Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA054252015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 29th January 2016
On 20th June 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

MR. FRANCIS KABUYE
(anonymity direction NOT made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Miss. A Walker: Counsel instructed by Wimbledon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. H Kotas: Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal against a decision and reasons by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana promulgated on 28th September 2015 in which she dismissed an appeal against a decision made by the Secretary of State on 6th March 2015 to refuse the appellant's claim for asylum and to give directions for the removal of the appellant from the UK.
2. The appellant is a national of Uganda. The appellant's immigration history is set out at paragraph [2] of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal:
"2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 5 November 2007 with a six month visitor visa which expired on 10 August 2007. The appellant did not leave the country but lived here unlawfully. On 5 March 2014, the appellant claimed asylum and was served with notice IS1 51A on 5 March 2014 as an over stayer. He was granted temporary admission and placed on reporting orders. The appellant's asylum interview took place on 10 February 2015 and his application was refused on 6 March 2015."
3. The background to the appellant's claim is set out at paragraphs [15] to [21] of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I do not repeat that background here. The evidence received by the Judge is set out at paragraphs [23] to [53] of the decision. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant and a number of witnesses called by the appellant. The appellant's evidence is summarised at paragraphs [23] to [38] of the decision. The evidence of Mr. Dan Ssekandi is summarised at paragraphs [40] to [43] of the decision. The evidence of Ms Katrina Woodrow is summarised at paragraphs [44] to [46] of the decision. The evidence of Ms Margaret Ferguson is summarised at paragraphs [47] to [50] of the decision and finally, the evidence of Mr. Herbert Bulindi is summarised at paragraphs [51] to [53] of the decision.
4. The Judge's findings of fact are to be found at paragraphs [55] to [89] of his decision. It is perhaps useful at this stage to set out the approach that the Judge adopted as set out at paragraphs [56] to [58] of his decision:
"56. The core of the appellant's claim is that he is a homosexual and fears that he will be subjected to persecution, if he is returned to Uganda.
57. I have attempted to decide whether the evidence in the appeal is consistent and coherent and whether it establishes that the appellants' claim is genuine to the low standard of proof required in asylum cases. I have also considered the case of HT (Iran) v SSHD and HT(Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 that sets out guidance for judges to follow in a case such as this. It states at paragraph 35: 'The first stage, of course, is to consider whether the applicant is indeed a homosexual. Unless he can establish that he is of that orientation he will not be entitled to be treated as member of the particular social group.
58. The respondent accepts that if the appellant can demonstrate that he is indeed a homosexual, he will be persecuted in Uganda. I therefore find that the only issue that I have to consider in this appeal is whether the appellant is indeed a homosexual, because unless he can establish that he will not be entitled to be treated as a member of that particular social group. Therefore I need not proceed to consider the next step of the test as laid down in HJ."
5. At paragraphs [59] to [84] of her decision, the Judge addresses the various facets to the appellant's claim and the evidence given by the witnesses. I do not repeat the findings made by the Judge in this decision but it is fair to say that the Judge found the appellant not be a credible witness. At paragraph [81] of the decision, the Judge sets out her reasons for finding that she can place no reliance upon the evidence of Mr Bulindi that the appellant is a homosexual. At paragraph [82] of the decision, the Judge sets out her reasons for finding that she can place no reliance upon the evidence of Mr Ssekandi that the appellant is a homosexual. At paragraph [82] of the decision, the Judge sets out her reasons for finding that both Ms Woodrow and Ms Ferguson are not in a position to know whether the appellant is a homosexual.
6. At paragraph [85], the Judge states:
"85. Taking all the evidence in the round, I do not accept the appellant is a homosexual or his evidence that he was caught having an intimate moment with Robert which was the moment that he realised he cannot live in Uganda anymore. I do not accept that he had a relationship with Robert in Uganda or Dan in the United Kingdom. I have found that the appellant is not credible and that the entirety of his evidence has been fabricated. I find that the appellant is not gay and I find that this evidence that he is a homosexual relationship with Dan has been fabricated and is his last desperate attempt to remain in this country."
7. The Judge went on to consider the impact of s8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants Etc) Act 2004 and having reminded herself at paragraph [88] of the need to undertake a global assessment of the appellant's credibility, concluded at paragraph that even on the lower burden of proof that applies in asylum cases, she was not satisfied that the appellant is homosexual now or that he has ever been homosexual in the past, that he fears persecution or mistreatment or has been threatened by anyone by reason of being homosexual or of being suspected of being one. The Judge found that the appellant lived here unlawfully and wants to continue to remain here for economic reasons.
The grounds of appeal
8. The appellant advances eleven grounds of appeal, each seeking to challenge the Judge's assessment of the evidence given by the appellant and his witnesses, and the Judge's conclusions. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ford on 7th December 2015. The matter comes before me to determine whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside for legal error and, if so, whether the decision in the appeal can be re-made without having to hear oral evidence.
9. At the hearing before me, Miss Walker handed up a typed transcript of the note taken by counsel for the appellant, of the evidence given to the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Kotas was unable to agree the note of the evidence, but he did not object to the note being relied upon by the appellant. He was confident that he could deal with the extracts that were going to be relied upon by the appellant.
10. In addition, Miss Walker sought to introduce a further ground of appeal. She submitted that in addition to the matters considered by the Judge in reaching her decision, the Judge should have undertaken an additional assessment as to how the appellant would be perceived by the Ugandan authorities in light of his activities in the United Kingdom. Miss Walker accepted that that was not a matter that has previously been raised in the lengthy grounds of appeal already filed, and she had not in fact formulated that ground or its scope in writing. Mr Kotas objected to the introduction of yet another ground of appeal that he has had no opportunity to consider. I refused permission to amend the grounds of appeal to include this further ground, that has not properly been formulated in a manner that Mr Kotas could properly be expected to respond to on the day of the hearing before me.
11. I first heard submissions from Miss Walker who confirmed that she relied upon the matters that are set out in the application for permission to appeal. As I have said, eleven grounds of appeal are set out. I then heard submissions from Mr Kotas. The respondent has filed a response under rule 24 dated 15th December 2015. The respondent opposes the appeal and Mr Kotas submitted that there is no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
12. Before I turn to each of the matters raised by Miss Walker, I note the observations made by Mr. Justice Hadon-Cave in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC);
It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.
13. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana spans some 22 pages and 93 paragraphs. Of that, some 38 paragraphs over 9 pages are dedicated to the Judge's findings of fact and conclusions. Miss Walker makes a number of criticisms as to the findings and conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal Judge, and I examine each in turn.
14. The issue for me to decide is whether or not the Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant is not a homosexual now, that he has never been a homosexual in the past, and that he does not fear persecution or mistreatment and that he has not been threatened by anyone by reason of being homosexual or of being suspected of being one.
15. In that respect I follow the guidance of the Court of Appeal in R & ors (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. The Court of Appeal held that a finding might only be set aside for error of law on the grounds of perversity if it was irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, or one that was wholly unsupported by the evidence. A finding that is "perverse" embraces findings that are irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, and findings of fact that are wholly unsupported by the evidence. On appeal, the Upper Tribunal should not overturn a judgment at first instance, unless it really could not understand the original judge's thought process when he was making material findings. I apply that guidance to my consideration of the decision in this appeal.
16. I have also had regard to the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons: set aside) [2013] UKUT 00085 IAC where it was stated in the head note that:
"Although there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions on the central issue on which the appeal is determined, those reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the judge."
17. I now turn to the appellant's grounds of appeal. As to the first ground of appeal, Miss Walker submits that during the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant was asked a number of questions about the sexual relationship between him and Dan Ssekandi. She submits that the line of questioning adopted by the Presenting Officer at the hearing was contrary to the guidance set out in the respondent's Asylum Policy Instruction: "Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum claim" which set out the approach to be taken to asylum claims relating to sexuality. She submits that not only is the guidance relevant to an assessment of sexuality by the respondent but it is also relevant to the assessment of sexuality undertaken by a Judge. She accepts that the line of questioning adopted was not objected to during the hearing itself, but she submits that it was wholly unfair of the Judge to attach significant weight to matters such as the number of times that the appellant and Dan had engaged in sexual activity, in reaching a decision as to the appellant's sexuality. She submits that the Judge erroneously found that the Appellant was using the excuse of finances for his failure to explain why he and Dan have not had sex more often. Miss Walker submits that the sexual behaviour of an individual is not materially relevant to the assessment of sexuality. She submits that the finding made by the judge was one that was not properly open to her. Miss Walker submits that the Judge does not reject the evidence that the appellant and Dan have had sex once, and if that is accepted, the assessment by the Judge of whether they are in a relationship, is erroneous, because the Judge assessed whether they are in a relationship simply by reference to the fact that they have not had sex more often.
18. In reply, Mr Kotas submits that counsel for the appellant did not take issue with the cross-examination of the appellant during the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal and cannot now complain that the questions asked, were inappropriate. He submits that the respondent's Asylum Policy Instruction is nothing more than an instruction that explains to caseworkers, how they should conduct asylum interviews in claims made on the basis of sexual identity. He submits that the Asylum Policy Instruction is neither binding upon a Judge, nor indeed a Presenting Officer, who at the hearing of an appeal is seeking to test the evidence of appellant in circumstances where the respondent has already made an adverse decision. He submits that the appeals procedure is one that is adversarial and that in any event, it is clear that the questioning by the Presenting Officer in this appeal was not of an explicit nature but went to the issue that was at the heart of the appeal. That is, whether the appellant is a homosexual. Mr Kotas submits that the findings made by the Judge were, on any view, properly open to Judge who has carefully considered all of the evidence.
19. There is in my judgement, no basis whatsoever upon which a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal can be said to be bound by the Asylum Policy Instruction that is issued by the respondent to her caseworkers, as to how they should consider a particular issue. In this appeal, how a caseworker should conduct asylum interviews in claims made on the basis of sexual identity. To do so, would be to fetter the independence of the judiciary and undermine the role of the Judge to independently determine an appeal on the evidence before the Tribunal. Sections 1, 3 and 5 of the instruction relates to casework decisions, and the way in which interviews are conducted. A Presenting Officer at the hearing of an appeal is not involved in an interview or casework decision. He or she appears before the Tribunal to defend the adverse decision made by the respondent often, as here, on the grounds that the appellant's account is not credible. The hearing takes place in an adversarial setting, and it would be extraordinary to say that the Presenting Officer should not be permitted to test an account given by an appellant before the Tribunal. The burden remains upon the appellant, albeit to a lower standard, to prove his claim.
20. In my Judgement, the finding made by the Judge at paragraph [79] of the decision that the appellant and Dan are not in a homosexual relationship is one that was open to the Judge and cannot be said to be perverse, irrational or unreasonable, or one that was wholly unsupported by the evidence. The Judge had the benefit of hearing from the appellant and Dan and of having their evidence tested. The appellant's first ground amounts, in my judgement, to nothing more than a disagreement with a finding that was properly open to the Judge.
21. The second ground of appeal arises from what is said by the Judge at paragraphs [61] and [67] of the decision. Miss Walker submits that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant could be a homosexual notwithstanding the fact that his first relationship might have been with a woman and not a man. She submits that the finding made by the Judge at paragraph [67] is speculative and irrational because the Judge appears to assume that in order to be genuinely a homosexual, the appellant could not have a healthy relationship with his wife, Gloria. She submits that the Judge failed to recognise that it is quite possible for the appellant to have a normal relationship with his wife, but also to be a homosexual. Miss Walker submits that it does not necessarily follow that just because the appellant and his wife are having a sexual relationship that undermines the appellant's claim to be homosexual.
22. In reply, Mr Kotas submits that this is an appeal that turned upon the credibility of the appellant's account that he is a homosexual. In considering that issue, Mr Kotas submits that the Judge was bound to take account of the fact that the appellant was married to Gloria in 2004, and the impact that the appellant's sexuality had upon his relationship with his wife. He submits that the finding was one that was again properly open to the Judge.
23. The appellant's account of his marriage to Gloria and the findings reached by the Judge must be read as a whole. The appellant's own evidence was that he did not enter into a homosexual relationship with Robert before 2005. The Judge notes at paragraph [61] that the evidence shows that the appellant married Gloria in 2004 even before he had had an intimate relationship with Robert or even before Robert knew that the appellant was purportedly in love with him. The Judge notes that this evidence demonstrates that the first sexual encounter that the appellant had, was with a woman and not with a man. That is plainly in accordance with the evidence. The Judge found at paragraph [64] that she did not find it in the least credible or plausible that the appellant would marry Gloria because his uncle put pressure on him to marry. The Judge found at paragraph [65] that the appellant is using the family pressure to marry, as an excuse in order to explain why he married Gloria when he is supposed to be a homosexual. The Judge sets out her reasons for those findings, and in my judgement they were findings that were open to the Judge who had had the opportunity of hearing the appellant and having the evidence of the appellant tested in cross examination.
24. At paragraph [67] of the decision, the Judge noted that on the evidence, the appellant had a healthy sexual relationship with Gloria who did not even suspect that the appellant was a homosexual. Miss Walker's submissions disregard the comment made by the Judge at paragraph [67] that she takes into account that there is no evidence before her to suggest that a man cannot have a sexual relationship with a woman. The Judge found that the evidence before her demonstrates that the appellant was having a normal sexual relationship with his wife, even before he had had a homosexual encounter with a man because his first homosexual act was with Robert in 2005. In my judgment, the findings made at paragraphs [61] and [67] of the decision and her conclusion that those findings go to the credibility of the appellant's claim are findings that were open to the Judge and cannot be said to be perverse, irrational or unreasonable, or findings that were wholly unsupported by the evidence. The appellant's second ground amounts, again in my judgement, to nothing more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge.
25. The third ground of appeal challenges the finding at paragraph [59] of the decision that the appellant is attempting to establish a homosexual relationship in Uganda since 1999 when there was no relationship at all. Miss Walker submits that the Judge appears to have reached that conclusion because the appellant was unable to give a coherent answer when asked about when it was that Robert reciprocated his feelings. However, she submits that the Judge has failed to consider the evidence set out at paragraphs 8 to 11 of the appellant's witness statement in which the appellant set out his account of when he first became aware of his homosexuality and how he dealt with that. Furthermore, Miss Walker relies upon the appellant's counsel's note of the hearing in which the following exchange is recorded:
J: there was a chap called Robert who lived in Uganda and you fancied him? Is that right?
A: Yes sometimes he would show me he was also attracted to me.
J. So it wasn't - you didn't get together - you just liked him and you weren't sure what his feelings were?
A: Yes
J: So then you leave in 2001, and not until 2005 that he starts liking you back?
A: I was a bit confused, but when we had sex, then that is when it was confirmed that he was interested in me.
J: So in 2005 both now know interested in each other. So what was Robert doing in 2005?
A: A telephone technician.
?.
26. In reply, Mr Kotas submit that this ground again amounts to nothing more than a disagreement as to the findings reached by the Judge that were properly open to her. He submits that the evidence established that the appellant was unable to properly explain if Robert reciprocated his feelings towards Robert, and there is nothing unreasonable about the Judge's approach to the evidence. It is plain from what is set out at paragraph [59] of the decision and in counsel's notes of the hearing that the appellant was asked about whether the feelings that the appellant had for Robert, were reciprocated by Robert. In counsel's notes, at page 5, the following exchange is recorded during cross examination of the appellant:
HOPO: When did you first start staying at Robert?
A: I didn't stay at Robert's I would just go there. When his brother was there wouldn't stay the night.
HOPO: So when did you first go and stay the night at Roberts?
A: Around 2005.
HOPO: Was it only after you started your relationship with him?
A: I had stayed there before. There was a relationship but not intimate.
J: have a relationship but not intimate - need to be quite clear - when would you say your intimate relationship started?
A: I first slept with him on a Saturday I will never forget it, in 2005.
HOPO: Can you recall which month?
A: I can't recall. All I remember is a Saturday I can't recall the month.
HOPO: Before you started your intimate relationship with Robert did you ever stay
there for the night?
A: Yes I did
HOPO: Was his brother Kenny ever at home?
A: No, I was scared of him. He told me that he worked for the intelligence - Robert told me he worked for the intelligence. Because I was attracted to Robert I thought we might be found out
?..
27. The Judge notes at paragraph [59] of his decision that the appellant stated in his witness statement, that he was scared to tell Robert his feelings for him, due to fear of how Robert would react and also due to fear of his own safety in case he would tell someone. That is a fair summary of the appellant's evidence. The Judge had the opportunity of hearing the appellant given evidence and of observing the appellant's evidence being tested in cross examination. In my judgment, it was plainly open to the Judge to conclude that the appellant was not able to give a coherent answer. In my judgment, the finding made at paragraph [59] of the decision was open to the Judge and cannot be said to be perverse, irrational or unreasonable, or a finding that is wholly unsupported by the evidence. The appellant's third ground amounts, again in my judgement, to nothing more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge.
28. The fourth ground of appeal relates to the Judge's finding at paragraph [60] that no explanation has been given for why the appellant and Robert did not enter into a homosexual relationship earlier, and waited until 2005. Miss Walker submits that the judge failed to have regard to the explanation that is set out at paragraphs 11 and 12 of the appellants witness statement. The explanation is twofold. First, the appellant was scared about how Robert may react, and second, the appellant suppressed his feelings because of the social pressures and the environment within which he was living.
29. I pause to observe at this point that the approach adopted by Miss Walker, in seeking to mount a challenge to the determination on the grounds that the Judge failed to set out all of the matters set out in the appellant's witness statement, is wholly misguided. That is an approach that is positively discouraged. As Mr. Justice Hadon-Cave observed in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC) it is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case.
30. In fact, the Judge refers at paragraph [59] to the evidence of the appellant as set out in the appellant's witness statement. The appellant's claim that he was scared to tell Robert of his feelings for him, due to fear of how Robert would react and also due to fear of his own safety in case Robert would tell someone, does not in fact explain why the appellant and Robert did not enter into a homosexual relationship earlier. That is particularly so, when the appellant's evidence was that he had travelled from Rwanda to Uganda regularly, and that he had stayed with Robert before 2005 and whilst there was a relationship between them, it was not an intimate one. In my judgment, the conclusion reached by the Judge at paragraph [60] that the lack of an explanation goes to the credibility of the appellant's claim is a conclusion that was open to the Judge when she reached her final decision.
31. The fifth ground of appeal relates to the Judge's findings at paragraph [62] and in particular the Judge's conclusion that the appellant did not have a credible answer to the question of what the secret was, given that there was no sexual relationship between the appellant and Robert anyway. Miss Walker submits that the Judge fails to engage with the appellant's evidence of the risks that the appellant would be exposed to, if he had made his feelings known at the time. She submits that in reaching his findings, the Judge does not consider the environment within which the appellant was living.
32. The Judge found at paragraph [62] that she did not find it credible that the appellant would be attracted to Robert and not have been able to perceive whether Robert was attracted to him or to tell Robert he was attracted to him for six years. The Judge also found, on the evidence, that the appellant did not have a relationship with Robert before he married. The Judge had acknowledged, at paragraph [59], the appellant's evidence. The decision must be read as a whole and when properly read, in my judgement, the findings made at paragraph [62] of the decision were open to the Judge and cannot be said to be perverse, irrational or unreasonable, or findings that were wholly unsupported by the evidence. The appellant's fifth ground amounts, again in my judgement, to nothing more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge.
33. The sixth ground of appeal relates to the Judge's conclusions at paragraphs [63] and [64] of the decision, relating to the appellant's marriage. Miss Walker submits that the Judge fails to engage with the evidence set out at paragraph 15 of the appellants witness statement. That is, the appellant chose to marry Gloria to hide his sexuality and also because she was living in Rwanda and it was convenient for him to continue seeing Robert who lived in Uganda. Miss Walker submits that the conclusion reached by the Judge at paragraph [64] is unreasonable and it appears to have been reached on the basis that there is a lack of objective evidence to corroborate the account given by the appellant. She submits that corroborative evidence was not necessary in the circumstances.
34. In reply, Mr Kotas submits that the Judge has properly considered the evidence and it was open to the Judge to reject the account advanced by the appellant, for the reasons are set out in the decision.
35. I have carefully read the paragraphs that the appellant seeks to criticise and the decision as a whole. There is no hint of any suggestion within the findings of the Judge that the adverse credibility findings made at paragraphs [64] arise from a failure to consider the appellant's account or a lack of objective evidence to corroborate that account. The appellant's account, as noted by the Judge, was that the appellant had married Gloria because of the pressure put upon him by his family to marry. It is uncontroversial that the appellant did marry Gloria. It adds nothing to simply say that he did so, to cover his sexuality in circumstances where, as the Judge noted, the appellant had not commenced an intimate relationship with Robert at the point in time that he married. The appellant's sixth ground amounts, again in my judgement, to nothing more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge.
36. The seventh ground of appeal relates to the finding at paragraph [71] of the decision that it is incredible that the appellant would not have thought that Kenny would look for him at the airport given his evidence that he always travelled to Rwanda by plane. Miss Walker submits that the Judge proceeds upon a mistake of fact because the evidence is that the appellant routinely travelled between Rwanda and Uganda by bus and not plane.
37. In reply, Mr Kotas submits that the evidence as to how the appellant travelled between Rwanda and Uganda is far from clear but even if one were to proceed upon the basis that the applicant routinely travelled by bus and not plane, the finding made by the Judge is immaterial. He submits that even if one were to put aside that finding, that would not undermine the decision of the Judge upon the material issue as to whether or not the appellant is a homosexual.
38. I have carefully considered the evidence that is set out at paragraphs [31] to [34] of the decision and I accept that it is far from clear whether the appellant travelled between Rwanda and Uganda by bus or plane. For reasons that will become obvious, I accept the submission of Mr Kotas that even if one were to find that the Judge proceeds upon a mistake as to fact at paragraph [71] of the decision, that cannot undermine the overall conclusion reached by the Judge as to the credibility of the appellant and his claim to be a homosexual. In my judgement, on its own this error of fact is not one that in itself amounts to an error of law that affected the outcome of the appeal.
39. The eighth ground of appeal relied upon by the appellant criticises paragraph [74] of the decision. It is said that the Judge does not give any or any adequate reasons for her conclusion that it is not credible that the appellant would ask anyone about gay clubs if he was still in hiding, as he claims. I reject that submission. Paragraph [74] of the decision must be read as part of the Judge's findings as a whole that are set out at paragraphs [57] to [87] of the decision. There is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions on the central issue on which the appeal is determined. It is plain that the Judge does so in a detailed decision in which she has considered various different facts of the appellant's claim. The reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted or rejected by the Judge.
40. Miss Walker took grounds nine and ten together. She submits that the Judge erred in her findings in relation to the evidence given by Mr. Burundi, Ms. Woodrow and Ms. Ferguson. She submits that the Judge's assessment of the evidence of the witnesses was infected by the findings that she had already made about the appellant's sexuality. Miss Walker submitted that the reasoning behind the failure to attach any weight to the evidence of the witnesses is inadequate, and the Judge simply failed to engage with the evidence given by the witnesses.
41. In reply, Mr. Kotas submits that the Judge has carefully recorded the evidence given by the witnesses and properly considered that evidence before making perfectly valid observations at paragraphs [83] and [84] of her decision. He submits that it was open to the Judge to attach no weight to the evidence of the witnesses for the reasons that are set out in the decision.
42. I reject the submission by Miss Walker that the Judge does not give an adequate explanation for placing no reliance on Mr. Bulindi's evidence that the appellant is a homosexual. The Judge carefully refers to the evidence given by Mr. Bulindi at paragraphs [51] to [53] of her decision. At paragraph [81] of the decision, the Judge considered the credibility of the evidence given by Mr. Bulindi and in my judgment it was open to the Judge to conclude that she could place no reliance on his evidence that the appellant is a homosexual.
43. Similarly, I reject the submission by Miss Walker that the Judge has failed to adequately consider the evidence of Ms. Woodrow and Ms. Ferguson as to why they genuinely believe the appellant to be a homosexual, and that the Judge has failed to consider the totality of their evidence. As I have said before, it is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail of evidence or issue raised in a case. The evidence of Ms Katrina Woodrow is summarised at paragraphs [44] to [46] of the decision. The evidence of Ms Margaret Ferguson is summarised at paragraphs [47] to [50] of the decision. The finding at paragraph [83] that neither Ms. Woodrow nor Ms. Ferguson are in a position to know whether the appellant is a homosexual, for the reasons that are set out is one that was properly open to the Judge. Further reasons for attaching little weight to their evidence are set out at paragraph [84] of the decision. In my judgment, the findings made at paragraphs [81], to [84] of the decision were open to the Judge and cannot be said to be perverse, irrational or unreasonable, or findings that are wholly unsupported by the evidence. The appellant's ninth and tenth ground amount to nothing more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge.
44. The eleventh ground relied upon by the appellant contends that there are numerous typographical errors and misrecordings of the evidence, within the Judge's summary of the appellant's case and the hearing. Miss Walker conceded that taken alone, these matters are not capable of establishing a material error of law, but they do raise concerns as to whether the Judge gave the appeal the anxious scrutiny required.
45. I do not burden this decision with all of the typographical errors and slips that the appellant has identified at paragraph 51 of the grounds of appeal, but in my judgement there is no conceivable basis upon which it can be said that those typographical errors or slips amount to an error of law, and even less so, ones that affected the outcome of the appeal
46. This is an appeal which, as the Judge correctly noted, essentially came down to the question of whether or not the appellant is homosexual. It was common ground that if the appellant was found to be a homosexual, then his appeal must be allowed, given the voluminous background evidence on ill-treatment of gay people in Uganda. There were no issues as to background evidence, and so the simple matter was a lack of credibility.
47. In my judgment, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge is a lengthy and well-structured decision that correctly identified the issue and addressed the evidence. The reasons for the Judge's decision that the appellant's evidence is not credible and that he is not a homosexual is multifaceted. There are a whole range of adverse credibility findings made against him, including of course the adverse credibility finding regarding his delay in claiming asylum. On any reading of the evidence and the decision, it is clear that there were a number of inconsistencies in the evidence that the judge was entitled to take into account. There is no hint in the decision that the judge had already made up her mind and did not carefully consider all of the evidence before her. She looks at the various aspects of the claim and the evidence given by the witnesses. The Judge carefully considered that evidence and concluded at paragraph [89]
"89. Considering all of the evidence in the case as a whole, in the round, I find the appellant's evidence is not credible in view of the matters to which I have referred. I find that his claim that he is a homosexual is an invention by the appellant and a ploy to remain in this country. I do not accept his account of his homosexual experience with Robert in Uganda or his claim to be in a homosexual relationship with Dan in this country. I am not satisfied, even on the lower burden of proof that applies in asylum cases, that the appellant is homosexual now or that he has ever been a homosexual in the past, or that he fears persecution or mistreatment or been threatened by anyone by reason of being homosexual or of being suspected of being one. I find that the appellant lived here unlawfully and wants to continue to remain here for economic reasons.
48. Having very carefully considered the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge and the grounds rigorously advanced on behalf of the appellant by Miss Walker, it is clear to me that the appeal had been fully ventilated before the First-tier Tribunal Judge at the hearing. The Judge rejected the appellant's account of his sexuality. The Judge was not bound to embark on a sentence-by-sentence review of the appellant's evidence.
49. The grounds relied upon by the appellant are numerous and lengthy, but they amount to a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge on the evidence and do not disclose an error of law affecting the outcome of the decision.
NOTICE OF DECISION
50. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law affecting the outcome of the decision.
51. The appeal is dismissed.
Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
52. No application for an anonymity direction was made, and no such direction is made.

Signed Date 20th June 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 20th June 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia