Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/06421/2013

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Glasgow
Determination promulgated
on 20 November 2013
on 19 December 2013

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MACLEMAN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MOHAMMED IBRAHIM
Respondent

For the Appellant: Mrs M O’Brien, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr B Criggie of Hamilton Burns & Co, Solicitors

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1) This determination refers to parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal.
2) The SSHD appeals against a determination by First-tier Tribunal Judge Quigley, promulgated on 20 August 2013, allowing the appellant’s appeal in terms of humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
3) The appellant said that he worked as a middleman between rice merchants and farmers. On 1 November 2012 he was robbed of 399,000 Egyptian Guineas (£31,500) which was due to twelve farmers. The farmers knew that the appellant had been robbed, but considered him still liable to pay them. Seven of the farmers threatened to kill him. On 2 March 2013 he fled Egypt. His wife and four children remain at home.
4) Although the respondent had not found the appellant’s account credible, the judge did, and the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal do not quarrel with that.
5) The first ground is that the sufficiency of protection findings at paragraphs 41-45 do not relate to the appellant’s particular circumstances and do not disclose application of the relevant legal test [to be found in Horvath v SSHD [2000] INLR 239], a significant omission in a case arising from a private dispute between the appellant and others in a village.
6) The Presenting Officer submitted that the judge cited background information on the situation in the wake of the “Arab spring” and the general shortcomings of the police and security forces, but failed to deal with the issue in light of the appellant’s own circumstances, overlooking the point that he made no effort to avail himself of domestic protection.
7) Mr Criggie argued that the judge did carry out an assessment of the availability of legal protection based on the background evidence and was entitled to conclude as she did.
8) The second ground of appeal is that the judge erred by giving inadequate reasons for the conclusion that internal relocation was not available:
“… the judge provides no reason why or how “others would report back [his location] to the farmers” nor qualifies over what geographical range this animus might extend.”
9) Mrs O’Brien said there was no evidence that the risk to the appellant was anything but local. That was not enough, and this issue was sufficient for the decision to be reversed. The appellant provided no indication of how a group of rural farmers would trace his whereabouts in a huge and populous country such as Egypt. His wife and children remained at home with no suggestion that they have come to any harm, which was some indication that the threat was of limited scope.
10) At paragraph 46 the judge said that she did not find the question of internal relocation to be “of particular relevance” given that she had found that there was no sufficiency of state protection in Egypt. Mr Criggie acknowledged that to the extent that the judge thought that a finding on sufficiency of protection meant there was no need to decide the issue of internal relocation, that was an error. However, he said that paragraph 46, read as a whole, did contain a reasoned conclusion on internal relocation which was open to the judge and which should not be set aside. Alternatively, if a fresh decision were required on internal relocation, the starting point was the favourable credibility findings. The sum of money involved was large by Egyptian standards and was likely to lead the aggrieved farmers into a tenacious pursuit. The appellant would not get any assistance from the police, and the risk would extend throughout Egypt, so internal relocation was excluded.
11) I reserved my determination.
12) The judge erred in thinking that a conclusion on internal relocation was of little or no importance, following a finding on sufficiency of protection. There does not have to be general sufficiency of protection in a country, or sufficiency of local protection for a particular appellant, before internal relocation can arise.
13) It is axiomatic that a purely localised risk does not make someone a refugee, and that international protection cannot be claimed if a person can be safe elsewhere in his own country. There was an error of legal approach. The judge went on to say the appellant could not relocate because everyone in his home town and surrounding area was aware of the robbery and even if he were to relocate, others would identify him and report back. That is a sweeping conclusion without any justification in the evidence. The respondent was not represented in the First-tier Tribunal, but made strong points in the refusal letter on internal relocation at paragraphs 45-47. The judge failed to deal with that. There is no evidence which might justify a finding of a risk beyond a limited locality. A fresh decision, properly taking into account internal relocation, can only be against the appellant.
14) The respondent’s point on sufficiency of protection at paragraph 48 to 65 of the refusal letter is not as strong as the internal relocation argument, but it is sensibly made. The shortcomings of the police and security services are accepted, but the appellant’s evidence about approaching the police is analysed and shown to be evasive. The issue is not whether the authorities are generally willing to provide protection, but whether they are capable of providing the particular individual with adequate protection. The error in this respect is not so clear, but it is not necessary to take the analysis any further, because the internal relocation issue decides the case.
15) The determination of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. In remaking the decision, I find that the appellant does not qualify for international protection because the risk of which he complains is local and can be avoided by his moving elsewhere in Egypt. His appeal, as originally brought to the First-tier Tribunal, is therefore dismissed.
16) No anonymity order has been requested or made.

20 November 2013
Judge of the Upper Tribunal