[2026] UKUT 00378

Case title: Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed, fraudulent applications, procedure)
Appellant name: Hoxha & Others
Status of case: Reported
Hearing date: 06 Mar 2026
Promulgation date: 21 Aug 2026
Publication date: 05 Oct 2026
Last updated on: 05 Oct 2026
Country: Not applicable
Judges: JUDGE FEENEY, PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER), UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM, UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
Keywords Tanveer Ahmed, fraudulent applications, procedure

The decision

NCN: [2026] UKUT 00378 (IAC)

Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed; fraudulent applications; procedure)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Heard at Field House

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard on 8 January and 6 March 2026
Issued on 21 August 2026

Before

JUDGE FEENEY
PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
and
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
and
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

AURON HOXHA

ATIF MEHMOOD

NAGINA KOUSAR

MUHAMMAD UZAIR AHMED
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

AND

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Appellant
and

ZAHID MEHMOOD
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellants: No appearance by or on behalf of the appellants

For the SSHD: Mr P Deller, Ms H Gilmour and Mrs A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officers for the hearing on 8 January 2026;
Ms H Gilmour and Mrs A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officers for the hearing on 6 March 2026

Tanveer Ahmed * [2002] Imm AR 318

(i) In light of rapid developments in the use of Artificial Intelligence to generate and manipulate documents and images that are increasingly difficult to distinguish from genuine documents and images the principled approach established in Tanveer Ahmed is reaffirmed to apply to any document provided in the currency of any proceedings, whether substantive hearing, interim hearings or applications or even bail hearings. [4], [52]

(ii) The overarching question for the judge will be whether the document in question can be regarded as reliable, looking at all the evidence in the round. Relevant considerations may include:
a. The point at which the document relied upon was provided to the SSHD and the extent to which, if any, the SSHD has had an opportunity to consider and comment upon the document.
b. The explanation provided for any failure to provide the document when the claim or application was made or at an earlier stage in the appeal proceedings. [46]

Late Evidence

(iii) Judges must be astute in identifying signs of possible fraud throughout the appeal process and ensure they are aware of when documents have been filed and whether those documents have been properly served. [6]

(iv) It remains for the party that relies upon a document to satisfy the FtT that a copy of the document has been provided to the other party in a timely way and that they have permission to rely upon that evidence. [32]

(v) A decision to refuse an application for entry clearance or leave to remain because of a failure to provide relevant documents to support the application without explanation can reasonably be categorised as a challenge to the credibility of the applicant or the sponsor. [47]

(vi) It is legitimate for a judge to ask themselves in their evaluation of the evidence and consideration of the appeal why an appellant would choose to have the appeal determined on the papers where the credibility of the appellant and/or sponsor is in issue or where there may be anomalies in the documents that require explanation.

(vii) Where a party seeks to rely on evidence filed in breach of directions, the following considerations apply:
a. An application must be made for permission to rely on such evidence.
b. It remains for the party that relies upon a document to satisfy the judge that a copy of the document has been provided to the other party in a timely way and that they have permission to rely upon that evidence. [28], [32]
c. Evidence filed in breach of directions should be approached with appropriate circumspection, particularly where no satisfactory explanation has been provided. Parties should expect the FtT to deal robustly with any failure to comply with directions for providing evidence. A judge may refuse permission to rely upon the evidence, apply Tanveer Ahmed principles when considering the weight to be attached to the evidence, or grant an adjournment. [34], [42]
d. If evidence is uploaded after the SSHD’s review and the judge cannot be satisfied that the evidence has been served upon the SSHD, it may be procedurally unfair for the judge to take account of that evidence in reaching their decision. The consequence of failing to serve evidence on the other party may be that the judge, applying the principles in Maleci [2024] UKUT 28 (IAC) and Dawrani [2026] UKUT 151 (IAC), will not admit the evidence and will have no regard to it in reaching their decision. [37]

Adjournments

(viii) When deciding whether a matter should be adjourned the following considerations apply:
a. Judges should be cautious about granting adjournments. The mere fact that evidence has been served late does not mean that an adjournment will necessarily be required and there may be sufficient time for the other party to familiarise themselves with the documents. [38]
b. In deciding whether to adjourn, the FtT must apply the principles in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC). The central question is whether refusal of the application would in all the circumstances of the case deprive the party of a fair hearing. [38]
c. Repeated applications for an adjournment, or requests for an appeal to proceed on the papers following a previous judicial decision that the appeal is unsuitable for paper determination, will ordinarily require a good reason. Delay is not in the interests of justice. [40]

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. All three members of the panel have contributed substantially to this decision.
2. These five appeals are among ten that were listed for hearing because they concerned similar issues. The decisions in these five appeals have been incorporated into a single document to enable the Upper Tribunal to provide guidance in situations where there have been, or it is suspected there have been, fraudulent immigration applications. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) (“FtT”) and Upper Tribunal have identified certain patterns in appeals in which there is a suspected fraud, the essential aim of which is to avoid proper scrutiny of the critical evidence provided, thus increasing the chance of a successful outcome. All ten appeals listed for hearing display certain characteristics indicative of abuse of the immigration appeal system.
3. We have issued separate decisions in the remaining five appeals, but do not burden this decision by reciting those decisions or attaching those decisions as annexes to this decision:
Appeal Reference
1. UI-2024-005943 SSHD v Aldo Dodaj
2. UI-2024-004888 Badar Hasnain v SSHD
3. UI-2025-002244 SSHD v Sheer Khan
4. UI-2025-001997 Altin Cani v SSHD
5. UI-2025-001266 SSHD v Hassan Javaid
4. This decision is also intended to provide guidance to FtT judges on the continuing applicability of the decision in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKIAT 00439 (“Tanveer Ahmed”). In light of rapid developments in the use of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) to generate and manipulate documents and images that are increasingly difficult to distinguish from genuine documents and images we reaffirm the principled approach established in Tanveer Ahmed and conclude that the Tanveer Ahmed principles apply equally in non-protection/human rights appeals.
5. Before we turn to the five appeals that are addressed in this decision, it is helpful for us to say a little more about the pattern of fraudulent behaviour that has been identified in all ten of the appeals and which is indicative of an abuse of the system.
Cohort of fraudulent cases
6. Fraudulent immigration applications can occur in a multitude of different ways. Judges must be astute in identifying signs of possible fraud throughout the appeal process and ensure they are aware of when documents have been filed and whether those documents have been properly served. We set out below certain characteristics common to these appeals that we have identified as being indicative of a fraudulent application. Not all the appeals share all the same characteristics or patterns. An overarching characteristic of the applications and appeals we have considered is the steps taken to prevent the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) from having an opportunity to consider and test the evidence that has been provided, often at the last minute, before a hearing or the appeal being determined ‘on the papers’.
7. In almost all the appeals the appellant presents as an Appellant-In-Person (“AIP”). Fraudulent applications can still occur where the appellant is legally represented for either the whole or part of the proceedings. The decision in R (on the application of Ahmed and Others) v Entry Clearance Officer (Solicitors’ duties: indication of fraud) [2026] UKUT 00273 (IAC) considers the nature of the obligation on solicitors where there are indicators of potential fraud.
8. Good administration requires that a client risk assessment should be carried out at the beginning of a client relationship. The need for a robust client and matter risk assessment cannot be underestimated. It informs the determination of the level of client due diligence needed. Where it is suggested that there is an agent abroad acting for or assisting an individual, that might be an indication of a high risk because the agent may not be bound by the regulatory framework that applies in this jurisdiction. That might call for some enhanced due diligence to ensure the professional standards that apply to representatives regulated in this jurisdiction, are not undermined by a veil. Where there are “red flags” that bear “the hallmarks of fraud”, a representative cannot continue to act for their client without first making enquiries to satisfy themselves that they are not being instructed to help further fraudulent conduct. To continue to act would be in breach of their professional obligations; R (on the application of Ahmed and Others), at [88].
9. These particular appeals relate to applications made under the EU Settlement Scheme (“EUSS”). Typically, an appellant will make an EUSS application, usually claiming to be a relative of an EEA national (“the sponsor”) with limited leave or settled status in the UK. The appeals before us have some or all of the following features in common:
a. The appellant makes an application and submits minimal evidence to support the application and demonstrate the relevant requirements are met. For example, critical evidence regarding the claimed relationship, such as marriage certificates or evidence of co-habitation, is omitted.
b. The SSHD requests further evidence to support the application, but the request remains unanswered. Alternatively, the SSHD invites the appellant and/or sponsor to attend an interview, but the interview does not take place.
c. The application is refused by the SSHD, citing the lack of evidence to support the application to establish that the requirements are met, or the failure to attend an interview.
d. The appellant will lodge an appeal to the FtT. The appellant elects for a determination of the appeal on the papers rather than requesting an oral hearing.
e. Often the grounds of appeal and witness statements have the appearance of being generated by a large language model (LLM) generative AI system (overly formal use of language, rigid structuring making heavy use of headings and bullet points, reliance on hallucinations (invented case law) or incorrect citations).
f. In response to the appeal, the SSHD will file and serve a bundle on the FtT and the appellant respectively.
g. Before the appeal is determined (often only days before), the appellant files a bundle with the FtT containing the critical evidence that had not been provided to the SSHD in support of the application. Although not immediately apparent, a copy of the bundle filed by the appellant may not have been served on the SSHD, or was served in breach of the relevant time limits.
h. The critical evidence, often including marriage certificates and residence cards, can appear persuasive and at first glance may seem genuine. Sometimes there is evidence of a child born of the relationship, occasionally it is said that a child has died and a document purporting to be a death certificate is produced. Other documents provided to the FtT include images that purport to be foetal scans, photographed residence documents, bank statements relating to the appellant and/or the sponsor, and money remittance documents purporting to demonstrate funds remitted by the sponsor to the appellant.
i. The appeal will often be allowed because the FtT judge is unaware that the evidence provided to the FtT has not been served on the SSHD. Unbeknown to the judge the SSHD has not had an opportunity to consider or make any enquiries as to the veracity of the documents relied upon.
j. In the majority of these appeals, once permission to appeal has been granted and the Upper Tribunal has directed the attendance of the appellant and/or sponsor to address allegations that false evidence has been provided, applications to adjourn or withdraw the appeal are often made and, in the majority of cases, there is no attendance before the Upper Tribunal of either the sponsor and/or the appellant.
10. Another common feature of some of the appeals before us is that the email address provided for the appellant bears no resemblance to their name. In fact, a striking feature of the appeals is that on closer analysis of the relevant records, it has become apparent that often the same email addresses have been used for several applications by different appellants or sponsors, who are otherwise unconnected.
11. We make it clear that although we have referred to grounds of appeal and witness statements having the appearance of being generated by a large language model (LLM) generative AI system, that is not to deprecate the proper use of AI tools by AIPs that has the potential to be of material assistance. The suspected use of an AI generative tool is not by itself an indication of fraud, but the possibility of misuse cannot be underestimated in an increasingly digital era.
12. The ability of AI models to generate material, including documents, is capable of posing an existential threat to the integrity of the immigration appeal system, and requires particular vigilance. These appeals provide the Tribunal with a timely opportunity to revisit the application of the Tanveer Ahmed principles over two decades since that decision was first issued and in light of the rapid improvement of AI technology in recent times.
Tanveer Ahmed
13. Tanveer Ahmed is a starred decision of the Upper Tribunal issued in 2002 and must be followed as it provides authoritative guidance. The appellant, a national of Pakistan, claimed to be a member of the MQM political party and to have been targeted by the Pakistani authorities for his political activities. He provided several documents to support his claim including a First Incident Report (“FIR”), an arrest warrant, an MQM party letter and newspaper cuttings. He claimed these documents were genuine and were indicative that he faced a real risk of persecution.
14. The adjudicator found the FIR and warrant were not likely to be genuine and attached no weight to the MQM letter. The adjudicator effectively concluded that the documents were manufactured and found that the appellant faced no risk of persecution. The grounds of appeal argued that the adjudicator misapplied the burden of proof regarding the authenticity of the documents, let his rejection of documents improperly “cloud” the rest of his findings and failed to treat the alleged forgery as an allegation the SSHD was required to prove.
15. At [31] the Tribunal stated:
“It is trite immigration and asylum law that we must not judge what is or is not likely to happen in other countries by reference to our perception of what is normal within the United Kingdom. The principle applies as much to documents as to any other form of evidence. We know from experience and country information that there are countries where it is easy and often relatively inexpensive to obtain "forged" documents. Some of them are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Some are "genuine" to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Examples are birth, death and marriage certificates from certain countries, which can be obtained from the proper source for a "fee", but contain information which is wholly or partially untrue. The permutations of truth, untruth, validity and "genuineness" are enormous. At its simplest we need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true. They are separate questions. It is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is "forged" or even "not genuine". It is necessary to shake off any preconception that official looking documents are genuine, based on experience of documents in the United Kingdom, and to approach them with an open mind.”
16. The Tribunal set out a summary of principles at [38]:
1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.
17. The Tanveer Ahmed principles have been endorsed in the higher courts (see, for example, N (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 255, at [30]). In MA (Bangladesh) & AM (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 175 the Court of Appeal considered whether Tanveer Ahmed was still ‘good law’ in light of the conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/2011)([1], [9] & [19]). The appellants argued that the Tribunals had placed inadequate weight on documentary evidence and that the SSHD failed to verify documents (including a Bangladeshi court judgement, lawyers’ letters, newspaper articles and reports and a Ministry of Home Affairs document) whose authenticity was said to be central to the appellants’ claims. At [28] Lord Justice Lloyd Jones noted that the Court of Appeal had considered this question in PJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2015] 1WLR 1322 (which concerned documents obtained by local lawyers and sent directly to lawyers in the UK) and concluded that the approach to verification of documents laid down in Tanveer Ahmed was compatible with the decision of the Strasbourg court in Singh v. Belgium and that there was no material difference in approach between the two decisions. Fulford LJ said, at [22], that the involvement of lawyers does not create the rebuttable presumption that the documents they produce in this situation are reliable. In the context of documents that appeared, on their face, to be authentic, the Court of Appeal referred, at [45], to uncontested features in MA’s case that tended to undermine the genuineness of his protection claim and then stated:
“…This court in PJ (Sri Lanka) emphasised that, while the circumstances of particular cases may exceptionally necessitate an element of investigation of documents by national authorities, documents should not be viewed in isolation but considered in the context of all the evidence. The uncontested evidence of MA's conduct is compelling evidence that his claim for asylum is not genuine. In these circumstances, I conclude that the Secretary of State was under no obligation to make further enquiries, which in any event may give no certainty of outcome, as to the authenticity of these documents.
18. In QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033, the Upper Tribunal considered the circumstances in which the SSHD may have an obligation to make enquiries in order to verify the authenticity and reliability of a document, and the consequences of her not doing so. The Upper Tribunal said (adopted in the first headnote):
“37. ..The decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 remains good law as regards the correct approach to documents adduced in immigration appeals. The overarching question for the judicial fact-finder will be whether the document in question can be regarded as reliable. An obligation on the respondent to take steps to verify the authenticity of the document relied on by an appellant will arise only exceptionally (in the sense of rarely). This will be where the document is central to the claim; can easily be authenticated; and where (as in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/11)), authentication is unlikely to leave any "live" issue as to the reliability of its contents. It is for the tribunal to decide, in all the circumstances of the case, whether the obligation arises. If the respondent does not fulfil the obligation, the respondent cannot challenge the authenticity of the document in the proceedings; but that does not necessarily mean the respondent cannot question the reliability of what the document says. In all cases, it remains the task of the judicial fact-finder to assess the document's relevance to the claim in the light of, and by reference to, the rest of the evidence.
19. We note that SM and Qadir v SSHD (ETS – Evidence – Burden of Proof) [2016] UKUT 00229 (IAC) at [60] suggests, obiter, that Tanveer Ahmed may only apply to asylum or protection claims. There is no reason in principle why the Tanveer Ahmed principles should not equally apply in non-protection/human rights appeals. The range of human rights appeals is multifarious and can include article 8 ECHR appeals in which issues concerning the reliability of documents are likely to be similar to those in appeals under The Immigration (Citizen’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. The ease with which AI generated documents can be created supports the need for a rounded assessment of documents irrespective of the nature of the underlying claim or application.
20. Our conclusion is supported by R (on the application of SO) v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham AAJR [2013] UKUT 00256 (IAC), in which the Upper Tribunal was invited to apply the Tanveer Ahmed principles to an age assessment, and appeared to do so (see [6], [82] and [87]). Further, in R (on the Application of Sudhir Patel) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 1442 (Admin), a challenge to a refusal to issue a UK passport, the Administrative Court appeared to apply the Tanveer Ahmed principles to the assessment of documents relied on by the claimant (see [3] and [37]). An earlier decision of the Administrative Court ((MD Maruf Ahmed Diamond v SSHD [2020] EWHC 3313 (Admin), at [42] to [45]), also concerned with the issuance of a UK passport, applied the Tanveer Ahmed principles to its assessment of the reliability of documents.
21. The core principle to be extracted from Tanveer Ahmed is as true now as it was two decades ago. That is, the burden of proof rests on an appellant to demonstrate that a document upon which they rely is reliable, just as with any evidence, and that the assessment of reliability must be reached through a holistic evaluation which considers all the evidence ‘in the round’. A document may be genuine in form but false in content, false in form but based on true information, or a combination thereof. It is only if the SSHD specifically alleges forgery with a proper evidential basis, that the burden (to the civil standard) lies on the SSHD. Logistical and cost constraints mean that the SSHD is not generally required to verify documents and a failure to investigate creates no presumption in an appellant’s favour. In most cases there will be no requirement to establish the existence of a forgery because the central issue is whether a document should be given weight, not whether it is forged. Documents should not be viewed in isolation, and the entire evidential landscape must be considered.
22. The observations made in paragraph [31] of the decision in Tanveer Ahmed remain as true now as they did in 2002. AI in the modern digital era presents even greater challenges than those perhaps envisaged in 2002. Generative AI is built on deep learning models that learn patterns from large amounts of data and use those patterns to generate desired outputs, such as images based on user prompts. The opportunity to consider and examine documents in physical form has diminished but that is not to say that the FtT should not require documents relied upon to be made available for examination by the SSHD or itself where that may be required.
General guidance in respect of potentially fraudulent applications
23. Most appeals now progressing through the FtT use the online procedure accessed through MyHMCTS. There remain, however, a number of appeals that could not be lodged using the online system and which have proceeded outside it. These are generally referred to as "offline" appeals. The procedure used to progress appeals differs slightly depending on whether an appeal is being managed through the online or offline process.
24. In an offline appeal, the process begins when an appellant lodges a valid appeal. The appeal is then allocated to a hearing centre, which assumes responsibility for case management. At the outset of proceedings, the hearing centre issues directions to the parties. Those directions require each party to file and serve the evidence upon which they intend to rely, and to do so within a particular time period.
25. Ordinarily, the SSHD’s bundle is filed first, followed by the appellant's bundle. Once the relevant deadlines have passed, the administrative team reviews the file. Where appropriate, and particularly where a party has failed to comply with the directions, the FtT may provide a further opportunity for evidence to be filed and served. The appeal is then listed either for determination on the papers or for an oral hearing.
26. Judges should bear in mind that in offline appeals, the FtT does not file or serve evidence on behalf of the parties. The directions expressly require each party to file and serve its own evidence on all other participants in the proceedings. The failure to properly serve evidence on the SSHD is a particular feature in these appeals. Judges must be vigilant to ensure they are aware of when documents have been filed and served in offline appeals and for appropriate inquiries to be made if there is any uncertainty.
27. The online process operates differently. With the exception of appeals subject to the 24-week statutory timetable, a Legal Officer reviews the validity of the appeal once it is lodged and then progresses the appeal through the various stages of case management. The appeal is ordinarily listed for a substantive hearing only once those stages have been completed or once the Legal Officer is satisfied that no further progress can be made. In respect of the appeals subject to the 24-week statutory timetable, once an appeal has been validly lodged the parties are provided with directions and a date of hearing at the outset. The parties are therefore aware of the timetable that will apply to enable the Tribunal to meet its statutory obligations and to understand the FtT’s expectations from the outset.
28. In all online appeals, evidence may be uploaded at any stage up to the hearing. The online system does not "lock" once the directions timetable has expired. As a result, parties will sometimes upload evidence after the deadline set by the directions. Where a party seeks to rely on evidence filed in breach of directions, it should apply to the FtT for permission to do so. Such requests should be made using the Applications process rather than by simply uploading the documents. The FtT will determine the admissibility of the evidence as a preliminary issue. A Legal Officer will consider the application and, where appropriate, invite the SSHD to review and respond to the new evidence before the appeal is listed for hearing.
29. Judges should therefore check when documents were uploaded and whether they were uploaded in compliance with the relevant directions. Judges should not assume that, because a document appears on the Documents tab of the FtT’s case management system, the SSHD has had an opportunity to consider it. The SSHD does not continually monitor appeals for newly uploaded material and will often have completed the review before the document was uploaded. This may be important when considering whether the other party has had a fair opportunity to consider and respond to the evidence. In particular, the SSHD’s review may have been completed before the additional documents were uploaded. In those circumstances, the SSHD may not have had an opportunity to consider the evidence when conducting the review.
30. Notwithstanding its constraints, one of the advantages of the online system is that it is generally straightforward to identify what directions have been issued and when they were issued. It is also easier to see whether evidence has been provided in response to those directions. The relevant dates and procedural history are recorded within the online case management system. By contrast, this information may be less readily apparent in an offline appeal.
31. Parties must comply with the requirements of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 and the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, 1 November 2024 (“Practice Direction”), particularly in respect of compliance with directions. If documents are provided in breach of directions the judge can determine their admissibility in accordance with the principles set out in Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC) and Dawrani (judicial discretion – late evidence – sanction) [2026] UKUT 00151 (IAC).
32. Once the appeal is ready for hearing, the FtT will generate a hearing bundle comprising the documents contained within the Documents tab. The inclusion of a document within that bundle does not necessarily mean that it was filed in accordance with the FtT’s directions or that permission has been granted for the party to rely upon it. It remains for the party that relies upon a document to satisfy the FtT that a copy of the document has been provided to the other party (here, usually the SSHD) in a timely way and that they have permission to rely upon that evidence.
33. In both offline and MyHMCTS appeals, parties may elect for an appeal to be determined without an oral hearing. In those cases, the judge determines the appeal ‘on the papers’ based on the documents filed and served by the parties. The procedure is broadly similar, but there is an important distinction. The FtT does not allocate a specific hearing date. The parties are instead notified that the appeal will be considered after the expiry of the directions timetable. There is therefore no particular day on which the parties should expect a decision to be made. If evidence is filed in breach of directions, the other party will not have the opportunity to address it at a hearing unless the FtT takes further case management steps.
34. There are a range of case management options available to the judge where evidence has been filed in breach of directions and without adequate explanation. Parties should expect the FtT to deal with any failure to comply with directions for filing and serving evidence robustly. A judge may refuse permission to rely upon the evidence, admit the evidence and apply the Tanveer Ahmed principles when considering the weight to be attached to the evidence, or, where necessary, grant an adjournment.
35. When determining appeals, either on the papers or at a hearing in which the appellant or sponsor do not attend, if a judge has concerns as to the reliability of documents, they should refer to MyHMCTS or the offline documents to ascertain what documents were before the SSHD at the review stage and whether the SSHD had a full and proper opportunity to consider them.
36. A review is an opportunity for the SSHD to consider the reliability of any documents that were not provided with the appellant’s original application. Judges must not assume that the SSHD has properly been served with any documents or bundle that is not referred to in the SSHD review, and particular caution must be taken when considering any claim that documents were served upon the SSHD after the review in the absence of confirmation from the SSHD that any such documents have been received and considered.
37. If evidence is uploaded after the SSHD has completed the review and the judge cannot be satisfied that the evidence has been served upon the SSHD, it may be procedurally unfair for the judge to take account of that evidence in reaching their decision. Rule 2(1) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2014 sets out the overriding objective to enable the FtT to deal with cases fairly and justly, and rule 2(4) imposes a duty upon the parties to help the FtT to further the overriding objective and co-operate with the FtT generally. It can come as no surprise to a party seeking to rely upon evidence they have failed to serve upon the other party that the consequences of that failure may be that the judge, applying the principles in Maleci and Dawrani, will not admit that evidence and will have no regard to it in reaching their decision.
38. Judges should be cautious about granting adjournments. Adjournments inevitably result in further delay. The mere fact that evidence has been served late does not mean that an adjournment will necessarily be required and there may be sufficient time for the other party to familiarise themselves with the documents. In deciding whether to adjourn, the FtT must apply the principles in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC). The central question is whether refusal of the application would deprive the party of a fair hearing. That focuses attention on the integrity of the hearing process rather than on whether granting the application would be helpful to the party making it. It must be answered by reference to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the application and quality of the evidence relied upon to support the application, its timing, the explanation given, the importance of the evidence to the principle controversial issues, the party’s compliance with directions, and the opportunities already given to prepare and participate in the proceedings.
39. Nwaigwe recognises that adjournment applications may be tactical, speculative or abusive, but cautions against treating that fact alone as determinative of whether a fair hearing can take place. The FtT must preserve the fair hearing rights of both parties while addressing concerns about conduct through the proper procedural lens, including abuse of process where appropriate. The requirement for parties to act with procedural rigour is now expressly reinforced by the Practice Direction. Although Nwaigwe referred to SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284 that authority must be understood in its own procedural context. It arose in the context of the fast-track regime, with severely compressed timescales later found to be unlawful. It does not provide a general answer to ordinary FtT cases involving delay, non-compliance with directions, non-attendance, or possible abuse of process. Judges should record in their decisions the reason as to why an adjournment application has been refused.
40. Repeated applications for an adjournment, or requests for an appeal to proceed on the papers following a previous judicial decision that the appeal is unsuitable for paper determination, will ordinarily require a good reason. Non-compliance with FtT directions, and a failure to attend a hearing when directed to do so, does not of itself mean that the appeal cannot be determined justly. Delay is not in the interests of justice. Although not relevant to the appeals that we have considered, the introduction of the statutory 24 week period for the determination of certain appeals by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 serves to re-enforce the need for timely determination of appeals.
41. Where parties are made aware that concerns about documents feature as an issue in the appeal, it is for the party that relies on the document to address the concerns, supported by evidence. Where a judge proceeds in the absence of the appellant or sponsor, the decision should explain why it was fair and consistent with the overriding objective to do so. A failure to attend and submit to cross-examination is a relevant, and often significant, factor when assessing the evidence as a whole and determining the weight to be attached to it.
42. Evidence filed in breach of directions should be approached with appropriate circumspection, particularly where no satisfactory explanation has been provided for the delay. Similar considerations may arise where evidence is uploaded after the SSHD has completed its review and has therefore had no opportunity to consider or comment upon the material. It is open to a judge to conclude that the circumstances in which late evidence has been produced, taken together with other factors in the refusal letter affect the weight that should be attached to the evidence when taking a holistic view about the appeal, applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed.
43. As noted in Tanveer Ahmed, the permutations of truth, untruth, validity and genuineness are enormous. Judges must now also be alert to the risk of what we describe as “fake documents” in immigration appeals. That is a document that has been artificially generated or materially altered using either conventional or advanced digital tools (sometimes, but not only, involving AI) so that it appears authentic but is not, whether in substance or in form. The tools needed for creating fake documents are becoming readily available and are rapidly improving in sophistication and can be used by non-technical users. The Upper Tribunal has already issued reported decisions on the use of AI in immigration cases, although these have focused on the use of AI by legal representatives and have not involved fake documents (UK and R (on the application of Munir) v SSHD (AIA hallucinations, supervision, Hamid) [2026] UKUT 00081; MS (Professional conduct, AI generated documents) [2025] UKUT 00305).
44. In the appeals before us we have seen authentic looking bank statements, money transfer documents, residence cards, birth and death certificates, and email correspondence all of which, on examination and without explanation, have been found not to be genuine.
45. Any documents relied upon should be provided to the SSHD in advance, so as to afford at least some opportunity for checks to be undertaken. However, the burden remains on the appellant to establish that documents relied upon are reliable. The SSHD is not under a general duty to verify documents, and a failure to investigate does not create any presumption in the appellant’s favour. The judge should also consider whether any directions are appropriate for the documents upon which the appellant relies to be produced at the hearing.
46. Judges should be particularly cautious of appeals in which the documents/evidence in support of an application were not provided to the SSHD to support the application when made. Material documents may of course be omitted for genuine reasons, but the omission of such documents from the initial application may warrant closer scrutiny and require explanation. The overarching question for the judge will be whether the document in question can be regarded as reliable, looking at all the evidence in the round. Without being prescriptive or determinative, relevant considerations may include:
a. The point at which the document relied upon was provided to the SSHD and the extent to which, if any, the SSHD has had an opportunity to consider and comment upon the document.
b. The explanation provided for any failure to provide the document at the time that a claim or application is made to the SSHD whatever the nature of the claim or application, and the explanation for any delay in disclosing the document to the SSHD or FtT.
47. When a request is made for the appeal to be determined on the papers, and the lesser fee is paid, judges should also be cautious about proceeding without a hearing in circumstances where there is a challenge to the credibility of the appellant and/or sponsor, for example, because the existence of the central relationship has been challenged. A decision to refuse an application because of the failure to provide relevant documents to support the application without explanation can reasonably be categorised as a challenge to the credibility of the applicant or the sponsor. It is legitimate for a judge to ask themselves in their evaluation of the evidence and consideration of the appeal why an appellant would choose to have the appeal determined on the papers where the credibility of the appellant and/or sponsor is in issue or where there may be anomalies in the documents that require explanation.
48. Appeals requiring an assessment of an appellant’s credibility should ordinarily be heard orally, and ideally in person, although we recognise this may not always be possible. Where an in-person hearing cannot be accommodated, the appeal may be heard remotely. In such cases, the judge should satisfy themselves that the individual participating in the hearing is the appellant or sponsor, that no other person is present in the room, and that the appellant is not using a computer or other device to assist in answering questions.
49. The guidance in SSGA (Disposal without considering merits, R.25) Iraq [2023] UKUT 00012 and Ghira (R 25 – AIP – Fairness) [2025] UKUT 00350 (IAC) is relevant and should be applied when considering whether an appeal can be determined justly without an oral hearing. As a preliminary issue, the judge should decide whether late evidence should be admitted. If the evidence is admitted and is likely to give rise to credibility issues, an oral hearing will often be appropriate. This applies even where the parties have asked for an appeal to be considered without an oral hearing. Where a judge is required to determine the credibility of an appellant or sponsor, or to consider the weight to be attached to documents relied upon, the judge is likely to be assisted by an opportunity to have the evidence tested by way of cross-examination.
50. Where an oral hearing is so directed, the judge should expressly state that credibility has been raised in the refusal letter and put the parties on notice that there may be issues concerning the reliability of documents provided in support of the appeal. This will enable the appellant to provide any additional information or arrange the attendance of any witnesses to support their appeal.
51. Where, applying SSGA and Ghira, a judge directs that an appeal can only be determined justly following an oral hearing, an appellant who has made a fraudulent application, or an agent acting on their behalf, may seek to avoid attendance. This may take the form of applications for adjournment or requests for the appeal to proceed on the papers. Adjournment applications are often supported by documentation that appears reliable on its face, including documents purportedly issued by medical professionals or hospitals. Documents relied upon in support of an application to adjourn may themselves be unreliable or fraudulently generated. This issue is not confined to EUSS appeals. Judges must avoid prejudging the substantive appeal, but they are not required to accept at face value documents produced in support of an adjournment application.
52. Applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed it remains for the appellant to establish that documents relied upon are reliable and this applies to any document provided in the currency of any proceedings whether substantive hearing, interim hearings or applications or even bail hearings. Each application must be considered on its own facts and merits. The judge should consider with care the nature of the application, its timing, the substance of the evidence relied upon, and whether the material could reasonably have been provided earlier. The quality of the supporting evidence will be important. Many applications for an adjournment are based on asserted medical emergencies. Where there is an established history of ill health, the explanation for non-attendance may be readily understood. Where there is no such history, or where a medical emergency is asserted, the quality of the supporting evidence will be important. A document which records a direct medical examination may carry different weight from a pro forma letter, produced without any physical examination or a screenshot of a text message from a GP surgery offering generic medical advice.
53. Where the SSHD does not attend, the judge may proceed on the basis that the SSHD relies on the decision under challenge, bearing in mind the guidance in MR (Pakistan) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 473.
54. Whilst considerable caution is required when drawing an adverse inference from email addresses that do not correspond to the named user (people very often use such email addresses and an email bearing no apparent connection to the appellant is an inherently weak indicator of fraud), this nevertheless remains a factor which judges should be alert to. On its own, it is not an indicator of fraud but taken together with other unexplained anomalies in the documents relied upon or the conduct of the parties, it may be a relevant marker pointing towards fraudulent activity, and, on the application of the Tanveer Ahmed approach, be properly taken into account in assessing the application as a whole.
55. Judges should consider with care the explanation provided for the failure to attend a marriage interview or for the omission of material documents provided to the SSHD with the initial application. The Document Verification Report (“DVR”) evidence produced in these appeals shows that fabricated email correspondence purportedly between an appellant or sponsor and the SSHD has been provided in respect of non-attendance at marriage interviews, as well as fabricated letters from hospitals and GPs relating to medical emergencies.
56. Where the SSHD has been provided with the documents relied upon and has had an opportunity to conduct checks, as in the appeals before us, the SSHD may file with the Tribunal either a DVR or an Enrichment Report. A DVR is an administrative report prepared by a Home Office official based on inquiries, either directly or through the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, with issuing authorities, institutions, employers, banks, educational bodies or other third parties, to assess whether a document is genuine, not genuine, or whether it cannot be verified as such. A DVR is likely to only be available in respect of those documents that purport to emanate from a source with established lines of communication with the SSHD for the purposes of enquiries as to the veracity of the document or the information contained on the document. An Enrichment Report is a report produced by a specialist team within the Home Office that (i) holds a variety of specimen genuine documents and can compare and contrast documents provided in support of applications or appeals with the specimen documents; (ii) has access to information already held by the Home Office on existing Home Office systems and lawful data sources. An Enrichment Report does not involve external inquiries (unlike a DVR) and is used to supplement decision-making or evidential reasoning. It is important to remember that both DVRs and Enrichment Reports are simply items of evidence relied on by the SSHD and are not determinative of the conclusions contained within them. The evidence forms part of the wider canvas of evidence to be considered by the FtT and the weight to be attached to the evidence will be a matter for the judge.
57. It is not sufficient for the SSHD’s decision or review to refer to a DVR or Enrichment Report but not to provide it for the purposes of the appeal – see MH (Respondent's bundle: documents not provided) Pakistan [2010] UKUT 168 (IAC). There must be an evidential basis upon which the SSHD reached the decision that the FtT should have regard to. The DVR or Enrichment Report would normally be expected to either contain or have appended to it the disclosable evidence used to support the conclusions within the DVR or Enrichment Report (if the SSHD wishes to rely on documents that she considers should not be disclosed because disclosure of a matter relating to the detection of a forgery would be contrary to the public interest she can invoke s.108 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; see also RP (proof of forgery) Nigeria [2006] UTAIT 00086 and OA (Alleged forgery – section 108 procedure) Nigeria [2007] UKAIT 00096). A judge needs to be satisfied that an appellant has been served with the DVR or Enrichment Report and any disclosable supporting evidence and has had sufficient opportunity to meaningfully consider that report. Reliance on a DVR or Enrichment Report may, depending on the conclusions, indicate that the SSHD is making a specific allegation of fraud. If an express allegation of fraud is being made the ultimate burden rests on the SSHD to prove the allegation to the balance of probabilities test. A judge will always need to carefully evaluate the DVR or Enrichment Report and, if the conclusions of the reports call for an answer, the appellant must be given an opportunity to respond.
58. We now turn to the five appeals that are the subject of this decision.
The appeals
Auron Hoxha, UI-2025-001013
59. Mr Hoxha is a national of Albania. He applied for settled status or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme claiming to be the spouse of Atti Aseva Deyanova (“Ms Deyanova”), a Bulgarian national. In his application Mr Hoxha claimed that he first arrived in the UK on 6 June 2020. The application was refused by the SSHD on 14 June 2023. Mr Hoxha’s appeal to the FtT was dismissed for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 15 January 2025, on the papers. He was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the decision of the FtT was set aside for reasons set out in a decision of the Upper Tribunal issued on 26 February 2026, a copy of which is attached to this decision as Annex 1.
60. Our error of law decision sets out the lengths to which Mr Hoxha went to avoid attending a hearing of the appeal and he did not attend the hearing listed on 8 January 2026. We were however satisfied that the FtT judge may have misunderstood the evidence before them and that the appropriate course was for the decision to be set aside and for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal. The SSHD had, by the time of the hearing before us, completed checks of the documents that were relied upon by Mr Hoxha and in fairness to him we directed that the matter be listed for a further hearing before us so that he could file and serve any evidence in reply.
61. A Notice of Hearing was sent to the parties on 4 February 2026. The Upper Tribunal records confirm a copy of the Notice was sent to the email address used by Mr Hoxha; bedy733@gmail.com and by post. We pause to note that the email address used has no obvious or immediately apparent connection to Mr Hoxha. As will become apparent when we consider another of the appeals before us, the personal email address used by Mr Hoxha is identical to the personal email address used by Mr Zahid Mehmood despite the two individuals being unconnected. In any event, there has been no response from Mr Hoxha to the Notice of Hearing and he has not sought to make arrangements to join the hearing remotely. Mr Hoxha did not attend the hearing before us on 6 March 2026. The Upper Tribunal clerk telephoned Mr Hoxha before the hearing commenced but that call and an email sent to him remained unanswered. Ms Deyanova did not attend the hearing. There has been no application to adjourn the hearing and the Upper Tribunal has not been provided with any explanation from Mr Hoxha for his absence.
62. We have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. We are satisfied that Mr Hoxha has had notice of the hearing before us and that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in his absence.
63. Ms Nolan, referred to the documents relied upon by the SSHD. We had granted the SSHD permission to rely upon those documents as set out in our error of law decision. The bundle comprises of 13 pages. First, the SSHD refers to a DVR dated 24 October 2025 in respect of Barclays Bank Statements relating to an account said to be held in the joint names of Mr A Hoxha and Mrs A Deyanova for the period 22 January 2021 to 21 January 2022. The DVR records the following enquiries made of Barclays Bank:
“1. Do the individuals named on the statement hold (or have they held) an account with Barclays? No
2. Does the account number and sort code match your records? Yes
3. Do the dates and transactions match your records? Yes”
64. Second, the SSHD relies upon an Enrichment Report in respect of the marriage certificate relied upon by Mr Hoxha and Ms Deyanova as evidence of a marriage said to have taken place on 12 August 2019 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The marriage certificate has been considered by a Verification Officer and the Enrichment Report states:
“…The marriage date is listed as 12 August 2019. Another applicant has also listed the same EEA national, Atti Aseva Deyanova, as their sponsor on their EUSS application and has also provided a marriage certificate showing the same marriage date.”
The original and translated copies of both marriage certificates are annexed to the report.
65. We have carefully considered the documents relied upon by Mr Hoxha and the DVR and Enrichment Reports filed and served by the SSHD. The Barclays Bank statements that are relied upon by Mr Hoxha that have been checked by the SSHD look for all intents and purposes to be statements issued by the bank. Neither Mr Hoxha nor Ms Deyanova have filed and served any evidence seeking to address the evidence relied upon by the SSHD. We find the evidence relied upon by the SSHD casts significant doubt upon the reliability of the documents provided by Mr Hoxha and we are not satisfied that the statements relate to a bank account held in the joint names of Mr Hoxha and Ms Deyanova. We attach no weight to those statements as evidence of Mr Hoxha’s relationship with Ms Deyanova or as evidence of them living together.
66. Similarly, neither Mr Hoxha nor Ms Deyanova have addressed the evidence that Ms Deyanova is also said to have married another individual on the same date. We have considered the two marriage certificates provided by the SSHD. They both identify Atti Aseva Deyanova (with the same ID number and DOB on both) having entered into a marriage in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 12 August 2019. They each have a seal with a manuscript signature that looks remarkably similar. The marriage certificates, considered individually, have all the appearance of a document which appears to be genuine in the sense that they appear to emanate from a proper source, with the proper seal. The fact that there is evidence that Ms Deyanova married two individuals at the same place on the same day requires a good explanation. We have no explanation and no hesitation in finding that the marriage certificate relied upon by Mr Hoxha contains information that is wholly untrue. We attach no weight to the marriage certificate as evidence of the relationship.
67. The use of false documents to support the application entirely undermines the credibility of Mr Hoxha and indeed Ms Deyanova. We are left in no doubt at all that Mr Hoxha’s relationship with Ms Deyanova is not as claimed, and that Mr Hoxha is unable to establish that he is the family member of a relevant EEA citizen.
68. In support of his application to the SSHD Mr Hoxha also provided 197 pages of what appear to be printouts relating to a Barclays Bank account in his sole name setting out transactions for the period 1 October 2020 to 25 April 2023. Curiously, the branch sort code for that account is different to the branch sort code for the other Barclays Bank account Mr Hoxha claimed to have held jointly with Ms Deyanova. Given the ease by which Mr Hoxha appears to have been able to manipulate the other Barclays Bank statements, we have little confidence that the printout provided by him with his application represents a true and accurate representation of transactions. Absent evidence from Mr Hoxha and any opportunity for the SSHD to test that evidence, and considering the evidence before us in the round in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed, we attach very little weight to that printout as evidence of Mr Hoxha’s presence in the UK between 1 October 2020 and 25 April 2023. We find Mr Hoxha has failed to establish he was resident in the UK prior to the specified date, as defined in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (i.e. 2300 GMT on 31 December 2020). Therefore, he does not meet the requirements for settled status based on a continuous qualifying period of five years.
69. If follows that we remake the decision and dismiss Mr Hoxha’s appeal against the refusal of his application for an EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
Zahid Mehmood, UI-2025-003579
70. Mr Mehmood is a national of Pakistan, born on 10 March 1983. On 2 May 2024 he applied for an EUSS Family Permit based on his claimed marriage to Silvia Shambova (“Ms Shambova”), a Bulgarian national who holds pre-settled status in the UK.
71. In his application Mr Mehmood identified his personal email address as bedy733.gmail.com, and Ms Shambova’s email address as ziaduny188@gmail.com. Mr Mehmood stated he had no other email address. As we have already said, this email address was also used by Mr Auron Hoxha as his personal email address (see [61] above). For reasons that are neither explained nor apparent it is curious that two unconnected individuals use the same personal email address. Here, it is more likely to be an indication of fraud or abuse.
72. In any event, Mr Mehmood claimed the following: that he first met Ms Shambova on 28 December 2016 in Cyprus; that their relationship began on 24 February 2017; that they started to live together on 5 May 2017; that they married in Pakistan on 14 November 2019 (a marriage certificate was provided); and that a child to the marriage was born on 5 August 2020. Accompanying the application was a photograph of a passport in Mr Mehmood’s name, and a photograph of a passport in Ms Shambova’s name. Also provided were “Taptap Send” transaction receipts suggesting that Ms Shambova had sent money to Mr Mehmood from the UK.
73. The SSHD attempted to arrange marriage interviews with Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova. Emails to arrange these interviews were sent on 2 December 2024 and 16 December 2024 to the email addresses provided by Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova. Although there was a response to the latter email this did not specify whether Mr Mehmood or Ms Shambova were willing to attend an interview and a further attempt to clarify this on 17 December 2024 met with no response.
74. The SSHD refused Mr Mehmood’s application on 7 January 2025. The SSHD drew adverse inferences from the failure to attend the marriage interview. The SSHD also noted that the application form provided an incorrect date of birth for Ms Shambova. Furthermore, a DVR concluded that the Taptap Send documents were false. The SSHD was not therefore satisfied that Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova were related as claimed.
75. Mr Mehmood gave notice of appeal against this decision on 16 January 2025. He opted for a ‘paper hearing’. He gave his email address as bedy733@gmail.com. His grounds of appeal asserted that his young son had been in a critical condition in December 2024 and died on 21 December 2024. He claimed he had shared a hospital letter with the interview department and that he called the relevant department “multiple times”. Mr Mehmood additionally claimed that he had been in communication with Taptap who had informed him they were unaware of any verification request. The appeal form was accompanied by a document that purported to be a death certificate issued in Pakistan.
76. The paper hearing was issued to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge on 4 April 2025. The judge’s decision was promulgated on 20 June 2025. When he made his decision, the judge had before him a bundle of documents running to 61 pages that was provided by Mr Mehmood. The bundle contained, inter alia, email correspondence allegedly sent on 16 December 2024 from Ms Shambova using the ziaduny188@gmail.com address to the Liverpool EUSS interview administrative team stating that she and Mr Mehmood had already informed the administrative team during a phone call that their child was in the intensive care unit and requesting that they be contacted 3 to 4 weeks later. The bundle also contained TSB Bank account statements relating to Ms Shambova, and Bank of Cyprus statements in the joint names of Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova.
77. The judge noted that the only issue in dispute was whether Ms Shambova was married to Mr Mehmood. The judge noted that the SSHD had not asserted any fraud in relation to the marriage certificate. The judge acknowledged the DVR but noted that the relevant Taptap receipts were not enclosed with the report and that the response from Taptap did not detail what checks were carried out and by whom. Nor were there any details of the relevant experience of the Entry Clearance Assistant who carried out the verification. The judge therefore attached little weight to the DVR. The judge considered both the marriage certificate and the death certificate and found he could attach weight to those documents which appeared, prima facie, reliable. The appeal was allowed.
78. The SSHD was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis that Mr Mehmood had not served his bundle of documents on the SSHD prior to the determination of the appeal ‘on the papers’. The SSHD produced an email indicating that the bundle was only served on 27 May 2025. We note that this was before the decision was promulgated but after it had been sent to the judge to determine. The SSHD maintained that she was deprived of the opportunity of considering the reliability of those documents and this constituted procedural unfairness.
79. The hearing of the appeal was listed for 18 September 2025. In correspondence with the Upper Tribunal Mr Mehmood sought to adjourn the hearing on the basis that he was in Pakistan and that there were serious internet issues that may prevent him for being able to attend the hearing online. He had earlier sought an adjournment on the basis that Ms Shambova was on holiday and the booking was non-refundable. In the alternative he invited the Upper Tribunal to consider the SSHD’s appeal in light of submissions that Mr Mehmood made in response to the grant of permission (asserting that the SSHD had sufficient opportunity to inform the FtT that she had not received Mr Mehmood’s bundle until 27 May 2025 and there was no procedural unfairness). The adjournments were refused and links were sent to Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova to enable them to attend the hearing remotely.
80. Prior to the hearing on 18 September 2025 the SSHD produced and sought to admit a further DVR which concluded that the TSB bank statement was false. A further DVR dated 17 June 2025 relating to the Taptap Send transactions confirmed for a second time that those transactions were false. This was because the details belonged to another customer. An Enrichment Report dated 10 June 2025 concluded that the email said to have been sent from Ms Shambova to the Liverpool EUSS interview administration team was false. Checks completed by the SSHD in respect of the relevant inbox showed an email was received on 16 December 2024, but this did not match the email produced for the purposes of the appeal.
81. The hearing scheduled for 18 September 2025 was turned into a Case Management Review Hearing (“CMRH”) as neither Mr Mehmood nor Ms Shambova attended remotely, and the Upper Tribunal were not satisfied that a decision could be made without a full hearing. Directions required Ms Shambova to attend the new hearing on 8 January 2026 in person and to produce the originals of the documents that were relied on in support of the appeal before the FtT.
82. On 23 September 2025 Mr Mehmood, using the bedy733@gmail.com email address informed the Upper Tribunal that a new EUSS Family Permit application had been made (the application details were UKVI_3EX0055166001, submitted on 23 September 2025). This was done “to avoid more delay and give fair chance to respondent”. This did not constitute a clear request for the Upper Tribunal to give its consent to the withdrawal of Mr Mehmood’s case under rule 17 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. A later email from Mr Mehmood sent on 5 December 2025 requested that his case be withdrawn.
83. At the hearing on 8 January 2026 there was no attendance by Mr Mehmood or Ms Shambova. We had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and satisfied ourselves that Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova had notice of the hearing before us and that it was in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in their absence. We refused to consent to the withdrawal of Mr Mehmood’s case.
84. We considered oral submissions from the Presenting Officers, which were supported by a skeleton argument. Having considered the evidence provided by the SSHD and having noted that the bundle provided by Mr Mehmood had not been served on the SSHD in sufficient time before the appeal was determined by the judge on the papers, we were satisfied that the SSHD had been deprived of an opportunity of considering the reliability of the documents provided, which constituted a material error of law. Had the SSHD had the opportunity to consider the new documents, appropriate checks could have been undertaken concerning the reliability of the documents provided by Mr Mehmood shortly before his appeal was decided. The decision of the FtT was set aside. We admitted the further DVRs. The standard directions issued to the parties contained a presumption that the re-making would take place at the same hearing if the FtT hearing was set aside as erroneous in law. We indicated that we would proceed to remake the decision. We reserved our remaking decision.
85. The issue we need to determine in remaking the decision is whether Mr Mehmood is related to Ms Shambova through marriage. We first note that the email address Mr Mehmood claims is his own personal email address (bedy733.gmail.com) was also claimed by Auron Hoxha to be his own personal email address. The use of the same email address by entirely unrelated individuals is suggestive of fraud. We have considered the marriage certificate purportedly issued in Pakistan on 14 November 2019, the document purporting to be a Pakistani death certificate issued on 15 January 2025, and the Bank of Cyprus statements purportedly in the joint names of Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova. We apply the principles established in Tanveer Ahmed and consider the reliability of these documents having considered all the evidence before us ‘in the round’. We note the DVRs in respect of the documents identified above (relating to the TSB bank statement, the money remittal transactions and the email to the Liverpool EUSS interview administration team). We are satisfied the SSHD has discharged the burden of demonstrating to the balance of probabilities standard that false documents were knowingly used to fraudulently support the application. The use of false documents undermines the credibility of both Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova. We take account of the absence of any further evidence from Mr Mehmood supportive of his claim to be married to Ms Shambova and the failure, without good reason, for Mr Mehmood and Ms Shambova’s attendance at the Upper Tribunal hearings. Having considered these factors cumulatively we find that the marriage and death certificates, and the Cypriot bank statements, are not reliable documents. We are not therefore satisfied that Mr Mehmood has demonstrated that he is married to Ms Shambova as claimed.
86. It follows that we remake the decision and dismiss the Mr Mehmood’s appeal against the refusal of his application for an EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
Atif Mehmood, UI-2025-001414
87. Mr Atif Mehmood is a national of Pakistan. On 12 September 2023, he applied for settled status or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. Mr Mehmood claimed that he first arrived in the UK on 5 October 2017 and to be the ‘durable partner’ of Anam Zia Choudhry (“Ms Choudhry”), a German national who had been granted limited leave to remain in the UK for five years under Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. The application was refused by the SSHD on 2 February 2024. Mr Mehmood elected to have his appeal to the FtT determined on the papers. The appeal was dismissed for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 11 December 2024. Mr Mehmood was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 15 April 2025. In granting permission, the Upper Tribunal judge observed that the fact that Mr Mehmood married his German national wife in Pakistan on 10 September 2020 was not mentioned in his application to the SSHD and was therefore unknown to the SSHD when the application was refused. In granting permission to appeal the Upper Tribunal considered it arguable that, whilst the FtT judge was aware of the marriage, the implications of the marriage in relation to the eligibility requirements under Appendix EU and under the EUSS were not properly considered and addressed in the FtT decision.
88. In his application for permission to appeal filed with the Upper Tribunal Mr Mehmood provided an address in Birmingham. His contact details do not include an email address, but early communications received by the Upper Tribunal from him were from an email address (junoonistan2@gmail.com) that has no immediately apparent connection to the appellant. On 12 May 2025, Mr Mehmood provided, by email, a written outline of his appeal. On 16 September 2025, a Notice of Hearing was sent to him, by email, informing him that his appeal was listed for hearing in Birmingham on 13 October 2025.
89. On 6 October 2025, the SSHD invited the Upper Tribunal to convert the hearing listed on 13 October 2025 to a CMRH. The SSHD said that there was reference in the decision of the FtT and in the grant of permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal to an appellant’s bundle, and to evidence of cohabitation and a marriage said to have taken place on 10 September 2020 that the SSHD has no knowledge or record of. The SSHD required sight of the documents relied upon by Mr Mehmood before the issues that arise in the appeal could be addressed.
90. The CMRH was listed before Judge Mandalia on 13 October 2025. On 10 October 2025 a 403 page bundle was received, by email, from Mr Mehmood. On 11 October 2025 a further email was received from the email address being used by the appellant (junoonistan2@gmail.com) in the following terms:
“I would like to inform you that I have recently asked Mr. Azhar Chohan to represent me for this hearing. His contact details are mentioned below.
Name: Azhar Chohan
Email: ***
Mobile: 07***
Thank you
Atif Mahmood”
91. Mr Azhar Chohan attended the CMHR on 13 October 2025 on behalf of Mr Mehmood. Judge Mandalia recorded the claim made by the SSHD that she had not received Mr Mehmood’s FtT appeal bundle and that it was not clear when the evidence of Mr Mehmood’s marriage to Ms Choudhry and other evidence relied upon by him was served upon the SSHD. He directed that the appeal to the Upper Tribunal was not suitable for determination on the papers and would be listed as a face-to-face hearing. He also made directions requiring Mr Mehmood to provide evidence to establish the date upon which his bundle was served upon the SSHD, and gave the SSHD permission to file any evidence in reply.
92. The appeal was listed for hearing before us on 8 January 2026. The Notice of that hearing was served upon Mr Mehmood by email on 26 November 2025. On 3 December 2025 the Upper Tribunal emailed Mr Mehmood noting that he had not complied with the requirement to file and serve the evidence that he relies upon to establish that his bundle of documents that was before the FtT had been served on the SSHD.
93. On 19 December 2025 the Upper Tribunal received an email from Mr Mehmood stating that he would like to withdraw his appeal with immediate effect. The matter was referred to Judge Mandalia and Mr Mehmood was informed:
“Whilst the Upper Tribunal acknowledges the request by Atif Mehmood to withdraw his case, the Tribunal does not consider that it appropriate in all the circumstances to consent to the withdrawal. The appeal involves matters relating to the integrity of the appeal process and potential abuse.
The hearing will take place on 8 January 2026 and Mr Mehmood is expected to attend.”
94. On 30 December 2025, an email was received by the Upper Tribunal from Mr Mehmood. This time, the email came from an email address that comprises of Mr Mehmood’s name, and a number followed by ‘@gmail.com’. In that email it was said:
“I write directly to the Tribunal for the first time regarding my appeal.
I recently became aware, through a message shown to me by my former representative, Mr Abdullah Saqlain, that a request had been made to withdraw my appeal. I wish to make it absolutely clear that I did not give any instructions or consent for my appeal to be withdrawn. I was never shown any withdrawal request before it was submitted, and I had no knowledge that such a request was being made in my name.
…
I have not received any correspondence directly from the Tribunal regarding the withdrawal request or the recent Directions….
…
Other requests
I respectfully request
1. Confirmation of who submitted the request to withdraw my appeal, and a copy of that request together with any covering email or letter.
2. Information on who instructed Mr A. Chohan (counsel) to appear at the Case Management Review on 13 October 2025, as I did not give instructions for any counsel to act on my behalf.
…”
95. On 2 January 2026 Judge Mandalia directed that Mr Mehmood’s application for an adjournment be considered at the hearing on 8 January 2026. He made separate directions requiring Mr Azhar Chohan to appear before the Upper Tribunal on 8 January 2026, and to file and serve a statement (with a signed statement of truth) explaining, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding his appearance on behalf of Mr Mehmood at the CMRH listed before Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia on 13 October 2026.
96. Mr Mehmood renewed his application for an adjournment by email (using the new email address) on 4 January 2026. He was informed on 5 January 2026 that the appeal remained listed for hearing on 8 January 2026 and that he should attend so that the Upper Tribunal could consider his application for an adjournment. He was informed that arrangements were in place for him to be assisted by an interpreter.
97. On 6 January 2026 having been provided with a copy of the bundle relied upon by Mr Mehmood before the FtT by the Upper Tribunal, the SSHD filed a Rule 15(2A) Application with a bundle comprising of 58 pages that comprises of a number of DVR’s following checks completed upon the documents relied upon by Mr Mehmood. The SSHD claims the documents relied upon Mr Mehmood are not genuine.
98. On 7 January 2026, the Upper Tribunal received an email from Mr Azhar Chohan who confirmed that he would attend the hearing on 8 January 2026. He confirmed that he is regulated by the Immigration Advice Authority (“IAA”) level 3 and able to appear before the FtT and Upper Tribunal. He confirmed he is also a partner at Apex Legal Services which is an IAA regulated firm at level 3. He summarised the circumstances in which he was instructed by Mr Mehmood and his brother, and the events leading to his appearance at the CMRH on behalf of Mr Mehmood. He was understandably concerned about the claim now being made by Mr Mehmood that he had not been instructed.
99. Mr Mehmood did not attend the hearing before us on 8 January 2026. Ms Gilmore, Senior Presenting Officer, informed the Upper Tribunal that the SSHD had received an email from Mr Mehmood (from a different email address; 469@gmail.com) confirming that he has instructed Mr Ramby De Mello of counsel to attend the hearing on his behalf. Enquiries were made by the Upper Tribunal with the relevant chambers and the Upper Tribunal was told that counsel was asked by Mr Mehmood about his availability to attend the hearing on a direct-access basis, but counsel has not formally been instructed and is unavailable.
100. We have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. We have not been provided with any, let alone any good reason for Mr Mehmood’s absence. We are satisfied that Mr Mehmood has had notice of the hearing before us and that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the over-riding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in his absence.
101. Mr Chohan attended and had instructed Mr Rashid Ahmed of counsel to represent him. Mr Chohan accepted that he is not a barrister and is erroneously described in the Directions made by Judge Mandalia on 13 October 2025 as ‘counsel’. The Directions were sent to Mr Mehmood and had not been sent to him. He told us that he had been contacted by Mr Mehmood and his brother (Zahoor Mehmood), directly, to represent Mr Mehmood at the CMRH on 13 October 2025. He did not meet them directly, but had spoken to them on the telephone. When asked about the steps taken and any due diligence carried out when he was instructed, Mr Chohan said that he obtained the relevant contact details including an email address. He would ordinarily require confirmation of identity in the form of a copy of a utility bill or passport, but here, he was not instructed by Mr Mehmood to make the application to the SSHD. He was simply assisting Mr Mehmood at the CMRH. He had a video call with Mr Mehmood and his brother via WhatsApp. He insisted that his fee be paid in advance and he had received payment on 9 October 2025. On 10 October 2025, at the same time that it was provided to the Upper Tribunal, he was provided with a copy of the bundle that Mr Mehmood had sent to the Upper Tribunal in readiness for the ‘error of law’ hearing.
102. Mr Chohan told us that the photograph of Mr Mehmood on the copy of the extract of his passport that was in the bundle was of the individual he had spoken to during the video call. He did not question the email address being used because Mr Mehmood had told him that someone abroad, an ‘agent’, was assisting him with the application and the appeal. They did not have a representative to assist them with the hearing and that is why he had been instructed to represent Mr Mehmood at the CMRH. Mr Chohan did not ask for any details of the ‘agent’ assisting Mr Mehmood. Mr Chohan maintained that Mr Mehmood was aware of the hearing on 13 October 2025 and he does not know why Mr Mehmood would now claim that he was not instructed to represent him at the hearing on 13 October 2025.
103. We do not need to address the claim made by Mr Mehmood that he did not instruct Mr Chohan to attend the hearing on 13 October 2025. It is sufficient for us to say that it is incumbent on professional representatives in this area to carry out proper checks on individuals they represent and to be satisfied that they are receiving instructions from the appellant.
104. It is no answer, as Mr Chohan suggested, to simply say that as he was not instructed by Mr Mehmood to make the relevant application and was simply assisting Mr Mehmood at a CMHR and provided he had received payment in advance, further enquiry by him was not necessary. Mr Chohan was appearing before the Tribunal in a professional capacity. Whether or not he had assisted Mr Mehmood make the application to the SSHD, once he had decided to represent Mr Mehmood before the Upper Tribunal, whether at a CMR or other hearing, it was incumbent on him to undertake the appropriate due diligence checks. The ability of the Upper Tribunal to rely upon professional representatives, based on their professional obligations, would be undermined and contrary to good administration of justice if it were otherwise. Here, Mr Chohan received payment of his fee on 9 October 2025, but it was not until the following day that he received the appellant’s bundle which had in it, an extract from the appellant’s passport. There appears to have been no attempt whatsoever to make any enquiries of who it was that Mr Chohan was being instructed by, or anything in writing setting out the basis upon which he will be acting for the appellant. The only concern appears to have been that his fee be paid in advance.
105. Mr Mehmood claims the error of law in the decision of the FtT was that, having accepted that he was married to his wife in Pakistan on 10 September 2020 and that there was extensive evidence of cohabitation between 2018 and 2023, he was not required to provide the required evidence in the form of a family permit, residence card, or other relevant document as a durable partner of an EEA citizen. What was required, he claims, was simply evidence that he was a party to a marriage with a relevant EEA citizen and that it was not a marriage of convenience.
106. Although Mr Mehmood did not attend the hearing, Ms Gilmour, quite properly in our judgement, accepted that the decision of the FtT judge is vitiated by a material error of law and should be set aside. At paragraph [12] of the decision, the judge said that it was common ground that Mr Mehmood married Ms Choudhry in Pakistan on 10 September 2020. Ms Gilmore does not accept that that was common ground, but for the purposes of the error of law decision, she is prepared to accept that the judge proceeds upon the premise that Mr Mehmood was married to Ms Choudhry. At paragraph [21] of the decision the judge found that Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry were in a durable relationship prior to 31 December 2020. The judge again refers to the marriage that was said to have taken place in accordance with the law of Pakistan and so will be legally recognised in the UK. We are prepared to accept that the judge failed to properly address the significance of the claimed marriage on 10 September 2020 by focusing upon the criteria to be met in an application as a durable partner of an EEA citizen.
107. We accept the decision of the FtT judge is vitiated by a material error of law and the decision must therefore be set aside. As we have said, Ms Gilmour does not accept that the judge was right to say that it was common ground that Mr Mehmood married Ms Choudhry in Pakistan on 10 September 2020. She points to the Rule 15(2A) Application that has been made by the SSHD. She submits the appeal was determined on the papers and the SSHD was not served with the documents relied upon by Mr Mehmood before the FtT. The SSHD has evidence that undermines the claim made by Mr Mehmood that he married Ms Choudhry on 10 September 2020. The SSHD has provided a copy of the application that was made by Mr Mehmood on 12 September 2023 in which he describes himself as an “unmarried partner”. Unsurprisingly therefore, the decision made by the SSHD proceeds on the premise that Mr Mehmood has not provided sufficient evidence to confirm that he is the durable partner of a relevant EEA citizen. That and other evidence would have been provided if it had been known that Mr Mehmood claimed to have married Ms Choudhry.
108. Having considered the material that our attention was drawn to by Ms Gilmour we accept that the decision of the FtT judge must be set aside with no findings preserved. The SSHD did not refer in the decision refusing the application to the claimed marriage, let alone concede that Mr Mehmood was married to Ms Choudhry on 10 September 2020. In paragraph [12] of the decision the FtT judge referred to the marriage registration certificate being in Mr Mehmood’s bundle. The judge does not refer to the bundle that had been provided by the SSHD which includes a copy of the application made by Mr Mehmood. The bundle does not include a copy of any marriage certificate despite disclosing all of the other documents that were provided by Mr Mehmood to support his application. The documents included a letter from Mr Mehmood dated 15 October 2023 in which he again stated “..I have been in a durable and subsisting relationship with my partner..” with no reference at all to a marriage in September 2020. The judge should have considered why a material document said to support Mr Mehmood’s claim had not been included in the bundle filed by the SSHD raising the possibility that the document was not provided to the SSHD previously.
109. It is unfortunate that Mr Mehmood had not attended the hearing of the appeal before us, given his clear indication in the email he sent to the Upper Tribunal that he does not wish to withdraw his appeal. The directions issued by the Upper Tribunal make it clear that there is a presumption that, in the event of the Upper Tribunal deciding that the decision of the FtT is to be set aside as erroneous in law, the re-making of the decision will take place at the same hearing.
110. We acknowledged however that the SSHD has made a Rule 15(2A) application for the Upper Tribunal to consider evidence that was not before the FtT. Mr Mehmood has not responded to that application. The SSHD has explained, and we accept, that the evidence was not submitted to the FtT because it is, in effect, evidence that responds to the evidence relied upon by Mr Mehmood before the FtT that was not served on the SSHD. Mr Mehmood has been given ample opportunity by directions to provide the Upper Tribunal with evidence that the documents relied upon by him before the FtT were served upon the SSHD prior to the determination of his appeal on the papers. He has failed to do so. We find that the bundle was not served upon the SSHD. There has been no unreasonable delay in the SSHD producing the evidence that accompanies the Rule 15(2A) Application and we admit that evidence. In fairness to Mr Mehmood and having noted the indication he gave in his email to the SSHD that he wishes to be represented at the hearing of the appeal, we determined that the appropriate course was for the appeal to be relisted for a further hearing so the decision could be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
111. The appeal was listed for a further hearing before us on 6 March 2026. Notice of the hearing was sent to the parties on 4 February 2026. It was sent to Mr Mehmood by email and by post. On 5 March 2026 the Upper Tribunal received an email from Mr Mehmood in which he refers to the hearing listed on 6 March 2026. Mr Mehmood said that having taken advice from counsel, he wishes to withdraw the appeal. Mr Mehmood was informed that afternoon that the panel did not consent to the withdrawal of the appeal and that he was expected to attend the hearing as listed. He was told that any further application would be considered at the outset of the hearing. On 6 March 2026, the Upper Tribunal received a Notice of Withdrawal on form UTIAC 10 filed by Luke & Bridger Law on behalf of Mr Mehmood. They state that they were instructed on the morning of 6 March 2026 and that Mr Mehmood has been advised as to the merits of the appeal.
112. We have significant concerns about the conduct of Mr Mehmood and the manner in which the resources of the FtT and Upper Tribunal have been abused to further an ulterior motive and we refuse to consent to the withdrawal of the appeal. As we have said in other similar appeals that we have considered in this particular cohort, an abuse of the Upper Tribunal’s process is a powerful factor for refusing consent to withdraw; EK and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rule 17 Withdrawal) [2025] UKUT 00089 (IAC).
113. Neither Mr Mehmood nor his representatives attended the hearing before us. We again had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. We have not been provided with any, let alone any good reason for Mr Mehmood’s absence. It is obvious that Mr Mehmood has had notice of the hearing before us. We are satisfied that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in Mr Mehmood’s absence.
114. It is submitted on behalf of the SSHD that she did not accept Mr Mehmood was married. We were taken through the documents that appear in the bundles filed by the SSHD including the bundle that accompanied the rule 15(2A) application that we had granted leave to rely upon. Neither Mr Mehmood nor Ms Choudhry have filed and served any evidence seeking to address the evidence relied upon by the SSHD which casts significant doubt upon Mr Mehmood’s account of his marriage and the reliability of the documents provided by Mr Mehmood in support of his application.
115. We begin by considering the claim made by Mr Mehmood that he married Ms Choudhry in Pakistan on 10 September 2020. Mr Mehmood had made an application for a visit visa on 27 April 2022 in which he claimed that he wished to visit his brother and sister-in-law. He described his relationship status in that application as ‘single’. That application was refused. Mr Mehmood made a further application for a visit visa on 8 February 2023. Again, he described his relationship status in that application as ‘single’. That application was successful and a visit visa was granted to him. As we have already said earlier in this decision, the SSHD has provided a copy of the application that was made by Mr Mehmood on 12 September 2023 in which he describes himself as an “unmarried partner”. It is surprising that Mr Mehmood describes himself in all three of those applications that post-date his marriage as either ‘single’ or ‘unmarried’ if in fact he was marred to Ms Choudhry on 10 September 2020. No explanation is offered by him or Ms Choudhry.
116. We have carefully considered the documents relied upon by Mr Mehmood and the DVRs filed and served by the SSHD. In the absence of any further explanation from Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry, we find:
a. The Council Tax bills for the periods 2018/19, 2019/20, 2021/22, 2022/23 and 2023/24 that purport to have been issued by Peterborough City Council to Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry in their joint names and were relied upon by them as evidence of their living together at an address on Bourges Boulevard, Peterborough, are false. In response to enquiries made, Peterborough City Council confirmed that “the individuals mentioned on the documents do not have an account with Peterborough Council. In addition, the account number and dates listed do not match Peterborough Council records”.
b. The Bank Statements that Mr Mehmood claims to be evidence of an account held in the joint names of Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry at Santander (which show the same address as the address on the Council Tax bills issued by Peterborough City Council) are false. In response to enquiries made, a Fraud Officer at Santander has confirmed that although the account number, sort code and transactions shown on the statements matches their records, the name on the statements does not match the record they hold for the account.
c. The Council Tax bill for the period 24/25 that purports to have been issued by Birmingham City Council to Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry in their joint names and relied upon by Mr Mehmood as evidence of him and Ms Choudhry living together at an address on Turnpike Close, Birmingham, is false. In response to enquiries made, Birmingham City Council confirmed that the document provided by Mr Mehmood is not genuine.
d. The Bank Statements that Mr Mehmood claims to be evidence of an account held in the name of Ms Choudhry at Barclays Bank (which show the same address as the address on the Council Tax bills issued by Peterborough City Council) are false. In response to enquiries made, Barclays Bank has confirmed that Ms Choudhry does not hold an account with them.
e. The Pakistani Marriage Certificate relied upon by Mr Mehmood as evidence of his marriage to Ms Choudhry on 10 September 2020, registered by Ghulam Hussain and issued on 15 September 2020, is false. In response to enquiries made by a FCDO Verification Officer in Islamabad with a ‘Field Office’, it transpires that there is no record of the marriage with the CRMS number that appears on the marriage certificate provided by the appellant on the systems.
117. We observe that all of the copies of the documents that we have referred to above, would, at first glance, appear to an innocent observer to be in what might be considered to be in a standard format with no obvious markers to indicate they are false or have been manipulated for fraudulent purposes. Our review of the evidence serves to reinforce our view that judges should not readily assume that documents that appear to be genuine are genuine simply because they have not been challenged or because they would appear to be in a format that one would usually expect. Judges should approach the issue of whether such documents are reliable applying the principles established in Tanveer Ahmed. Here, the documents are in the proper format, but it is the content that has been manipulated. The council tax bills and bank statements do not reflect the records held by the relevant organisation.
118. The burden of proof rests on an appellant to demonstrate that a document upon which they rely is reliable and the assessment of reliability must be reached through a holistic evaluation which considers all the evidence ‘in the round’. Judges must be alert to the fact that AI in the modern digital era presents even greater challenges. We have already referred above to features in the appeal before the FtT that might have aroused some suspicion and should have caused the judge to proceed with a degree of caution, and if necessary, direct that the appeal be listed for an in-person hearing with directions to ensure the SSHD is aware of the documents relied upon and giving a proper opportunity to carry out any checks that might be appropriate.
119. The use of false documents to support the application entirely undermines the credibility of Mr Mehmood and Ms Choudhry. We can attach no weight to the evidence relied upon. We are left in no doubt at all that Mr Mehmood’s relationship with Ms Choudhry is not as claimed, and that he is unable to establish that he is the family member or a durable partner of a relevant EEA citizen.
120. If follows that we set aside the decision of the FtT promulgated on 11 December 2024. We remake the decision and dismiss Mr Mehmood’s appeal under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (as amended).
Nagina Kousar and Muhammad Uzair Ahmed; UI-2025-001514 and UI-2025-001515
121. Both Ms Kousar and her son, Muhammad Ahmed are nationals of Pakistan. On 9 July 2024 they applied for EUSS Family Permits based on Ms Kousar’s claimed marriage to Mr Ognyan Sergeev Kirilov (“Mr Kirilov”), a Bulgarian national who holds pre-settled in the UK issued under Appendix EUSS to the Immigration Rules. The applications were refused on 24 July 2024. Their appeals to the FtT were dismissed for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 23 January 2025.
122. In her EUSS application Ms Kousar identified her personal email address as hairbrush27@yahoo.com. She claimed she met the Mr Kirilov “at work” in September 2016. She claimed they began to live together in Cyprus on 20 January 2017 and that she and Mr Kirilov married in Bulgaria on 10 February 2020. The SSHD was not satisfied that any evidence had been provided in support of the claimed relationship between Ms Kousar and Mr Kirilov. The SSHD additionally noted that Ms Kousar’s passport, issued on 6 December 2019, stated that her husband was Ahmed Ali and that this was inconsistent with the information provided in the application that Ms Kousar’s relationship with Mr Kirilov commenced in 2016. The application was refused as the SSHD was not satisfied that Ms Kousar was a family member of a relevant EEA citizen.
123. Ms Kousar and her son gave notice of appeal against this decision and requested a ‘paper hearing’. Ms Kousar provided a postal address for Mr Kirilov in Redditch and again gave her email address as hairbrush27@yahoo.com. The grounds of appeal asserted that evidence of her relationship with and marriage to Mr Kirilov had been provided to VFS, an official commercial partner of UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) that manages visa applications in Pakistan. This included a pregnancy scan in respect of a child being carried by Ms Kousar. The notice of appeal was supported by various documents including a purported death certificate relating to Ahmed Ali (asserting that he died on 24 December 2024), a Bulgarian marriage certificate and its English translation, Cypriot residence documents issued to Ms Kousar and her son on 21 April 2020, money transfer documents suggesting Mr Kirilov was sending money to Ms Kousar, HSBC Bank account statements in Mr Kirilov’s name, Bank of Cyprus account statements in respect of an account held jointly by Mr Kirilov and Ms Kousar, and a new passport issued to Ms Kousar on 1 August 2024 naming Mr Kirilov as her husband.
124. The FtT judge’s decision was promulgated on 23 January 2025. The judge stated that there was no evidence as to why Ms Kousar and her son elected to have a paper hearing and expressed concerns that the SSHD had not had an opportunity to comment on the documents. The judge was not persuaded that the documents were reliable as there was no evidence of any complaint against the commercial partner, no reliable evidence that the documents had in fact been submitted with the application to the SSHD, and because a paper appeal had been requested in circumstances where Mr Kirilov was resident in the UK. The judge believed that Mr Kirilov would have been aware of the importance of an oral hearing which would give the SSHD an opportunity to challenge the documentary evidence, which had been deliberately avoided by electing an appeal to be determined on the papers.
125. Ms Kousar and her son obtained permission to appeal the FtT decision on the basis that the judge failed to sufficiently consider whether the appeal could be determined fairly without an oral hearing, that the adverse inferences were drawn by the judge without Ms Kousar and her son being made aware, and that the judge acted in a procedurally unfair manner by essentially penalising Ms Kousar and her son for electing to have a paper determination of their appeals and drawing adverse inferences from that choice in circumstances where, if the judge had concerns as to the reliability of the evidence, he could have issued directions for an oral hearing.
126. Following the grant of permission to appeal a request was made by Ms Kousar for the matter to be remitted back to the FtT even though there has been no ‘error of law’ hearing in the Upper Tribunal. The structure of the letter and the language used was incongruous with Ms Kousar being a Litigant-In-Person (LIP). She relied on Tribunal caselaw from 2011 and stated, in respect of remitting the same to the FtT, “This approach would promote both procedural fairness and judicial economy.” This suggests the possible use of a generative AI tool.
127. Through correspondence with the Upper Tribunal the SSHD indicated that she had never been served with the bundle of documents upon which Ms Kousar and her son had relied in their appeal to the FtT.
128. An ‘error of law’ hearing was listed for 18 September 2025. The Notice of Hearing was served on Ms Kousar at the English address she provided for correspondence and also by email to hairbrush27@yahoo.com and to am3400585@gmail.com, the email address provided for Mr Kirilov.
129. On 17 September 2025 the Upper Tribunal received an email from the hairbrush27@yahoo.com account asserting that Ms Kousar was outside the country and that Mr Kirilov “had heart problem and discharge today after having stunt, please request to Judge to give us judgement on the evidence is before this court.” Attached to the email was a document purportedly issued by Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust dated 17 September 2025 suggesting that Mr Kirilov had been admitted to hospital for two days because of heart problems. Mr Kirilov was, according to the document, medically fit for discharge. There was no medical evidence suggesting that Mr Kirilov was incapable of attending the hearing. There was no attendance at the hearing on 18 September 2025 by Mr Kirilov or anyone acting on behalf of Ms Kousar and her son.
130. The hearing was adjourned and case management directions were issued indicating that the next hearing would be an in-person hearing and requiring Ms Kousar to file and serve confirmation, supported by evidence, that the bundle of documents she provided to the FtT was served on the SSHD and the date of that service. The SSHD was given permission to file and serve a Rule 24 response and, if she considered it warranted, to file and serve an application under Rule 15(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in respect of the documents contained in the appellants’ FtT bundle. Mr Kirilov was specifically directed to attend the hearing and to produce the originals of the documents that were relied on in support of the appeal before the FtT.
131. The SSHD provided a Rule 24 response (time was extended by The Upper Tribunal). The SSHD acknowledged that there were issues concerning the fairness of the procedure adopted by the judge. The SSHD felt compelled to agree that the FtT decision was flawed by error of law such that it should be set aside and the decision remade.
132. An application was made by the SSHD to adduce new evidence if the FtT decision was set aside. The new evidence consisted of several Document Verification Reports (DVRs). A DVR relating to Ms Kousar’s Cypriot residence card verified it as being false following an assessment carried out by the Document and Banknotes Examination Laboratory of the Cyprus Police. A DVR relating to the death certificate of Mr Ahmed Ali found that it was forged. This conclusion was reached following a check from the relevant Union Council. Following an assessment, detailed in a DVR by HSBC bank, the bank statements that purported to relate to Mr Kirilov were identified as being false. Following an assessment by a money remittance service, detailed in a DVR, the money transfers allegedly sent by Mr Kirilov to Ms Kousar were found to be false. A further DVR relating to an alleged Cypriot Residence Card issued in the name of Muhammad Uzair Ahmed, was found to be false following an assessment by the Cypriot authorities.
133. At the hearing on 8 January 2026 there was no attendance by Mr Kirilov or Ms Kousar. We had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and satisfied ourselves that Mr Kirilov and Ms Kousar had notice of the hearing before us and that it was in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in their absence.
134. Having considered oral submissions from the Presenting Officers and the rule 24 response, we agreed with the position taken by the SSHD in her rule 24 response. We found there had been procedural unfairness in the way the decision was reached. The judge drew an adverse inference from Ms Kousar’s election of a paper hearing without making her aware of the judge’s concerns that such election was designed to avoid scrutiny of the evidence relied on by Ms Kousar and her son. The parties should be made aware of the issues in dispute and if a judge is considering drawing an adverse inference from the election of a paper determination, then fairness required Ms Kousar be given an opportunity to engage with and respond to that concern. It is not apparent that the judge gave any consideration to the option of directing that there be a hearing to ventilate his concerns (see SSGA (Disposal without considering merits; R25) Iraq [2023] UKUT 12 (IAC) and Ghira (R 25, AIP, Fairness) Romania [2025] UKUT 350 (IAC) which address at length the question of whether an appeal can be fairly decided without an oral hearing even if this is at the request of the appellants and without objection from the SSHD). We additionally note an element of unfairness to the SSHD in the process of the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) given that Ms Kousar’s bundle of documents was not served on the SSHD and the SSHD therefore had no opportunity of investigating the reliability of those documents.
135. We indicated that we would set aside the decision of the FtT. The standard directions issued to the parties contained a presumption that the re-making would take place at the same hearing if the FtT decision was set aside as erroneous in law. We indicated that we would proceed to remake the decision. We admitted the DVRs and reserved our remaking decision.
136. The issue we need to determine in remaking the decision is whether Mr Kirilov is related to Ms Kousar through marriage. We have considered the various documents identified above upon which Ms Kousar placed reliance in her appeal before the FtT. We apply the principles established in Tanveer Ahmed and consider the reliability of these documents having considered all the evidence before us ‘in the round’.
137. We note the DVRs in respect of the documents identified above (relating to the HSBC bank statement, the money remittal transactions, the Cypriot residence documents and the death certificate in respect of Mr Ali). We find the use of false documents to support the application undermines the credibility of both Mr Kirilov and Ms Kousar. We note in particular the false death certificate suggesting that Ms Kousar remains married to Mr Ali. We take account of the absence of any further evidence from Ms Kousar supportive of her claim to be married to Mr Kirilov and the failure, without good reason, for either of them to attend the Upper Tribunal hearings. Having considered these factors cumulatively we find that the marriage certificate, the pregnancy scan and the Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust letter are not reliable documents. Having regard to the evidence before us ‘in the round’ we are not therefore satisfied that Ms Kousar has demonstrated that she is married to Mr Kirilov as claimed.
138. It follows that we remake the decision and dismiss the appeals of Ms Kousar and her son against the refusal of their applications for EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permits under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
Notice of Decisions
Auron Hoxha, UI-2025-001013
139. We remake the decision and dismiss Mr Hoxha’s appeal against the refusal of his application for an EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
Zahid Mehmood, UI-2025-003579
140. We remake the decision and dismiss the Mr Mehmood’s appeal against the refusal of his application for an EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
Atif Mehmood, UI-2025-001414
141. The decision of FtT Judge Beg promulgated on 11 December 2024 is set aside.
142. We remake the decision and dismiss Mr Mehmood’s appeal under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (as amended).
Nagina Kousar and Muhammad Uzair Ahmed; UI-2025-001514 and UI-2025-001515
143. The decision of FtT Judge Abdar promulgated on 23 January 2025 is set aside.
144. We remake the decision and dismiss the appeals of Ms Kousar and her son against the refusal of their applications for EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permits under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.

Judge Feeney
Judge Blum
Judge Mandalia

ANNEX 1

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: ~
First-tier Tribunal No: ~

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

JUDGE FEENEY
(President of the First-tier Tribunal)
and
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
and
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

AURON HOXHA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: No appearance by or on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr P Deller, Senior Home Office Presenting Officers

Heard at Field House on 8 January 2026
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Albania. He applied for settled status or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. The appellant claimed to be the spouse of Atti Aseva Deyanova (“Ms Deyanova”), a Bulgarian national. In his application the appellant claimed that he first arrived in the UK on 6 June 2020. He said that he had completed the application himself and would prefer to be contacted by email. H gave the following email address: ‘visaservicesuk@gmail.com.
2. The application was refused by the respondent on 14 June 2023. In summary, the respondent claimed the appellant had not provided and evidence to confirm that he is the spouse of a relevant EEA citizen / civil partner of a relevant EEA citizen and was therefore not satisfied that the appellant is a family member of a relevant EEA Citizen.
3. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) under the Immigration (Citizens Rights Appeals) (UK Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”) and elected to have the appeal determined on the papers. The appeal was dismissed by FtT Judge Simpson (the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 15 January 2025, on the papers (“the decision”).
4. The FtT judge noted the background to the appeal had been set out in a bundle provided by the appellant comprising of 22 pages, and a bundle from the respondent comprising of 228 pages. The judge identified the issues in the appeal at paragraphs [4] to [6] of the decision and identified the particular documents relied upon at paragraph [12] of the decision. The judge noted there was no witness statement from the appellant or his sponsor. At paragraphs [15] and [16] the judge concluded:
“15. Ultimately the appellant asks me to make inferences from a limited selection of documents. The only material before me which might indicate that the sponsor was resident before the specified date is the appellant’s assertion in his skeleton argument, and given the possibility that the assertion is self-serving corroboration is required. The appellant appears to rely on the boarding passes, page 210 of his bundle. However the boarding passes by themselves merely indicate that a flight was booked and do not demonstrate residence. In particular I note that the sponsor was not granted pre-settled status until after the specified date and the only documentary evidence of her presence in the United Kingdom, the bank statements, date from March 2023. The appellant has not succeeded in showing that his wife was resident in the UK before 31 December 2020, therefore she cannot be a relevant EEA citizen for the purposes of this appeal and therefore he cannot be a family member of a relevant EEA citizen.
16. Having found that the sponsor is not a “relevant EEA citizen” the issue of whether the appellant has a continuous qualifying period of residence does not arise. However I have considered nearly 200 pages of the appellant’s bank statements dating between 2020 and 2023. I note that that there are entries which do appear to show purchases in shop that might be in the United Kingdom, however there are also many entries which are unclear, which take place abroad or are merely subscription type payments. By themselves these bank statements are insufficient to corroborate the appellant’s assertion that he has a period of continuous residence in the United Kingdom.”
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant claims the transactions disclosed by the bank statements clearly show transactions entered into in the UK at UK-based high street retailers and service providers. They are, the appellant claims, evidence of the appellant’s physical presence in the UK and demonstrate regular activity from within the UK. The appellant claims the judge confused ‘card transactions’ with ‘on-line transactions’ and transactions processed by companies registered abroad. The appellant seeks a decision setting aside the decision of the FtT and invites the Upper Tribunal to direct that the decision be remitted to the FtT for determination afresh, on the papers.
6. Permission to appeal was refused by FtT Judge McMahon on 19 February 2025. The application for permission to appeal was renewed to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce on 22 April 2025. She said:
“2. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal finding (d) in particular to be “unclear”, and noting that there were also withdrawals relating to subscription based services. I grant permission because I consider it arguable that the bank statements were in fact perfectly clear, and that the First-tier Tribunal may have misunderstood the evidence.”
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Us
7. It is helpful for us to record a little more about the chronology of events following the grant of permission to appeal:
a. On 12 May 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an email from an email address: bedy733@gmail.com In the absence of a Rule 24 reply from the respondent, the appellant said: “I kindly request for final disposal.”
b. On 16 May 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com Again, in the absence of a Rule 24 reply from the respondent, the appellant said: “I kindly request for final disposal.”
c. The appellant’s email of 16 May 2025 was considered by an Upper Tribunal Lawyer. A reply was sent to the appellant. The appellant was informed that the time for filing the Rule 24 response had not expired. For the avoidance of doubt the respondent was directed to file a Rule 24 response by 27 May 2025.
d. On 23 May 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an email from a Senior Presenting Officer stating the respondent does not oppose the appeal and agreeing that the appeal should be determined again on the appeal so that “the evidence can be reconsidered correctly”.
e. On 4 June 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com The appellant invited the Upper Tribunal to remit the appeal to the FtT for redetermination on the papers.
f. On 7 July 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com The appellant again invited the Upper Tribunal to remit the appeal to the FtT for redetermination on the papers.
g. On 24 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia issued Directions. The Upper Tribunal was not satisfied that it is appropriate to determine the question as to whether the decision of the FtT is infected by a material error of law, and if it is, that the appeal should be remitted to the FtT for rehearing, without a hearing.
h. On 25 July 2025, a Notice of Hearing was sent to the parties. The appeal was listed for hearing before the Upper Tribunal on 18 September 2025.
i. On 22 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com The appellant stated he is now living at an address in Kilmarnock, Scotland, and inviting the Tribunal to list the appeal for hearing in Scotland.
j. On 28 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal responded to the appellant inviting the appellant to provide proof of his current address. The appellant was informed the appeal will remain listed at Field House, London, as set out in the Notice of Hearing provided.
k. On 5 September 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com The appellant provided proof of his address in Kilmarnock, Scotland, and again invited the Tribunal to list the appeal for hearing in Scotland.
l. On 15 September 2025, the Upper Tribunal responded to the appellant. The appellant was informed the appeal will remain listed on 18 September 2025 at Field House, London, as set out in the Notice of Hearing provided. The appellant was informed that should make the necessary arrangements to attend the hearing as required. He should bring the originals of the documents as directed at paragraphs 3 of the Upper Tribunal’s directions issued on 24 July 2025.
m. The appellant did not attend the hearing on 18 September 2025. The Presenting Officer sought and was granted permission to withdraw any concession made in the email from Stephen Walker, Presenting Officer from the respondent’s Specialist Appeals Team dated 23 May 2025 indicating that the respondent does not oppose the appeal. In the absence of the appellant, the hearing was treated as a Case Management review Hearing. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned. The Tribunal directed that the appeal is not suitable for determination on the papers and will be listed as a face-to face hearing before the Upper Tribunal sitting at Field House.
n. On 3 October 2025, a Notice of Hearing was sent to the parties. The appeal was listed for hearing before the Upper Tribunal on 8 January 2026.
o. On 20 November 2025, a replacement Rule 24 response was filed by the respondent.
p. On 5 January 2026, the Upper Tribunal received a further email from: bedy733@gmail.com The appellant said he was not well. He said that he has already sent the documents he relies upon to the Tribunal and invited the Tribunal to make a decision.
q. On 6 January 2026, the Upper Tribunal Legal Officer responded to the appellant. The appellant was told that if he is too unwell to attend the hearing on 8 January 2026, he can send the Upper Tribunal evidence that he is unwell and ask for the hearing to be adjourned until another date when he will be well enough to attend.
r. The appellant did not attend the hearing of the appeal listed on 8 January 2026.
8. There is no further explanation for the absence of the appellant and/or his partner. There has been no application for an adjournment. We have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. We are satisfied that the appellant has had notice of the hearing before us and that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the over-riding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in the appellant’s absence.
9. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Deller submits the respondent should be permitted to resile from the concession previously made and that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT. He accepts that there was no evidence before the FtT previously that undermined the documents relied upon by the appellant.
10. Having heard from Mr Deller we recorded at the hearing that we are satisfied that the decision of the FtT is infected by a material error of law such that it must be set aside. We said that our reasons will follow in writing and this we now do. We directed that the decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal on a date to be fixed.
Decision
11. We can address the error of law briefly. It is useful to begin by considering the application to withdraw the concession made by the respondent. In AM (Iran) v SSHD, Simon LJ said:
“40. I would accept that the Court may, depending on the circumstances, permit a concession that was made in a tribunal hearing to be withdrawn. There are no all-embracing principles that will apply beyond those implicit in CPR Part 1.1.
41. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Davoodipanah [2004] EWCA Civ 106 a concession had been made before the Immigration Adjudicator. On an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Secretary of State considered that the concession had been wrongly made; and revisited an issue that was implicitly covered by the concession. The appellant appealed against an adverse decision on the basis that the IAT could not go behind the concession made before the Immigration Adjudicator. Kennedy LJ, giving the leading judgment, considered this point:
22. It is clear from the authorities that where a concession has been made before an adjudicator by either party the Immigration Appeal Tribunal can allow the concession to be withdrawn if it considers that there is good reason in all the circumstances to take that course. (See, for example, Ivanauskieine v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA.Civ 1271 , and Carrabuk v Secretary of State for the Home Department (a decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal presided over by Mr Justice Collins on 18 May 2000)). Obviously if there will be prejudice to one of the parties if the withdrawal is allowed that will be relevant and matters such as the nature of the concession and the timing may also be relevant, but it is not essential to demonstrate prejudice before an application to withdraw a concession can be refused. What the tribunal must do is to try to obtain a fair and just result. In the absence of prejudice, if a Presenting Officer has made a concession which appears in retrospect to be a concession which he or she should not have made, then probably justice will require that the Secretary of State be allowed to withdraw that concession before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. But, as I have said, everything depends on the circumstances, and each case must be considered on its own merits.
12. The effect of the concession made by the respondent is that the decision of the FtT is set aside and the decision in the appeal falls to be remade. It is plainly in the interests of justice that the appeal proceeds upon an accurate understanding of the factual matrix. A mistake as to fact can amount to a material error of law. Everything depends on the circumstances, and each case must be considered on its own merits. The respondent did not file and serve any evidence that undermines the documents that were relied upon by the appellant before the FtT. We make no direct criticism of the respondent for that since it is far from clear that the documents relied upon by the appellant were in fact served upon the respondent prior to the determination of his appeal on the papers. For reasons which become clear below, there is no prejudice to the appellant by the withdrawal of the concession. We accept that it is in the interests of justice to permit the respondent to withdraw the concession previously made.
13. The decision of the FtT is brief. Mr Deller, quite rightly in our judgment, accepts, as set out in the grant of permission to appeal, that there were clear bank statements before the FtT and that the First-tier Tribunal may have misunderstood the evidence. That in our judgment is sufficient for us to find that there is an error of law in the decision such that it must be set aside.
Disposal
14. Mr Deller was careful not to concede that the evidence relied upon by the appellant is such that the appeal is bound to succeed. As to disposal, Mr Deller submits decision in the appeal should be remade in the Upper Tribunal. The respondent intends has undertaken verification checks regarding the documents relied upon by the appellant. In summary, the respondent will claim that the bank statements from Barclays Bank are said to be false and that an enrichment report has been obtained that undermines the marriage certificate relied upon by the appellant. Me Deller accepts, in fairness to the appellant, the appellant must have an opportunity to respond to that evidence and we cannot therefore proceed to remake the decision immediately.
15. We are satisfied that the appropriate course is for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal and that in fairness to the appellant the appeal will be listed for a further hearing for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal. We make the following further directions:
1. We grant the Rule 15(2A) application made by the respondent to rely upon the evidence concerning the bank statements and marriage certificate. The SSHD has permission to file and serve any further evidence to be relied upon by the SSHD at the hearing of this appeal, within 7 days.
2. The appellant shall file and serve any further evidence he relies upon in reply.

Notice of Decision
16. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Simpson promulgated on 15 January 2025 is set aside.
17. The decision in the appeal will be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
18. The appeal will be listed for a face-to-face hearing at Field House on 6 March 2026.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 February 2026