Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/06675/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
Heard on 9th September 2016
On 14th September 2016
Prepared on 12th September 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

Ms Ramela Valli
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of state for the home department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N. S. Ahluwahlia of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr S. Whitwell, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
The Appellant
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka born on 26 May 1986. She appeals against a decision of Judge of the First-tier tribunal Kelly sitting at Taylor House on 17 June 2016 in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant's appeal against a decision of the Respondent dated 24th March 2015. That decision was to refuse the Appellant's application for asylum which had been made on the grounds that she was a refugee entitled to asylum and also that her removal to Sri Lanka would breach Articles 3 and 8 of the European convention on human rights.
2. The Appellant first came to the United Kingdom on 3rd of October 2010 with leave to enter as a Tier 4 student valid from 14th of September 2010 to 15th of October 2013. On 29th of October 2010 she attended the asylum screening unit and claimed asylum but failed to attend a full asylum interview arranged for 12th of November 2010 and failed to comply with a reporting requirement. She re-established contact with the Respondent in October 2011 and was offered a further asylum interview appointment on 2nd of November 2011 but she said she felt too unwell to proceed with that interview. On 27th of April 2012 her student visa was curtailed to 26th of June 2012 because her sponsor advised the Respondent that the Appellant had failed her course. A full asylum interview was finally carried out on 17th of March 2015.
The Appellant's Claim
3. The Appellant's claim was that she had been arrested and ill treated by the Sri Lankan authorities who continued to have an adverse interest in her. Her problems began in 2006 when she was forcibly recruited by the LTTE a Tamil separatist organisation. She was made to undergo two months of compulsory training but when this finished the Appellant refused to join the organisation saying that she wanted to go abroad to study. The LTTE threatened her and said that if she wanted to do that she must first help them but in return they would contribute towards her studies and arrange for an agent to facilitate her trip to Singapore where she studied computer networking. She distributed leaflets about the plight of the Tamil people on the street or in shops and temples. The purpose of the leaflets was to raise funds for the LTTE although potential donors were not told this. The leaflets were supplied to her by two men whom she met after her arrival in Singapore.
4. She returned to Sri Lanka on 15th of December 2009 when she was arrested by two men and driven to an office where she was questioned about the help she had given to the LTTE in Singapore. After being threatened and beaten up she confessed to working for the LTTE and was blindfolded and driven to another location where she was detained for the next three months. During that time she was beaten to unconsciousness and burned with cigarettes. This occurred two or three times per week. She was also deprived of food and water and was only released (on or about 15th of March 2010) after her mother paid a bribe.
5. Between March 2010 and the time she travelled to United Kingdom in October 2010 she was kept in a house in an unknown location are not allowed to go out. An agent helped her to obtain a student visa and she left Sri Lanka on a Sri Lankan Airways flight using her own passport accompanied by an agent to the airport. She attended college for a couple of weeks after her arrival in the United Kingdom until her mother telephoned her on 20th of October 2010 to notify her that the Appellant was now the subject of an arrest warrant in Sri Lanka. Although her mother posted the warrant to her in United Kingdom it never arrived. The Appellant was unable to concentrate on her studies after this and claimed asylum on 29th of October 2010. She failed to keep in touch with the Respondent thereafter because she was unwell. Since arriving in the United Kingdom she had attended four or five demonstrations in support of a separate state for Tamils. She feared that she would be at risk of death or serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka.
6. The Respondent rejected the claim because she did not accept that the Appellant had been a member of the LTTE. The Appellant's account was said to contain a number of discrepancies and to be inconsistent with background country information relating to Sri Lanka.
The Hearing at First Instance
7. The Appellant did not give oral evidence. The Judge had before her a report from Dr Zapata, a Consultant Psychiatrist who said that the Appellant lacked the mental capacity to give evidence. The Appellant had provided a witness statement and had given replies in her screening and asylum interviews. The Judge found the Appellant's claim to be undermined by the vagueness and implausibility of certain aspects of the account and also by the Appellant's conduct since arrival in the United Kingdom. The Appellant was an economic migrant who believe that she would enjoy a better quality of life in the United Kingdom where other members of her family had previously claimed asylum successfully. The Appellant had made an unsuccessful application for a visit visa to come to United Kingdom in 2008 more than two years before she claimed to have been detained and tortured in Sri Lanka.
8. At paragraphs 22 to 28 the Judge set out what she found were difficulties in the Appellant's account which undermined its credibility. It was not plausible that the LTTE would recruit the Appellant by force requiring her to undertake 2 months of physical training only to agree to pay for the Appellant to study computer networking and cyber security in Singapore and distributing some fundraising leaflets. The account given of the training did not accord with what was known of LTTE training in general. The Appellant described carrying weights and being trained how to collect food parcels whereas the refusal letter had referred to training being weapons training, battle craft and indoctrination. Counsel for the Appellant (who did not appear before me) proffered the explanation during the hearing that the Appellant's training may have differed from that referred to in the objective evidence because she was not being trained as a cadre. But if that were so and the Appellant was merely being trained as a fundraiser the Judge found that the sort of physical training she had described in the asylum interview would be senseless.
9. The Judge did not accept that the if the Appellant were tasked with raising money for the LTTE she would be instructed by them to keep this fact concealed from fellow Tamils as the objective evidence suggested that the LTTE had an extensive and visible international fundraising operation. The Appellant had been vague and inconsistent in respect of the arrangements by which she forwarded the proceeds of her alleged fundraising to the LTTE. Two and a half years of fundraising on the LTTE's behalf should have left the Appellant with a greater level of knowledge about the organisation than she exhibited in her asylum interview. Her claim to have been detained for 3 months on return to Sri Lanka was undermined by the fact that she was still in possession of a passport after her detention and able to use it to travel to the United Kingdom in 2010. The passport she used to leave Sri Lanka was the same one she had submitted in support of unsuccessful application for a visit visa in 2008. If she had been arrested and detained on 15th of December 2009 as she exited the airport the Judge found that the passport and other belongings would have been seized from her. If her release was unofficial and secured only through a bribe the passport would not have been returned. If her unofficial escape from detention caused her to be of adverse interest to the authorities it was highly unlikely she would have been able to travel through the airport in her own name without being rearrested even if she was assisted by an agent.
10. There was no plausible explanation why the Sri Lankan authorities would issue an arrest warrant more than 6 months after the Appellant's escape from detention. The Appellant could provide no details of that warrant or the nature of the charges. She had not asked her mother about the warrant despite the fact that she had remained in regular contact with her mother since arrival in this country. The Judge did not accept the claim that the warrant had been lost in the post or that the Appellant's mother had failed to take or obtain a copy of the warrant before forwarding it on to the Appellant.
11. The Appellant had provided two medical reports. One as indicated above was from Doctor Zapata who stated that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression could cause short and long term memory problems. The Judge rejected this as a cause for the difficulties which the Appellant had in giving her evidence since the credibility issues she had referred to did not relate to the ill-treatment of torture from which the Appellant said she suffered which might be too distressing to recall if it had taken place. They also did not relate to the chronological order in which events occurred or to specific dates such that the discrepancies might be attributable to the sort of memory problems that Doctor Zapata associated with PTSD and depression. They were not peripheral discrepancies they were matters the Judge found to be inherently implausible or gaps in the Appellant's knowledge. There was no reference to any significant cognitive impairment in the medical evidence. The Appellant had only been prescribed a very low dose of antidepressant medication and had not been referred by her GP to a psychiatrist. In her screening interview she had made no reference to any mental health problems.
12. While the Appellant as a Tamil might fear adverse treatment from the authorities this did not mean that her fears were based in reality. Doctor Zapata appeared to recognise that even if her fears of return were genuinely held it did not follow that they were well founded. The Judge found that the Appellant had exaggerated her mental health condition for the purpose of bolstering her asylum claim. Although claiming to be mentally unwell she had nevertheless been able to participate in a number of pro-Tamil events and demonstrations and to embark upon an arranged marriage.
13. The second report relied upon by the Appellant was a scarring report prepared by Dr Martin dated 17th of December 2015. The Respondent had conceded that the Appellant may have suffered some form of ill-treatment in the past. The Judge accepted Dr Martin's qualifications and noted his findings that the majority of scars on the Appellant's body were typical of those that would be expected if she had been intentionally burned as she claimed. However such burns might have been inflicted in a number of circumstances and it did not follow from Dr Martens findings that the burns were inflicted in the manner and circumstances that the Appellant had described. If the Appellant were otherwise credible then the Judge would have been content to accept that the burns were caused in the manner claimed but as the Appellant was not credible the report did not assist the Appellant.
14. The Judge also noted the delay by the Appellant in claiming asylum and the lack of cooperation with the Respondent thereafter. Even though the Appellant had attended demonstrations as the Judge did not accept that the Appellant had been of previous adverse interest to the Sri Lankan authorities there was no risk she would be identified by them attending such demonstrations. The Judge referred to the country guidance case of GJ [2013] UKUT 00319 and found the Appellant did not fall within any of the risk groups highlighted there. The Appellant's mental health problems were not sufficiently severe to reach the very high threshold necessary to engage Article 3 on health grounds. The Appellant had been able to enter into a customary marriage and attend political demonstrations and had only been prescribed a modest dose of antidepressant medication. Thus while the Judge accepted that the Appellant had some mental health problems these fell far short of the severity necessary to lead to a grant of leave on Article 3 grounds. The Judge considered the case law on health matters noting that Doctor Zapata had referred to an increase suicide risk on the Appellant's return but that was premised on the assumption that no mental health treatment would be available to the Appellant in Sri Lanka. This appeared to ignore the fact that the Appellant's parents and 3 siblings continue to live there who could support the Appellant on her return. They were likely to be of sufficient means to access any mental health treatment the Appellant might need.
15. At Paragraph 30 the Judge concluded her determination by considering Article 8. The Appellant's customary marriage was not legally recognised in this country and therefore the Appellant could not succeed under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules. However the Appellant did enjoy a private life in this country but her removal was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Judge noted at paragraph 41 that the Appellant's husband had married the Appellant knowing she was an asylum seeker and that her asylum application was pending. He therefore entered into the marriage in the full knowledge that her immigration status was precarious and she might not be able to remain in this country. The couple's unborn child had been conceived in the full knowledge that the Appellant might be required to return to Sri Lanka. Section 117B (4) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 cited by the Judge at paragraph 41 provided that little weight should be attached to a private life that was established at the time when the applicant's immigration status was precarious. The Judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
The Onward Appeal
16. The Appellant appealed against this decision on grounds settled by counsel who had appeared at first instance (but who did not appear before me). The first ground argued that the Judge had approached the medical evidence incorrectly. She should have considered it as part of a holistic assessment of all of the evidence before deciding whether the Appellant was credible. She should have weighed in favour of a positive credibility finding that the doctor's opinion was that the burns were caused as the Appellant had described. Instead the Judge had made her decision on credibility before considering the medical evidence and then discounted it in reliance on her decision that the Appellant was not credible. That was an erroneous approach according to the Court of Appeal decision in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 where it was held that the Judge should not reach a conclusion by reference only to the Appellant's evidence and then if it be negative ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the medical evidence.
17. The second ground was that the Judge had made findings without evidence in relation to the Appellant's defence training. The quotations in the refusal letter from documents about the LTTE were not identified and were not produced to the tribunal. Without having sight of those documents it was unreasonable for the tribunal to treat the quotations in the refusal letter as evidence that belied the Appellant's case. In any event it was unreasonable to treat what the refusal letter said as being inconsistent with the Appellant's evidence. What the Respondent was referring to was the training of fighters. The documents did not say that the LTTE provided no other training or no training for civilians. The Appellant received training as a civilian not as a fighter. Even if the Judge was entitled to rely on the quotations from the unidentified report it did not show the Appellant's description of her activities of in Singapore to have been inconsistent with the country evidence.
18. The 3rd point was that the Judge had mistaken the Appellant's evidence about her possession of a passport after detention. Her evidence was not that she was still in possession of the passport after detention but that the agent who secured her release by payment of a bribe also recovered her passport.
19. The determination was also attacked for findings said to be inconsistent with country guidance. The Judge had found it highly unlikely that the Appellant would have been able to travel through the airport and board a flight to the UK in her own name without being rearrested. That was inconsistent with GJ which endorsed the evidence of a witness that the seriousness of any charge against an individual was not determinative of whether a bribe could be paid. It was possible to leave through the airport even when a person was being actively sought. If the Judge did not apply that country guidance she should at least explain why she was not applying it. The grounds did not seek to challenge the Judge's dismissal of the Article 8 claim.
20. The application for permission to appeal came on the papers before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Pooler who granted permission in the following terms:
"The Judge did not reject the medical evidence found in a scarring report but accepted that the Appellant had been intentionally burned. She was however not persuaded that the burns had been inflicted in the circumstances described by the Appellant.
The remaining grounds challenge adverse findings on 3 matters: the Appellant's description of her LTTE training, her evidence that her passport was returned to the agent when she was released on payment of a bribe and her account of passing through the airport in Colombo without being rearrested. It is arguable that the Judge erred in law in relation to those findings, which were material to her overall finding that the Appellant's account was not credible. In these circumstances it is appropriate to grant permission.
The Judge was entitled to take her general credibility findings into account when reaching that conclusion and did not demonstrate an arguable failure to consider the medical evidence by way of a holistic assessment of the claim as a whole. Nevertheless all grounds may be argued as permission is given to challenge the overall credibility findings ".
The Hearing Before Me
21. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the event that an error of law was found the matter should be remitted back to the First-tier for rehearing. There had been a further incident in Sri Lanka on 10 July but the Appellant was waiting for documents to be sent from Sri about it. A further expert's report might also be sought in the future.
22. Taking the grounds raised in the onward grounds of appeal in reverse order counsel argued that the Appellant had explained in her statement that after her passport was confiscated the agent had told her he would sort it out which he did. The Judge had overlooked that. The Judge had also erred in finding that the Appellant could not have been able to leave Sri Lanka on her own documents it if she was wanted by the authorities. There had been a concession made by the Respondent during the hearing of GJ that a witness who had given evidence to the tribunal was correct to say that one could leave Sri Lanka on payment of a bribe even if wanted by the authorities. The Judge should have explained her reasons for departing from this country guidance.
23. What the Respondent had said in the refusal letter about training was for those being trained as fighters but this Appellant was not going to be a fighter. I pointed out at this stage that in her determination at paragraph 23 the Judge had specifically dealt with the point made by counsel that there were two kinds of training one for fighters and the other which the Appellant had undergone. The Judge had answered that point in her determination by saying that if the Appellant was merely being trained as a fundraiser physical training would be senseless. Further such an explanation was at odds with the Appellant's own account that the LTTE's concern in recruiting her was to recruit more people to partake in the war. That was taken from the Appellant's own answer at question 83 of the asylum interview. In response counsel pointed to the objections taken to the material in the refusal letter which had been mentioned in the grounds of onward appeal.
24. The fourth point was the Mibanga point that the Judge had made her findings of credibility and that the medical evidence was then considered afterwards as an adjunct instead of being considered in an overall assessment of credibility. Dr Martin had found that each of the scars on the Appellant's legs were typical of cigarette burns. There was a significantly large number of scars such that it was impossible to say they had been incurred accidentally. That they were fully mature indicated they had been imposed several years ago not recently. There was a sixth point that the Judge had not dealt with the Appellant's claim under Article 8 family life. Counsel appreciated that this had not been raised in the grounds of onward appeal and the Presenting Officer indicated that he would object to the matter being raised at this late stage. In reply counsel argued that Article 8 both private and family life had been put to the Judge during the hearing (as was clear from the Judge's own notes and the skeleton argument). It was a Robinson obvious point that the Judge had not considered Article 8 outside the rules correctly.
25. In response the presenting officer accepted that the Judge may have failed to apply GJ correctly in relation to the claim that the Appellant had left Sri Lanka on her own passport but that was not sufficient of itself to undermine the determination when set against the reasons given by the Judge for her finding of lack of credibility. The Judge had given her reasons why she rejected the Appellant's evidence on the training received by the Appellant. The Mibanga point was also unfounded. The Judge was considering credibility in its entirety. When she came to consider the medical evidence she had not finished considering her assessment thereof. For example in the following paragraph at paragraph 32 the Judge had dealt with the impact on the Appellant's credibility of the delay in claiming asylum. There were a number of components to the Judge's criticism of credibility. Why would the LTTE pay for a fundraiser to study abroad when all she had done for them was to distribute leaflets. The Judge had spoken of vagueness in the Appellant's account for example about the 2 individuals who had sent the Appellant to Singapore to study. The Appellant had not known much about the LTTE. The scarring report was only one component of the evidence. In any event the Judge had accepted the medical evidence as far as it went so this was not a true Mibanga point. He reiterated his opposition to the reintroduction of the Article 8 claim.
26. In conclusion counsel argued that the Judge's pre-existing decision on credibility had affected her assessment of the medical evidence including the mental health issues. The Judge had accepted the Appellant had depression. In effect what the Judge was saying was that she had made her conclusion on credibility and the medical evidence did not displace that conclusion. Counsel accepted the Respondent's point on Article 8 and concluded that the case was finally balanced overall but the balance should fall in the Appellant's favour.
Findings
27. This case turned on an assessment of the credibility of the Appellant's claim. The Judge set out at some length her cogent reasons for finding that the Appellant lacked credibility. It was of significance that the Appellant appeared to know so little about the organisation that trained her and had given her leaflets to distribute. It was also significant that the Appellant claimed the existence of an arrest warrant which had somehow been lost in the post. In this connection I note that the Appellant before me claimed that there had been a further incident two months ago but still no documentation had been forwarded to the Appellant in the United Kingdom in respect thereof.
28. It was for the Judge to weigh the evidence and make an overall assessment of the credibility of the Appellant's case. Much of the criticism made by the Appellant of the Judges determination is a mere disagreement with the outcome of the case. One point taken against the determination is that the Judge felt the Appellant's evidence of being trained by the LTTE was undermined because her description of the training did not match the description quoted in the refusal letter. The refusal letter indicated that if a person was being a trained as a fighter the training would be far more militaristic than anything which the Appellant had experienced. That was attacked in the grounds of appeal with the argument that the Respondent's sources information could not be relied upon as the documents from which the quotations were taken were not produced at the hearing. That point is somewhat undermined by the fact that the refusal letter is dated 24 March 2015 15 months before the final hearing before the Judge. The Appellant and her legal representatives had more than ample time to check the quotations if they suspected they might be inaccurate. It is evident that no such checks were carried out and it is only extremely late in the day after the Judge had given her decision that the documents have been challenged and then only in the most vague of terms. There was nothing for example to prevent the Appellant and her representatives from looking up the documents on the website quoted in the letter. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Appellant and those advising her take objection to the documents because they do not support the Appellant's case rather than because they are of no evidential value. In any event as I have indicated the Judge was aware of the potential explanation for the difference between the Appellant's claimed training and that of the training for a fighter and gave cogent reasons why she did not accept that explanation.
29. A further point taken against the determination is the Judge's scepticism about the Appellant's departure from Sri Lanka. In particular that the Appellant having been arrested and detained and her passport confiscated was nevertheless able to leave Sri Lanka on that same passport without any difficulties. It is fair to say that evidence was received by the Upper Tribunal during the case of GJ that upon payment of a sufficient bribe someone who was of interest to the authorities could still leave Sri Lanka on their own documents. The important point however is not whether that was possible but whether it happened in this case, bearing in mind of course the lower standard applicable in asylum appeals which the Judge had directed herself on. The Judge held that it was not possible in this case that the Appellant could have left Sri Lanka in such a way.
30. It is not hard to see why the Judge would have reached that conclusion. Firstly when the Appellant was released according to her statement she was not released with her passport. This meant that someone had to apply to the relevant authorities to obtain the passport. Leaving aside the issue of whether it might have been easier for the Appellant to have obtained an alternative fake passport to leave Sri Lanka, there were obvious difficulties in this case in that the Appellant had to explain how after being released on a bribe but still apparently wanted by the authorities they would simply have released her passport to a third party on payment of a further bribe. For the Judge this was clearly an account too far and suggestive of the fact that the Appellant was embroidering her account as she went along to deal with credibility issues which were thrown up on the way. I do not read GJ as saying that such a complicated account of obtaining one's own passport and then leaving on it was sufficiently possible to have been a realistic prospect in this case. The Respondent's concession in GJ heavily relied on in the submissions made to me really extended no further than to acknowledge the existence of bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka. That is not in doubt, what was in doubt was whether the very complicated story advanced by the Appellant was credible. The Judge was required to take a view thereon in the light of all of the evidence in the case. This she did and she came to a sustainable conclusion that the Appellant's account was fabricated.
31. A further point taken against the determination is that the Judge has considered the credibility of the Appellant and found against her and then as something of an afterthought rejected the medical evidence which might otherwise have supported the Appellant's case. The Judge of necessity had to set out her conclusions in some form of order. Whether she considered the medical evidence at an earlier paragraph of the determination than her consideration of the credibility evidence or vice versa made very little difference provided that the Judge had in mind all of the evidence when arriving at each and every one of her conclusions. A fair reading of the determination in this case shows that to be the case. The Judge did not reject Dr Martin's scarring report as an afterthought. Far from it, she engaged fully with the report accepting many of the doctor's conclusions. Where she differed from the Appellant's case was that she did not accept that the scarring on the Appellant's body particularly her legs had been inflicted in the way that the Appellant claimed.
32. There had been some mistreatment of the Appellant in the past but the Appellant's account of how she got the scarring was not accepted by the Judge. It was not for Dr Martin to establish whether the Appellant was or was not credible in her account. What Dr Martin did was to indicate that the scarring on the Appellant's body could only have been inflicted intentionally. That still begged the question of whether the scarring was inflicted against the Appellant's will or by her volition. It was not for the Judge to speculate on how the scarring might otherwise have occurred. What the Judge had to decide was whether the Appellant's account met the necessary legal test and she found that it did not. As the Presenting Officer correctly pointed out the assessment of the medical evidence was not in fact the final assessment carried out by the Judge. After the medical evidence the Judge went on to consider the section 8 point as to delay.
33. Much was made in argument before me of the comment by the Judge in her determination that if the Appellant could have established credibility then the Judge would have accepted that the scarring found by the Doctor Martin was caused in the manner claimed. Here one has to look carefully at the words used by the Judge. She did not say that if the Appellant had been credible then her finding was that the burns had been incurred as she claimed. She indicated that she would be "content" to accept that the burns were caused in the manner claimed. In other words the Judge was not making a finding that all things being equal the burns were caused as the Appellant had said but rather that if the Appellant was credible there would be no reason to oppose the Appellant's claimed version of events that the scarring was inflicted deliberately by the Sri Lankan authorities. The burns may have been inflicted in a number of circumstances but it did not follow from Dr Martin's report that the burns were inflicted in the manner and circumstances that the Appellant described. That is not a Mibanga point at all because the Judge was assessing all of the evidence in the round.
34. Similarly the Judge was entitled to come to the view that she did in relation to the report of Doctor Zapata. He based his report on the presumption that the Appellant was receiving support from her husband and family in the United Kingdom. In fact the position would be that if she were returned to Sri Lanka she would receive support from her family there that is her parents and three siblings. Where the medical report was founded on a mistake of fact as here it was a matter for the Judge to decide what weight could be placed on the doctor's conclusions. Inevitably Doctor Zapata was heavily reliant on an acceptance of the Appellant's claim. If however that claim such as the claim to have been tortured was incorrect then it would follow that Doctor Zapata's conclusions were undermined. It was not for Doctor Zapata to usurp the position of the tribunal and make his own findings as to whether the Appellant was credible. That was a matter for the Judge which she did. Of course the Judge could not simply reject the report without giving adequate reasons for her conclusions but as will be seen from a fair reading of the determination the Judge gave cogent reasons at some length to explain why she came to the view that she did on the medical evidence. Again this was not a Mibanga point.
35. I would also add one further point here that permission to appeal the medical evidence point was not granted in terms by Judge Pooler. He found that the Judge was entitled to take her general credibility findings into account when reaching her conclusions and that her findings did not demonstrate an arguable failure to consider the medical evidence by way of a holistic assessment of the claim as a whole. In effect he granted permission on other grounds but gave permission for all grounds to be argued insofar as they related to the credibility aspects of the case. However on the technical point of whether the Judge had approached the medical evidence correctly or had breached the Mibanga principle I do not read the grant of permission as giving any support to the Appellant's arguments. Having said that I must come to my own view and for the reasons which I set out at some length above I reject the Mibanga argument in this case.
36. Finally in relation to Article 8 counsel who drafted the grounds of onward appeal did not see fit to appeal the Judge's findings under Article 8. This is not perhaps surprising given that the Appellant's circumstances may well change significantly in the near future. For example as and when she gives birth that child may or may not be entitled to British citizenship and different considerations may apply at that time. That is not a matter for me but equally it would not be appropriate to allow an Article 8 appeal to proceed at the error of law stage where permission had to appeal had not been sought on that ground.
37. Overall the grounds of onward appeal amount as I have indicated to no more than a disagreement with the result. I do not consider that the matter is finely balanced as was submitted to me by counsel, a fair reading of the determination in this case shows that there is no merit to this appeal. The grounds do not demonstrate any material error of law on the Judge's part and I therefore dismiss the appeal.
Notice of decision
The decision of the First-tier tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I dismiss the Appellant's appeal against that decision.
Appellant's appeal dismissed
I make no anonymity order in this case as there is no public policy reason for so doing the Appellant's claim for international protection having failed.

Dated this 13th day of September 2016

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Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Woodcraft

To the Respondent
Fee award
The appeal has been dismissed and no fee was payable there can be no fee award.

Dated this 13th day of September 2016

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Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Woodcraft