Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/07582/2014

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 9 January 2017
On 21 February 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
v

Ms AR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
______________________________________

DECISION & REASONS
______________________________________

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G. Brown, counsel instructed by Farani Javid Taylor solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. J Staunton, Home Office Presenting Officer

Hearing

1. The appeal came before me for a resumed hearing de novo, following a hearing on 21 November 2016, when the Upper Tribunal found a material error of law in the decision of First tier Tribunal Judge Chana.

2. In addition to the bundles of evidence previously before the First tier Tribunal, which included background country and medical evidence, evidence from the Metropolitan Police, an expert report from Ms Usma Moeen and witness statements, I had the benefit of a skeleton argument from Ms Brown and updating statements from the Appellant's mother, Bushra Bano and her brother, Mujeed Ul Rehman both dated 6 January 2017.

3. The Appellant gave evidence before me, with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. She adopted her witness statement and in response to supplementary questions she confirmed that she had not had any contact with her husband since August 2016, nor any news about him.

4. The Appellant was cross-examined by Mr Staunton, when she confirmed that she was maintained and accommodated in the United Kingdom by friends. She said that she was in contact with her mother in Pakistan and a friend of her in-laws, who she asks about her children, who remain living with their father and his family. She said that she had last heard from her husband a few years ago. In respect of the FIRs, she said that she had obtained these from her husband when he was living in the United Kingdom and she did not know where the originals were. She did not know the outcome of the murder case. She said that she was no longer in contact with her brother in Pakistan due to her problems with her husband.

5. She said that her husband left the United Kingdom for Pakistan late in 2012, because he was very worried about being here and the police had already taken him once and he was violent again and she said that she would inform the police. After that he left the house. She said that she did not ask for assistance from the police when she was having problems with her husband in Pakistan because they probably could not assist with regard to resourceful people like her husband and his family. She had made attempts to divorce her husband but he refused to divorce her and this had happened many times even when her children were being born. She said that if she won her case maybe she would be in a position to pursue a divorce.

6. Upon re-examination, she said that was not sure if the charges against her husband were dropped. She was asked about contact with people in Pakistan and said that her mother does not work.

7. In answer to questions from me, the Appellant confirmed that the
brother she was no longer in contact with, in Pakistan, is Tussif Ul Rehman and that her brother, Mujeeb Ul Rehman, lives in Germany. She has one sister in Pakistan but her husband does not let her get involved in any of her matters and she has 3 children. She said that her mother sometimes lives in her own house and sometimes with her sister. Her mother lives in Narowal city, which is about one and a half hours by car from her husband and his family. The Appellant confirmed that she was still receiving treatment for depression and had a prescription for Citolapram and Amityptyline, which are anti-depressants and painkillers. In response to my request as to the outcome of the Appellant's husband's asylum claim in the United Kingdom, Mr Staunton said that he had no knowledge of this and Ms Brown said that it was what the Appellant's husband told her, so it was not known if it was even true or not.

Submissions

8. In his submissions, Mr Staunton relied on the extensive refusal letter. He said that there were credibility issues in the appeal and highlighted the Appellant's evidence in relation to the claimed murder charge in Pakistan: in her 2014 statement the Appellant said he served time in prison and was then released on bail when he came to UK, whereas under cross examination the Appellant said she did not know the outcome of the case and her more up to date witness statement says the case was dropped against the Appellant's husband. He queried how the Appellant obtained the documents submitted to the Secretary of State and whether her husband would leave documents behind if he was planning to claim asylum in the United Kingdom and whether it was likely he would leave the Appellant in the United Kingdom, bearing in mind the pressure and influence he placed on her during the relationship, which was a turbulent and controlling one.

9. He relied on section 8 of the 2004 Act, bearing in mind the timing of the asylum claim. In relation to the documents submitted, he sought to rely on the Country Information and Guidance on this issue and the weight that could be attached to them. In relation to the issue of risk on return, Mr Staunton sought to rely upon the Country Information and Guidance on women fearing gender based violence and the decision in SM (lone women - ostracism) Pakistan CG [2016] UKUT 00067 (IAC) and drew my attention to paragraphs 2.2.2 ,2.3.4, 2.3.6. level of and 2.5.3-2.5.4. He submitted that internal relocation is an option for the Appellant, who could access support from family members or a male guardian and it was unreasonable for her to say that her brother is fed up with her situation and queried whether it was likely that he would simply brush her aside. Mr Staunton submitted that the Appellant has been educated to some extent and that a single woman may be able to use State run domestic violence shelters for a short time or access a privately run shelter. He submitted that if I were to find the Appellant credible, it was a finely balanced case and lone women cases should he decided on their own merits but there are reception facilities and internal relocation was viable because there would be adequate support facilities for the Appellant from family members.

10. In her submissions, Ms Brown relied upon her skeleton argument dated 9 January 2017. She submitted that the evidence in support of the claim viz the witness statements from the Appellant's mother and brother; the expert report of Usma Moeen and psychiatric report of Dr Hussain establishes to the required standard that the Appellant's account is a genuine one, or at least establishes that she ought to be given the benefit of the doubt taking all those matters into account. She has provided a reasonable explanation for the late claim for asylum at [15] of the bundle in her statement. Ms Brown submitted that the Appellant's account was consistent and plausible. She referred me to page 12 of Appendix 2 of the Appellant's main bundle, which is the police report dated 25.4.12, which confirms domestic violence and the Appellant's injuries and supports the main issues in the case. In respect of the Appellant's
husband's criminal matter, the evidence is that he had applied to come to the UK and had permission to travel and the issue does not go to the heart of her claim in any event. Ms Brown submitted that the main issue for the Tribunal if the Appellant is found to be credible is sufficiency of protection and internal flight cf. SM (lone women - ostracism) Pakistan CG [2016] UKUT 00067 (IAC).

11. Ms Brown drew my attention to the expert report of Ms Moeem at 76-77 [140]. The Appellant is single and vulnerable and Dr Hussain finds she is suffering from mixed anxiety and depressive disorder and she is taking anti-depressants. The expert report states that it is not reasonable to expect that the Appellant could access meaningful protection from the state and internally relocate and she deals with the rise in violence against women and at [98]-[99] the nature of shelters is that they are a temporary measure and not always accessible. In respect of the issue of divorce and access to children [125] if she does seek to divorce her husband the courts will favour her husband, which will prevent her from being reunited with her children. Ms Brown accepted in light of the decision in SN and HM (Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 that whether a person has qualifications is a relevant matter. The Appellant has no qualifications as she did not complete her degree and she has very few family members in Pakistan and no-one there to support her. Her brother in Pakistan has had nothing to do with her for his own reasons: in her statement the Appellant explains that both her brothers were also victims of her husband and this is why he will not have anything to do with her. It would be unreasonable for her to live alone in a big city without any means of employment or obtaining accommodation and she is vulnerable. In respect of the Home Office Country Information and Guidance document, Ms Brown submitted that there was nothing in the report or in the decision in SM that can mandates a negative conclusion and there has to be a fact sensitive approach to the issues.

Decision

12. I reserved my decision, which I now give with my reasons.

13. The background to her asylum application, taken from her witness statements and interview is that the Appellant is a national of Pakistan, born on 10 April 1976. On 23 March 2003, she married Farrukh Nadeem. The marriage was arranged and the Appellant lived with her husband, his parents and his sister. From the outset, the Appellant suffered verbal and physical abuse from her husband and his family. She gave birth to two babies that died and then to a daughter, on 27.11.05; a son on 19 January 2007; a daughter on 16 July 2008; and a further son on 2 December 2009. The children were conceived by the Appellant being forced to have sex with her husband against her will. In October 2009, the Appellant's husband was jailed on remand for murder. He was released on bail in January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, the Appellant with her husband, against her will because she did not wish to be separated from her children, travelled to the UK, in order for him to escape the murder charges. Their children remained in Pakistan, with the extended family.

14. After their arrival in the UK, the Appellant's husband continued to beat her and in June or July 2012, the Appellant and her husband had an argument and the police were called by their neighbour. Her husband fled to avoid arrest but later telephoned her stating he would cut her into pieces and feed her to the dogs if he was caught by the police. He was subsequently arrested but the Appellant, though fear, withdrew her complaint against him and they resumed living together. The Appellant became pregnant again but did not want to have the child, however, her husband attempted to force her to continue with the pregnancy on the basis that it would give him the right to remain in the UK. The Appellant had a termination of the pregnancy and refused to return to Pakistan with her husband. In October 2012, the Appellant's husband left the house and never returned and he subsequently returned to Pakistan. The Appellant's mother has received threats from him due to the Appellant's failure to return to Pakistan.

15. The Appellant then remained in the UK unlawfully until she met a woman on a bus who informed her about Southall Black Sisters, as a result of which she attended the Asylum Screening Unit on 11 April 2014 and made an asylum claim. This application was refused on 15 September 2014 and her appeal against this decision was dismissed on 22 December 2014. This appeal was dismissed but following an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the appeal was remitted back to the First tier Tribunal for hearing on 19 August 2016, when in a decision promulgated on 27 September 2016, First tier Tribunal Judge Chana dismissed the appeal. This was the decision in respect of which we found an error of law on 21 November 2016.

16. The basis of the Appellant's claim for asylum is that she would be at risk of persecution from her husband and his family in Pakistan due to the history of sexual, physical and psychological abuse. The burden of proving that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood or serious risk that she would face such persecution if returned to Pakistan is upon the Appellant. The Respondent, in her decision letter, accepts that Pakistani women constitute a particular social group.

17. The issue of credibility was raised in the Respondent's decision letter of 15.9.14. In particular, it was not accepted that the Appellant's husband was suspected or wanted for murder by the Pakistani authorities, despite the fact that an FIR and Court Document in his name have been submitted, due to the fact that it is possible to obtain fraudulent documents in Pakistan [20]-[23]; it was not accepted that the Appellant had been physically and verbally abused by her husband and his family in Pakistan as the benefit of the doubt principle was not applied due to the fact that the Appellant failed to make an asylum claim at the earliest opportunity [31]-[33]; in respect of risk on return, it was considered that the caselaw shows that the Pakistani authorities are willing to provide victims of domestic abuse with protection [36] and whilst women's shelters are limited, they are still available and the Appellant would have access to them [38]; in respect of risk on return as a single woman, it was considered that the Appellant would have a support network available to her on her return [41] and there is a police force who could provide the Appellant with sufficient protection [51] and it would not be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to internally relocate [59]-[60].

18. I have given careful consideration to the credibility of the Appellant's account in light of the expert and background evidence submitted on her behalf. I consider that the Data Protection Act notes from the Metropolitan Police of the incident of 24 April 2012 are of particular importance [Appendix II at page 12 of the Appellant's bundle refers] in that they record that the Appellant's neighbour "heard the initial assault" and then went down to the flat the Appellant shared with her husband and intervened. The Appellant's husband then left. The police records also confirm that when they attended the premises the Appellant "had blood going on the left side ridge of her nose from the bottom of her eye to her top lip." I consider that this evidence corroborates the Appellant's claim to have suffered domestic violence from her husband in the United Kingdom.

11. There is also substantial medical evidence of 131 pages, confirming that the Appellant underwent a termination in July 2012 which does not appear to have been successful but resulted in a miscarriage in August 2012 when the Appellant was hospitalized. It is clear from the medical notes that the Appellant has consistently reported to medical professionals that she is a victim of domestic violence and a letter from Dr Berko, a clinical psychologist dated 20.5.15 states that the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 assessments of mood completed in Urdu indicated severe symptoms of depression and anxiety. There is also a psychiatric report from Dr Razia Hussain dated 19.11.16 which diagnosed the Appellant as suffering from Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder. The medical evidence also indicates that she has suffered from chronic pain in her back, neck and right ankle, which she reported may be related to physical attacks by her husband.

12. The background evidence set out at Appendix III of the Appellant's bundle details incidents of so-called honour killings. A report from the Asian Legal Resource Centre at 3-5 states that 90% of women in Pakistan face domestic violence but the perpetrators enjoy impunity, due to the fact that this not reported and when cases are reported to the authorities, there is a failure of State protection, both by the police and the judiciary. This is generally in keeping with eg the US State Department Report 2016 which provides at page 40 that spousal rape is not a crime; and at 41 that "women who tried to report abuse faced serious challenges (as) police and judges were sometimes reluctant to take action in domestic violence cases, viewing them as family problems" and at 42 that "there were some reports of women being trafficked and prostituted out of shelters"; that shelter staff discriminated against women in shelters because it was assumed that they were women of ill repute and in some cases "women were reportedly abused at the government run shelters, found their movements severely restricted or were pressured to return to their abusers." The information contained in Home Office Country Information & Guidance - Pakistan: Women fearing gender-based harm/violence (February 2016) 16.2.16 is also consistent with the other documentation: see 2.3.5, 2.4.6 and sections 8.1. to 8.3. and sections 10 and 11.

13. The expert report of Usma Moeen [24-77 of the Appellant's bundle] expressly notes that the Respondent has not accepted the credibility of the Appellant's account and does not seek to assess her credibility, but helpfully seeks to place her account in the context of her knowledge of Pakistan. The expert concludes inter alia at 76-77 that: (i) in light of the background evidence, the Appellant's subjective fears of physical harm or unlawful killing by her estranged husband and his family are well-founded; (ii) there is no realistic possibility that the authorities or her own family would be of any meaningful assistance against threats and risks to her life from her estranged husband and his family; (iii) it is highly likely that the Appellant would not be able to seek any meaningful assistance from the State or non-state organizations in Pakistan in the form of public or private shelters; (iv) internal relocation would be unduly harsh in the specific circumstances ot his case; (vi) it is plausible and likely that the Appellant's estranged husband and in-laws would have threatened to kill her due to her independent decision to separate from her husband and report him to the police in the UK, thus bringing shame and dishonour on the family; (vii) it is highly likely that the Appellant would not be able to obtain contact or custody of her children through the local Courts in Pakistan.

14. Having considered the Appellant's credibility in light of the evidence summarized above, particularly the medical evidence and police records, and her oral evidence and the manner in which she gave it, I have concluded that the Appellant's account of having experienced domestic violence from her husband in the United Kingdom is credible. Whilst this does not necessarily indicate that the Appellant also experienced domestic violence from her husband in Pakistan, in light of the background and expert evidence summarized above and given that the marriage subsisted for seven years prior to arriving in the United Kingdom, I consider there is a serious possibility that the Appellant was subjected to sexual, emotional and physical abuse by her husband whilst in Pakistan. In fact, it was only because the Appellant's neighbour called the police and the Appellant's husband was subsequently arrested that the violence (and ultimately the relationship as the Appellant then refused to return to Pakistan with her husband) was brought to an end.

15. It is the case that the Appellant delayed in making an asylum claim. Her husband left in October 2012 and she did not attend the asylum screening unit until April 2014. The medical evidence for this period indicates that she was suffering from anxiety and depression and had been prescribed anti-depressants. The Appellant's evidence, which I accept, is that she only found out that she could make an asylum claim when she met a woman on a bus who referred her to Southall Black Sisters. In these circumstances, I do not consider that the delay in making an asylum claim fundamentally undermines that claim or its veracity.

16. Mr Staunton, in accordance with the Respondent's refusal letter, sought to cast doubt on the authenticity of the documents relating to the murder charges brought against the Appellant's husband, on the basis that it is possible to obtain fraudulent documents in Pakistan. Ms Brown did not seek to place any particular weight on these documents and submitted that they do not go to the heart of the claim in any event. I accept that submission. Whilst it is possible to obtain fraudulent documents in Pakistan, in the absence of any authentication of the documents it is not possible to tell whether or not these particular documents are genuine, particularly given that they are only photocopies. However, I have concluded that the documents are not material to my assessment of the Appellant's claim, given that it is based on a fear of persecution from her husband due to the history of domestic violence and abuse and not because he was charged with murder. The Appellant's evidence is that her husband returned to Pakistan in October 2012 because he was informed that the charges against him had been dropped and so this issue is no longer a live one that requires determination.

17. The issue before me is whether, having found the Appellant to be credible, she remains at risk of persecution from her estranged husband and his family if she were to return to Pakistan. I find, in light of the Appellant's particular circumstances, the history of domestic violence and the fact that her mother and brother in Pakistan have continued to received threats from the Appellant's estranged husband since his return there, that the Appellant remains at risk of persecution from her estranged husband, in the form of serious harm. I find that the fact that the Appellant refused to return to Pakistan with her husband and reported him to the police exacerbates the risk to her. I find that, in light of the background and expert evidence, summarized at [12] and [13] above, that the Appellant would not receive sufficient protection from the State in respect of the risk of harm to her from her estranged husband and/or his family. The remaining issue is whether it would be viable or unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to internally relocate.

18. In SM (lone women - ostracism) Pakistan CG [2016] UKUT 00067 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal concluded as follows:

"(1) Save as herein set out, the existing country guidance in SN and HM (Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 and in KA and Others (domestic violence - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC) remains valid.
(2) Where a risk of persecution or serious harm exists in her home area for a single woman or a female head of household, there may be an internal relocation option to one of Pakistan's larger cities, depending on the family, social and educational situation of the woman in question.
(3) It will not be normally be unduly harsh to expect a single woman or female head of household to relocate internally within Pakistan if she can access support from family members or a male guardian in the place of relocation.
(4) It will not normally be unduly harsh for educated, better off, or older women to seek internal relocation to a city. It helps if a woman has qualifications enabling her to get well-paid employment and pay for accommodation and childcare if required.
(5) Where a single woman, with or without children, is ostracised by family members and other sources of possible social support because she is in an irregular situation, internal relocation will be more difficult and whether it is unduly harsh will be a question of fact in each case.
(6) A single woman or female head of household who has no male protector or social network may be able to use the state domestic violence shelters for a short time, but the focus of such shelters is on reconciling people with their family networks, and places are in short supply and time limited. Privately run shelters may be more flexible, providing longer term support while the woman regularises her social situation, but again, places are limited.
(7) Domestic violence shelters are available for women at risk but where they are used by women with children, such shelters do not always allow older children to enter and stay with their mothers. The risk of temporary separation, and the proportionality of such separation, is likely to differ depending on the age and sex of a woman's children: male children may be removed from their mothers at the age of 5 and placed in an orphanage or a madrasa until the family situation has been regularised (see KA and Others (domestic violence risk on return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC)). Such temporary separation will not always be disproportionate or unduly harsh: that is a question of fact in each case.
(8) Women in Pakistan are legally permitted to divorce their husbands and may institute divorce proceedings from the country of refuge, via a third party and with the help of lawyers in Pakistan, reducing the risk of family reprisals. A woman who does so and returns with a new partner or husband will have access to male protection and is unlikely, outside her home area, to be at risk of ostracism, still less of persecution or serious harm."

19. In KA and Others (domestic violence - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal held as follows:

"i. In general persons who on return face prosecution in the Pakistan courts will not be at real risk of a flagrant denial of their right to a fair trial, although it will always be necessary to consider the particular circumstances of the individual case.
ii. Although conditions in prisons in Pakistan remain extremely poor, the evidence does not demonstrate that in general such conditions are persecutory or amount to serious harm or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
iii. The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006 ("PWA"), one of a number of legislative measures undertaken to improve the situation of women in Pakistan in the past decade, has had a significant effect on the operation of the Pakistan criminal law as it affects women accused of adultery. It led to the release of 2,500 imprisoned women. Most sexual offences now have to be dealt with under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) rather than under the more punitive Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. Husbands no longer have power to register a First Information Report (FIR) with the police alleging adultery; since 1 December 2006 any such complaint must be presented to a court which will require sufficient grounds to be shown for any charges to proceed. A senior police officer has to conduct the investigation. Offences of adultery (both zina liable to hadd and zina liable to tazir) have been made bailable. However, Pakistan remains a heavily patriarchal society and levels of domestic violence continue to be high.
iv. Whether a woman on return faces a real risk of an honour killing will depend on the particular circumstances; however, in general such a risk is likely to be confined to tribal areas such as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and is unlikely to impact on married women.
v. Pakistan law still favours the father in disputes over custody but there are signs that the courts are taking a more pragmatic approach based on the best interests of the child.
vi. The guidance given in SN and HM (Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 and FS (Domestic violence - SN and HM - OGN) Pakistan CG [2006] UKIAT 00023 remains valid. The network of women's shelters (comprising government-run shelters (Darul Amans) and private and Islamic women's crisis centres) in general affords effective protection for women victims of domestic violence, although there are significant shortcomings in the level of services and treatment of inmates in some such centres. Women with boys over 5 face separation from their sons.
vii. In assessing whether women victims of domestic violence have a viable internal relocation alternative, regard must be had not only to the availability of such shelters/centres but also to the situation women will face after they leave such centres."

20. Applying the principles set out in the caselaw to the particular facts of this case I make the following findings in respect of internal relocation:

20.1. whether the Appellant could relocate to a larger city will depend on her social, familial and educational situation ie. if she is educated, better off or an older woman. The Appellant is from Narowal city and her mother still lives there. Her estranged husband (and children) live in Basra Chamiwala, approximately one and a half hours away. Both places are in Punjab province, not far from Lahore, however, there are other cities eg Islamabad or Karachi in Sindh province, to which she could relocate in theory. However, whilst she has had some education, the Appellant has no qualifications nor money, as she has been supported by friends in the United Kingdom since October 2012 and the statement from her mother dated 6 January 2017 states that she has no financial means to support her. The Appellant is 40 years of age and is thus neither young nor old.

20.2. the Appellant's father has died but she has two brothers. One, Mujeeb Ul Rehman, now resides in Germany. The other, Tussif Ul Rehman lives in Pakistan. The Appellant's evidence before me and before the First tier Tribunal Judge, was that her brother and her family would not help her any longer. This evidence was rejected by the First tier Tribunal Judge in the absence of any substantiation, however, in so doing the Judge failed to take account of the witness statements of the Appellant's mother and her brother, Mujeeb Ul Rahman as to their inability to support the Appellant, financially or practically. I accept that evidence and whilst the Appellant could obtain emotional support from her mother, who is now elderly and frail and has had heart surgery on two occasions, the Appellant could not reasonably be expected to return to live with her mother. I further find that, in the absence of contact with her brother, Tussif, it would be unduly harsh to expect her to relocate to live with him, absent any evidence that this would be a practical or realistic possibility.

20.3. Consequently, the Appellant would be without a male protector. Whilst the country guidance cases make reference to the fact that there are shelters for women who have experienced domestic violence in Pakistan, I have had regard to the recent background and expert evidence before me, summarized at [12] and [13] above and conclude that any shelter to which the Appellant could gain access, which is doubtful, would be, at best, a short term solution. The Home Office CIG at 11.2.1 cites the Aurat Foundation as stating that there are very few shelter homes against the number of women seeking refuge and it is still considered taboo; at 11.2.4 that the Benazir Bhutto Crisis Centres (of which there are 26, all government funded) can only provided shelter for 24-72 hours after which they are either sent to the Islamabad Women's Crisis Centre or the provincial government operated Dar ul Aman shelter homes. 11.2.4 sets out the number of these shelters in operation (in 2014). Whilst there is only 1 in Islamabad there are 7 in Karachi. There is also reference at 11.2.5. to the fact that privately run shelters (by NGOs) are better than those run by the government, however, in her expert report, Uzma Moeen states that 8 women were killed by their families after seeking refuge in the NGO run shelter in Lahore [AB 59] and the CIG at 11.2.6 also reports that conditions in safe houses are "abysmal and akin to a prison." A report on the Dar Ul Aman shelters cited by the expert at AB 61-62 repeats concerns about the conditions and also the fact that for most of the past two decades, these shelters have house only women sent there by court order.

21. Therefore, in conclusion, for the reasons set out above I find that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Pakistan and it would be unduly harsh and unreasonable to expect her to internally relocate, for the reasons set out at [20] above.

22. The appeal is allowed on the basis that the Appellant is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 UN Convention and Article 2(c) of the QD and paragraph 334 of the Immigration Rules.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman

19 February 2017

Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of her family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.