Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/00676/2012

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Columbus House, Newport
Determination Sent
On 20 May 2013

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRUBB

Between

j a

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts instructed by Migrant Legal Project
For the Respondent: Mr K Hibbs Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. This appeal is subject to an anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal pursuant to rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005 (SI 2005/230). Neither party invited me to rescind the order and I continue it pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2698).
2. The appellant is a citizen of Iran who was born on 11 February 1992. He illegally entered the United Kingdom on 5 December 2011 and claimed asylum. On 6 January 2012, the Secretary of State refused the appellant’s claim for asylum. On that same date, the Secretary of State also made a decision to remove the appellant by way of directions to Iran as an illegal entrant under paras 8-10 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
3. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In a determination sent on 14 March 2012, the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Page) dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds. The appellant successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Mr C M G Ockelton, VP and UTJ Grubb) which remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo rehearing. That appeal came before Judge Whiting in the First-tier Tribunal and, in a determination promulgated on 31 January 2013, Judge Whiting dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds. On 22 February 2013, the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Froom) granted the appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Thus, the appeal came before me.
4. During the course of the hearing, I indicated to both representatives that I was a part of the constitution of the Upper Tribunal which had previously set aside the decision of Judge Page and had remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, the decision of which was now the subject of this appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Both representatives indicated that they had no objection to my hearing this appeal.
The Appellant’s Claim
5. The basis of the appellant’s claim may be summarised as follows. In April 2011, the appellant was detained by the Basiji when found in a park with his girlfriend. He was detained for two days at the Fathol Mobin base but was not physically mistreated. He was not formally charged and no court proceedings ensued. He was released after the intervention of a Mullah (‘YH’) and then returned home. Some three or four days after his release he was contacted by YH, who had secured his release, and asked to obtain money from others as contributions for a religious group who prayed at a shrine about ten minutes’ travelling distance by car outside the appellant’s home town. The appellant was also asked to provide the names of people who were deemed to be “acting against the laws of God”.
6. The appellant claims that YH was trying to brainwash him and in September/October 2011 the appellant confronted YH when he discovered that he had been covertly given drugs by YH. Despite the confrontation the appellant continued to take drugs given by YH which had a calming effect upon him. He would be given drugs every other night for the purposes of praying and worship and was told that the substance was called the “earth of Karbala”. The appellant says that he knew YH for a total of seven months during which time YH restricted the appellant’s movements by requiring him each night to attend meetings which the appellant did approximately four or five times each week. At those meetings, the appellant would be given drugs, would pray for between four to five hours and engage in chest-beating for about an hour. This was, the appellant says, part of the act of praying of this religious group. About one week before leaving Iran on 14 November 2011, the appellant last saw YH. The appellant brought a classmate of his to YH and the appellant saw three people take his classmate away to an unknown destination. He was told by YH not to tell anyone about it.
7. Prior to the appellant leaving Iran, he says that he was contacted by YH who asked him to bring someone else to him but the appellant refused. The appellant told his family and his father wanted to call the police but the appellant told him that YH’s paternal cousin worked at the police station and so, instead, through his paternal uncle, arrangements were made for the appellant to leave Iran illegally using an agent. The appellant says that YH has connections with the Etela’at and that one of his brothers is a member of the Basiji. The appellant fears YH and the Iranian authorities if he returns to Iran.
The Judge’s Findings
8. Judge Whiting did not accept the appellant’s account. He did not accept that the appellant had been detained by the Basiji in April 2011 as a result of being found with his girlfriend in a park. Further, the judge did not accept that the appellant had been released at the instigation of YH who had brainwashed him and given him drugs. Finally, the Judge found that even if the appellant’s account were true he could safely and reasonably internally relocate within Iran.
Error of Law
9. The substance of the grounds of appeal challenges the judge’s reasoning in finding the appellant’s account not to be credible. In his submissions, Mr Hodgetts adopted the grounds of appeal which he expanded upon orally.
10. First, he challenged the judge’s reasoning in paras 25, 26 and 27 of his determination which led the judge not to accept that the appellant had been detained in April 2011 by the Basiji following him being discovered there with his girlfriend.
11. The judge’s reasoning in full is at paras 25-28 as follows:
“25. In April 2011 the appellant asserts sitting together with [S] in the park around 10 a.m. one morning and being apprehended in the park by that the Basiji. [S] was coming from school in Fasa and was wearing a veil. He was forcibly taken into a car by two Basiji but [S] did not get into the car and he said, at asylum interview, that the Basiji let her be. He said because she was a girl they could not touch her and she refused to get into the car.
26. The report from Sheri Laizer records that ‘The Basijis had a reputation particular the law into their own hands and committing gross violations of human rights knowing they have the support of the Islamic government ...’ and ‘The Basij have been heavily criticised in the human rights abuses attributed to them during and since the elections of 2009 ... The conduct of the Basij include extreme use of force, beating, abduction, killing and looting.’ The appellant’s written statement records that he was approached by three Basij when in the park with [S] and that he was forcibly detained and placed in a car by two of them. That would have left one member of that force free to apprehend [S]. Against that informed statement from Sheri Laizer it is clearly inconsistent that members of the Basij would have felt constrained in apprehending a female who had been witnessed by them committing acts perceived to be against public morality.
27. The appellant has recorded that he was forcefully taken to the Fathol Mobin base where he was detained for two days. He was not physically mistreated whilst in detention; was not formally charged and no court proceedings ensued. He records being released from detention without any papers following intervention by [YH] and that he returned to his home. Citing extensive material in the public domain detailed in the refusal letter the respondent rejected the appellant’s assertion that he had been so arrested and detained without consequence. In essence whilst accepting that the Basij are responsible for monitoring moral behaviour in Iran, including state of dress and relationships between men and women outside of marriage, such material recorded that the Iranian Penal Code is based upon Sharia law and is applied in practise in Iran. That Code states at: Article 637 – Any man and woman who are not married and who commit a crime against public morality, excluding adultery, should be sentenced to flogging (99 lashes). If one of them did not consent to the crime then only the one who initiated the crime should be punished, and at Article 638 – Anyone who explicitly violates any religious taboo in public besides being punished for the act should also be imprisoned from ten days to two months, or should be flogged (74 lashes). Accordingly the respondent did not accept that the appellant has encountered the Basij accompanied by his girlfriend in a park; nor was it in consequence accepted that he was arrested detained by the Basij as claimed.
28. In cross-examination the appellant said that there was no prosecution following upon him being found in the public park with [S] because he had pushed the Basiji and [S] had escaped. Although he had been seen with the girl, at a trial there would be no girl. They could not find the girl. There would be no proof that he had been seen with the girl. He said the Basiji would need to show evidence at the trial which they could not do. Given the background evidence relating to the Basij and the justice system in Iran I do not find it credible that the first hand observational evidence of three Basiji would not be prohibitively accepted against the word of an individual so accused. That finding undermines the appellant’s account in respect of consorting with a girlfriend in public.”
12. As regards paras 25 and 26, Mr Hodgetts submitted that the judge had been wrong to find an inconsistency between the expert report of Sheri Laizer and the appellant’s evidence that the Basiji would, according to the appellant’s evidence, have felt constrained not to touch his girlfriend. Further, Mr Hodgetts submitted that in para 27 the judge had been wrong to view the offence that the appellant was accused of under the Iranian Penal Code as so serious that he would have only been detained for two days and would not have been subject to court proceedings and more severe punishment. Mr Hodgetts referred me to the Danish Immigration Service Report “On Certain Crimes and Punishments in Iran” (April 2005) at D1 of the respondent’s bundle and, in particular, at page 9 of that report where it was stated that: “The Organisation for Defending Victims of Violence’s International Department reported that the normal punishment for having an illegal relationship is detention for 24 hours.” He further referred me to para 11.31 of the Country of Origin Information Report (at E24 of the Appellant’s bundle) which, he submitted, made clear that the appellant’s offence fell within the least serious crimes under the Iranian Penal Code of “Ta’zir”.
13. Whilst there may well be some merit in Mr Hodgetts’ submission that the appellant’s detention for only two days by the Basiji is not inconsistent with the background material to which he referred me, it is clear from para 27 of his determination that the judge did not take this into account in reaching his adverse finding. Paragraph 27 is, when read carefully, merely a recitation of what the Secretary of State took into account in the refusal letter at paras 25-28. It is clear to me that the judge’s reasons for not accepting the appellant’s account of being detained in April 2011 are, in fact, contained in paras 26 and 28 of his determination.
14. As regards para 26, I do not accept Mr Hodgetts’ submission that the judge was not entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence that the Basiji did not touch his girlfriend simply because she was a girl. This does not seem to have been a point raised in the grounds of appeal. The judge was entitled to rely upon a passage in the report of Sheri Laizer (at A35 of the appellant’s bundle) where she identified that the Basiji have
“a reputation for taking the law into their own hands and committing gross violations of human rights knowing they have the support of the Islamic government, the Ayatollahs, Imams and Mullahs ...”.
15. Mr Hodgetts’ challenge is no more than a disagreement with the judge’s reasoning which was properly open to him.
16. As regards para 28, the grounds of appeal (although I did not understand Mr Hodgetts to press this point in his oral submissions) argue that the judge was wrong to speculate in finding that it was implausible that no prosecution would follow, on the appellant’s evidence, because there could be no trial as his girlfriend escaped and they could not find her and prove that he had been with a girl despite him having been observed by three Basiji. Contained within the appellant’s bundle is the US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 (Iran) [24 May 2012]. At B19-B21 the section on “Trial Procedures” makes plain that, although in principle fair procedures exist, in practice they are not respected. In my judgment, the judge was entitled, having regard to the background evidence, to find that it was not credible that the appellant would not face prosecution simply because his girlfriend could not be found given the “first hand observational evidence of three Basiji”.
17. Consequently, I reject Mr Hodgetts’ submissions that the judge’s finding that the appellant had not established the incident in April 2011 which led to his detention cannot stand. Of course, if that finding stands the whole of the appellant’s claim as it relates to YH falls away. Without his detention in April 2011, he could not have met YH who arranged his release and none of the consequences which, he now claims, put him at risk on return can have occurred. That, however, was not how the judge approached the appeal and he gave independent reasons for rejecting the remainder of the appellant’s accounts. It is to those reasons that I now turn.
18. Mr Hodgetts, in essence, made two principal submissions. First, he submitted that the judge had wrongly discounted the expert evidence of Sheri Laizer concerning the authentication by an informant of a number of aspects of the appellant’s claim including that he had been given illegal drugs by YH. Secondly, the judge had failed to take into account the background evidence concerning the use of illegal drugs by Mullahs in Iran and that there was nothing implausible in the appellant’s account that he was given these by YH and that he continued to be given them (they being addictive) despite having challenged YH.
19. The appellant submitted a number of photographs which, he claimed, showed him with YH and others.
20. The judge dealt with this evidence together with the evidence provided by an informant who reported to Sheri Laizer at paras 37-40 as follows:
“37. Submitted on behalf of the appellant are copies of photographs said to represent the appellant with [YH] together and with others. In cross-examination the appellant was asked whether the photographs were taken at the Ashrafi Mosque. He responded negatively saying that all photographs had been taken at the Imam Reza Haram shrine in Mashad. Asked how far those two locations were apart he responded that they were a long way apart. Ashrafi Mosque was in the south-eastern Iran and the shrine was in the North-East of that country.
38. It is conceded in the report of Sheri Laizer that the individual said to be identified as [YH] within the submitted photographs is not dressed like a mullah in those representations, said to have been taken within a religious shrine, to where such a group of individuals had travelled some 600 miles for religious purposes. That individual is as casually dressed as other individuals represented within those photographs.
39. Within the report from Sheri Laizer is to be found the statement that the author, in seeking authentication of certain elements in the appellant’s account, first contacted an individual named as Mr Samin Rashti, a former lawyer who fled Iran, who in turn contacted another individual in Iran for such purposes. The recorded responses are therefore not within the personal expert knowledge of Sheri Laizer but amount to what the author of the report has been told by another, who in turn has been told matters by another [“the informant”]. That amounts to what is known in evidential terms as second-hand hearsay. The informant also records obtaining further information from others – third-hand hearsay.
40. The report by Sheri Laizer opines on page A42 that the photographs said to depict the appellant with [YH], authenticated by the informant, is said to be in a location identified by reference to other photographs as the Ashrafi Mosque in Fasa. That assertion is clearly inconsistent with the appellant’s oral evidence that all such photographs were taken at the Imam Reza Haram shrine in Mashad, a location some 600 miles away from Fasa. It is unclear whether the author or the informant has made such identification. The informant passed back certain information copied in the body of that report relating to locations and individuals named by the appellant, including [YH].”
21. As Mr Hibbs pointed out in his submissions, Sheri Laizer has made an obvious error. The photographs do not show the unofficial Mosque (“Hosseiniyeh”) in the appellant’s home town of Fasa where YH is based. The photographs show, rather, the Imam Reza Shrine which is about 600 miles away and is one of, if not the, largest Mosques in the world. That was, of course, where the appellant claimed these photographs were taken. It is an error in the expert’s report which is acknowledged in her email of 8 February 2013 where she says that she was “confused which Mosque it was” because the architecture was “similar to Fasa”. As Mr Hibbs submitted, it is difficult to understand how the expert could confuse a clear photograph showing the appellant and, whom he claims to be YH, standing by the world’s largest Mosque with an unofficial backstreet Mosque in Fasa.
22. Having considered the expert’s evidence the judge expressed the following view as regards its reliability at para 41 of his determination:
“41. Whilst Sheri Laizer clearly understands the duty owed to the court in compiling such report, information provided in the manner described in relation to the identification of individuals, their occupations and activities and other assertions does not carry the same weight as that provided by an expert with first-hand knowledge or in assimilating reliable research, for the reasons above recorded. Given the clear unreliability of the statement contained within the body of that report, I do not find the contents of the report reliable or persuasive in regard to the identification or activities of [YH] or [YH’s] asserted relatives.”
23. Leaving aside the expert’s clear error, there is nothing in principal wrong with the judge’s approach in para 41 of his determination. There the judge is not referring to the expert’s opinion as such but rather factual matters related to her by another person. That individual is described in her report as being a “former Iranian lawyer” who is “well-known to me”. Despite that, it remains the case that the expert is neither expressing an opinion nor relating facts directly within her knowledge. Contrary to Mr Hodgetts’ submission, the judge did not say that the evidence relayed by the third party carried no weight. What the judge said was that it “does not carry the same weight” as that provided by an expert with first-hand knowledge or based upon research. Likewise, the judge was clearly entitled to take into account that, despite her expertise, Ms Laizer had made, what can only be said to be, a rather elementary mistake in placing the appellant and YH in the wrong Mosque in the photographs. Those reasons justified the judge in his conclusion that:
“I do not find the contents of the report reliable or persuasive in regard to the identification or activities of [YH] or of [YH’s] asserted relatives.”
24. Turning to Mr Hodgetts’ second submission, this concerned the judge’s reasons leading to his finding that he did not accept that the appellant had been given (illicitly at first but then voluntarily) illegal drugs by YH. The judge’s reasons are at paras 42-46 as follows:
“42. Sheri Laizer was requested by instructing solicitors to consider the use of trafficking in drugs by mullahs. Citing various sources it is opined that clerics in Iran are reputedly involved in illegal business activity including drug trafficking. That may well be the case, and given the Internet sources cited in support of the conclusion, would be known to anyone accessing such information, from within and without Iran. The Iran COI Report 2013 records: The Freedom on the Net Report 2012. Throughout 2011 and early 2012, the Iranian authorities continued to restrict access to tens of thousands of websites, particularly those of international news sources, the opposition Green Movement, ethnic and religious minorities, and human rights groups. Some previously accessible websites and blogs also began being blocked, including news sources like Yahoo News and Reuters. That report indicating continuing and increasing on the accessibility of anti-establishment websites which in itself indicates that not all such websites had been successfully blocked by the Iranian government within its borders
43. The submitted report from Anna Enayat has been submitted on behalf of the appellant. That report is stated to contain information not specific to the appellant’s claim that replicates an account written by the author on 4 February 2011 on the use of drugs in Iranian prisons for obtaining confessions/facilitating interrogation. The use of drugs by the authorities in Iran to obtain confessions from people held in custody has been accepted by the respondent in submissions. No such concession was made in respect of the use of drugs by individuals or government allied groups within Iran in order to persuade people to the government viewpoint.
44. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had been arrested and detained by the Basij in Iran and therefore would have met [YH] but nevertheless accepted that religious leaders held powerful positions with much influence in day-to-day life in Iran and recorded in the refusal letter that background information demonstrated that the Iranian Government and authorities had recently taken a hardline attitude to those trafficking and in consumption of drugs and illegal substances, with recent changes in Iranian law regarding drugs extending the application of the death penalty and increased penalties for the possession of relatively small amounts of illegal substances. Accordingly the appellant’s assertions of being provided with and purchasing mind-altering drugs from a prominent clergy member were stated to be inconsistent with the background information cited. It was considered that his account of being brain-washed by mullah [YH] initially by the infusion of drugs without the appellant’s knowledge, and subsequently with his knowledge, was inconsistent with the background information revealing the powerful positions enjoyed by important religious figures in Iran and the Iranian Government’s commitment to punished harshly those involved in the supply and consumption of illegal substances.
45. The respondent in the refusal letter noted the inconsistency that when the appellant confronted [YH] upon realisation that his motives towards him may have been otherwise than that of religious guidance and when challenged directly that he had covertly been given addictive drugs to ingest the appellant then took some more of the drugs proffered by [YH] which had the effect of calming him down. I do not find it credible that the appellant having challenged an individual whom he believed had been drugging him without his knowledge would then immediately go on and consume more drugs on a voluntary basis.
46. In cross-examination at the appeal hearing the appellant was asked why, given the background of the extent of religious extremism prevalent in Iran, he thought that [YH] would need to go to the extent of recruiting teenagers and drugging them. He responded that he wanted to train ‘us’ to do anything. He said [YH] was working on behalf of the government to get them to agree with the government. He said people would be more interested following brainwashing. I find such explanation of the stated purposes against the background evidence of pervasive religious beliefs in Iran to be implausible; religious zealotry being not uncommon within the country without resort to such extreme methods.”
25. In her report Sheri Laizer states that Mullahs do use illegal drugs. That opinion rests upon an article from the internet set out at A43-A44 of the appellant’s bundle entitled “Mullahs and Opiates”. Ms Laizer says that she agrees with this “informal appraisal”. It refers to the Mullahs as being “heavy opium smokers” and speaks of the common use of opium smoking by Iranian citizens. Ms Laizer then cites further extracts from the article which, to quote her, shows:
“The Mullahs are involved at every level of drug production, traffic and luring Iranians into drug addiction.”
26. In my judgment, this background evidence does not unravel the judge’s reasoning nor is it inconsistent with it. It may well show that the use of drugs is, perhaps, common in Iranian society. It further may well show that the Mullahs are actively involved in its production and trafficking. To the extent that it supports Ms Laizer’s statement that they are involved in “luring Iranians into drug addiction”, this is only supported in the context of Iranian society generally. Nothing in the report suggests that Mullahs used opium or heroin to “groom” or “brainwash” specific individuals in the way that the appellant claims that YH targeted him and others to follow and support YH’s extreme religious views. I accept that the report provides some support to the appellant’s account, in particular in his reference to the substance being the “earth of Karbala” (see Ms Laizer’s report at A42). Taking the evidence as a whole, however, it is not inconsistent with the judge’s reasons at paras 42-44 and 46 that it was implausible that YH had used illegal substances in the way the appellant claimed to brainwash him. As the judge pointed out in para 43, the second expert report from Ms Enayat provided no specific support for the appellant’s account.
27. Likewise, I do not accept Mr Hodgetts’ submission that the judge was not entitled in para 45 to take into account that the appellant, having challenged YH on his drugging the appellant illicitly, that he nevertheless continued immediately to take the drugs voluntarily. In any event, even if that were not the case, the implausibility of the appellant’s underlying claim to have been given these drugs by YH to brainwash him was sufficient to support the judge’s adverse finding.
28. Mr Hodgetts also challenged the judge’s reasoning in para 47 in which the judge took into account that the appellant had failed to mention in his asylum interview that YH had a brother in the Basiji, despite mentioning that he had a brother in the Etela’at. The judge did not accept the appellant’s explanation that he had not been given sufficient time to do so in the interview, given that the interview was over three and a half hours long. That reasoning was properly open to the judge and to take it into account albeit as a relatively minor part of his reasons for reaching his adverse credibility finding.
29. For these reasons, the judge did not err in law in reaching his adverse credibility finding which stands.
30. In any event, the judge found that the appellant could safely and reasonably internally relocate within Iran. Although the grounds of appeal did not directly challenge this finding, Mr Hodgetts nevertheless argued that the grounds did challenge the risk to the appellant elsewhere in Iran on the basis of the failure to consider the fact of his illegal exit following SB (Risk on return – illegal exit) Iran CG [2009] UKAIT 00053. Although it was not referred to at the hearing, the appellant’s representatives had, in fact, on 17 May 2013 sought permission to amend the grounds of appeal to directly challenge the judge’s finding in respect of internal relocation.
31. Because of the view I have taken that the judge’s finding is unassailable, I need say no more about that application other than to note that Mr Hibbs, in his submissions, sought to support the judge’s decision on the basis of internal relocation.
32. At para 54 the judge noted that:
“I have not found the appellant’s claim to be credible and a finding in respect of internal relocation is consequently not necessary. For the sake of completeness I record that had I found such claim to be largely credible I would have found in the alternative, as above recorded in the body of this determination on the appellant’s own evidence relating to the limited interest taken only by [YH] in him since leaving this (sic) country of origin, that there was no evidence demonstrating at the lower level that any state organisation had any adverse interest in him and after taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the appellant and his country of origin that it would be reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate to reside in another area within Iran such as Tehran or Shiraz where he could safely reside without coming to the attention of [YH] or his associates.”
33. That finding refers back to paras 49 and 50 of the judge’s determination where he dealt with the evidence concerning any contact by YH or the Iranian authorities since the appellant left Iran:
“49. In cross-examination the appellant was asked that if his account was credible why he could not reside safely in a different part of Iran and if so how [YH] would come to know or why he would be interested. He responded that [YH] would find him. The fate of his classmate was in his hands. [YH] would be looking for him. The Etela’at would find him. They would want to find him because he knew that [YH] was brainwashing people. It is the appellant’s account of [YH] was working on behalf of the Iranian government. If [YH] was brainwashing people towards a view of supporting the government as the appellant has asserted it is implausible, given the background evidence of state immunity and lack of accountability of state organisations in Iran, that the authorities would have any interest in searching for or locating an individual making such allegations.
50. The appellant was asked in cross-examination when he last had contact with his family. He responded that it was one week ago and on the morning of the hearing. He was asked if his family had been contacted by the Iranian authorities. He said that only [YH] had been to their home on a number of occasions asking for him. Asked what [YH] had been told he said that his mother had informed him that he was staying with relatives. [YH] had last called at his family home a few months previously when he had left the message asking the appellant to see him as he had something for him. If that account the credible it would mean that only [YH] had any interest in the appellant and following his absence from the family home for a period of 14 months and had not sought from his family information enabling him to locate the appellant purportedly staying with family relatives. The appellant asserts that he could not live anywhere else in Iran to avoid his problems because Etela’at could find him in any city. There is no evidence that the Etela’at have evinced any interest in the appellant since he left Iran in November 2011. He has remained in contact with his family since that time and has recorded contact with them on the day of the appeal hearing. It is not demonstrated that the lower standard that the Etela’at or any other government agency have any adverse interest in the appellant. On the appellant’s own account, if credible, no active pursuit of the appellant by [YH] had been maintained, nor had any Iranian government organisation sought to trace or pursue him. That would mean, if credible, the appellant could reasonably and safely relocated to reside in another part of Iran in accordance with the dictum of Lord Bingham in Januzi, Hamid, Gaafar & Mohammed v SSHD [2006] UK House of Lords 5 where he recorded that the decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so.”
34. It is worth noting that at para 56 the judge specifically referred to SB and noted that simply because of illegal exit, the appellant would not be at risk on return.
35. The judge’s reasoning at paras 49 and 50 is unassailable. Since the appellant left Iran, the Iranian authorities had shown no interest in the appellant. Indeed, since his claimed release after his detention in April 2011 there was no evidence that the Iranian authorities had any interest in the appellant. Likewise, the evidence concerning YH was that he had visited the family home, the last occasion being a few months earlier, and had been told that the appellant had gone to stay with family relatives but had not sought any information enabling him to locate the appellant.
36. On the basis of this evidence, the judge was properly entitled to find that the Iranian authorities had no interest in the appellant and that he could safely and reasonably relocate within Iran without being at risk from YH. The fact of the appellant’s illegal exit from Iran did not, as such, expose him to a real risk from the Iranian authorities.
37. Consequently, even if the judge’s adverse credibility finding could not stand, the appellant’s appeal fell to be dismissed on the basis that he could internally relocate within Iran.
Decision
38. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appellant’s appeal did not involve the making of an error of law. The decision to dismiss the appeal on all grounds stands.
39. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Signed

A Grubb
Judge of the Upper Tribunal