Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-AR-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/06786/2009

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Determination Promulgated
On 16 August 2013
20 December 2013
Prepared on 20 November 2013

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALLEN
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CRAIG

Between

aa
(Anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent
Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms S Akinbolu, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr T Wilding, Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, who for the purpose of this determination will be refereed to as AA, is a national of Zimbabwe who was born in 1966. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 25 February 2001 with leave to enter as a visitor and was subsequently granted leave to remain as a student until 30 November 2007. A subsequent application for further leave to remain was refused but on 28 April 2009 he applied for asylum.
2. This application was refused and his appeal against this decision was dismissed by Immigration Judge Devittie in a determination promulgated on 15 September 2009.
3. The appellant appealed against this decision, seeking reconsideration, and on 2 October 2009 reconsideration was ordered by Senior Immigration Judge Chalkley. Thereafter, following a hearing on 8 January 2010, Senior Immigration Judge Ward found that Judge Devittie’s original determination had contained a material error of law such that his decision regarding the dismissal of the appellant's claim for asylum and humanitarian protection had to be reheard, although the rejection of the appellant's Article 8 claim was to stand. The findings made by Judge Devittie that the appellant had “consciously steered clear of politics in Zimbabwe and has not been active in the MDC in the UK” were to stand.
4. The appeal then came before Designated Immigration Judge Shaerf, sitting in the Upper Tribunal on 11 March 2010, but in a determination promulgated on 23 March 2010, Judge Shaerf again dismissed the appellant's appeal on all grounds. In the course of a lengthy and through determination, Judge Shaerf gave his reasons for finding the appellant not to be a credible witness. At paragraph 38 of his determination, Judge Shaerf found as follows:
“38. I did not find the appellant a reliable witness of truth by reason of the various unexplained apparent inconsistencies in his evidence already mentioned. I found he had no political profile before he left Zimbabwe. He returned in March 2003 and did not experience any difficulties. I accept he has attended some ROHR vigils outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London and has been photographed by other ROHR members and that such photographs have been placed on the websites of Flickr and the Zimbabwe Vigil Coalition. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the person shown in the photographs had been identified by name or any other indicator. The appellant on his own evidence had attended only three vigils before 28 April 2009 when he claimed asylum and thereafter he joined ROHR at the end of June 2009. I have already mentioned the inconsistencies in the evidence of the appellant and [another witness] about the frequency of his Vigil attendances.”
5. Then, at paragraph 39, Judge Shaerf continued as follows:
“39. Again on account of the unexplained matters already mentioned, I do not find the appellant has been entirely truthful about his relationship with his family in Zimbabwe, whether it be his mother and sister or his son in the care of his wife[‘s] ... family. There was no explanation why the appellant did not seek asylum earlier during the currency of or on expiry of his leave to remain as a student. This is behaviour of the type referred to in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and which I find further undermines his credibility.”
6. Then at paragraph 40, Judge Shaerf found that “the appellant's credibility is [also] undermined by the lack of any explanation for the absence of any evidence from [his wife and his fiancée] other than her July 2009 statement”.
7. While Judge Shaerf accepted that photographs of the appellant had been posted on the websites of Flickr and Zimbabwe Vigil Coalition, he did not accept that this would put the appellant at risk on return. He also found that even on his own evidence, the appellant’s “engagement with ROHR has been relatively limited both in duration and importance” (at paragraph 46). He noted (at paragraph 47) that “on the appellant's own evidence he was not politically engaged before he left Zimbabwe” and rejected the appellant's account that his mother had been forced to relocate because of harassment by ZANU-PF Youths.
8. Summarising the evidence, at paragraph 49, Judge Shaerf then concluded as follows:
“49. Looking at the evidence in the round, I do not find the appellant has shown even to the lower standard that he is likely to be at risk of persecution or ill-treatment on account of his political opinions or imputed political opinions whether on arrival at port or subsequently [in] his home area or elsewhere in Zimbabwe. He will be able to account for his absence by reference to the studies he has pursued and the breakdown of his marriage: he said his wife came to the United Kingdom as a work permit holder. For similar reasons his claim for humanitarian protection ... and also under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention must also fail.”
9. Judge Shaerf also dismissed the appellant's appeal under Article 8 for reasons which he gave.
10. The appellant subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, who allowed his appeal to the limited extent of remitting the case to the Upper Tribunal, for the following reason:
“... the issue is not simply whether the appellant could ‘account for’ his absence in the UK. The judge failed to address the issue as to his ability to show his loyalty to the regime. Unlike [another applicant], he has not been held to be a credible witness. Accordingly ... we do not feel able to substitute our own conclusion on this issue. We will therefore allow the appeal and remit the case to the Upper Tribunal.”
11. Follow the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Southern gave directions for the hearing of this appeal on 5 August 2011. These directions make clear the scope of the hearing which was to be conducted, and I set out the relevant parts of these directions as follows:
“1. The scope of this at the hearing is made clear in [the Court of Appeal decision in this case] ... .
2. Given the basis of the challenge raised in the grounds, and the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, both of which are limited to the assessment of risk on return informed by the applicable country guidance it is considered that it will be unnecessary for the Tribunal to receive any further oral evidence. ...”
12. Subsequently, further directions were given by Upper Tribunal Judge Latter on 17 September 2012, as follows:

“1. These directions replace the directions given by UTJ Southern on 5 August 2011. ....

3. Given the basis of the challenge raised in the grounds and the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court [which had subsequently dismissed the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal] the issue for the Tribunal will be to assess whether the appellant would now be at risk on return in the light of the current country guidance and the law as set out by the Supreme Court. ...”
13. Further directions were given as to service of skeleton arguments and written submissions and then it was directed that the Tribunal would consider these submissions and any response “before deciding whether it is necessary to list the appeal for an oral hearing or whether the appeal can properly be determined on the basis of these submissions without a hearing.”
14. The appeal was then listed before a panel consisting of Mrs Justice Lang and myself, sitting at Field House on 13 December 2012, following which, in a document entitled “Decision and Directions”, Mrs Justice Lang recorded as follows:
“ …
2 On 18 November 2010, the Court of Appeal allowed [the appellant’s] appeal and remitted it for re-consideration by the Upper Tribunal…
3. On 25 July 2012, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent’s appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal…
4. It is apparent from the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court that the appeal was to be re-considered in the context of the current country guidance. Directions were also given to this effect by the Upper Tribunal on 5 August 2011 and 17 September 2012 [as I have recorded above].
5. The country guidance in RN (Zimbabwe) CG [2008] UKIAT 00083, referred to in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, was replaced by new country guidance in EM & Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 00098. There were some significant differences. However, the decision in EM was quashed by the Court of Appeal in June 2012.
6. A potential new country guidance case was heard by the Upper Tribunal in October 2012, and a determination is imminent. In those circumstances, it is inappropriate for us to embark upon a critique of RN and to seek to make new findings on current conditions in Zimbabwe, without reliable evidence and with a time estimate of only 2 hours. If we did so, there is an obvious risk that our findings might be at odds with those in the country guidance decision which is shortly to be issued.
7. We conclude that this appeal should be adjourned so that it can be heard once the new country guidance is available.”
15. Mrs Justice Lang then concluded by stating the decision of the panel that a directions hearing would be required to ensure that the adjourned appeal hearing was properly prepared.
16. The awaited country guidance decision in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 having been promulgated on 31 January 2013, the appeal was then re-listed before me for further directions on 15 February 2013, in accordance with Mrs Justice Lang’s previous order. At this hearing, I noted that “regrettably, files appear to be missing, the respondent did not have any papers, and on behalf of the appellant, Ms Akinbolu informed the Tribunal that the appellant will wish to file an additional witness statement and additional evidence”. I directed that the appellant was given permission to serve further evidence, in particular an additional witness statement from the appellant together with further evidence in support and that the appeal was then to be listed for hearing.
17. The appeal was then listed for hearing before a panel consisting of Upper Tribunal Judge Allen and myself on Friday 16 August 2013, for which Ms Akinbolu had supplied a skeleton argument, dated 4 April 2013, on the appellant's behalf.

The Hearing
18. At the hearing, we heard evidence from the appellant, and also submissions on behalf of both parties. Each member of the panel made a contemporaneous note of the proceedings, which are contained in the Record of Proceedings. Accordingly, I shall not set out in this determination everything which was said to us during the course of the hearing. However, we have taken into consideration everything which was said before us, and have also had regard to everything contained within the file, whether or not the same is specifically referred to below.
19. On behalf of the appellant, Ms Akinbolu informed the Tribunal that she was relying mainly on the documents contained within the supplementary bundle which had been provided. This included an expert report as to present conditions within Zimbabwe from Dr Clayton Peel.
20. The appellant gave evidence, and adopted his four witness statements.
21. In the course of his evidence, the appellant told us that he had been elected as the publicity secretary for the London Branch of Restoration of Human Rights (ROHR), which in his most recent statement he says was as “a result of my contribution to the meetings and demonstrations”. He told us that his job was to deal with the publicity and the Vigil members, by passing on information about the demonstrations they would be attending and the Vigil and ROHR. He told us that Vigil and ROHR were two different organisations, but both worked for human rights. Regrettably, since moving to Sheffield, it was more difficult for him to attend meetings, and now he only attended about twice a month.
22. During the course of being asked questions by his own Counsel, the appellant referred to some photographs of people demonstrating outside Zimbabwe House, which were on the Flickr website. No password was needed to access this site, or to see the photographs which had been posted on it.
23. During the course of cross-examination, the appellant was asked whether it would be fair to say that his main duty as publicity officer for ROHR was designing posters and leaflets, and that he was not at all the demonstrations, to which the appellant replied that he did not design all the time, but whenever he was there he tried to reach out to people. He did have a role in handing leaflets out, but he agreed his name was not on the leaflets. No one’s name was.
24. When asked why he was not a member of the MDC, even though he had said in the past he was sympathetic to its aims, he said that he was a member of ROHR, and that maybe in time he would be a member of the MDC. He had not joined the MDC because, he said, “I can’t be juggling from one to the other”. He said that ROHR highlighted the plight of human rights in Zimbabwe, which is what he was now doing.
25. When asked what he was trying to achieve, the appellant said that there had to be some way of telling the people what was going on in Zimbabwe. When asked whether it would have made sense for him to be a member of the MDC as well as ROHR, and whether it was correct that his involvement in ROHR might have led to membership of the MDC, the appellant did not immediately respond.
26. He was then asked whether if he returned to Zimbabwe he would join the MDC, to which he replied that he would continue with ROHR, “because this is as powerful an organisation as the MDC”. It was well known worldwide now.
27. The appellant was then asked what presence ROHR had in Zimbabwe, to which he replied that they had offices there. However, when asked where these offices were in Zimbabwe, the appellant was unable to say. He said that he did not deal with ROHR in Zimbabwe, his function was dealing with them in this country. However, “they have ROHR offices”. He confirmed that he would continue his involvement with ROHR in Zimbabwe.
28. The appellant was asked why he could not return to Bulawayo, to which he replied that he could not because there had been a tribal war which had been going on for some time, as well as considerable political violence. It was predominantly Ndebele and he was Shona.
29. When it was put to him that the MDC was in control in Bulawayo, and he was asked whether he was saying that the only reason he could not return was because he was Shona, he said that Mugabe was still in power and nothing would ever change. It was put to him that the population in Bulawayo was 20% Shona, but he maintained he did not know anyone there.
30. The appellant confirmed that he was from Chitungwiza, which was a suburb of Harare, and that was where his family was. However, he would face difficulties from the Chipangano gangs because he had been out of Zimbabwe for so many years. These gangs with affiliated with ZANU-PF.
31. The appellant was asked questions about what contact he had with his family, and the answers were recorded.
32. Although there was a recent letter from Vigil, which said that the appellant regularly attended and made new visitors welcome, the appellant confirmed that he had no up-to-date evidence from ROHR. The latest was from 2009, because his barrister had never asked. However, although there were no recent documents from ROHR saying what his involvement was with that organisation, he was sure he could get something, although his lawyer had never suggested this.

Submissions
Submissions for the Respondent
33. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Wilding referred first to the decision of Judge Shaerf, which he submitted should be the starting point in this appeal, and particularly his adverse credibility findings. At paragraphs 15 to 39, he had rejected the appellant’s evidence more or less in its entirety, in the sense that it was not accepted that the appellant had fallen out with his family as he claimed, nor the reasons for his falling out, nor that the relationship with his son was as painted before the Tribunal in 2010. This was important when the Tribunal was assessing the scenario he would be returning to in Zimbabwe. This was also relevant in connection with what the appellant now said about not having anyone to return to in Zimbabwe.
34. The other important credibility finding was regarding the appellant’s attendance historically at the Vigil. There was a significant discrepancy between the appellant’s evidence and that of his witness, Mr Muranganwa, which was relevant in connection with the appellant’s motivation in continuing to attend the Vigil. It remained the case that even when taking into account the appellant’s up-dated evidence, he remained someone with no great political profile, and certainly no great profile in the Zimbabwean Diaspora in the UK.
35. Apart from the very small amount of documents, contained in the bundle at pages 69 through to 79, there was very little evidence at all linking the appellant to ROHR and the Vigil and very little suggesting he had any higher profile.
36. The country guidance decisions of EM and CM were relevant. Obviously, the main country guidance now was CM, but EM had some relevance in connection with internal relocation.
37. The respondent relied on the guidance given in CM at paragraph 215. At 215(i) the Tribunal set out what continued to be the country guidance as given in EM, but as modified in CM. At paragraph 215(i)(1) it was noted that there was “significantly less politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, compared with the situation considered… in RN”.
38. This appellant could not be treated as someone with MDC or significant profile. This guidance was repeated at paragraph 215(i)(5). This appellant would not have any difficulties unless it were found that he had a significant profile which would lead to his being targeted. The long and short of it was that this appellant was not someone who would be viewed as having a significant profile, and so he could return to a high density part of Zimbabwe.
39. What this led on to was the guidance given at paragraph 204 of EM, which was set out at paragraph 100 of CM. It was the guidance given at paragraphs 204 and 205 of EM, accepted in CM, which provided the reasoning behind the summary at paragraph 215(i)(5) of CM.
40. With regard to the argument that this appellant’s profile might have been increased because he had been involved in an appeal which had been heard by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, there was nothing in this point. It was for the appellant to show that his identity would be known, and there was no evidence regarding this. Nothing in the judgments would have identified him, and there was no basis for making any assumption that his identity would be known. Although there was scrutiny, this did not extend to low-level activity, and this appellant’s activities were not of any real concern. The Zimbabwean authorities have always been aware that people claim asylum even though they are not in truth political activists, so the mere fact that someone has claimed political asylum is not evidence that that person has a high political profile. Even if this appellant’s identity was known, it is not clear how this would enhance his political profile, but in any event, there is no basis for believing that his identity would be known.
41. With regard to the risk on return, it was clear from the guidance in CM that the appellant would be safe in Harare. He would be returning to an area which was a suburb of Harare, described by the appellant as a “town” outside Harare. Judge Shaerf had not accepted that he was not in contact with his family, and it followed that all his family were in and around Harare. He would not be at risk.
42. Mr Wilding then made submissions with regard to the report from Clayton Peel which is contained within the bundle. Our findings with regard to this report are set out below. He also submitted that the appellant would in any event be able to relocate to Bulawayo. We discuss this submission below aswell.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
43. Ms Akinbolu relied upon the arguments set out in her skeleton argument.
44. With regard to the criticism of the Clayton Peel report, it was not correct that the Tribunal in CM found that the Chipangano was not a ZANU-PF related gang. Rather, it is saying that the evidence fell short of saying that it was an arm of the party. There it is saying that the gang was autonomous from the party. However, it was also clear that the Tribunal recognised that this was a gang made up of ZANU-PF youths, whose power had increased so that they were now broadly a criminal gang with ZANU-PF sympathies.
45. The Tribunal at paragraph 216 (page 74) of CM, giving the “summary of the country information on Zimbabwe as at October 2012” referred to people going to “a neighbouring high density area of Harare” and Dr Peel had said that the risks involved in this had spread. There was support for that in articles which were appended at pages 143 to 150 of the main bundle, where there was reference to activities that had been carried out by a Chipangano gang in Chitungwiza (the headline to one article at page 143 was “Chipangano forces MDC-T to cancel Chitungwiza rally” and there is reference to the gang in that article as “ZANU-PF youths”).
46. Dr Peel considers what the appellant’s situation would be on return in his circumstances. The appellant’s position was that he sympathised with the MDC, but the risk to him would be from his highly visible involvement with ROHR and his involvement in a very high profile case.
47. Ms Akinbolu accepted, as she had to, that the judgments in the appellant’s appeal do not identify him, but he had been involved with the activist movement since 2009 and during that time he had also been involved in this high profile case. The activist movement was very closely linked and people were aware of his asylum status. Ms Akinbolu relied on letters which had been produced.
48. When Ms Akinbolu was asked what letters she was referring to, she referred to one from Vigil and also another from Mr Mwanganu, who had been a witness on the appellant’s behalf. Although Judge Shaerf had referred to the conflict between the appellant’s evidence and that of this witness, there had been no dispute as to his origins or his status in itself.
49. Ms Akinbolu referred to the letter from ROHR, at page 135 of the bundle, but this is headed “To whom it may concern” and did not indicate any knowledge of his asylum status.
50. The Tribunal having examined these letters, Ms Akinbolu accepted there was no direct evidence of this appellant’s involvement in this case, but his position was that having been so heavily involved, it would be common knowledge who he was. However, she accepted that there was no evidence before the Tribunal which supported this contention.
51. Ms Akinbolu did not accept that the appellant’s profile could be properly described as “low profile”. It might have been so described had this appeal been heard three years ago (as indeed it had been, as the Tribunal observed). However, now he had been an active member of ROHR for four years, and at its lowest had been attending the Vigil twice a month. The photographs showing his attendance were on a publicly available website, and some of those were exhibited at pages 69 to 74 of the bundle. Also, for at least the last eight to ten months the appellant had held a position on the ROHR committee which increased his profile. At page 78 was a publicly available report in which reference was made to his position as “Publicity Secretary” (this is at page 79).
52. It appears from the report that this had been a meeting to launch the London branch, and in answer to a question from the Tribunal, Ms Akinbolu informed the Tribunal that this branch had been launched by the National Executive. A committee for the Central London branch had then been elected which had included this appellant.
53. Accordingly, whatever one might think of the actual activities of this group, and whether or not handing out leaflets can properly be said to be “low-level”, this appellant had an official position and the appellant did not accept the respondent’s suggestion that his activity would be unlikely to attract the attention of Zimbabwean officials. It was said on his behalf that his activities over the course of four years, and in particular while he was holding his current position, were precisely the kind of activities likely to attract the attention of ZANU-PF people who infiltrate such meetings. Accordingly, if the appellant’s activities were likely to be known, he could properly be described as someone with a “significant profile”.
54. Dealing with the question of risk, on the basis of this profile, he would first be at risk at the airport in Harare. Then, even if he was not arrested at the airport, because he would remain a person with a significant profile thereafter, and it was likely on his evidence that he would continue to carry out political activities, he would continue to be at risk.
55. In answer to the observation from the Tribunal that Judge Shaerf had found that he was not genuinely an activist, Ms Akinbolu submitted that although that was the starting point for this Tribunal, the evidence supported his contention that he had become more involved, and that the situation had moved on by this stage.
56. The appellant would be returning to a high density area after a very long absence. The finding in CM was that those with a significant profile would continue to be at risk from the various militia groups.
57. The effect of the elections in Zimbabwe was that there was no longer an MDC buffer in Parliament. So ZANU-PF now had control over all areas.
58. With regard to any Article 8 claim which this appellant might have, Ms Akinbolu accepted that the matters which had been remitted to the Upper Tribunal did not include his Article 8 claim, and that accordingly this was not before us.

Discussion
59. As has been accepted on behalf of both parties, our starting point has to be the determination of Judge Shaerf, in which he had made a number of adverse credibility findings with regard to this appellant. In particular, he did not accept that this appellant did not have family to return to in Zimbabwe; nor did he accept that he was a genuine political activist.
60. Having listened to the appellant’s evidence, we were similarly unimpressed. In particular, we do not find it credible that a publicity secretary of an organisation who was seriously interested in its aims would not be able even to mention what offices that organisation had in Zimbabwe, which was its home. We do not find any reason why we should depart from Judge Shaerf’s findings (including his findings as to the discrepancies between the evidence of the appellant and that of Mr Muranganwa); rather, those findings have been reinforced by the appellant’s evidence before us. Accordingly, we do not accept that this appellant would be in the least interested in becoming engaged in political activities on return, nor do we accept that his involvement in ROHR has been for any purpose other than to provide him with a basis upon which to claim asylum in this country. He does not attend many rallies, the evidence of his attendance is slender, amounting to a few photographs which have been exhibited, and he has still not got round to joining the MDC, which remains the main opposition group to ZANU-PF. Although in evidence the appellant claimed that ROHR was as important an opposition group as the MDC, he was extremely vague about precisely what it was that this group did.
61. We do not consider that being called “publicity secretary” whilst seemingly doing little other than occasionally handing out leaflets has given this appellant any profile at all. There is no basis, in our judgment, for considering that he would be regarded by the Zimbabwean authorities as having any profile, and no evidence was put before us which could justify such a finding. In the absence of such evidence, we do not consider that a few photographs on a website is sufficient to give someone who is not a genuine political activist a profile, let alone a significant profile.
62. Given our finding that this appellant does not have a significant (or indeed any) profile as a political activist in Zimbabwe, we are satisfied, having regard to the guidance given in CM (affirming previous guidance) that as a returnee with no significant political profile, this appellant would not be at risk at the airport.
63. With regard to the report from Clayton Peel which is contained within the bundle, we agree with the submission made Mr Wilding that the report itself was not particularly impressive. Although Dr Peel says in his report that he has taken note of the country guidance given in CM, when referring to the activities of the Chipangano gangs he did not give an accurate account of the findings in CM. At paragraph 5.1.11 of his report, Dr Peel had claimed that there had been “a significant recognition by the Tribunal [in CM] of urban-based militia activity by ZANU-PF then known as Chipangano and Mandimbandimba which has affected both MDC supporters and ordinary members of the public in distant parts of Harare”. In fact, at paragraph 196, the Tribunal in CM had specifically rejected some of the evidence given with regard to the gangs’ activities and had noted first at paragraph 197 that “the press report say that it was Chipangano’s criminal activities and their extortion at cab ranks in particular that led to a backlash in September 2012” and then, at paragraph 198 that “weighing the evidence, we find that Chipangano has been responsible for acts of violence and intimidation outside Mbare on limited occasions and that largely in neighbouring suburbs such as Epworth and Highfields”. The Tribunal had then continued as follows:
“The backlash in September 2012 shows that professed allegiance to ZANU-PF was not sufficient to insulate Chipangano from a crackdown on their activities. There is scant evidence that Chipangano has any significant influence in low or medium-density suburbs of Harare, and their forays into the centre of the city are infrequent”.
64. Moreover, with regard to Dr Peel’s statement that the Tribunal had recognised this “urban-based militia activity by ZANU-PF gangs known as Chipangano…”, the Tribunal specifically found, at paragraph 198 that “notwithstanding the consistent claims of direction or control by ZANU-PF, we find that the evidence falls short of showing that Chipangano is an arm of the party, capable of being deployed at will to further ZANU-PF’s end”. It continues by stating that “the evidence of the press and media reports suggests, rather, that the threats and extortion at the commuter omnibus ranks are signs of autonomy”. Furthermore, the Tribunal found in CM, that “overall, Chipangano’s criminal activities, no doubt the cause of considerable anxiety in high density suburbs in Harare, had not, on the evidence, led to a significant rise in the overall number of human rights violations in the city”.
65. It also did not appear from CM that Chipangano had any presence in Chitungwiza. We find that Dr Peel was wrong to categorise the findings in CM in the way he has, because the findings in CM were that Chipangano was a criminal gang rather than ZANU-PF’s militia, but in any event this would not be relevant for the purposes of this appeal, because the appellant was not from those areas where Chipangano was said to operate and he could live in a different area in Harare.
66. Finally, with regard to the Clayton Peel report, we also agree with Mr Wilding that it contains very little analysis of what the situation actually was now in Zimbabwe, but consists rather with his agreeing with the instructions he had been given rather than making an independent assessment of the situation in March 2013. It certainly does not provide a sufficient basis to enable this Tribunal to go behind the guidance given in CM that Harare was now a safe place for someone with no significant profile.
67. Regarding the submission that the appellant’s involvement in a high profile case would on its own give him a significant profile, we reject this submission. As Ms Akinbolu was obliged to accept, the judgments were anonymised and the appellant has produced no evidence to show that anybody was aware of his asylum status. In those circumstances, it is not even necessary for us to consider whether or not that on its own would be a risk factor, which we would consider unlikely.
68. Accordingly, this appellant must be regarded as someone with no significant profile, who would not be reasonably likely to engage in political activities on return, or not engage only because he was fearful of the consequences.
69. It is in this context that we consider the guidance given in CM, and in particular at paragraph 215(i)(5) as follows:
“A returnee to Harare will in general fact no significant difficulties, if going to a low-density or medium-density area. Whilst the socio-economic situation in high-density areas is more challenging, in general a person without ZANU-PF connection will not face significant problems there (including a ‘loyalty test’), unless he or she has a significant MDC profile, which might cause him or her to feature on a list of those targeted for harassment, or would otherwise engage in political activities likely to attract the adverse attention of ZANU-PF, or would be reasonably likely to engage in such activities, but for a fear of thereby coming to the adverse attention of ZANU-PF.”
70. This appellant comes from Chitungwiza, which is a suburb of Harare, and is a medium to high-density area. Judge Shaerf found that the appellant’s contact with his family there is stronger than he claimed, and in our judgment there is no reason why he should not return there. In light of the guidance given in CM, which is the current guidance relating to Zimbabwe, and in light of our findings, the appellant has not made out a case that he would be at any risk on return.
71. For the sake of completeness we also considered the respondent’s alternative submission that the appellant would in any event be able to relocate to Bulawayo. We have regard in this respect to the guidance given in CM, in particular paragraphs 219 to 225. Although (as the Tribunal found at paragraph 225) a Shona would face discrimination in terms of jobs and housing in Bulawayo, 20% of the population in Bulawayo was now Shona and therefore it would not be necessary to speak Ndebele. Had we found that this appellant could not safely return to Harare (which we have not) we would have found that it would not be unduly harsh for him to relocate to Bulawayo. He had been able to live in various areas in the UK, including Sheffield, and this appellant is clearly articulate, educated and intelligent; he would be asked to relocate from the largest city in Zimbabwe to the second largest city, and it would not be unreasonable for him to do so. However, this will not in any event be necessary, as he does not have a high profile and nor (as we have found) does he have any genuine interest in becoming engaged in political activities on return.
72. It follows that this appeal must be dismissed, and we so find.

Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.

Signed: Dated: 12 December 2013

Upper Tribunal Judge Craig