Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: aa/00003/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 3 May 2016
On 1 November 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE H H STOREY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRUBB

Between

a S
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Neale of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr I Richards, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Yemen. Upon receipt of a decision made by the respondent on 5 December 2014 refusing him leave to enter and proposing to remove him to Yemen, he appealed. In a decision sent on 28 April 2015, First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Davidge dismissed his appeal. Whilst dismissing the appellant's account of past persecution and current risk, she accepted that the appellant was (i) a Sunni Muslim; and (ii) a moderate Shafi'i Muslim. At paras 34-36 she stated:
"34. Rather, Counsel argued that the Appellant's claims to have suffered persecution were credible when viewed against the current evidence of the sectarian nature of the conflict. I have set out above why I have rejected this particular Appellant's account in that regard. Counsel argued that even if I found the Appellant had not established past persecution on the facts alleged, the Appellant had an alternative case for asylum based on his position as a Sunni Muslim. Counsel accepted that at the time of the Appellant leaving Yemen the country background evidence did not establish the Appellant was at risk based on the fact of his Shafi Sunni Muslim religion alone whether from other Sunni Muslims or Houthi/Zaida Shia, however the position had now deteriorated to the point that it was now established that Shafi'i Sunni Muslims were at risk from other Sunni Muslims, specifically Wahabist Muslims. Further that in any event as they were Sunni Muslims they were also at risk, in common with Wahabist Muslims, from Houthi Shi'a Muslims.
35. I was careful to ensure that Counsel took me through all of the country background evidence upon which he relied.
36. I found the evidence did not establish the case to the lower standard. Put shortly, whilst I am satisfied that the evidence shows that the Houthi militia have taken control by violent means, and that there is opposition to the Houthi so that there is violent conflict, the notion that moderate Shafi'i Muslims are somehow stuck in the middle, and so at risk of persecution on account of their religious beliefs is not borne out. Nor did I find merit in counsel's submission that the risk of persecution to the Appellant as a result of his being a Sunni Muslim from the Houthi militia was real. I have already explained why I did not find past persecution. In respect of the position now, the evidence is that Houthi target the state and militia who support them. The Appellant is not in that category. He has had no involvement with politics and no significant religious profile so as to attract individual attention. There is little evidence of Sunni's generally, who are not involved in politics, and have no significant political or religious profile, and are not, for example, in a Militia, being specifically targeted. The references in the skeleton at paragraph 9, to the bombing by terrorists of two mosques (B6 in the Appellant's bundle) and sectarianism and a north south divide and the presence of Al-Qaida in the south (B7), read in the round with the rest of the country background information to which I have been referred, simply falls short of the evidence necessary to establish the claim."
2. At para 38 she turned to consider whether the appellant might nevertheless succeed on the basis of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive by virtue of facing a real risk of indiscriminate violence in a situation of internal armed conflict. Although accepting that Yemen was in a state of armed conflict, she did not consider that it had been shown that the threshold of indiscriminate violence was sufficiently high to show that the appellant could qualify merely by virtue of being an ordinary civilian of that country.
3. The appellant's grounds of appeal were twofold; it being contended first of all that the judge failed to give any or adequate reasons for dismissing the appellant's appeal under Article 15(c); and secondly, that she failed to reach clear findings on the appellant's credibility.
4. The appellant was successful in being granted permission to appeal, the judge who made the grant observing that whilst Judge Davidge had given adequate reasons for her credibility findings, her reasons as regards Article 15(c) were arguably deficient. The appellant's case was heard on 10 August 2015 by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge J F W Phillips. DUTJ Phillips stated at paras 5 and 6 of his decision that:
"5. The history of this appeal is detailed above. The facts, not challenged, are that the Appellant is a Yemeni citizen born on 22 May 1983. The Appellant left Yemen on 6 October 2014. He claimed that he was a Shafi'i Sunni Muslim who had lived with his family in Taiz before moving to Sana'a in 2011 because of the turbulent situation in that area. He left Sana's fearing that it was about to fall to the Houthi Shi'a militia and that they would expel or kill him and that he also faced persecution by Wahabi Sunnis because he is a moderate Shafi'i. The Appellant also claimed that the circumstances in Yemen had deteriorated to such an extent that the degree of indiscriminate violence was at such a high level that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm solely on account of his presence in Yemen.
6. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant had not established that he faced persecution on a return to Yemen and this finding is not challenged. The Tribunal went on to find that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellant would face a real risk of being subject to serious harm solely on account of his presence in Yemen."
5. DUTJ Phillips then addressed submissions relating to Article 15(c). He concluded that Judge Davidge had failed to engage with or assess the substantial body of background material relating to conditions in the Yemen, including very recent evidence. Noting that the judge made reference to the "limited evidence available", DUTJ Phillips said that there was no indication of the basis on which the judge considered the evidence to be limited.
6. At the outset of the hearing before us the parties agreed that the only salient facts as regards the re-making of the decision on this appeal were that the appellant is a national of Yemen and a Sunni Shafi from Taizz who lived in Sana'a from 2011 until his exit from the country in 2015.
7. Mr Richards averred that on the basis of these given facts the appellant could not succeed on the basis of general risk as the level of indiscriminate violent in Yemen as a whole was not high enough to warrant a conclusion that all civilians faced a real risk of serious harm contrary to Article 15(c). There being no dispute that the appellant's home area was Sana'a, the only two issues that needed decision were (1) would the appellant be at risk on return to his home area; and (2) if he would be at risk in his home area, would he have a viable option of internal relocation in Aden. In relation to (1), the Secretary of State accepted that in line with the Home Office Country Information and Guidance, "Yemen, Security and humanitarian situation", April 2016, the level of general risk was sufficiently high in Sana'a and northern and central areas to cross the Article 15(c) (and Article 3 ECHR) threshold. In relation to (2), the Secretary of State accepted that the appellant could not safely relocate to Taizz from where the appellant originated; as a viable internal relocation alternative the Secretary of State was only suggesting Aden. There were flights to Aden. Whilst the Secretary of State accepted that the situation in Aden has deteriorated and is fluid, volatile and unstable, it is not sufficiently serious to place the appellant at risk. Essentially, Aden should be considered as an exception to the situation of general insecurity because it was the seat of the Sunni-backed provincial government. There were elements of control and security marking Aden out as a comparatively safe city.
8. Mr Neale highlighted the dire humanitarian situation especially the huge numbers of IDPs (2.5 million) in the country. The view of the UN Special Rapporteur regarding the situation in Yemen was that it is catastrophic. The humanitarian situation, as regards for example lack of healthcare and food insecurity, was a direct result of the Saudi blockade. It was not the result of a national disaster; the predominant causes of the armed conflict were man-made.
9. As regards Aden, the driving out of the Houthis had not brought security. Al Quaeda and ISIS had a significant presence in the city; there were armed clashes and attacks in broad daylight; there were examples of persons killed through indiscriminate violence; in 2015 there had been an assassination of the governor and in April 2016 the police chief narrowly survived an attack; there had also been a high profile attack in March 2016 on a care home run by nuns; peace talks had broken down; the situation was likely to get worse. As compared with the view the Secretary of State expressed in December 2015, the view she expressed in April 2016 was that the situation had worsened.
10. Mr Neale drew attention to various features of the background evidence relating to Yemen, noting that the rate of casualties was 0.4 per 100,000 persons which was higher than that experienced in Kirkuk and Diyala (0.1 and 0.07 respectively) where the respondent accepted there was an Article 15(c) risk. The great majority of the casualties, up to 93%, were reported to be civilians. The methods used by the parties to the conflict, including the Saudis, showed that civilians were disproportionately targeted.
11. Mr Neale emphasised that the principal issue in this case was one of relocation (it having been accepted by the respondent that the appellant would face risk in his home area). UNHCR guidelines (Guidelines on International Protection No. 4 Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative) repeatedly warned against reliance on internal relocation in the context of armed conflicts in which there can be shifting armed fronts. In addition, it was not sufficient to consider whether the appellant could achieve safety in Aden; it had also to be considered whether that would be reasonable for him. The appellant is from a northern part of Yemen. He had never lived in Aden. He has no family connections in Aden. People from the north were treated with hostility and were suspected of being Houthi or Houthi supporters. It may be that with Saudi help, civil servants in Aden are still able to draw a salary, but that would not assist someone in the appellant's position.
12. In relation to the issue of internal relocation, Mr Richards said that there was nothing in the evidence to indicate that suspicion of the appellant as a northerner would translate into a real risk of serious harm or even very significant difficulties. The appellant had successfully relocated within Yemen in the past, from Taizz to Sana'a. He had shown himself to be resourceful. He could earn a living. Mr Neale responded by saying that yes the appellant had relocated in 2011 but the situation had been less dire then. Not only did the appellant have no family links in Aden, he had no connections with powerful actors.
13. At the end of the hearing the Tribunal directed the parties to produce further background country materials and subsequently received an addendum report prepared by Mr Henry Thompson. It suffices to say that Mr Thompson is an established expert on the situation in Yemen. On 9 June 2016 the appellant's representatives sent his addendum report together with further submissions which largely repeated those sent previously. No further submissions were received from the respondent nor has the respondent raised any objection to the contents of Mr Thompson's addendum report.
14. It is not necessary to summarise Mr Thompson's addendum report in full as much of it addresses questions relating to the situation in Yemen as a whole, whereas it has been conceded by the respondent as set out in para 2.4.5 of her Country Information Guidance, April 2016 that "in the north west and centre of the country the levels of indiscriminate violence are likely to be at such a level as to engage Article 15(c)".
15. Mr Thompson's assessment of the appellant's likely situation if returned to Aden is substantially contained within the following paragraphs 4.4-6:
"4.4 What are the prospects of the Appellant being able to find housing and a livelihood in Aden?
The events in Aden during the first two weeks of May demonstrate how difficult and dangerous it would be for the Appellant to remain in Aden (See section 6 below).
To remain in Aden the Appellant would need an Aden sponsor of some standing to provide him with letters authorising leave to remain in Aden, and/or some kind of physical protection. In Yemeni society this kind of allegiance is either based on family or need: the sponsor needs the individual he is sponsoring, or he linked by family obligation. The Author is unaware if the Appellant has a potential 'sponsor' in Aden, but the fact that the Appellant's family escaped Taizz to Sana'a (rather than Aden) makes this seem unlikely.
If the Appellant had a sponsor, he could find a flat to rent if he had the cash, however he would probably still not find a job or a livelihood. Unlike Sana's, Aden does not have a government-led economy, and because trading is so slow, the labour market is flooded and there is only a very small chance that the Appellant could find a livelihood. This takes into account his work with MALI and his relationship with MALI's owner. The English-language schools in Aden are open, but are not as busy as they have been.
5. To what extent, if at all is Aden subject to indiscriminate violence?
Aden doesn't have government - it has a local council backed by the Emirati forces and advisors, but the Emiratis have a minimal presence on the ground. The local council is not elected, and has limited capacity to implement the basis functions of governance in the areas it controls.
Aden suffers from political/criminal violence at quite a high level. In the week of writing this report on 23rd May two suicide bombs left over forty people dead in Aden, on the 27th May three bombs were found in mosque shoe-racks? the reaction, two days later on the 29th May was for the Government forces to round up and forcibly expel yet more 'Northern' Yemenis (see also section 6 below). There has been a steady string of assassinations of senior members of the security forces - the assassins tend to use suicide bombs, roadside bombs, car bombs or drive-by shootings from motorcycles. Many innocent people have lost their lives or been wounded as a result of these attacks.
There is a curfew - maintained by troops nominally under Emirates control - these troops man checkpoints on the main transport nodes (major intersections, roundabouts, etc.), however, 'popular committees' (armed groups) some of tribal origin from the hinterland (Abyan, Lahj, Yafae and Adjourned Dahale) are present - and some of these have strong connections with Al Quaeda. These gangs fight each other for control of territory, since territory equates to the right to control specific markets: typically the qat market and retail of black market fuel.
These 'popular committees' not infrequently set up temporary checkpoints at night on urban roads and extract rents from passing mini-buses and taxis. Failure to pay the armed men can lead to violence.
In addition to political/criminal violence, there are growing areas of religious intolerance in Aden. A few Salafi mosques have set up very strong levels of social control in their immediate neighbourhoods. If a man was to walk through a salafi-dominated area and not be either a known local man or obviously salafi (salafis have a full beard as sign of piety) he would be subject to severe criticism and possible violence. There are eight districts in Aden. While it is hard to 'map' the Salafi influence at mosque/community level, there are significant Salafi communities in Crater, Tawahi, Bureiqa and Mualla and due to the mountainous geography of peninsular Aden (comprising Crater, Tawahi and Mualla) these mosques take a dominant position - it is hard to navigate around them.
6. To what extent, if at all, is the Appellant likely to face any serious harm, a threat to his life or person, prejudice, discrimination, or a risk of violence in Aden as a person from North Yemen with no ties to Aden?
Throughout the first week of May 2016 the armed forces ostensibly loyal to President Hadi forcibly rounded up and expelled people from Taizz and other provinces beyond Aden. According to press reports, a few thousand 'Northerners' - mostly from Taizz - were expelled by force with no recourse to any protection by the state or its agents. The 'reason' for the expulsion was that the men had no ID cards - and if they could not be officially recognised, they were considered to be a potential threat. The expelled were mostly men, but some families and children were recorded (photographed) in social media. This action was repeated in the 28th May in the wake of two suicide bombs in Aden (see section 5 on the previous page).
The author's own informants suggest that the move to expel 'Northerners' was popular among Adenis who are fearful that 'Northerners' may be Huthi agents. It should be understood that during the Huthi attempt to lay siege and occupy Aden from March to July/August 2015, Huthi fighters were smuggled into and infiltrated Aden's districts. These fighters made a significant impact on the civilian population of Aden. What appears to be happening on 13th May 2016 is that Northern/Taizzi men without significant roots in Aden and who wish to live and work in Aden will need an Adeni guarantor - a system not unlike the Saudi Kafala (Sponsorship) system. However, this is de facto dividing the state - thus the President's official denial.
The enmity between Adenis and Northerners has historical precedence prior to 2011-2016: The siege of Aden in 1994 by the Northern Army (many of them Taizzis) led to the sacking of Aden; between 1965 and 1968 the bitter pre-independence and post-independence struggles between the hardline socialist National Liberation Front (NLF) and the more liberal Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) led to NLF taking power and killing off many FLOSY leaders. NLF was dominated by Adeni cadres of Taizzi origin, mostly put in place by Abdul Fattah Ismail (himself from Taizz). Both events are in living memory of elder Adenis. The rhetoric coming from former President of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Ali Salem Al Beidh, externalises Aden's woes by putting blame on malign Northern influences. The remaining old guard perpetuate a very sour political landscape.
The Appellant's name shows clearly that he is from Taizz - he is seen as a 'Northerner' by the Adeni population. Even if he hides his full name and merely uses his two given names, thus omitting his tribal or village name, his accent is clearly Taizzi. Identified as a Taizzi and with no Adeni sponsor or protection, he will be treated with suspicion and subject to expulsion."
Our assessment
16. As already noted, we are tasked with re-making the decision on the appeal made by the appellant against the decision of the respondent dated 5 December 2014.
17. By virtue of further directions made by the Tribunal at the end of the hearing which took place on 3 May 2016, we have received an addendum report from Mr Henry Thompson dated 3 June 2016. Accordingly, we must consider the latest issues in this case as to whether the situation in Yemen or parts thereof as at early June 2016 is such as to place the appellant at real risk of serious harm as defined by Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The appellant no longer claims he is entitled to refugee status and there is no continuing challenge to the adverse findings of fact made by Judge Davidge as regards his claim to have suffered past persecution or serious harm. As stated by appellant's Counsel, the only salient facts in this case are that the appellant is a national of Yemen who is a Sunni Shafi'i from Taizz who lived in Sana'a from 2011 until his exit from the country in 2015.
18. In deciding this case we must consider a substantial body of background evidence, including that set out in the appellant's supplementary bundle and the two reports of Mr Henry Thompson. We have also to take account of the Home Office Country Information and Guidance "Yemen: Security and humanitarian situation April 2016".
19. It is accepted that the only issue in this case concerns whether or not the appellant qualifies for humanitarian (or subsidiary) protection within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. Although the grounds also refer to Article 3 ECHR, it is not suggested that if the appellant fails under Article 15(c) he could succeed under either Article 15(b) or Article 3 ECHR.
20. The appellant's written submissions for the hearing did advance the argument that the situation in Yemen was such that the country as a whole posed an Article 15(c) risk. That had also been the appellant's case before DUTJ Phillips. However, in light of the respondent's conclusion as regards risk in the appellant's home area(s), it is unnecessary for us to address the situation as regards Yemen as a whole, particularly since the appellant relies inter alia on the expert evidence of Mr Henry Thompson according to whom (see his addendum report at 1.3) "the conflict does not directly or equally affect all people in Yemen". It would be contrary to the geographical focus of the appellant's case to focus on Yemen as a whole.
21. We have concluded that the appellant is entitled to succeed under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive by virtue of the lack of a viable internal relocation alternative in Aden. We shall set out our principal reasons in two sets. The first set of reasons concerns general factors.
22. First of all, the respondent's own assessment is that internal relocation within Yemen is in general difficult. At 2.5.3 of the Country Information and Guidance April 2016 it is stated:
"Relocating to most parts of Yemen remains difficult, a number of Yemenis have relocated internally to flee combat zones (mostly to Taiz, Amran and Hajjah governorates). Although in some cases relocation to Aden and surrounding areas may be feasible, the volatile security environment and frequent violence, harsh humanitarian situation and lack of livelihood opportunities mean that this will not be possible for many Yemeni citizens. Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person, including where they originate from in Yemen and where they will be returning to."
At 3.1.4 it is added that "[i]internal relocation within Yemen is unlikely to be a viable option for most people although it may be for some individuals, depending on their particular circumstances".
23. This guidance is significantly different from that given in the November 2015 predecessor which stated that it "may be reasonable for persons to relocate to Aden and the more stable areas in the south of the country".
24. Second, whilst Aden is far from being one of the most affected areas of the country, it has suffered significant damage to its security and economic infrastructure as a result of the civil war. In addition to attacks on the city by shelling and rockets, as noted in reports such as the Humanitarian Response Plan - Yemen, January 2016, the city has been devastated by sustained shelling and air strikes and medical supplies, including essential medicine for chronic diseases, are in increasingly short supply. Restriction on life-saving supplies were imposed in Aden early in 2016.
25. Of particular importance for the purposes of assessing Article 15(c) risk is the fact that the internationally recognised government of President Hadi maintains only limited control over the security forces and Aden does not have a functioning government in the ordinary sense of that term. It has a local council backed by the Emirati forces and advisers, but these have limited capacity to implement the basic functions of governance in the areas it controls. Troops nominally under Emirates control man checkpoints at the main transport nodes (major intersections, roundabouts etc). However, these actors co-exist and compete for control with "popular committees", some of which are based on tribal origins from the hinterland (Abyan, Lahj, Yafae and Ad Dahole), some of which have strong connections with external groups such as Al Quaeda and other Salafist organisations and some of which are purely criminal; and these "people's committees" not infrequently set up temporary checkpoints at night in urban areas and extract rents from passing mini-buses and taxis.
26. According to a July 2015 report by the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies, the political structure of Aden is composed of a number of loosely allied groups with differing ideological motivation, not all of which are loyal to Hadi's government. "Popular resistance" groups can be classified into (a) a number of Sunni Islamist groups which are mostly Salafist in nature and include the Al Rashad party and Al Quaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS) group's Yemen branch; (b) the Hirak Movement, also known as the Southern Separatist Movement, fighting to re-establish South Yemen as a separate country; and (c) the political parties with affiliated tribal militias in other governorates who reject Houthi domination and are fighting for greater self-determination. According to the UNSC 7625th meeting 17 February 2016 report, there has been a notable upsurge of terrorist attacks in Aden. According to the UNSC Panel of Experts in a report of I5 April 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces have attacked civilian and civilian objects, including by shelling civilian resident areas, medical facilities and other civilian infrastructure. Such attacks are carried out with impunity and it is difficult to see that the authorities (such as they are) in Aden are able to provide effective protection against such attacks.
27. Even though we have some reservations about whether the above factors suffice to establish an exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence such as to mean that conditions in Aden pose an Article 15(c) risk to the generality of civilians, we consider it clear beyond peradventure that in this city there is a high level of insecurity and a lack of effective protection from the authorities.
28. The above general factors relating to the situation in Yemen as a whole and Aden in particular provide a background for our second set of reasons for allowing the appellant's appeal, reasons which focus on the appellant's particular circumstances. We agree with Mr Richards that the appellant has shown himself a resourceful individual and he is of a relatively young age and has no known health problems. He managed to relocate successfully from Taizz to Sana'a in 2011. He has valuable work experience in the hotel trade.
29. However, we do not think these factors would be sufficient to make relocation for him to Aden either safe or reasonable. This is essentially for two reasons.
30. First, the appellant has no family in Aden (Mr Richards did not dispute that we were entitled to consider his case on this basis). The importance of family connections and roots in Aden at the present time is something that has been particularly emphasised by Mr Thompson. In his addendum report the latter stated:
"To remain in Aden the appellant would need an Aden sponsor of some standing to provide him with letters authorising leave to remain in Aden and/or some kind of physical protection. In Yemeni society this indefinite leave to remain of allegiance is either based on family or need: the sponsor needs the individual he is sponsoring or be linked by family obligation".
31. Second, the appellant is a northerner from Taizz. We are unable to accept Mr Richard's submission that these facts would not translate into either serious harm or very significant difficulties for the appellant. There is a considerable body of evidence indicating to the contrary. Emblematic of this evidence, the International Crisis Group report of February 2016 states that:
"[F]or many southerners, the war, especially the brutal five-month battle for Aden, has unlocked a torrent of long-festering anger and hatred against the north, feeding their desire for separation. 'Us versus them' narratives appear to be solidifying, encouraging blatant discrimination and attacks against northerners and their property.... Locals say robberies and looting have disproportionately targeted property of persons originally from the north. Crisis Group interviews, Aden resident, Adeni journalist, September 2015. Even political moderates in Aden routinely express blanket scepticism about the motivations of Yemenis from the north... A general state of lawlessness in Aden feeds and underscores divisions among the Southern Resistance and highlights the anti-Huthi/Saleh bloc's governance challenges... Residents also report that some of the Southern Resistance fighters associate with AQAP or IS because these groups can pay, and the government is not meeting their financial needs. Others in the Resistance have turned to criminal activity, controlling parts of the city or government for profit."
32. It also appears that persons from Taizz feature prominently in the account of attacks against northerners. Mr Thompson in para 6 of his addendum report observes that in the first week of May 2016 armed forces ostensibly loyal to President Hadi forcibly rounded up and expelled people from Taizz and other provinces beyond Aden. According to press reports a few thousand northerners - mostly from Taizz - were expelled by force with no recourse to any protection by the state or its agents. Actions against the same profile of persons were repeated on 28 May in the wake of two suicide bombs in Aden. Although it appears from an investigative report dated 10 May 2016 by Middle East Eye that the campaign of expulsion is against the wishes of President Hadi, he has not been able to prevent them. We observe that whilst between 2011-2015 the appellant lived in Sana'a, the question of his identity would be perceived by potential actors of serious harm in Aden as turning on his family and tribal origins in Taizz.
33. For the above reasons we conclude that the appellant would not have a viable internal relocation alternative in Aden as it would neither be safe nor reasonable for him to relocate there. Accordingly, we conclude that he has established that there are substantial grounds for believing that to remove him to Aden would expose him to a real risk of serious harm contrary to Article 15(c).
To conclude:
The decision we re-make is to allow the appellant's appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date

Dr H H Storey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal