Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/06670/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 16th November 2016
On 01st December 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D E TAYLOR

Between

RB
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr M Symes
For the Respondent: Mr C Avery, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the appellant's appeal against the decision of Judge Obhi made following a hearing at Birmingham on 30th June 2016.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 23rd October 1983. She arrived in the UK, lawfully, on 2nd April 2011, and her leave expired on 31st March 2012. On 6th July 2013 she was apprehended by Immigration Officers and three months later, on 29th October 2013, applied for asylum. She was refused on 26th March 2015.
3. The basis of the appellant's claim is that she fears a return to Pakistan because of the attitude of her family towards her marriage. She said that she married her husband against her uncle's wishes and against the wishes of his family. In 2006 her husband was badly assaulted by his family and three police officers. The family moved to a number of different areas in order to avoid them, from Multan, to Faisalabad and finally to Karachi.
4. In a lengthy determination the judge analysed all of the evidence adduced on the appellant's behalf and concluded, essentially, that there was no truth in any of her claims. She dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds and with respect to the claims made under the Immigration Rules regarding the appellant's private and family life.
The Grounds of Application
5. The appellant sought permission to appeal on two grounds. First, that the judge had erred in law in assessing the medical evidence and, second, she had erred in her consideration of the document verification reports.
6. The appellant had relied on a medical report produced by Dr Juliet Cohen of the Medical Foundation, who is highly respected in this field. Dr Cohen makes a number of findings in relation to the physical injuries sustained by the appellant's husband. She concluded that the scars were either highly consistent or typical of the attributions claimed. The grounds argued that the judge failed to properly engage with the medical evidence and indeed only considered the report after reaching conclusions on the credibility of the account.
7. Second, the appellant had relied on three FIRs in support of her claim. The document verification reports claimed that all three were not genuine. However, in respect of two, the appellant had reasonable explanations. In respect of the first, the respondent had used an incorrect reference number, and in respect of the second, there had been a mistranslation of the reference number. Furthermore, the appellant had submitted an affidavit from a local attorney who confirmed that he had attended each of the police stations and checked to see if the FIRs existed. The judge simply disregarded that evidence.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge Brunnen on 16th August 2016 for the reasons stated in the grounds.
9. On 7th September 2016 the respondent served a reply defending the determination.

Submissions
10. Mr Symes took me through the documentation. He submitted that Dr Cohen's report was extremely strong, identifying a number of different scars, which she concluded were either highly consistent or typical of the attribution claimed by him, reminding me that the report was properly referenced with the Istanbul Protocol. The judge had been unduly dismissive of important evidence which was highly relevant or even determinative of the account.
11. The respondent and the judge had accepted that the appellant had given consistent evidence - this is not a case where there are difficulties with the story itself. More importantly, she had not considered the medical evidence in the round as she was required to do, as a part of her assessment of credibility, but had reached her conclusions first, and considered the medical evidence afterwards.
12. So far as the FIRs were concerned, he took me to the documents. With respect to the first, the reference number on the FIR, 365/B-25-06 is clearly different from the reference number on the DVR, which is given as 425/06. So far as the second document was concerned, there was a mistranslation of the reference number given as 1951867/07 in the FIR but the document from Oracle Translation, which acknowledged the mistake, stated that the FIR number should have been 19501076/07. The subtleties of the case had been misunderstood by the judge who had not properly engaged with the evidence.
13. Mr Avery defended the determination. He observed that the criticisms made did not undermine the judge's approach as a whole. She had taken into account the appellant's explanations and was clearly troubled by aspects of her evidence, particularly the fact that it appeared that an envelope containing documentation sent from Pakistan appeared to have been tampered with.
14. So far as the medical evidence was concerned, he submitted that the judge had indeed considered it as a part of her assessment as a whole and she was fully entitled to say that, whilst the husband had clearly been mistreated, it was not possible to reach a conclusion on the context for that mistreatment.
Findings and Conclusions
The Medical Evidence
15. The appellant's case is that, in 2006, her husband was badly beaten by two brothers-in-law from his first wife and three policemen. So far as the scars are concerned, Dr Cohen stated:
(i) L1 was a 2.5 centimetre linear scar on Mr I's right cheek that he claimed he received from a blow from a pistol. The scar was highly consistent with this attribution (paragraph 32).
(ii) L4 was a faint 0.5 centimetre scar inside the upper lip, Mr I claimed he received when hit with a rifle butt on the chin. The scar was typical with this attribution (paragraph 35).
(iii) L6 was a 2 centimetre irregular shaped linear scar under the chin. L7 was a 4 centimetre irregular shaped linear scar under the chin. Both attributed to a blow from a rifle butt. The scars "typical" of the attribution (paragraph 37).
(iv) L8 was a 4 centimetre x 0.5 centimetre scar on the right lower leg and L9 was a 1.5 centimetre scar next to it. L10 was a 2 centimetre depressed scar on the left lower leg. All three were attributed to a dando, a type of baton with a metal round it. The appearance was "highly consistent" with the attribution (paragraph 39).
16. The Istanbul Protocol defines highly consistent as "the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes". Typical of is defined as "this is an appearance that is usually found within this type of trauma, but there are other possible causes".
17. The judge dealt with the evidence in the following way. At paragraph 37 she described Dr Cohen's report and identified her conclusions. The judge stated that the doctor provided alternative causes for the injuries, such as a fall directly forwards but recognised that being struck with a pistol or being hit with a wooden baton were highly consistent causes. She also noted that Dr Cohen commented on the passage of time since the injuries were inflicted.
18. She then wrote as follows:
"The report of Dr Cohen is heavily dependent on the account of the appellant. She has considered the scars and lesions based on his account and she has found them to be highly consistent with the account. She does comment on the difficulty of dating these injuries, and she provides an alternative explanation. They could be accidental injuries. She thinks they are not because of the number of the injuries, but she is unable to date them and therefore cannot say whether they all occurred at the same time or were acquired during different events. Though I find the report to be very helpful, it does not assist me with assessing the credibility of the accounts given by the appellant and her husband. I have to consider the findings of Dr Cohen in the context of the remainder of the appellant's evidence. I am also not entirely sure about the documents which were provided to her".
19. There can be no real complaint about the judge's approach to the evidence of Dr Cohen. The judge recognised Dr Cohen's expertise, and she said that the report was very helpful. She does not dispute the doctor's findings. She correctly states that the medical evidence has to be assessed in the context of the evidence as a whole. It is not disputed that the appellant's husband bears scars, some of which may very likely have been caused by having been hit with a rifle butt. The medical report however can say nothing about the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained.
20. There is no merit in the suggestion that the judge unlawfully reached her conclusions on the credibility of the claim first, before taking into account the medical evidence. She was bound to have to consider all of the different strands of the evidence in turn. She says in terms that the findings of Dr Cohen had to be assessed in the context of the remainder of the evidence. The fact that the medical report was considered last does not mean that her conclusions were reached without having properly taken it into account. In fact, her overall conclusions on credibility are not reached until paragraph 40 of the determination where she summed up all of the evidence and decided that the appellant and her husband had tried to "weave a careful account of persecution by their respective families." It is only at that point that she finally concludes that the account is false.
21. Second, with regard to the FIRs, the judge took into account the appellant's point in relation to the wrong reference number on the first FIR. She was entitled to observe in respect of that FIR, that the rest of the information was correct including the date and the other reference. She was also entitled to consider that the envelope containing some of the documents had been cut in places where the date and other information would have been stamped.
22. Moreover, the appellant makes no specific challenge to the third document verification report concluding that the last FIR was not genuine.
23. In any event, the judge did not rely solely upon the conclusions in the document verification report in relation to the first two FIRs when reaching her decision that the appellant had not been truthful in her claim. At paragraph 33 she sets out a number of different reasons for doubting the credibility of her story.
24. First, it was not credible that she would have been allowed to work if her uncle was as strict as she claimed or that he would wait until she was 22 years of age before arranging a marriage for her. Second, it was not credible that her husband, having married only a short time before into a wealthy and influential family, would be entering into a relationship with another woman. It was particularly unlikely that her husband's cousin's wife would be instrumental in introducing them for that purpose.
25. Most important, there was a substantial delay in making this claim which was only made after the appellant had been refused further leave to remain as a student. Not only did she arrive here as a student, but she applied to extend her leave to remain on two occasions and it was only after these had been rejected that she decided to apply for asylum.
26. This is a meticulously drafted determination. The judge analysed the evidence in great detail and came to conclusions plainly open to her. The grounds disclose no arguable error.
Notice of Decision
27. The original judge did not err in law. Her decision stands.

Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 26 November 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Taylor