Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA034212015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 4 May 2016
On 17 June 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLIVE LANE

Between

FATHIMA MUNSHIFA MAHABOOB
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION not made)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Brown, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Pettersen, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, Fathima Munshifa Mahboob, was born 15 April 1985 and is a female citizen of Sri Lanka. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hindson) against the decision of the respondent to remove her from the United Kingdom having rejected her asylum claim. The decision was made on 12 February 2015. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. At [21-22], the judge wrote:
"I remind myself that asylum seekers may exaggerate and embellish their cases yet still give an account that is, at its core, the truth. Having done all of that, I accept that the appellant is a generally credible witness and has given an account that is largely true. I set out below, my reasons for coming to this conclusion ?I found that the appellant has given a generally consistent account of events in Sri Lanka. Some minor inconsistencies have been identified in the refusal letter and by Mr Lees [the Presenting Officer before the First-tier Tribunal] but the appellant has explained them in a credible and cogent way. I am therefore prepared to accept the core of her account is correct."
3. The judge did not accept "that the authorities in Sri Lanka have an adverse interest in the appellant." [23]. However, as the grounds of appeal point out, a statement of the appellant's mother (which was before the judge) and which is dated 27 November 2015 indicated that, "? On 26 January 2014 police came and asked about my daughter ? and said that my husband and my daughters were helping LTTE. So we came to arrest [the appellant]."
4. Further, there was a letter from a family lawyer in Sri Lanka (Mr Rajendran) confirming the appellant's mother had told him that the police had indicated to her that they were interested in the appellant and that they wanted to arrest her.
5. The difficulty with the judge's decision is that, having accepted the appellant's evidence as credible and accurate, it is unclear why the judge has failed properly to assess the evidence of the mother or the letter from the lawyer. I assume when the judge states that he accepts the appellant's evidence, he is accepting as true all the evidence adduced by the appellant, including the witness statement of her mother and the lawyer's letter. At [23], the judge appears to have placed a great deal of weight on the fact that the mother had not been arrested although she had been in regular contact with the police. However, the judge has failed to consider the truth and accuracy of the statements (quoted above) which prima facie suggest that the police seek to arrest the appellant together with the fact that the appellant (by her own evidence perceived by the Sri Lankan authorities as, at the very least, an LTTE sympathiser) had been living amongst the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the United Kingdom. That evidence appears to have been ignored by the judge who has simply assumed that the appellant cannot be at risk because events (such as the arrest and detention of her father and the kidnapping of her sisters) occurred in Sri Lanka whilst the appellant has been in the United Kingdom. Further, the judge has failed to take account of the fact that, while she had not been arrested, the appellant's mother claims to have been moving around Sri Lanka in order to evade the authorities. I have to say that I am also concerned that the judge's assessment of credibility is inadequately supported by clear reasoning. The judge has accepted that the appellant was "generally consistent" and that her "account was largely true" because she had given consistent accounts of past events and had explained away "minor inconsistencies" "in a credible and cogent way." I find that the judge needs to be rather more specific than that. Further, the use of the words "largely" and "generally" in what should be a detailed examination of the evidence beg the question as to what parts of the account the judge did or did not accept.
6. In the light of what I have said above, I find that the proper course of action is to set aside the First-tier Tribunal's decision and to return the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for that Tribunal to remake the decision. None of the findings of fact shall stand.
Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 1 January 2016 is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (not Judge Hindson) for that Tribunal to remake the decision. None of the findings of fact shall stand.

No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 1 June 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane