Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/01619/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at: Field House
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On: 12th September 2016
On: 30th September 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

SG
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
And

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

For the Appellant: Mr Claire, Counsel instructed by A2 Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Wilding, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of both Pakistan and Egypt. She was born in 1987.

Anonymity Order
2. The basis of the Appellant's case is a claim for international protection which turns in part on allegations of sexual and "honour" based violence. Having had regard to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and the Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013: Anonymity Orders I therefore consider it appropriate to make an order in the following terms:
"Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings"
3. Due to the nature of the evidence I have considered it appropriate to anonymise the identity of other individuals named by the Appellant and who have produced statements in support of her case. I do so with the consent of the Respondent.

Background to Appeal
4. The Appellant came to the United Kingdom in 2010 as a student. She has returned to Egypt on a number of occasions, the last being in December 2011. She claimed asylum in January 2013.
5. It is not in dispute that in order to qualify for protection the Refugee Convention the Appellant must show that she faces a real risk of harm in both Pakistan and Egypt. She is entitled to citizenship of both of those countries by virtue of her parent's respective nationalities.
6. Her claim was factually complex but can be distilled to this: she had a relationship outside of marriage in the UK, that fact has come to the attention of her family who now believe that she has "dishonoured" them. She fears serious harm at the hands of her father and/or various other male relatives who live in Egypt and Pakistan who would seek to punish her for what they regard as her sexual transgression against social mores. She cannot turn to the man with whom she had the relationship in the UK for support or protection in either country because they are no longer together. The Appellant now alleges that this man assaulted and raped her.
7. The Secretary of State had rejected the claim for want of credibility. A number of discrepancies arose from the Appellant's evidence and the Respondent noted that the Appellant had not claimed asylum until her student visa was about to expire.
8. When the matter came before the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Parker) the Appellant gave oral evidence. The Judge was not impressed. The determination gives a number of reasons why the Tribunal did not believe that the Appellant was telling the truth. The appeal was dismissed.
9. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was sought and refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Scott-Baker on the 14th October 2015. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal and on the 12th November 2015 I granted permission in the following terms:
"It certainly cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to give reasons for its negative assessment of the Appellant's credibility: between paragraphs 16 and 27 there are no fewer than 12 reasoned conclusions as to why the Tribunal did not attach weight to the Appellant's oral and documentary evidence. The question remains whether the numerous findings were infected by some other error. The core of the findings turn on the First-tier Tribunal's assessment of how a "strict" Muslim father might behave: see for instance, the question of whether the Appellant wore hijab, was permitted to pursue her education, was able to live alone and whether she was allowed to return to the UK after being beaten. The Tribunal found the evidence on these matters to be "incredible" or "at odds" with the Appellant's description of her father. It is arguable, just, that in the absence of any expert evidence or country background material as to how "strict" Egyptian fathers might behave, the Tribunal has erred in making findings unsupported by the evidence".

Errors of Law
10. On the 2nd August 2016 I heard oral submissions on whether the decision contained an error of law such that it should be set aside. The Appellant was represented by Mr Claire, the Respondent by Mr Tufan. Having had the opportunity to consider the case further, and having heard the submissions of the parties, I found that the Appellant had demonstrated the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to contain material errors over and above that I considered to be "just" arguable when I granted permission. The decision was set aside for the following errors.
Error 1: Failure to consider medical evidence/assess credibility in the round
11. The bundles before the First-tier Tribunal contain numerous pieces of medical evidence from various agencies which indicate inter alia that the Appellant has been receiving:
a) Therapy for depression and anxiety since January 2014 at a service to which she was referred following a rape in 20121
b) Anti-depressants2
c) Domestic violence outreach support since August 20143
A letter from her GP further confirms that she had reported to him being raped and subject to domestic violence as long ago as April 2013. A letter dated 28th March 2015 from her therapist confirmed that the Appellant had told her about how her father would pull out her hair when he caught her not wearing hijab. This letter was supported by various photographs showing large patches of hairlessness on the Appellant's scalp.
12. I am satisfied - and Mr Tufan agreed - that in making its credibility findings the Tribunal nowhere had regard to this medical evidence. That is important for a number of reasons.
13. First of all, it illustrates that the Tribunal made an assessment of this young woman's evidence without considering the possibility that her ability to give a coherent account would have been affected by her mental state. That was a particularly egregious error considering that submissions had been made on the Appellant's behalf about that very matter, reliance having been placed on the well-known article by Dr Juliet Cohen published in 2001 in the Medico-Legal Journal 'Errors of Recall and Credibility - Can Omissions and Discrepancies in Successive Statements Reasonably be Said to Undermine Credibility of Testimony?'
14. Secondly, it means that the specific adverse finding on whether her father would have permitted her not to wear hijab has been made in isolation from her evidence on that matter. The Appellant was photographed for her passport with her head uncovered. The Tribunal placed significant weight on that matter, finding it to be "totally at odds" with her claim to a strict upbringing, and found that this "seriously damages the appellant's claim" [at 16]. In fact, the Appellant's evidence had been that her father had violently assaulted her when he had found out about the photograph, pulling out so much of her hair that she today wears a wig. She had produced photographs of her scalp and a letter from her doctor confirming this to have been the account given to her long before the asylum appeal.
15. Finally, it suggests to the Appellant that the Tribunal has not given the "anxious scrutiny" to her appeal that it was obliged to do by law.
Error 2: Findings not Supported by Evidence
16. When I granted permission I was concerned that the Tribunal had appeared to base virtually all of its negative findings on an assessment of how a strict Muslim father might or might not behave. Negative inference was drawn, for instance, from the fact that the Appellant was permitted to study in the UK, and even to return here after having received a beating at her father's hands. His claimed behaviour was considered to be "incredible". Mr Tufan was unable to point to any objective evidence before the Tribunal upon which such findings could have been based. In truth those findings are based on speculation and unfounded inference. There may be a stereotype of how a "strict Muslim father" might behave but this will rarely if ever translate into reality, which is invariably more complex. For instance, in a society where young women are expected to unquestioningly obey the wishes of their father, it will often by the case that those women are trusted to conduct themselves accordingly, because they know the consequences if they do not. There is to my mind nothing "incredible" in the Appellant's father allowing her to study in the UK, nor to him having sought to introduce a prospective marriage candidate to her family.

The Re-Made Decision
Legal Framework
17. In order to qualify for a grant of refugee status the Appellant must show that she has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the five reasons set out in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. In her case this has been identified as her "membership of a particular social group", namely 'women'. The test requires me to consider a number of factors. Does she actually have a fear? Is it objectively well-founded? Is the harm feared serious enough to amount to persecution? Is the feared harm something that the government in her home country either cannot or will not protect her from? The overall burden of proof lies on the Appellant who must show it to be reasonably likely that she qualifies as a refugee. This formulation reflects the lower standard of proof applicable in claims for international protection. In this case, somewhat unusually, the Appellant must discharge that burden in respect of two countries: Egypt and Pakistan.
18. In respect of both countries the Respondent contends that the Appellant can reasonably be expected to avoid the feared harm at the hands of her family members by relocating elsewhere in the country. In assessing whether or not her relocation is 'reasonable' I must assess all factors relevant to her. This requires me to examine not just the country conditions generally, but assess those conditions in the context of the Appellant's individual characteristics.
The Appellant's Evidence
19. The Appellant's evidence is set out in the following documents before me:
Screening interview dated 24th January 2013
Witness Statement dated 27th October 2014
Asylum interview dated 28th October 2014
Witness statement dated 4th November 2014
Witness statement dated 31st March 2015
Witness statement dated 7th September 2016
20. At the hearing she adopted all four of her witness statements and gave oral evidence. She was cross-examined by Mr Wilding and answered my questions asked in clarification. Her core account is as follows.
21. She has always lived in Cairo, Egypt. Her father went to Egypt to study a long time ago and when there was introduced to her mother. It was an arranged marriage but it has never been a happy one. Her mother has been subjected to her father's controlling, and sometimes violent, behaviour over a long period of time. Although he could be very caring and act as if he wanted to help, he has a fiery temper and would beat her, the Appellant and the Appellant's younger sister if he became angry. The Appellant describes him as being very manipulative. Both of her parents are Sunni Muslim. The Appellant describes her father as being very conservative and observant, her mother less so. Over the years the Appellant's father has maintained close contact with his family in Pakistan, but has only intermittently visited the country. He was last there, as far as the Appellant is aware, in 2013. The Appellant herself visited her family in Karachi in 2005 and again in 2007. She did not enjoy the experience. She regarded the family in Pakistan as being overly restrictive in respect of her conduct, for instance insisting that she wear long clothing and a headscarf. On the last occasion that she was there the Appellant was very unhappy and wanted to return home. She has seven uncles and two aunts living in Pakistan with their families. Most are in Karachi but she also has relatives elsewhere.
22. The Appellant came to the United Kingdom in October 2010 in order to study English. Her father had agreed to this because he is an educated man (he is a religious scholar and a retired medical doctor) and he expected his daughters to be educated. They had previously discussed possibility that the Appellant might travel to Dubai to study but he had ruled this out as they do not have any family members in the Gulf. Her father has some relatives living in the UK, in Manchester and London, so he was reassured that they would be able to support the Appellant and look after her. He wanted her to stay with them. That was why he agreed to her coming here. In fact she did not do that. After her arrival she did not go to her relatives' home but stayed in a hotel for the first night. She arranged to rent a room with a Chinese family. Her father was cross and said bad words to her on the phone but she wanted to be free and not be controlled by her Pakistani family.
23. On the day after her arrival she was walking home and became lost. She asked a man for directions. He happened to be walking the same way and so they walked together. He told her that his name was MFR. He was from Pakistan. They chatted and she told him that her father was Pakistani. They exchanged numbers.
24. The Appellant stayed in the UK for four months on that occasion. During that time she stayed in contact with MFR. They became friends. During the last month of her stay he underwent an operation. She invited him to stay at hers afterwards so she could look after him. During the five days that he spent with her there was a strange incident where he frightened the Appellant. They had been "messing around" when he grabbed a pillow and held it down over her face. She was very frightened and could not breathe as he sat on the pillow. She managed to get him off her by twisting her face and biting him. She threw him out and was very upset.
25. After a few days MFR came to see the Appellant. He was crying and saying he was sorry for being so stupid. He begged the Appellant to forgive him, and she did. As she put it in her asylum interview: "it is not easy for men to cry and say they're sorry". They resumed their friendship, retaining contact by social media and telephone when the Appellant went back to Egypt at the end of her English course.
26. When the Appellant got back to Egypt at the end of 2010 her father and her argued. He was angry with her because she had not stayed with his relatives as had been arranged. He hit her with a stick on her legs. He spat in her face. The Appellant became tearful in her oral evidence when he recounted this incident. She explained that her father was conflicted because he wanted her to carry on with her education but did not want her to be living alone in the UK. She talked to him and made him understand that although she was not living with his cousins because her college was far away, she would retain contact with them. They would have her address and they could visit her accommodation whenever they wanted.
27. So it was in 2011 that the Appellant came back to the UK to start another course. This one was in Glasgow. After she returned to the UK her relationship with MFR continued. He would speak to her on the phone and visited her in Glasgow.
28. In approximately May 2011 MFR called the Appellant's father and asked him for her hand in marriage. As is usual in arranged marriages, MFR gave her father his home address so that he could conduct checks on the family. He explained what he was doing in the UK, what he was studying and what he hoped to do in the future.
29. The relationship between the Appellant and MFR progressed and in around June they became a 'couple'. This did not include a sexual relationship. The Appellant recounts another incident where MFR behaved erratically and with violence towards her. He was visiting her in Glasgow when he became angry that she had arranged to visit friends. He took a knife and threatened her with it. He took her phone from her and said that she was not allowed any contact with anyone. The Appellant was really scared and started screaming. Afterwards he apologised and said that he would never do that again.
30. The Appellant travelled to Egypt in December 2011. Her father told her that he was satisfied that MFR was from a good family and that the marriage could go ahead. The Appellant's uncle in Pakistan had contacted MFR's family and had made arrangements for them all to travel to Egypt to discuss the wedding. The Appellant was happy that her father had agreed but also apprehensive. She could not tell her family about MFR's violent behaviour because she should never have had him in her home. She was scared and did not want to talk about the marriage. She asked her father if she could come back to the UK in order to finish her education. He refused. He was concerned that if MFR was here, she might have contact with him. The Appellant and her mother begged her father to let her come back. She told him that she needed to come back to collect her exam results and graduate. He reluctantly agreed but made her swear on the Qur'an that she would not see MFR at all. He said that she was mature and that he was trusting her. She promised to obey him and was permitted to come back for one month. Her father booked her a return ticket and ensured that she had a one-month visa.
31. When the Appellant arrived in the UK she decided to change her visa. She applied for a visa extension. She missed her return flight back to Egypt. Her father was furious and shouted at her over the phone. She made excuses about her college and said that she would be back soon.
32. The Appellant did not initially tell MFR that she had come back but he found out from her family and pestered her until she agreed to meet him. She thought because the family were involved now he would not be violent again.
33. In March 2012 she was living at an address in London. On the 12th she and MFR had gone out for dinner and had argued. He walked her home and outside the building the argument escalated and he attacked her. The commotion caused people in her building to come to their windows. He had her pinned to the wall holding her by her hands with one hand whilst he beat her with the other. After he left her neighbours told her that she should call the police. They did not want him to come back into the building.
34. A couple of days later MFR called the Appellant. She ignored it but he turned up at her house. Again he was apologetic about his violence and begged her to forgive him. She agreed to go out with him for breakfast. They went together to his sister-in-laws house. Once there the argument flared up again. MFR pushed the Appellant onto a bed and told her to take off her clothes. When she refused he kicked her with his heavy boots on. He held her down and although she was crying and asking him to get off her, he raped her.
35. The Appellant said that afterwards he told her to get dressed and leave as he was busy and his sister-in-law would be coming home soon. The Appellant was crying and miserable. She went home because she did not know what else to do. She did not want to call the police because she was alone and afraid.
36. On the 19th March 2012 the Appellant called MFR and said that he was having abdominal pains. She was bleeding heavily. She told him he had to take her to a doctor. He said he was too busy and that she should leave him alone. She knew that his brother had come from Pakistan to discuss the marriage so the next day she called him again and insisted that they meet. She said otherwise she would go to the flat where his family were. When they met she told him that he had to marry her because of what he had done. Otherwise her family would kill her. He laughed in her face and asked her if she was crazy. He started mocking her. He told her that this was the UK and it was only fun. He would not marry her. The Appellant was very distressed. She ran in the road and lay in front of an oncoming bus. He ran after her and picked her up and pulled her to the side. He said she was crazy. She said that he had damaged her life and now her family would kill her. He left her there.
37. The Appellant returned to her flat. She received a threatening call from MFR's brother telling her not to tell anyone. She took an overdose of tablets in an attempt to kill herself.
38. After two weeks of agonising about what she should do the Appellant went to hospital. She was still bleeding and having pain. She told the staff that she had been raped, and they called the police. The Appellant states that the two police officers assigned to her case were not sympathetic. They were abrupt and she felt that they were shouting at her. When she explained that in her culture the man would now be expected to marry her, they laughed at her. They were scornful of the suggestion that the perpetrator should be made to marry her. They did not appear to take her claim seriously and after a couple of days they got back to her. Although they had arrested MFR his brother had got a lawyer and he had very quickly been released. A judge had said that the case could not proceed4.
39. The Appellant became very depressed. She was very upset about what MFR had done and was frightened about the consequences for her when she returned home. In around June 2012 things got worse. She got a call from her father who was very angry. He told her that she was to return to Egypt as soon as possible. He wanted her on the next flight. The Appellant was scared and refused. He wouldn't tell her why he was so cross but she could guess. A few weeks before the sexual assault in March 2012 she had bumped into one of her father's relatives in Westfield Shopping centre in Stratford, East London. She and MFR had been walking "catching hands" and they had met this man, Muhammad. She introduced them and the men exchanged numbers. She recalls that Muhammad was staring at their hands. After the call from her father it was obvious to her that Muhammad had gone back to him and said something bad about her. She feared that perhaps Muhammad had spoken directly to MFR and he had told him that they had had intercourse. Even if he hadn't the fact that she and MFR had been together was bad enough. In her culture just holding hands with a man is enough to make people think you are having a sexual relationship.
40. Her father stopped sending her money and she became dependent on the support of friends. This caused the Appellant further problems as some of these male 'friends' starting harassing her and expecting sexual favours in return for accommodation and food. She had to try and extend her visa at that time so she sold her gold to finance herself. She was afraid of her father trying to contact her so she changed her telephone number.
41. In January 2013 she received a letter from her mother that confirmed her worst fears about what her father might know. Her mother was very upset. She said that she was being accused of living like a westerner, doing things like drinking and having sex with men. Her mother said that the matter was out of her hands and that she would not be able to protect the Appellant if she returned to Egypt. It was this letter which prompted the Appellant to seek asylum. It was then that the Appellant understood why her father had been so angry with her on the phone - she realised he must have known that she had not behaved as she should have done with MFR and perhaps he knew about the rape too.
42. In February 2014 the Appellant was feeling very isolated and lonely. She tried to call her Mum but got no reply. Her Mum saw the number from the UK and called her back. Her mother was very upset and said that her father had told all the family in Pakistan and that everyone was angry and saying that she had to go back to Egypt. Her mother was worried and told her not to go to either Pakistan or Egypt. She was afraid about what would happen to the Appellant.
43. In July 2014 the Appellant was contacted on Facebook by Muhammad who was asking her how she was and where she was. She had brief contact on the phone with him but did not tell him where she was living. Shortly after her contact with Muhammad the Appellant started receiving threatening messages on her mobile telephone. They were from three different numbers that the Appellant did not recognise. The threats were saying things like "do not return home we will kill you" and that she would have acid thrown on her. None of the senders identified themselves but the Appellant surmises from the speech patterns used that they were from her father, her father's cousin and from a distant relative on her mother's side, who lives in the village in Egypt. The Appellant was living in Leicester when she received these messages. She went to the police and made a report. The police advised her to change her mobile number and she did so.
44. In November 2015 the Appellant received a further letter from her mother, who told her that her father has filed a complaint about her at the Egyptian Ministry of the Exterior - he has asked for their help in trying to find the Appellant. A further letter from her mother was received in August 2016, in which she reiterates her fears about what her husband will do to the Appellant.
45. In respect of whether the Appellant's father was as strict as she claims she notes the issues raised by the Respondent as to why she appears in photographs not wearing a headscarf. The Appellant explains that she objected to wearing the hijab and only ever did so because he forced her to. He had made her wear it in Egypt between 2008 and 2010 but she did not like it. This battle caused many problems between them. If he caught her not wearing it, for instance for a photograph, he would viciously assault her, pulling her hair from her head. As a result of repeated assaults like this the Appellant suffers from a bleeding scalp and poor hair growth. She wears a wig.
46. In her oral evidence the Appellant reiterated a claim she had earlier made in her witness statements, that her sister has been driven to attempt suicide by their father's behaviour, latterly including an attempt to force her to marry an old man of his choosing. The Appellant became noticeably distressed whilst giving this evidence.
Medical and Support-Service Evidence
47. The medical evidence consists of the following (in chronological order)5:
Discharge note dated 6th April 2012 issued by Newham University Hospital confirming that the Appellant attended in connection with injuries caused during a rape two weeks earlier. She was treated for a UTI and discharged, after the police had been called.
Letter dated 29th October 2014 from Leicester Partnership NHS Trust 'Open Mind Service'. This confirms that the Appellant has been attending the counselling service there since January 2014. She originally presented with depression, anger and flashbacks relating to a rape that occurred in 2012. The difficulties that this has caused with her family has caused her additional anxiety. She has been prescribed anti-depressants with variable success
Letter dated 4th November 2014 from Beena Solanki, Domestic Violence Outreach Worker at 'SAFE Domestic Violence Support Services". Ms Solanki confirms that the organisation has been supporting the Appellant on a regular basis since August 2014
Letter dated 11th December 2014 from Leicester City Assist Practice which states that the Appellant has, since registering with the practice in April 2013, given a consistent account of rape and domestic violence. She is receiving counselling at the practice as well as from the rape charity SAFE
Letter dated 3rd March 2015 from Dr N Malik of Leicester City Assist Practice who writes to confirm that the Appellant suffers from bleeding scalp and poor hair growth related to the fact that her father repeatedly violently assaulted her when she was not wearing a hijab. This letter is accompanied by photographs showing large bald patches on the Appellant's head
Report dated 28th March 2015 from Maria Finch, CBT Therapist with Leicester Partnership NHS Trust who confirms that the Appellant had, as of that date, had twelve counselling sessions with the service. She had been diagnosed with moderate to severe depression and anxiety and had a number of symptoms associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome including nightmares and flashbacks related to her rape. Ms Finch records a history of events consistent with that provided by the Appellant in these proceedings.
Letter dated 12th September 2016 from Dr Susan Hadley of Assist Inclusion Healthcare confirming that the Applicant suffers from hair loss. Blood tests to exclude a treatable cause have been negative. The hair loss is significantly worse than would be expected for normal hair loss.
Police Evidence
48. The Appellant has had contact with two British police forces, the Metropolitan Police in London, and Leicester Police.
49. The Metropolitan Police notes date from April 2012 when the Appellant reported being raped. The record shows that the Appellant was asked why she had taken "so long" to report the matter. She explained that she had been engaged to the suspect for 2 years. Elsewhere it states that she had met him 2 years earlier in the street and had started a relationship with him. It also shows that the Appellant explained to officers that in her country, he would be made to marry her. The Appellant's description of the event is recorded, reading: "Viw1 tried to push sus1 off but was unable overpower sus1. Sus1 then inserted his penis into viw1 vagina. Viw1 then told sus1 "you are paining me" I want this, I want to be a virgin". Sus1 ejaculated inside viw1 and then told her to get dressed". Given that description, the report's conclusion that the event should be recorded as "no crime" is striking, being recorded as such because: "the complainant did not allow suspect to penetrate her with his penis". This apparent contradiction is explained on the last page of the report, which states that the complainant had made a withdrawal statement, reiterating that she wants the perpetrator to marry her. The officer recording the event makes several references to the Appellant's insistence that the police find him and enforce marriage.
50. Leicester Police have provided, under cover of letter dated 10th November 2014, their records relating to the Appellant. This record shows that an aggrieved Appellant made a complaint on the 18th August 2014 that she had received threats by way of mobile telephone. The record shows that the Appellant relayed her account of being raped by MFR and being disowned by the family to the officer who attended. That officer records that the Appellant "appears petrified" and is sleeping with a knife next to her bed. The officer concludes that there is a "high risk of HBV if her family manage to locate her" and arranges for "drive bys" of the property by patrol cars. She was advised to stop using Facebook, to get rid of the mobile phone that she received messages on, and to keep her door locked. The records show that the Appellant received a follow-up visit from a police officer on the 6th November 2014 whose irritation with the Appellant and her "laidback" approach to her own safeguarding is apparent from his notes. The Appellant explained that her family were aware of the addresses she had stayed at in London but she wanted to return there because she had friends in London who were supporting her. The officer records being "blunt" with her at this point, telling her that if she was afraid of her family, she should not go to live anywhere that they might be able to trace her. She was advised again to close her Facebook account, as she had still not done this. The officer explained various measures that the Appellant could take to protect herself, from not answering the telephone to changing her name by deed poll. The officer concludes that report:
"There is a huge concern over the difference in the report given to the MET re the alleged rape and the information [the Appellant] provided to me today. I would accept slight differences in the information however the circs given to myself and the report on the PND are significantly different"
Those discrepancies are identified as being the fact that she had told the MET that she had been engaged to the perpetrator for almost 2 years after having met him in the street to ask for directions. This was contrasted with the information that she had given officers in Leicester, that he was a man whom her parents had arranged for her to marry.
51. The notes from Leicester Police show that the Appellant called them on a number of other occasions, including on the 4th November 2014 when she became frightened that she was being followed by an Asian male. The police reports contain 'screenshots' and translations of the messages on the phone that the Appellant submitted as evidence of having received threats.
Other Documentary Evidence
52. The Respondent's bundle contains the Arabic original and an uncertified and undated English translation of what purports to be a letter from the Appellant's mother. In it the writer criticises the Appellant for her "western" lifestyle and tells her that her father and uncles, in both Egypt and Pakistan, have taken vows to kill her because she has slept with a man in the United Kingdom. The letter concludes:
"All of them are waiting for you to come to Egypt to kill you. They said [you] should immediately come to Egypt. I sent you a letter because your father and your relatives in Egypt have forbidden me from calling you. I cry every day. I can't do anything. I can't protect you too because you disrespect our religion's instructions and our traditions. God forgive you".
The envelope that this document is said to have been sent in was submitted to the Home Office with the letter. It shows that the sender has written her name and address on the back.
53. The Appellant's most recent bundle contains two further letters handwritten in Arabic which are said to have come from her mother. In one her mother warns her that her father has registered a complaint against her with the Egyptian Ministry of the Exterior and asked for their assistance in finding her. Both letters are accompanied by envelopes showing that they were delivered by DHL having been posted in Egypt, one in November 2015. The second letter is addressed directly to the Home Office. In it the Appellant's mother pleads that the Appellant should not be removed to Egypt. She states that her husband and his relatives want to "wash her disgrace" by killing her. Her husband speaks to his relatives in Pakistan and they too are waiting for the Appellant. The writer states that to her knowledge the family in Pakistan are very strict. When the Appellant last visited there in 2007 she was made to wear the "long Pakistani costume and cover her body completely". She was prohibited from leaving the house and even from watching television. She had wanted to return to Egypt but her father would not allow it. The writer said that she herself had encountered problems on a visit to Pakistan in 2005 when she had been forced to contact the Egyptian embassy and ask for help because her husband had taken away her passport and would not return it.
54. The Appellant's most recent bundle contains some photographs of her father. One shows him standing next to a man described as being a famous Islamic cleric, another with two men who are said to be notable politicians in Pakistan. A third shows him with a microphone attached in what appears to be a minbar. The Appellant states that this photograph was taken inside the largest mosque in Pakistan. The bundle also contains photographs of the Appellant and a man identified as MFR.
55. The bundle contains the following documents relating to Pakistan national Mr T:
His notarised statement dated 2nd September 2016
A copy of his Pakistani identity card
A copy of his Pakistani passport
A letter dated 12th September 2007 from the Pakistani Ministry of Education approving the transfer of his studies and stipend from al-Azhar to the University of Cairo
A letter dated 26th November 2007 from the Pakistani Embassy in Cairo confirming that Mr T is studying at the Faculty of Law, University of Cairo
Envelope showing proof of postage from Islamabad on the 2nd September 2016
Two photographs of groups of men, said to depict the appellant's father with Mr T and other members of his family
56. The statement from Mr T explains that his family have known the Appellant's father for many years. In December 2006 Mr T travelled to Egypt in order to attend al-Azhar University. He struggled with the tuition because of difficulties with the Arabic language and transferred to the University of Cairo. He approached the Appellant's father for assistance. That was when he first met the Appellant. In 2009 Mr T left Egypt and came to study in the UK. He subsequently graduated from Huddersfield University. His family wanted him to continue with his Qur'anic study so under pressure he returned to Egypt. He was accommodated by the Appellant's family. He stayed there for 1 year. He writes:
"When I was staying with [the Appellant's father] I came to know that he is making calls to his cousins in the UK that find [the Appellant] and send her back to Egypt or Pakistan because she has sexual relation with her boyfriend and I thought [the Appellant's] life is in danger I contacted with my family and told them all about that's going in [her father's] house.
My family shouted on me and said that why are you trying to know [the Appellant] she is very bad she is against Islam her family is trying to find her and my cousin told me her uncle will kill her if he found [her] my family already had knowledge about all happening.
Later I tried to convince her father but he packed my bag from his house by saying you are also not good and you are so open minded its not in Islam we have to kill [the Appellant] as she has had sex before marriage its totally forbidden in Islam and not good for my family respect".
57. The Respondent's bundle contains an undated handwritten letter from a Mr Amir Khan who states that he was formerly a tenant at a specified address in East London. He states that on the 13th March 2012 he was at home when he heard screaming outside of the building. When he looked outside he saw the Appellant and her boyfriend. Her boyfriend had both of her hands held with one of his and was slapping her with his free hand. She was struggling to break free and her shoe came off. The man picked one of them up. It looked like he was going to hit her with it but the Appellant managed to push him away and run into the building. Mr Khan states that the boyfriend was hitting the Appellant "like and animal". He states that "we" [I take this as a reference to other tenants of the building] asked her to call the police. She was crying and shaking and asked that they leave her alone. They informed her that she was not to let her boyfriend in the building for everyone's safety. Mr Khan provides a mobile telephone number.
Country Background Material: Egypt
58. I did not understand the Respondent to contest the Appellant's assertion that "honour" based violence against women occurs in Egypt. Mr Wilding certainly made no such submission before me. I therefore need not set out in any great detail the expert evidence of Dr Rebwar Fatah set out in a report dated 23rd July 2015. It suffices to note that Dr Fatah confirms that reported instances of such gender based violence include murder, attempted murder, battery, burning and kidnapping. Other examples of crimes against women include false accusations of insanity. Fatah cites a series of articles published by Robert Fisk in 'The Independent' about the phenomena of "mass suicides" by young woman in Egypt, a device used by families to cover up "honour" killing. In respect of the state's willingness and capacity to protect women from such crimes Dr Fatah notes the frequent use of Article 17 of the Penal Code which is invoked to reduce the sentences of perpetrators who plead that "honour" was the motivation for their crimes. That Article permits reduction in sentence where the conditions that the crime were committed under "necessitate leniency". Although murder is a crime that should incur life imprisonment, in reality perpetrators of "honour" based killing in Egypt can receive sentences as low as two to three years. Robert Fisk cites a case in which a brother who murdered his sister went to prison for only six months because the judge was concerned that he would have to "live with" the death for the rest of his life.
59. In respect of the question of internal relocation within Egypt Dr Fatah does not believe that there are any legal impediments to the Appellant living on her own away from her family. He cautions however that it is very rare for a young woman to do so, and as such the Appellant would be vulnerable to "unwanted attention, harassment and speculation amongst others within the community as to their moral standing". Family and social networks play a major role in individuals being able to find employment and accommodation, so without such support networks the Appellant would struggle.
60. The bundle contains the Home Office Operational Guidance Note (OGN) dated October 2014 (version 3.1.19). I was directed to paragraph 3.3.15 which states that there is widespread discrimination towards women who experience endemic sexual harassment, including sexual assault and rape. It states "inadequate legal provisions and government efforts to protect women from violence, together with a serious lack of police enforcement severely compromises women's access to effective protection". It goes on at 3.13.16 to state that whilst some applicants may be able to escape persecution by relocating internally, "it needs to be noted that women, especially single women with no support network, are likely to be vulnerable and may be subjected to destitution"
61. The Home Office Country Information and Guidance (CIG), dated May 2015, Egypt: Background information, including actors of protection and internal relocation reads:
1.2.6 For persons fearing non-state agents, decision makers must assess whether effective protection is available in relation to the particular circumstances and profile of the person. Any past persecution and past lack of effective protection may indicate that effective protection would not be available in the future. The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that the security forces and judiciary would not be willing and able to provide protection. Women fearing sexual or gender based violence may be unable to access effective protection.
[emphasis added].
62. Mr Claire further submitted that there was a risk that upon the Appellant's arrival in Egypt the authorities would alert her family. Although there was no specific evidence on that point he relied on the Appellant's evidence that her father has now reported her missing to the Egyptian authorities. He further relied on the CIG:
1.2.11 Unmarried young women occasionally had to provide their father's written permission to obtain a passport and to travel. Many women complained about their exposure to sexual harassment and assault whilst using public transport.
Country Background Material: Pakistan
63. The Appellant relies on the Home Office Country Information and Guidance of February 2016 Pakistan: Women fearing gender based harm / violence (Version 3.0). She relies on the information in this document first to establish that the risk of "honour" based violence exists for women in Pakistan [emphasis added]:
2.4.10 In the country guidance case of KA & others the Upper Tribunal held that whether a woman on return faces a real risk of an honour killing will depend on the particular circumstances; however, in general such a risk is likely to be confined to tribal areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is unlikely to impact on married women (paragraph iv). More recent information indicates that the risk of honour killing in Pakistan is not restricted geographically or
otherwise. In 2014, Punjab reported 362 cases of honour killings compared to 212 in Sindh, 60 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 77 in Balochistan. There were also 2 cases of honour killings reported in Islamabad.
64. She further submits that there will not be a sufficiency of protection should her Pakistani relatives pursue her:
2.4.9 The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006 has introduced significant changes to the consideration of rape cases in the courts; however, the Act is poorly implemented and some police have reportedly been implicated in rape cases in some instances. Police often perceive rape victims as immoral in character and therefore to blame, and survivors of rape are sometimes pressurised into withdrawing their complaint and not pursuing the matter, or settling out of court. There are reports that some women are forced to marry their attackers. Prosecutions in rape cases are rare and court cases can take years.
2.4.11 The authorities may be unable or unwilling to provide protection for women fearing honour crimes. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2004 which recognises offences committed in the name of honour is reported to be flawed and inadequately enforced. The Qisas and Diyat Ordinances continue to be applied in cases relating to 'honour' allowing perpetrators to negotiate compensation with the victim's family in exchange for dropping charges. An
estimated 70 per cent of perpetrators go unpunished. Jirgas have invoked death sentences against women for honour related crimes. The police have been reported to be 'complicit' with perpetrators of honour crimes to avoid filing cases or destroy evidence. There is limited support for women fearing honour crimes and security breaches have been reported in shelters and courts, resulting in the deaths of women.
65. In respect of internal flight in Pakistan the CIG gives the following guidance:
Where the person's fear of persecution is at the hands of non-state actors decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person.
2.5.3 In the country guidance case SN & HM (Divorced women- risk on return) Pakistan, 25 May 2004, the Tribunal held that the question of internal flight will require careful consideration in each case. The Tribunal found (at paragraph 48 of the determination) that the general questions which decision makers should ask themselves in cases of this kind are:
(a) Has the claimant shown a real risk or reasonable likelihood of continuing hostility from her husband (or former husband) or his family members such as to raise a real risk of serious harm in her former home;
(b) If yes, has she shown that she would have no effective protection in her home area against such a risk, including protection available from the Pakistani state, from her own family members, or from a current partner or his family?
(c) If yes would such a risk and lack of protection extend to any other part of Pakistan to which she could reasonably be expected to go (Robinson [1977] EWCA Civ 2089 AE and FE [2002] UKIAT 036361), having regard to the available state support, shelters, crisis centres, and family members or friends in other parts of Pakistan?
2.5.4 In the country guidance case SM (lone women - ostracism) (CG) [2016] UKUT 67 (IAC), 2 February 2016, the Upper Tribunal held that:
Where a risk of persecution or serious harm exists in her home area for a single woman or a female head of household, there may be an internal relocation option to one of Pakistan's larger cities, depending on the family, social and educational situation of the woman in question (paragraph 73 ii).
It will not be normally be unduly harsh to expect a single woman or female head of household to relocate internally within Pakistan if she can access support from family members or a male guardian in the place of relocation (paragraph 73 iii).
- It will not normally be unduly harsh for educated, better off, or older women to seek internal relocation to a city. It helps if a woman has qualifications enabling her to get well-paid employment and pay for accommodation and childcare if required (paragraph iv).
- Where a single woman, with or without children, is ostracised by family members and other sources of possible social support because she is in an irregular situation, internal relocation will be more difficult and whether it is unduly harsh will be a question of fact in each case (paragraph v).

My Findings
66. I remind myself that the standard of proof is lower than that normally applied in civil proceedings. It is for the Appellant to demonstrate to that lower standard that she has a well-founded fear of persecution in both countries. Although that is a composite question, in this case it can be broken down into a series of distinct considerations. I will first consider the extent to which the Appellant has established that her historical account is true, and then whether her circumstances give rise to a current risk of serious harm in Egypt and Pakistan.
The Appellant's Account
67. The Appellant has given her account on numerous occasions. She had twice been interviewed by an immigration officer (on the last occasion for a very long time), she has provided her legal representatives with four witness statements, she has spoken at length to the police, her counsellors and GP, and she has given evidence in the course of these proceedings. The Respondent has sought to highlight a number of discrepancies that have emerged in that evidence over the three years that the Appellant has been repeatedly setting out her case. In making my findings I have given careful consideration to those matters, and to the points made by Mr Wilding in his submissions. Having done so, I am satisfied that although there are some inconsistencies, the account has remained consistent at its core. I am satisfied that such discrepancies that have been identified arise through innocent mistake, a failing of memory or simply the perspective of the author. The substantive interview lasted approximately seven hours and I pay due regard to the Appellant's submission that over the course of such a long interview she became tired and confused. I have also had regard to the medical /support service evidence that is before me. It is apparent that the Appellant has been struggling with anxiety and depression for some time, and I bear in mind that this can have an effect on someone's ability to accurately report events.
68. Having had regard to all of those factors I am satisfied that many of the problems identified in the claim are in truth not discrepancies at all. For instance, she is recorded as having told Leicester Police that her family disowned her "because they heard about the rape"; that was not, as I understood it, the Appellant's case before me. Whilst she was afraid that her family might know, she could not be sure that her family had found that out. More likely her father had simply drawn negative inferences from the information passed to him by Muhammad. Having read the police reports and having had a chance to see the Appellant give evidence myself, I observe a tendency for her to conflate what she knows with what she suspects.
69. Leicester police found there to be "significant" differences in the information the Appellant gave to them, and that which she had given to the Metropolitan Police. I am not satisfied that the differences identified as "significant" by Leicester Police were in truth discrepancies at all. The officer who made the report appeared to be concerned that the Appellant had told the Metropolitan Police that the perpetrator has someone that she had met, formed a relationship with, and become engaged to over a period of two years, whereas she had told Leicester Police that this was a prospective marriage arranged by her parents. Having had regard to the overall evidence before me, I do not consider there to be any difference at all, simply a shift in emphasis. This was someone whom she had met, and become engaged to, in the context of a marriage "arranged", i.e. approved, by her family.
70. The police reports give rise to another difficulty. Close reading of the record show that the Appellant prevaricated about the degree to which she claimed to have been assaulted, and it would appear that it was this vacillation which resulted in the event being recorded as "no crime". In the context of the Appellant's cultural background, and what professionals working with victims of sexual assault term the "profound shame response" associated with rape, I am not at all surprised to see that she balked at pressing charges once she understood that pursuing this matter was not going to protect her from her family. On the contrary, it would make matters worse. The Appellant claims that the officers laughed when she said that in her culture MFR would be expected to marry her; although the police record does not confirm that (for obvious reasons) it is apparent that the officers were struck by her comments, since they are referred to on numerous occasions in the police notes. Taking into account the medical evidence that the Appellant was experiencing depression and anxiety throughout the time that she was in contact with the two police forces, I do not find that her failure to clarify these matters should be weighed against her.
71. There is some variation in the dates that the Appellant has provided, and as she herself says, she appears to have a difficulty in recalling dates accurately. I attach little weight to a slight variation in dates, since anyone might struggle to accurately remember dates, or even the order of events that happened a number of years ago. For instance, the Appellant was at times confused in her evidence about when she changed her mobile telephone number, and at what exact point she was in contact with her mother. In the circumstances I do not find such confusion surprising. If the Appellant has been through the traumatic events that she describes I would expect there to be some confusion in her memory
72. Overall I am satisfied that the Appellant has been consistent about the following core events: her father subjected her, her mother and sister to domestic violence when she was growing up; she fell into a relationship with MFR in the UK; her family approved their marriage; MFR raped her; her family have turned on her and threatened her because they believe her to have contravened their conservative Islamic social mores. That consistency at the core of the account is a matter that weighs in the Appellant's favour. I have attached significant weight to this factor.
73. There does not appear to be any dispute between the parties that the account is consonant with the country background material. Women in both Egypt and Pakistan are subject to "honour" based violence, and the practice of forcing rape victims to marry their rapists is one that sadly remains ingrained in many communities. That the account is generally plausible in the context of the country background material is a matter that weighs in the Appellant's favour. I have attached some weight to this factor.
74. Whilst the Respondent accepts that some men in Egyptian society (or indeed Pakistani) would wish to violently enforce strict conservative norms on their daughters, she does not accept that the Appellant's father is such a man. In his submissions Mr Wilding asked me to look carefully at the chronology. First there is the issue as to whether a traditional and controlling man would allow his daughter to come to study abroad. In view of my findings at the 'error of law' stage Mr Wilding did not press this point. He acknowledged that people can have different pressures upon them and that in some cases a father's desire to have his daughter educated, and the social status that brings, would outweigh his impulse to control her. Mr Wilding rather focused on the plausibility of the alleged events after the Appellant initially came to the UK in 2011. He points out that the Appellant has twice returned to Egypt to be met by hostility by her father. In 2010 when she had completed her English course he assaulted her and spat at her because he was so furious she had disobeyed him and not stayed with his cousins. In 2011 he again let her return to the UK even though he knew that there was a man here who wanted to marry her, and he was afraid that they would have direct contact. Mr Wilding submits that this chronology points to one of two possible truths. Either the Appellant's father is not the ruthless murderer that she now claims to fear, or the account cannot be true. I have given careful consideration to the former suggestion. If the Appellant has managed to 'talk him round' on all these previous occasions, the risk is perhaps not as great as she portrays it to be. In respect of the latter Mr Wilding asked me to consider whether it was credible that a man such as the Appellant describes would allow his daughter to a) come back to the UK after she had directly disobeyed his instructions that she live with her relatives and b) when he knew that her honour was at risk from potential contact with MFR. I have attached some weight to these points. That the account is arguably inherently implausible in this respect weighs against the Appellant. It is not however a matter that weighs heavily against her. That is because there is a third possibility, namely that the Appellant's father does not behave in a rational or consistent manner. This interpretation receives some support from her description of her earlier years, in which she specifically said that her father could be kind and would listen to her, but then would be quick to turn angry and be violent towards his family.
75. The account is supported by other evidence. The claim that the Appellant is of mixed Pakistani-Egyptian heritage is supported by her passports. Her claim to have been subjected to repeated domestic violence is a teenager, specifically being dragged by her hair, derives some support from the medical evidence which shows that she has suffered from significant hair loss, for which there is no straightforward medical explanation. The evidence concerning the relationship with MFR is supported in a number of ways: Amir Khan, the student in the halls of residence, confirms that he saw the Appellant being assaulted by this man; the bundle contains photographs of the couple together; the police reports confirm that a suspect was investigated for rape. The rape claim itself is supported by the fact that the Appellant did go to the police (exposing herself to the risk of arrest if the allegation was fiction), that she sought medical attention within a few weeks of the alleged event occurring and by her long history of involvement with various support agencies, all of whom confirm her consistent reporting of having been raped in March 2012.
76. The claim that the Appellant is now estranged from her family, the matter at the heart of the case, is also generally supported by the medical evidence which attests to her ongoing depression and anxiety. Furthermore, it is directly corroborated by three other sources. First there are the telephone text messages. Mr Wilding did not make any submissions about these but I have taken into account the obvious point that they could have been easily engineered with the assistance of a friend or relative in Egypt. The fact that they were taken seriously by Leicester Police does not take the matter much further, since the officer was simply doing his job. In themselves the messages do not therefore attract much weight. Second there are the letters from the Appellant's mother. Again, there is an obvious criticism that these letters are easily produced and even if they are from her mother, are self-serving. Much was made at the First-tier of the fact that the envelopes have a return address on them, thereby exposing the Appellant's mother to risk if for whatever reason they were returned to her undelivered. That is a matter I have borne in mind. Again, in themselves the letters do not attract a great deal of weight. The third tranche of evidence is in my view of a different quality. That is the evidence of Mr T, the Pakistani student who stayed with the family in Egypt. His statement attracts greater weight than that purportedly sent by the Appellant's mother for a number of reasons. He is not a member of the Appellant's family. He is a distant family friend who has no obvious motivation to perjure himself in assisting her to pursue a false claim. He has provided a detailed account which contains additional information - such as his dispute with his own family over the described events - that give it the ring of truth. He has provided copies of his own identity documents and contact details so that the evidence could have been verified at any time. He has also provided documentary evidence which confirms that he was indeed a student in Cairo at the given time. For those reasons I am minded to attach a significant amount of weight to his evidence. Overall I find that the corroborative evidence produced lends weight to the Appellant's claim.
77. Having weighed all of that evidence in the round I am satisfied that the Appellant has told the truth about the events over the last few years. Although there were some discrepancies in her evidence, and there were aspects of her account that were arguably implausible, I am satisfied that she has discharged the burden of proof. The weight of the evidence established that the core events in her account are true. I find as fact that she was in a relationship with MFR and that her family have discovered that. Whether he did in fact rape her, or whether her family are aware of the details is in fact immaterial to the claim. The Appellant has established that she has received threats from her father in Egypt who perceives his "honour" to have been stained by her behaviour.
Current Risk in Egypt
78. I find as fact that the Appellant has a currently well-founded fear of persecution in Cairo for reasons of her membership of a particular social group. The Appellant believes without hesitation that her father will kill her in order to restore his family name. Having had regard to the country background evidence, the statement of Mr T, the consistent evidence of the Appellant and to some extent the letters from her mother, I am satisfied that this threat is real. I am satisfied that it would be highly problematic for the Appellant to try and return to the city. I am satisfied that a young woman trying to live away from her family would very quickly be at risk of discovery, simply because of the novelty that she would represent.
79. Given the conclusions drawn in the Respondent's own OGN, and mirrored in the rest of the material I have been given, I am satisfied that the police in Egypt would be unwilling or unable to intervene in what is essentially seen as a family matter.
80. I have considered whether it would be possible for the Appellant to move away from Cairo, and to live independently from her family. She considered this to be an impossibility. The CIG and Dr Fatah both indicate that Egypt has an endemic problem with sexual harassment and assault. A young woman living on her own would be vulnerable not just to gossip and social exclusion but to a real risk of unwanted attention from sexual predators. The Appellant would be living without the financial support of her family, and this would leave her exposed to relying on kindness in return for 'favours'. She would live in constant fear of discovery by her father. I am satisfied that the Appellant would not be able to lead anything like a 'normal' life if she tried to live in Egypt alone. Internal relocation would, in all the circumstances, be unduly harsh.
Current Risk in Pakistan
81. Since the Appellant has never lived in Pakistan, I must perform a somewhat artificial exercise in assessing the risk to her in her "home" area. Mr Wilding agreed that in the circumstances the most sensible way to construe that test would be to look at the situation in Karachi where many of her uncles live and where her father regards the family home to be. Given my findings on the risk from her father it does not require any great analysis to conclude that she is equally at risk from his brothers, all of whom have apparently supported his stated aim of killing her. The suggestion arising from KA that it would be unlikely to find honour based violence outside of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa is, it seems, no longer reliable given the statistics cited in the recent CIG.
82. The same CIG makes it clear that the Appellant would be unlikely to receive any material support from the police or any other state agency in Pakistan. I find that there would not be a sufficiency of protection.
83. The Appellant does not of course have to go to Karachi. She speaks English, as do many educated Pakistanis, particularly in the cities. She would however face significant disadvantages in trying to relocate within Pakistan away from Karachi. She does not speak Urdu or indeed any other Pakistani language and would therefore immediately be marked out as a foreigner. Notwithstanding that status she is Muslim, and would be readily identifiable as such by people around her. She would therefore be expected to confirm with social norms perceived by Pakistanis to be commensurate with her status as a Muslim woman. As in Egypt, this would immediately raise questions about why a young single woman was living on her own away from her family. It is not the norm and it would be bound to attract attention. The Appellant would have no obvious means of supporting herself. It is difficult to imagine how she would possibly manage in a country to which she has no connection save with people who want to kill her. I am satisfied that the Appellant would run the risk of discovery by her family, would be subject to societal isolation and possibly the risk of unwanted sexual advances by men who misunderstand her situation. She would, as in Egypt, be living with the constant fear of discovery, not an easy matter for someone who has already suffered serious psychological difficulties over a number of years. I am satisfied that it would not be reasonable to expect the Appellant to live alone in Pakistan.

Decisions
84. The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law such that must be set aside in its entirety.
85. The decision in the appeal is remade as follows:
"The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.
The Appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection because she is a refugee".
86. There is an order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
25th September 2016