Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA065532015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 28 April 2016
On 17 June 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLIVE LANE

Between

FRANCISCA ONSHOGHIE ODE
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Khan, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Pettersen, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, Francisca Onshoghie Ode, was born on 16 July 1978 and is a female citizen of Nigeria. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in October 2010 and her leave was subsequently extended. She applied for asylum on 11 October 2014. She has two dependants in her appeal (her children, born respectively in 2007 and 2011). On 30 March 2015, a decision was taken to refuse her claim for asylum, to refuse to vary her leave to remain in the United Kingdom and to remove the appellant by way of directions. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Birkby) which, in a decision promulgated on 27 July 2015, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. Ms Khan, for the appellant, explained to me that there was only one ground in this appeal, namely the failure of the judge to assess material which had been before the First-tier Tribunal. In consequence of the error, she submitted that the judge's findings at [30] were vitiated.
3. I find that the appeal should be dismissed. I have reached that finding for the following reasons. First, the appellant challenges the judge's finding that the appellant had given evasive, vague, implausible and inconsistent evidence. At [30(i)] the judge noted that the appellant gave evidence in Yoruba assisted by an interpreter. The appellant had no difficulty reading the record of her asylum interview in English and the judge also noted that she had obtained a BSc degree in computing whilst living in the United Kingdom. The judge recorded that "the appellant in my judgment was particularly evasive with regard to her lack of knowledge of English". The ground of appeal does no more than to assert that the appellant was not evasive, pointing out that the appellant did not claim that she could not read or speak English, only that she could not do so as well "as a white person"; she used Google Translate "when she got stuck". I find that the grounds offer no more than a disagreement with findings clearly available to the judge on the evidence. Another judge may have accepted that the appellant was not acting in an evasive manner as regards her use of English, possibly citing the reasons referred to in the grounds (see above). However, that is not the point. There was no perversity or irrationality in the judge's assessment that an appellant who used an interpreter to give oral evidence but who had undertaken an undergraduate degree in the United Kingdom wholly taught in the English language was behaving "evasively".
4. The grounds raise the finding of the judge at [30(ii)] to the effect that the appellant had not been truthful regarding the divorce petition sent to her by her husband. It appears that this petition had been served by substituted service. The divorce petition also contained an inaccurate statement of the appellant's husband's age (43 years, not 42). The judge decided not to rely upon the divorce document pursuant to the decision in Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439. I acknowledge that the judge's reasoning at [30(ii)] is rather cryptic although the grounds [8] appear to accept that the appellant gave inconsistent answers regarding the service of the divorce petition and the presence of her husband in the United Kingdom. In her witness statement, the appellant had explained that her husband was a barrister and could have prepared the papers before he left Nigeria asking a colleague to file the papers whilst he was in the United Kingdom. [Witness statement, 30]. The grounds complain that the judge did not deal with this explanation. I am satisfied that the judge has looked at all the evidence; he was not obliged to refer to each and every item of evidence or to every part of the appellant's witness statement. Ultimately, the judge was not satisfied that the appellant had given consistent and reliable evidence regarding the divorce proceedings. That was a finding open to the judge. The judge was not bound to accept explanations given by the appellant for inconsistencies in the evidence.
5. The judge also considered that the appellant's credibility was diminished by the fact that she had delayed in claiming asylum. She claimed asylum some months after her visa had expired. The judge noted that "part of her reason for not claiming earlier was that she did not know that the visa had expired". The judge did not accept that evidence. He also did not accept the appellant's claim that she had no knowledge of asylum given her stated educational history and her history of applying for visas in the past. The appellant's explanation is that her husband (a lawyer) had applied for visas and that the appellant herself had never claimed that she had no knowledge of asylum, only that she did not know asylum was available for the sort of problem (domestic violence) which she had encountered. Once again, these are explanations offered by the appellant which the judge was not obliged to accept. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the significant level of education achieved by the appellant and to have regard also to the fact that, notwithstanding the fact that her husband may have applied for visas, applications had been made in her name and that she was responsible for the contents of those applications. The judge's general finding (that the appellant had been evasive and untruthful about her knowledge of the English language and the UK asylum system) was available on the evidence and notwithstanding the explanations provided by the appellant. The grounds, therefore, amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge's findings.
6. The judge also considered in detail the appellant's evidence regarding the reporting of domestic violence to the police in or about 2014-2015 [30(vii)]. Considering the discrepancies in her evidence as to reporting (detailed in the sub-paragraph), the judge was led, on his assessment of all the evidence, to a finding that the appellant had not been the victim of domestic violence as she claimed. An examination of the interview record bears out the judge's findings. The discrepancies are significant and clearly go to the core of the appellant's account and her claim for asylum. The grounds of appeal are largely silent as regards sub-paragraph (vii) stating no more than that "we are aware that this would not be a matter for an application for permission to appeal but we would note that we are due to submit a subject access request on behalf of the appellant for records relating to her from the police". In essence, therefore, the grounds of appeal make no serious challenge to the findings of the judge. I am satisfied that the judge was entitled to reach the findings which he did as regards the credibility of the appellant's account and, in particular, as regards the appellant's evidence concerning the alleged domestic violence. The judge has provided a clear and cogent decision fully supported by adequate reasoning. I find that he has not erred in law for the reasons asserted in the grounds of appeal or at all.

Notice of Decision
7. This appeal is dismissed.
8. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 1 June 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 1 June 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane