Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: AA040462015
AA040472015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 23 May 2016
On 20 June 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

m f k (FIRST Appellant)
n f (SECOND Appellant)
(anonymity directioN MADE)
Appellants

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr C Yeo, Counsel, instructed by Roelens Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Kotas, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, I make an anonymity order. Unless the Upper Tribunal or a Court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the original Appellant. This direction applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this direction could give rise to contempt of court proceedings. This direction has been made in order to protect the Appellants from serious harm, having regard to the interests of justice and the principle of proportionality.

Introduction
1. The two Appellants are husband and wife and are both Pakistani nationals. Their appeals have been linked throughout.
2. By a decision promulgated on 31 March 2016 I found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law when dismissing the Appellants' appeals against the Respondent's decisions of 13 February 2015, refusing to vary leave to remain and to remove them from the United Kingdom under section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. My error of law decision is set out in full at Annex 1.
3. I am now remaking the decision on the Appellants' appeals.
The parameters of the remaking decision
4. As can be seen from my error of law decision, this is not a complete rehearing of the appeals: certain findings of fact by the First-tier Tribunal are preserved. A number of these findings are adverse to the first Appellant in particular, and this places obstacles in the way of success in the appeals. However, it is the logical effect of my decision to have set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal that the adverse matters are not fatal to the Appellants' cases. If it were otherwise I would have found any errors of law by the First-tier Tribunal to be immaterial.
5. I summarise the preserved findings here:
a) both the Appellants are Ahmadis by birth;
b) the first Appellant had a distinguished career in the Pakistani Civil Service;
c) the first Appellant had not had specific problems in Pakistan as a result of an alleged argument with an individual, or indeed anyone else;
d) no fatwa had been issued against the first Appellant;
e) the Appellants had not severed all ties with Pakistan;
f) whilst in Pakistan the first Appellant had not engaged in activities prohibited by law.
6. The basis upon which I found there to be material errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal's decision was, in summary, that despite the adverse findings on particular claims offered by the first Appellant, the Judge had failed to address the following questions: why he (the first Appellant) had acted as he did in Pakistan; what activities he had undertaken in the United Kingdom; how and why he would act if returned to Pakistan now.
7. These questions all arise from the relevant country guidance case of MN and Others (Ahmadis - country conditions - risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC) (hereafter, MN), which encapsulates the principles set down in HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31 as part of its conclusions.
The evidence
8. I have the original Respondent's appeal bundle (RB) containing: the screening interview; the full asylum interview; a witness statement for the first Appellant dated 23 January 2015; a letter from the Ahmadiya Muslim Association UK (AMA) dated 25 January 2015; a letter from Mr J Kelly dated 29 January 2015; the notice of immigration decision; and the reasons for refusal letter. As the second Appellant is dependent upon her husband's, all the evidence in RB relates to the first Appellant.
9. From the Appellant I have the bundle prepared for the First-tier Tribunal hearing (AB), indexed and paginated 1-125. This has not been referred to in the hearing before me.
10. In addition, I have a new witness statement from the Appellant, dated 9 May 2016, and a second letter from the AMA, dated 17 February 2016.
11. Both Appellants attended the hearing. The first Appellant gave oral evidence with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. A full note of the oral evidence is contained in the Record of Proceedings.
12. In summary, the first Appellant gave the following evidence. In-chief, he adopted his latest witness statement. He told me that he has been distributing leaflets on the Ahmadi faith in this country, and has attended inter-faith meetings. He has manned a stall in public places on a regular basis. Leaflets have been given out and people spoken to.
13. In cross-examination the first Appellant confirmed that he had had a good career as a tax officer in Pakistan. Since retirement he had had more time to undertake faith-related activities. He was asked about being discreet when in Pakistan. I was told he was discreet in the sense that he knew he was unable to go out and speaking openly to people. However, if asked about his faith, he would tell the truth; neighbours and colleagues knew he was Ahmadi. He knew that the law prohibited open practising of his faith.
14. Preaching was said to be important. It was a primary duty of Ahmadis to preach. The first Appellant had noticed that marks had been placed on his front doors at different addresses at which he resided in Pakistan. He had not been attacked, though. The first Appellant maintained that his whole account was true, even when the preserved adverse findings from the First-tier Tribunal Judge were pointed out to him. Soon after arrival in the United Kingdom he registered with the AMA. When asked why Mr Kelly was not at the hearing to provide supporting evidence, the first Appellant said that he had not been asked to attend. The AMA letters confirmed the fact of conversion and the first Appellant did not want to give the impression that this was being exploited for his own advantage.
15. The first Appellant was asked about the contents of the 2015 AMA letter. It did not mention the distribution of leaflets. This was because the letter was issued in a hurry. Initially, the first Appellant stated, the AMA had been unsure of his reason for entering the United Kingdom; they thought it was to attend a specific religious event. They did not want to issue a letter in support of the Appellant. However, when the Appellant cleared this up by showing them his multi-entry visit visa, they did issue a letter on 25 January 2015, the evening before the full asylum interview with the Respondent. In respect of why it took over a year to obtain a more detailed letter from the AMA, the first Appellant said that his previous solicitors had not told him the need for a better letter. He subsequently changed representation and the new letter was obtained. He had not thought that the first AMA letter was problematic. He was unaware of the importance attached to such evidence. He was doing more activities in January 2015 than is stated in the first AMA letter. Specifics were not mentioned there. In respect of activities in Pakistan, the AMA in the United Kingdom had obtained a report from the relevant organisation in Pakistan only in September 2015. The first Appellant said that his activities in the United Kingdom were expanding all the time. He had not done more simply to bolster his asylum claim. In Pakistan, he had been in fear to practise his faith. It is very different in the United Kingdom.
16. There was no re-examination.
Respondent's submissions
17. Mr Kotas relied on the preserved adverse credibility findings from the First-tier Tribunal. A number of material parts of the first Appellant's claim were found to be untruthful. There is a 'tipping' point at which the rest of the claim falls down in line with the previously disbelieved elements.
18. Nothing on meetings was mentioned in the asylum interview. The first AMA letter was very brief. It was odd that the second letter contained so much more information. Was the first Appellant doing more now simply to bolster his asylum claim? In any event, the first Appellant had lived his life in Pakistan as it suited him; he could return and do the same again. It was of real concern that Mr Kelly had not attended the hearing.
19. In short, the Appellant could not bring himself within the scope of MN.
Appellants' submissions
20. Mr Yeo relied on his skeleton argument. Contrary to what Mr Kotas submitted, the first Appellant had not been comfortable in Pakistan as far as his faith was concerned. In any event, the life in this country has changed the first Appellant's view of matters. The second AMA letter is reliable and significant. There is a credible explanation for why the first letter was brief. The first Appellant is not a lawyer and would not have known about MN or the importance attached by the Respondent and Tribunal to AMA letters. He had undertaken activities before and after his appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Both he and his wife are Ahmadi by birth. The second Appellant is from a prominent Ahmadi family. This is consistent with the importance attached to their faith.
21. In respect of MN, preaching in the ordinary sense used by lay people is not the only way of breaching Pakistani legal restriction of the practise of the Ahmadi faith. Tabligh is a wider concept. It makes sense that the first Appellant has had more time since retirement to undertake activities. In respect of the preserved adverse credibility findings, I was referred to the facts of the various appeals in MN and paragraphs 9-13 of the skeleton argument. The first Appellant's former career as a successful civil servant would make him a 'good' target for extremists. If the first Appellant were to exercise any discretion in the practising of his faith on return to Pakistan, it would be in order to avoid persecution.
Burden and standard of proof
22. The burden of proving material facts rests with the Appellants, and the standard of proof is that of the balance of probabilities.
Findings and reasons
The preserved findings
23. I have referred to the preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal, above. Most of these are adverse to the first Appellant.
24. Clearly, these are relevant to my assessment of the rest of the evidence, and I have taken them very much into account. I have assessed the evidence in the round, of course, but this has been coloured by the fact that material aspects of the claim as put forward by the first Appellant have been deemed untruthful. As I have stated previously, it makes the first Appellant's task in succeeding all the more difficult and I have viewed his latest evidence with appropriate caution.
25. Having said, I do not accept that by virtue of the preserved findings alone, a 'tipping point' has been reached, after which all other aspects of the first Appellant's account fall to be rejected. I find this to be so for the following reasons.
26. First, it is a trite proposition in this jurisdiction that certain parts of an individual's account can be rejected, whilst other material aspects are believed.
27. Second, there is merit in Mr Yeo's reliance on the actual factual backgrounds to the linked appeals in MN. The four appellants in MN all had significant adverse credibility findings against them (I refer to the summary at paragraphs 9-13 of the skeleton argument). Notwithstanding this, they all ultimately succeeded in their appeals. This illustrates well the importance of my first point, above.
28. Third, in the present case the rejected aspects of the claim related to alleged specific incidents: the argument with Mr Rana, the issuance of the fatwa, and the disposal of assets in Pakistan. It has been accepted throughout that he is in fact an Ahmadi by birth. It is also a fact that the open practising of the Ahmadi faith is severely restricted in Pakistan, whilst that is clearly not the case in the United Kingdom. Therefore, in seeking to peer through the 'window of a man's soul', as it were, and in ensuring that anxious scrutiny is accorded to a protection claim, there remains the possibility of embellishments being made and certain untruths stated whilst at the same time a core of credibility running through the claim. In particular, there is the possibility of a development or awakening in the first Appellant's approach to his faith since arriving in this country (as I will discuss, below).
29. Having considered all of the evidence with care, I have concluded, based on what I have said above and below, that the untruths told by the first Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal were not of such central gravity as to undermine the core thread of the claimed adherence to, and practise of his Ahmadi faith.
Activities in Pakistan
30. The undisputed fact that both Appellants are Ahmadis by birth is of some significance. There has never been any suggestion, let alone a finding, that they are non-practicing Ahmadis. Whether they practised their faith discreetly is different question. In my view it adds some weight to the first Appellant's underlying claim to have wanted to practise his own faith and that of his parents without fear of consequences.
31. Also of some import is the fact, as I find it to be, of the second Appellant being from a prominent Ahmadi family. Whilst this does not of course mean that the couple would themselves be fervent practitioners of the faith, it nonetheless lends credence to the claimed importance of religion to their respective identities.
32. I find that the first Appellant was fully aware of the legal restrictions on the practice of the Ahmadi faith in Pakistan. He is an educated man with a distinguished career in the civil service behind him. He has always been an Ahmadi. It is obvious that he would have known about the legal position. His own evidence is consistent with this (see, for example, Q58-61 of the asylum interview).
33. The same applies to the societal hostility towards Ahmadis, in particular those seeking to practise their faith openly.
34. The first Appellant has never claimed to have 'stood on the rooftops' and proclaimed his faith to all. As the First-tier Tribunal found, a finding I have preserved, the first Appellant did not engage with behaviour specifically prohibited under Pakistani law. That would have included proactive open discourse with non-Ahmadis in a public setting, for example. I take Mr Kotas' point that this discreet behaviour was in order for the first Appellant to continue in his civil service career. However, I find that the actual evidence indicates at least a mixed picture. The first Appellant may well have adopted this position in part with a view to maintaining his career. Yet he knew full well that there were legal restrictions in place, and that 'indiscretions' could/would lead to serious consequences potentially going beyond dismissal from employment. Taking my assessment of the evidence as a whole, I find that a desire to maintain his career was at most a secondary motive in the first Appellant's self-denying approach to his faith.
35. I accept that the first Appellant had responded truthfully to neighbours and work colleagues who asked him about his faith. I find this to be consistent with his evidence of acting discreetly but with a sense of pride in his religion of birth (see Q59-60 of the interview and paragraph 4 of the latest witness statement). It also sits well with his decision to voluntarily have his Ahmadi faith stated in his passport.
36. I turn to the AMA letter of 17 February 2016. I will deal with the issue of what the Appellant has done whilst in the United Kingdom, below. For present purposes I find the first section of the letter relating to activities in Pakistan to contain reliable evidence. I find the source (the AMA) to be, in principle, a reliable one (the Pakistani end of the association was deemed a reliable source in MN, and the Respondent has historically attached importance to the presence, or indeed absence, of letters from the AMA). Indeed, the AMA is a source cited in the Respondent's guidance on Ahmadis in Pakistan.
37. I find that the AMA sought and obtained a report from the Pakistan association on 24 September 2015. Thus, the information contained in the AMA letter has been sourced from records held in Pakistan. The relevant information includes confirmation that:
a) the first Appellant was involved in the Majlis Ansarullah group;
b) he had good contact with the community;
c) he regularly attended prayers, meetings and sermons;
d) he was well-known locally and at work;
e) that his father was an Ahmadi activist in the 1960s;
f) that the second Appellant is from a very prominent Ahmadi family and was involved in meetings at the family home and participated in medical camps, deemed to be important outreach work.
38. I find that the information summarised above is accurate.
39. I accept the evidence as expressed in both witness statements, albeit by a narrow margin, that there was a genuine desire on the first Appellant's part to engage in a more expansive, open practise of his faith but for the restrictions in place and the serious consequences of contravention.
40. All of the above leads me to find that despite the preserved adverse credibility findings, the first Appellant has proved three important elements of his case: that his faith was genuinely of particular significance to his religious identity whilst in Pakistan; that he maintained a desire to practise his faith more openly; and that the major factor in not acting in this way was in order to avoid the potentially serious consequences for his freedom and safety.
Activities in the United Kingdom
41. As with the issue of the activities in Pakistan, I have taken full account of the preserved adverse credibility findings when assessing this aspect of the case.
42. I turn first to the two AMA letters. The first letter is brief and omits particularised information which is included in the second letter and upon which the first Appellant seeks to rely, such as the distribution of leaflets and the attendance at certain events. The explanation offered by the Appellant for the omissions is that the letter was issued in a hurry and just prior to the asylum interview. It is right that the letter is dated 25 January 2015 and that the interview was the following day, and this supports the explanation. Having said that, the second AMA letter does not set out a corroborative account of the reasons for the brevity of the first. I also note that the first letter refers to a report from the "President of Birmingham East", dated 21 January 2015, which apparently provided the information upon which the relevant details of the first Appellant's activities was based. I note too that in his own evidence the first Appellant has not particularised the chronology of when he began undertaking the various claimed activities (stalls, leaflets, etc.). Taking of this into account, I will accept that the first letter was issued in a hurry and that it might not have stated every aspect of the activities then undertaken by the first Appellant. However, I do not accept that he was in fact doing as much then as he appears to have claimed in his own evidence, or at least was not then as centrally involved in the activities. If he had been, I find that the President's report would have made some mention of them. The first Appellant cannot have it both ways: if the AMA letters are reliable (which I find them to be), I need to go by what is contained therein, including the sources stated therein.
43. The second AMA letter is much more detailed. I note that the information contained in paragraph 2 was derived from a report from the Leamington Spa President, dated 21 January 2016. I accept that this is the source of the information contained in the letter. I also find that the AMA is fully aware of the need for reliable evidence to be provided in respect of asylum applicants. It is, as I have already mentioned, a source for the Respondent's own country information guidance, and it has been subjected to scrutiny by the Tribunal over time. It is, I find, reasonably likely that the information provided in respect of the Appellant is accurate.
44. As it is, and applying a good deal of caution to the evidence of activities undertaken in this country, I do accept that the first Appellant has taken an increasingly active role in promoting and espousing his faith since arriving in the United Kingdom. In particular, and based in the main upon what is contained in the second AMA letter, I find that the first Appellant has undertaken the following:
a) attending prayers and local meetings;
b) attending the annual AMA convention;
c) continued involvement in the Majlis Ansarullah;
d) distributing leaflets door-to-door;
e) manning stalls in public places at which literature and oral information on the faith is provided;
f) attending Tabligh training sessions with a view to enhancing knowledge and disseminating the faith;
g) participating in a peace conference.
45. I go on to find that these activities are consistent with the importance of his faith whilst in Pakistan and also a development of this aspect of his identity during his residence in a free society here. The activities undertaken are, I find part and parcel of the Ahmadi concept of Tabligh, as stated by the AMA and in the country information.
46. Rather than see the timing of this increased activity as suspiciously convenient to the progress of his appeal, I find that this has been undertaken out of genuine motives. It is, I find part of a plausible continuum beginning with his faith by birth, moving through restricted atmosphere in Pakistan, and then into an environment in which the first Appellant could articulate and manifest his religious identity more fully.
47. The delay in obtaining the second AMA letter is not significant. First, because the first Appellant is not a lawyer and would not be expected to appreciate the importance of AMA letters and the Tribunal's case law on Ahmadis. Second, I have found that the first Appellant's activities in fact increased over time in any event. Third, I have found this increase to be genuine, and thus the reliability of the AMA letter is not undermined.
48. I find that the genuinely undertaken activities of the first Appellant in the United Kingdom include open public discourse with non-Ahmadis and the open distribution of literature which is very likely to include references to Ahmadi practices banned under Pakistani law.
49. In summary, the behaviour genuinely engaged in by the first Appellant in this country is of particular importance to his religious identity and elements of this behaviour would also be contrary to Pakistani law.
50. I make it clear that without this evidence from the AMA I would be highly unlikely to have accepted the first Appellant's word at face value.
51. I now address the issue of the conversion of Mr Kelly to the Ahmadi faith. This is not without its evidential problems. I have to say that I find it odd that Mr Kelly was not asked to attend the hearing or at least provide a statement. Whilst there is something to be said for the first Appellant's sentiment that he did not want to appear to be exploiting the conversion, the potential importance of evidence from Mr Kelly should have overridden this.
52. If it were not for the AMA letters I would probably not have accepted this element of the evidence either. As it is, the letters confirm the conversion. It is reasonably likely that the AMA would not have committed themselves to writing unless they knew of the conversion and had confidence in its authenticity. I combine this reliable evidence with the consistent (yet somewhat tarnished) evidence from the Appellant himself, and the letter from Mr Kelly in RB. Overall, I accept that the first Appellant was instrumental in converting Mr Kelly to the Ahmadi faith. I see this as another aspect of the first Appellant's commitment to his faith and the manner in which he wishes to practise it.
The position on return to Pakistan
53. If removed to Pakistan now I find that the first Appellant would hold a genuine desire to continue to practise his faith as he has been doing in the United Kingdom.
54. In light of his knowledge of the state of Pakistani law, the societal attitudes and the manner in which he conducted himself when last there, I find that he would forego the expression and behaviour exhibited in the United Kingdom, and would act discreetly.
55. However, it is clear to me that the primary reason for adopting this course would be in order to avoid the very real risk of persecution (including persecutory prosecution) should he not do so.
Conclusions
56. I apply my findings of fact to the guidance contained in paragraphs 119 to 126 of MN.
57. Both the Appellant's are in fact Ahmadis by birth.
58. I have found that it is of particular importance to the first Appellant's religious identity that he is able to manifest his faith in a manner that would contravene the restrictions set down in Pakistani law.
59. He would deny the manifestation of his faith in this manner in order to avoid persecution.
60. In light of MN and HJ (Iran), the first Appellant is therefore a refugee and a person at risk of Article 3 ill-treatment if removed to Pakistan.
61. It has never been suggested that the second Appellant's case has any material independence to that of her husband: they clearly stand or fall together.
62. Therefore, the second Appellant's appeal succeeds as well.

Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.

I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

I re-make the decision by allowing the appeals on asylum and human rights (Article 3 ECHR) grounds.

Signed Date: 16 June 2016

H B Norton-Taylor
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date: 16 June 2016

Judge H B Norton-Taylor
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

ANNEX 1: The error of law decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: AA/04046/2015
AA/04047/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 8 March 2016

?????????????

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

M F K (first Appellant)
N F (second Appellant)
(anonymity directioN MADE)
Appellants

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Yeo, Counsel, instructed by Roelens Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the Appellants against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Asjad (the judge), promulgated on 23 July 2015, in which she dismissed their appeals. Those appeals were against the Respondent's decisions of 13 February 2015, refusing to vary leave to remain and to remove the Appellants from the United Kingdom under section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.
2. Both Appellants are Pakistani citizens. The first Appellant is the husband of the second. It has been accepted throughout that they were Ahmadis by birth, and that the first Appellant had had a distinguished career in the Pakistani civil service. His protection claim was founded upon problems said to have arisen as a result of his faith. In addition, he asserted that he was unable to practise his faith in Pakistan to the extent desired because of the legal and societal restrictions in place there.
The judge's decision
3. In line with the Respondent's position, the judge accepted that the Appellants were Ahmadis and that the first Appellant was a former civil servant (paragraphs 14-16). She found that there was no evidence to suggest that the first Appellant was a "staunch Ahmadi" (paragraph 17). In paragraphs 19-27 the judge deals with a specific element of the first Appellant's claim, namely that as a result of an argument with one Mr Rana an FIR and fatwa were consequently issued against him. For a variety of reasons, the judge rejects this aspect of the account in fairly robust terms. The first Appellant's evidence concerning his ties with Pakistan was also subject to criticism (paragraph 28).
4. Having made these findings, the judge goes on and sets out the headnote of MN and Others (Ahmadis - country conditions - risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC). At paragraph 30 she finds that the first Appellant had not engaged in activity that was prohibited in Pakistan, and that his faith had been practised out of sight, as it were. At paragraph 31 she appears to have accepted the contents of a letter from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (AMA) in the United Kingdom. It seems implicit in what the judge says that she regarded the activities carried out by the first Appellant in this country as being somewhat opportunistic in nature. His conversion of a British citizen to the Ahmadi faith did not, it seems, carry much weight.
5. The appeals were dismissed on all grounds (including those pertaining to Article 8).
The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
6. The grounds are in essence threefold: the judge failed to have regard to the evidence of witnesses; the HJ (Iran) issue was not considered; and there was a failure to examine the evidence in the round and give the first Appellant the benefit of any doubt.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Plimmer on 9 December 2015. Whilst not formally limiting the grant, her focus was clearly on the HJ (Iran) point.
The hearing before me
8. Mr Yeo relied on the grounds. He accepted that the HJ (Iran) issue was central to the appeals. The judge had, he submitted, simply failed to engage with this matter. In addition, the judge had failed to have regard to evidence from the second Appellant and background information about the Ahmadi faith in general.
9. Ms Isherwood submitted that there were no errors at all. The adverse credibility findings were relevant to all other issues in the appeals. In light of these findings, there was only one conclusion open to the judge, namely that the appeals failed.
Decision on error of law
10. As I announced at the hearing, there is a material error of law in the judge's decision as regards the HJ (Iran) issue. Notwithstanding the adverse credibility findings in relation to the FIR/fatwa issue (more of which, below), and the conclusion that the first Appellant had not practised his faith overtly in the past, the judge still needed to ask herself the following questions: why had the first Appellant acted in the way he did whilst in Pakistan (i.e. why was he discreet); what has he done whilst in this country and why; how would he act on return to Pakistan and why. These issues are of relevance to Ahmadi cases, as indicated in paragraph 3(ii) of the headnote in MN.
11. In my view, the judge has not deal with these matters in sufficient detail, or indeed in some respects at all. Paragraphs 16 and 17 do not include sufficiently detailed findings as to what the first Appellant in fact did as regards his faith. Further, and importantly, the question of why he did what he did (or perhaps more pertinently, why he did not do certain things) is simply not posed or answered. In terms of the first Appellant's time in this country, there is a failure to make clear findings of fact on precisely what he has done, in particular relating to the conversion of Mr Kelly and the activities described (albeit briefly) in the AMA letter. Again, the question of why he has acted as he has is not adequately addressed. The implication that the first Appellant has acted in bad faith is not properly reasoned with reference to findings on the evidence. Finally, there is nothing on how the first Appellant would wish to act on return to Pakistan and why he might in fact act differently by reason of the restrictions in place there. This was an aspect of his case before the judge and it required full consideration. Thus, the judge has erred.
12. The errors are material. First, the judge's comment that there was no evidence to suggest that the first Appellant was a "staunch" Ahmadi is in part predicated upon the basis that he was not openly preaching. Yet that is of course part and parcel of the HJ (Iran) issue: why was he not acting in this way? The judge's errors in respect of the HJ (Iran) issue render what is said in paragraph 17 unsustainable. Second, and contrary to Ms Isherwood's submission, the adverse findings on the FIR/fatwa issue do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the first Appellant's case could not in any event succeed on the HJ (Iran) issue. Applicants for protection do sometimes exaggerate or embellish their claims, and it maybe that the first Appellant has done just that. In the present case, the FIR/fatwa element can properly be separated from the remainder of the claim for the purposes of my decision on error of law.
13. In light of the above, the judge's decision is set aside.
14. I have decided that the judge's findings on the FIR/fatwa issue shall stand. As I have said, they can be split off from the rest of the claim without rendering the remaking exercise artificial. Adverse credibility findings on the discreet point clearly do not assist the first Appellant, but they certainly do not preclude success under the HJ (Iran) principle (as that falls within the scope of MN).
15. The judge has given numerous reasons for her findings on the FIR/fatwa issue. These were open to her. The evidence of the second Appellant, whilst not expressly referred to, would not in my view have had a material effect on this aspect of the decision. There was nothing in the AMA letter to support the first Appellant's case in this regard.
Disposal
16. On the basis that these appeals do not require a full fact-finding exercise, retaining them in the Upper Tribunal is appropriate.
17. In the normal course of events I would be remaking the decision on the evidence currently before me. However, there is good reason for adjourning the appeals to a future date. The Appellants have produced a new letter from the AMA. This is fairly detailed and Ms Isherwood did not have a proper opportunity to consider it at the hearing before me.
18. Adjourning the appeals will also allow for some limited oral evidence to be given on the HJ (Iran) issue.
Anonymity
19. Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, I make an anonymity order. Unless the Upper Tribunal or a Court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the original Appellant. This direction applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this direction could give rise to contempt of court proceedings. This direction has been made in order to protect the Appellants from serious harm, having regard to the interests of justice and the principle of proportionality.

Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.

I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

These appeals are adjourned.

Directions to the parties:

1. The ambit of the adjourned continuation hearing of these appeals is limited to the following:
a) How and why the Appellants practised their Ahmadi faith in the manner they did whilst in Pakistan;
b) How and why the Appellants have practised their Ahmadi faith in the manner they have whilst in the United Kingdom;
c) How and why the Appellants would practise their Ahmadi faith if returned to Pakistan now;
d) The issue of risk on return in light of MN, including whether the first Appellant's profile as a former civil servant is relevant.
2. It is undisputed that the Appellants are both Ahmadis by birth and that the first Appellant was a civil servant of some standing, and these facts stand;
3. The findings of the First-tier Tribunal at paragraphs 19-28 are preserved;
4. A further witness statement from the Appellants, dealing with the relevant issues set out above, shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the Respondent no later than 10 working days before the next hearing;
5. A skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellants shall be shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the Respondent no later than 5 working days before the next hearing;
6. Any further evidence relied on by either party shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other side no later than 10 working days before the next hearing;
7. Oral evidence on relevant issues will be permitted at the next hearing.

Directions to Administration:

1. These appeals are adjourned for a continuation hearing before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor at Field House on 23 May 2016;
2. There is a 3 hour time estimate for the continuation hearing;
3. An Urdu interpreter is required for the continuation hearing.

Signed Date: 29 March 2016

H B Norton-Taylor

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal