Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/05600/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 13 October 2016
On 20 October 2016
Extempore

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RINTOUL

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ELIDA [L]
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Walker, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr D Sills, Counsel, instructed by J D Spicer Zeb Solicitors

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The respondent appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S George promulgated on 23 February 2016 in which she allowed the appeal of the respondent against a decision of the Secretary of State to refuse her asylum and to remove her from the United Kingdom.
2. This matter previously came before the Upper Tribunal when the appeal was heard by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Archer who unfortunately became extremely unwell before he was able to produce as decision on his reserve decision and accordingly by way of a transfer order the matter comes before me today.
3. There in reality little dispute over the facts of this case. In essence the appellant's case is that she is at risk of domestic violence from her husband and also from violence from her family as she has committed adultery, has had children from another man and accordingly she would face serious ill-treatment if returned to Albania as her actions had infringed upon the honour and reputation of her former husband and her current family.
4. The Secretary of State did not accept her case and did not accept, for reasons set out in the refusal letter, that she would be at risk on return. As noted by Judge George at paragraph 16 of her decision, a large part of the facts was not disputed.
5. The judge's found that the appellant is a member of a particular social group and that she had been subjected to domestic violence. The judge then sets out the risks in respect of internal relocation at paragraphs [33] to [38] and next addresses sufficiency of protection at paragraphs [39] to [44] of her decision.
6. The judge's findings at paragraphs [33] to [36] are not entirely easy to comprehend on first reading, but in the context of the decision as a whole, and bearing in mind that it had been accepted that she had been subjected to domestic violence, it appears that what the judge concluded was that the appellant would be at risk from her family and from her husband if they came into contact with her but not that they would necessarily actively look for her. The judge found that this is because they have in effect contained the shame that would otherwise occur and that the appellant has moved away.
7. The judge also found that if the respondent were to return to Albania that the situation would be different in that there was a real risk that her presence would come to the attention of the family and that accordingly the difficulties which had arisen due to the shame she had brought would come to the attention of others and that they would then take action. The judge also found out that it would not be possible for the appellant reasonably to relocate within Albania in any event.
8. The judge then found that there would not be a sufficiency of protection and then went onto allow the appeal also under Article 8. I do not need to deal with the latter issue in any great detail for reasons which will become apparent.
9. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal on relatively narrow grounds in that it is said that the judge had made contradictory findings, stating at paragraphs [33] and [34] that the husband would not be involved in being a danger to the appellant but at paragraph [35] that she had found that she would be at risk of coming to the attention of her family because of the attentions of others and that thus the findings at paragraphs [33] and [35] were contradictory, it not being explained why strangers would feel the need to trace her family.
10. The second ground is that the error is compounded by the findings at paragraph [36] that the appellant's now partner would have the ability to relocate with the appellant, be that in Albania or Kosovo.
11. I heard submissions from Mr Walker and Mr Sills. These focused on the findings set out at paragraphs [33] to [36] of the decision. I consider that it is implicit in these findings that if she returned to her home area, and there is no challenge to this finding, that the respondent would be at risk there from domestic violence from her family and her former husband who had already perpetrated that. Hence the decision focused on internal relocation and sufficiency of protection
12. I consider, and Mr Walker did not demur from this position when it was put to him, that in reality there is not a contradiction between the judge's findings that the family would not actively seek her but that if confronted with a return there would be a difficulty. The point is that the judge found that the risk arises not from the fact that the family would actively seek her but that if she did come to their attention whether they actively this would result in the danger to her as a result.
13. At Mr Walker accepted, the judge's observation that the appellant's now partner would be able to assist her is of limited assistance given firstly that he is not Albanian and, second, it is not correct to say that somebody can relocate to another state, in this case Kosovo, as amounting to internal relocation.
14. I accept Mr Sills' submission that there is no challenge to the finding at paragraph [38] that it would be unreasonable for the appellant to relocate within Albania. As the judge found, and there is no challenge to this, there is no guarantee that her partner could join her as he is not Albanian and she would be at risk as a single woman without children given the social difficulties that exist for single women in Albania who face difficulty in moving or in living apart from their families without permission and that this would put her and the children at greater risk.
15. For these reasons I am not satisfied that the judge did not reach contradictory findings and I note that in reality this is at best an adequacy of reasons case, as Mr Walker accepted. When viewed as a whole, the judge's conclusions are adequately reasoned. It is evident to the losing party that the judge was satisfied, having applied the relevant case law and having directed herself properly as to the law and evidence, that the respondent was at risk in her home area; that there was a risk to her if she returned, as her family would know of it, and then seek to harm her; and, in any event, that it was unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect her to relocate, there being in effect no sufficiency of protection.
16. I find that properly considered, the judge's conclusions are not contradictory and when reviewing the decision as a whole, although it could have been better expressed, there is no contradiction and accordingly the findings are sustainable.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold that decision.
2. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 19 October 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul