or at least the details from one or both of these documents; which is, in addition to the application form and bio-metric data which he can provide in London, sufficient to make a successful application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London; as AJ will have all of the standard documents required.
382. In the alternative, even if the reference in paragraph 74 of the First-tier Tribunal decision to CSID and/or INC details were to those contained on AJ’s grandfather’s own documents, they would in any event still assist AJ in identifying his family register page in the Family Book to establish his identity as well and therefore still satisfy the authorities of his identity for the purposes of an INID application. There are also other paternal relatives in Iraq who may assist in a similar way. The First-tier Tribunal made no express findings on whether AJ was in contact with any of them, but AJ’s evidence before us is simply that he is not (which we approach with some caution given the adverse credibility findings already made) with no reason given as to why even if that was the case, he would not be able to re-establish contact.
383. The burden is on AJ to establish that he is unable to obtain an INID and there is no evidence before us that he has made any attempt to do so through the Iraqi Embassy in London (who have the facilities in place to take the required bio-data and process an application and with information and documentation that can be obtained from or through his grandfather or other paternal relative), nor anything to support an assertion that such an application would be refused if he did so.
384. As such, AJ would be returning to Iraq as a documented person with an INID. There would be no reason as to why a laissez-passer could not be obtained for his travel and with his INID he would be able to pass through the airport and any checkpoints thereafter to return to his home area of Kirkuk (where it has already been found he is not at any risk on return) or to relocate within the KRI. In any event, if we are wrong about that, we go on to consider in the alternative whether AJ would be able to obtain an INID on return to Iraq from his local CSA office without encountering treatment contrary to Article 3.
385. In accordance with the country guidance given above, we find that AJ (i) would be able to obtain a laissez-passer for his travel to Iraq; (ii) would not be at risk on return to either Erbil (or Sulaymaniyah) airport and would be permitted to leave either airport; and (iii) would be able to pass through the first checkpoint at the perimeter of either airport without risk. The Respondent has indicated that she would return AJ to Erbil airport as the closest one to his home area (although Sulaymaniyah is not that much further), and as above, whilst at the date of hearing such returns had not been made, the Respondent was confident that this would be practically possible in the very near future.
386. The next question is whether AJ would face any risk on the journey after leaving the perimeter of Erbil airport to his home area of Kirkuk, which would involve passing from the KRI in to the Disputed Territories. We do not find that he would for one or both of the following reasons.
387. First, we find it likely that his grandfather could meet him at Erbil airport and bring AJ’s CSID and/or INC to him there (if not already given to him in the United Kingdom) or use his own identity documentation to assist AJ in establishing his. With his CSID, AJ could safely pass through any required checkpoints, particularly in combination with an authorisation letter; assistance from his grandfather or other paternal relative and a copy of his laissez-passer to show recent arrival in Iraq and to dispel any concerns about travel from an ISIL territory.
388. Secondly, in accordance with the country guidance findings above, it is for AJ to establish that he would need to pass through any further checkpoint after leaving the perimeter of the airport and in this case, he has not done so. To the contrary, the Respondent has identified a specific route from Erbil airport to Kirkuk which avoids further checkpoints after the airport. We therefore find that AJ is not at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on his journey home from Erbil airport as he has not established that he would not need to pass any checkpoints giving rise to such a risk.
389. The final question is whether AJ would be able to successful apply for an INID on return to his home area in Kirkuk. For the same reasons as above in relation to an application for an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London, we find that he would be able to provide either his own documentation (recovered from his grandfather) or would be able to provide sufficient information with the assistance of his grandfather or other paternal relatives, to successfully make such an application at his local CSA and that the process would be relatively straightforward. In addition, once in Iraq, there would in any event be further ways in which AJ could establish his identity by attending his local CSA office himself, through the local Mukhtar and/or witnesses as to his identity and through the Iraqi Courts. Although the latter would take longer, we find that AJ would have family support during the process. We therefore find that AJ could obtain an INID on return to his home area, within a reasonable time and/or with family support such that he would not face a real risk of breach of Article 3 on return for this reason either.
390. For all of these reasons, we find that AJ would not face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on his return to Iraq as he would be able to obtain an INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London before his return. With an INID, he would be able to freely live and travel in Iraq and would face no real risk at the airport. Further, in the alternative, AJ would not face any risk on return to Erbil airport or leaving the perimeter of it; nor any real risk travelling through the KRI; nor the Disputed Territories as he would not need to pass through any additional checkpoints to reach his home area. Once in his local area, AJ would be able to successfully obtain an INID (if not already done so from the Iraqi Embassy in London) within a reasonable period of time and/or with family support from his grandfather. The remainder of AJ’s protection and human rights grounds of appeal are dismissed in line with the preserved findings from the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
As set out in the error of law decisions for each Appellant, the making of the decisions of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such, it was necessary to set aside the respective First-tier Tribunal decisions (with preserved findings of fact in each case).
The appeals for each Appellant are remade as follows:
In respect of AK:

The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.
In respect of AH:

The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds (including Article 3).
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, Article 8 only.
In respect of AJ

The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10th April 2026

ANNEX A – Disputed Territories map

ANNEX B:

AA (Iraq) CG [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC) guidance, as amended on appeal – [2017] EWCA Civ 944 - and supplemented in AAH (Iraq) CG [2018] UKUT 212 (IAC)

B. DOCUMENTATION AND FEASIBILITY OF RETURN (EXCLUDING IKR)
5. Return of former residents of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) will be to the IKR and all other Iraqis will be to Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport relating to P, or a Laissez passer.

6. No Iraqi national will be returnable to Baghdad if not in possession of one of these documents.

7. In the light of the Court of Appeal's judgment in HF (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a Laissez passer, if the Tribunal finds that P's return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.

8. Where P is returned to Iraq on a Laissez Passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport.

C. THE CSID
9. Whilst it remains possible for an Iraqi national returnee (P) to obtain a new CSID whether P is able to do so, or do so within a reasonable time frame, will depend on the individual circumstances. Factors to be considered include:

i) Whether P has any other form of documentation, or information about the location of his entry in the civil register. An INC, passport, birth/marriage certificates or an expired CSID would all be of substantial assistance. For someone in possession of one or more of these documents the process should be straightforward. A Laissez-Passer should not be counted for these purposes: these can be issued without any other form of ID being available, are not of any assistance in ‘tracing back’ to the family record and are confiscated upon arrival at Baghdad;

ii) The location of the relevant civil registry office. If it is in an area held, or formerly held, by ISIL, is it operational?

iii) Are there male family members who would be able and willing to attend the civil registry with P? Because the registration system is patrilineal it will be relevant to consider whether the relative is from the mother or father’s side. A maternal uncle in possession of his CSID would be able to assist in locating the original place of registration of the individual’s mother, and from there the trail would need to be followed to the place that her records were transferred upon marriage. It must also be borne in mind that a significant number of IDPs in Iraq are themselves undocumented; if that is the case it is unlikely that they could be of assistance. A woman without a male relative to assist with the process of redocumentation would face very significant obstacles in that officials may refuse to deal with her case at all.

E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION
13. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID or a valid passport.

14. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi passport, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR, whether by air or land, is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.

15. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID or a valid passport.

16. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or valid passport. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor a valid passport there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.

17. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There is no sponsorship requirement for Kurds.

18. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.

19. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.

20. For those without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:

• Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;

• If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;

• P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;

• In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.

21. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:

• Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;

• The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;

• P cannot work without a CSID;

• Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;

• Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;

• If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.

F. EXISTING COUNTRY GUIDANCE DECISIONS
22. This decision replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq

ANNEX C: English translations of authorisation letters

ANNEX D: Extract from EUAA Country Guidance Iraq: Common analysis and guidance note, November 2024

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The denial of documentation, which also leads to no access to basic education, may be linked to belonging to a minority (see 3.10. Religious and ethnic minorities) or perceived link to ISIL (see 3.1. Persons perceived to be affiliated with ISIL). See also 3.12.5. Children
born under ISIL rule who lack civil documentation.
· Family situation: Abandoned babies have been perceived as disgraceful or the product
of illicit sexual relations, and therefore stigmatised. Children of unknown parentage were not easily accepted in Iraq.
Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?
Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for a child under this profile, this may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group. For example, persecution of abandoned children or children of unknown parentage may be due to their common background (family situation) which cannot be changed and distinct identity in Iraq, in relation to stigmatisation by society.

3.13. Persons living with disabilities(12) and/or with severe
medical issues
Last update: January 2021
Minor updates added: November 2024
The Government of Iraq has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and has adopted the Law No. 38 on the Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs, including the establishment of a Commission for the promotion of respect and protection of the rights of people living with disabilities. However, people with disabilities are among the most vulnerable communities and often neglected in public discourse.
Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?
The Iraqi public healthcare system has severely deteriorated over the past two decades and has continued to be largely in crisis [Country Focus 2024, 2.1.1]. However, the lack of personnel and adequate infrastructure to appropriately address the needs of individuals with (severe) medical issues fails to meet the requirement of Article 6 QD/QR regarding the existence of an actor that inflicts persecution or serious harm, unless the individual is intentionally deprived of healthcare(13). Therefore, the threshold for persecution for individuals under this profile would be reached in exceptional cases.

(12) For the definition of persons with disabilities, see Art. 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
(13) CJEU, M’Bodj, paras. 35-36. See also CJEU, MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-353/16, judgment of 24 April 2018 (MP), paras. 57, 59.
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COMMON ANALYSIS: IRAQ | NOVEMBER 2024

Nevertheless, the severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that persons living with disabilities and/or with severe medical issues could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also considered. Persons with disabilities face a wide array of societal discrimination which hinders, prevents or impairs the full enjoyment of their rights and their full and equal participation in all aspects of society. Adults and children with disabilities are at a higher risk of violence than non-disabled. Children with disabilities are most at risk of being excluded from schools.
Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?
The individual assessment of whether, in exceptional cases, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a person with disability or severe medical issue to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:
· Age: Among others, children with disabilities are reported to be particularly prone to different forms of exploitation, including child labour, forced and/or child marriage, sexual exploitation, and trafficking [Country Focus 2024, 1.4.4]. Additionally, as of 2019, many children with disabilities dropped out of public school due to insufficient physical access to school buildings, a lack of appropriate learning materials in schools, and a shortage of teachers qualified to work with children with developmental or intellectual disabilities.
· Nature and visibility of the mental or physical disability: Those with mental illnesses could be particularly vulnerable to violence and discrimination.
· Support network: Having a family with negative perception towards the applicant could increase the risk.
Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?
Where a well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group (e.g. persons with noticeable mental disabilities, due to their innate characteristic (disability) and distinct identity linked to their stigmatisation by the surrounding society).

3.14. Persons involved in and affected by blood feuds in
the context of tribal conflict
Last update: November 2024
In the Iraqi context, tribes represent a cultural and social reality. Blood feuds are conflicts between tribes involving cycles of retaliatory killings. Tribal confederations and tribes are ‘often cross-sectarian’ and major tribes are composed of both Sunni and Shiite members. Due
to the diversity of tribal structures and origins, geographical and sectarian divisions are not always clear-cut.

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ANNEX E: List of sources

Date
Title Author/Source
14 September 2025 Country Guidance Case Addendum by Dr Fatah Middle East Consultancy Services
September 2025 Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Actors of protection (version 2.0) Home Office
29 August 2025 Statement by Mairead Peronius, Senior Executive Officer, Returns Logistics Operations Home Office
26 August 2025 Expert Report by Dr Fatah Middle East Consultancy Services
30 June 2025 Statement by Mairead Peronius, Senior Executive Officer, Returns Logistics Operations Home Office
1 April 2025 Statement by Mairead Peronius, Senior Executive Officer, Returns Logistics Operations Home Office
29 January 2025 Letter from the British Ambassador to Iraq: Returns of Iraqi Nationals British Embassy Baghdad
28 January 2025 Statement by Mairead Peronius, Senior Executive Officer, Returns Logistics Operations Home Office
23 January 2025 Response to an Information Request - Iraq: Updates to October 2023 CPIN on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns Home Office
5 January 2025 Ministry of Interior: Your card is in your home” service will be activated soon and includes all Iraqis, with English translation Iraqi News Agency
January 2025 Response to an Information Request - Iraq: Checkpoints in the KRI and surrounding areas Home Office
5 December 2024 Unauthorised migration: UK returns agreements with other countries House of Commons Library Research Briefing
28 November 2024 UK/Iraq border security pact to target smuggling gangs Gov.UK News story
11 November 2024 Portable National ID Issuance System Iraq Embassy announcement
3 November 2024 Case study involving journey by undocumented returnee from Erbil International Airport to home area in Kirkuk Unknown
November 2024 Country Guidance: Iraq – Common analysis and guidance note European Union Agency for Asylum
17 October 2024 Issuance of the National Card Iraq Embassy announcement
15 October 2024 The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq issues the first National Card outside Iraq Iraq Embassy announcement
August 2024 Country Information Note - Iraq: Healthcare and medical treatment (version 3.0) Home Office
1 July 2024 Letter from Chief Executive of IRARA - Case Study: Successful Collaboration Between IRARA and ETTC in Assisting Returning Migrants International Returns and Reintegration Assistance
4 June 2024 Iraq: Employment Rights for People with Disabilities Human Rights Watch
9 February 2024 Letter from Chief Executive of IRARA - Successful Collaboration Between IRARA and ETTC in Assisting Returning Migrants International Returns and Reintegration Assistance
18 January 2024 Important note regarding the national card (as translated online through Google Translate) Iraq Ministry of Interior announcement
2024 Iraq Program – Positioning Paper 2024: The Recent Disability Legislation in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Sheyaw NGO
2024 Impact of developmental language disorders on mental health and well-being across the lifespan: a qualitative study including the perspectives of UK adults with DLD and Australian speech-language therapists BMJ Open
October 2023 Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns Home Office
July 2023 Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Home Office
May 2023 Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Humanitarian situation Home Office
January 2023 Inspection report on Home Office country of origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma) Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
January 2023 List of CSID-issuing CSA offices Received by the Respondent from the Iraqi authorities
November 2022 Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Security situation Home Office
12 April 2022 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq US Department of State
April 2008 Common EU Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) European Commission
Undated IRARA information leaflet in English and Arabic “Returning to Iraq” International Returns and Reintegration Assistance
Undated IRARA information leaflet in English and Kurdish International Returns and Reintegration Assistance
Undated Laissez-Passer information Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in London website
Undated Expert Submission: Commentary on Embassy Correspondence Regarding Returns to Iraq Unknown
Undated GeoPDFs Iraq (including Erbil city, Kirkuk city, Mosul city and Sulaymaniyah city) Unknown

Additional source material was before the Upper Tribunal as part of the original First-tier Tribunal bundles in respect of UI-2021-001982 and UI-2021-001948, none of which was referred to or expressly relied upon by any of the parties before the Upper Tribunal. All of this material predated the decision in SMO2. In these circumstances, this additional source material is not individually listed in the table above.