Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-BH-PMP-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/08971/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bennett House, Stoke
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 7th November 2016
On 20th December 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GARRATT

Between

ea
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr J Nicholson of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. In a decision dated 16th September 2016 I decided that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained errors on points of law such that it should be set aside and re-made. I now set out the relevant parts of my decision:
"Background
1. On 2nd March 2016 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Davidge gave permission to the appellant to appeal against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Foudy who dismissed the appeal on all grounds against the decision of the respondent to refuse asylum, humanitarian and human rights protection to the appellant, a female citizen of Nigeria.
2. Permission was granted because Judge Davidge thought that, despite Judge Foudy making cogently reasoned adverse findings of fact, there was no reference to objective evidence provided in a bundle submitted by the Citizens Advice Bureau on the appellant's behalf. Such objective material was said to make reference to the practice of human sacrifice in Nigeria. That information was relevant to the appellant's claim that, if she and her daughter were returned to Nigeria, her child would be killed or subjected to FGM. In allowing the application Judge Davidge also pointed out that the appellant had been unrepresented at the First-tier hearing.
Error on a Point of Law
3. Mr Nicholson submitted that the relevant objective material could be found on pages 28, 30, 47 and 48 of the bundle which had been submitted by CAB in Bolton about ten days before the hearing. That information talks about 'ritualists' commissioning others to procure body parts for sacrifice, ritual murder and cult and secret societies. He urged me to accept that the judge's error in failing to refer to this information was material particularly bearing in mind that the appellant was unrepresented and had drafted her own grounds of appeal.
4. Mr Nicholson made reference to paragraph 18 of the decision in which the judge had erroneously indicated that the appellant had produced no independent evidence about human sacrifice or country information relating to such practices in Nigeria. He also thought that the reference in that paragraph to the appellant's response to question 30 of the asylum interview had been misinterpreted and so it was not open to the judge to find it incredible that the appellant would be taken to see members of her wider family if she was at risk of being killed by them. He also thought that the appellant's response to question 60 did not support the conclusion that the appellant had completed her secondary education. Further, he contended that the judge had not shown that she had considered the provisions of paragraph 276ADE or identified compelling circumstances such as disability and trafficking which might have been relevant.
5. Mr Nicholson has also mentioned an alleged failure by the judge to refer to trafficking in the appellant's case. However, the decision of the respondent of 21st May 2015 shows that the appellant was not found, on a balance of probabilities, to be a victim of trafficking.
6. Mr Bates confirmed that the respondent relied upon the response which suggested that it was not entirely clear why permission to appeal had been granted as the First-tier Judge had given a 'plethora' or negative credibility findings all of which were open to her. It was clear that the appellant's subjective fear was wholly speculative and could not remotely be described as objectively well-founded.
7. Mr Bates conceded that the objective evidence present in the bundle had not been referred to by the judge but asked me to find that it was not relevant. Further, the judge had found that the appellant had not shown that she was, actually, Nigerian so none of the information was relevant in any event. He thought that the cogent reasons given in paragraph 18 should have been sufficient. As to the references to answers in interview he pointed out that the appellant's statement had clearly indicated that she had completed her secondary education and, as to visits to her wider family, the judge's conclusions were open to her. In any event, if the appellant had completed her education he questioned why that might suggest the ill-treatment claimed. In conclusion, Mr Bates agreed that the judge should have considered paragraph 276ADE although he regarded that failure as also irrelevant.
8. Mr Nicholson concluded by emphasising that the judge had reached conclusions on human rights issues which were inadequate.
Conclusions
9. At the end of the hearing and after I had considered the matter for a few moments, I announced that I was satisfied that the decision did show material errors on points of law such that it should be set aside and re-made. I now give my reasons for doing so.
10. Whilst there is no doubt that the decision of the First-tier Judge gives reasons for concluding that the appellant had not shown that she was part of a family that practised human sacrifice or a family that had any future interest in her or would put her daughter at risk of FGM, it is clear that the judge did not take into consideration the objective material submitted in the appellant's bundle which showed that such activity did take place in Nigeria. It may be that the judge would have reached the same conclusions if she had taken the objective material into consideration but that conclusion cannot be presumed. Additionally, the judge dismissed human rights issues in one short paragraph (33) without any reference to the possibility of the claimed private life coming within the provisions of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules. Although the judge appears to find (17) that the appellant had not shown that she is from Nigeria, it is not clear that the judge made her other findings of fact in the alternative or that, if the appellant did not originate from Nigeria, she was not living there at the relevant time.
11. In these circumstances it appears to me that the appeal should be re-made before the Upper Tribunal bearing in mind the defects in the appellant's evidence which have been properly highlighted by the First-tier Judge. The hearing will therefore resume before me in the Upper Tribunal where the inconsistencies in evidence already identified by the First-tier Judge can be considered against the objective material produced in the original bundle and the human rights claim can be examined at the date of that hearing."
Anonymity
2. At the first hearing before me in the Upper Tribunal I made an anonymity direction which is repeated at the end of this decision.
Resumed Hearing
3. At the resumed hearing I confirmed with representatives that the matter would be re-made on the basis I have previously specified.
4. The appellant produced a fresh bundle of documents through the Citizens Advice Bureau in Bolton under cover of a letter dated 27th October 2016. This contains the documents listed in the index. During the hearing reference was also made to the appellant's original hearing bundle produced to the First-tier Tribunal.
5. Medical evidence in the form of a patient summary shows that the appellant suffers from osteoarthritis and consequent impaired mobility. As she complained of some pain at the commencement of the hearing, but that this might be relieved by her standing, I indicated that she should feel free to adjust her position or stand without any further reference to me. No additional problems in this connection arose during the course of the hearing.
The Respondent's Case and outline of the appellant's claims
6. The respondent refused asylum, humanitarian and human rights protection for the reasons set out in a refusal letter dated 1st June 2015. The appellant's claims had also been referred to the respondent's Trafficking Unit which made the decision, on 21st May 2015, that the appellant was not a victim of trafficking.
7. In the refusal letter the respondent outlined the appellant's claims. It was noted that the appellant was born on 1st April 1987 in Nigeria and claimed to be a member of the Yoruba tribe. Her mother died when she was 1 year old and her father died when she was 10. She claimed to have no siblings or other family members in the country. She was educated to secondary school level. She came to the United Kingdom in 2006 by air but did not claim asylum until 28th March 2013. Before he died, her father had told her, when she was about 10 years of age, that her family had been involved in human sacrifice of female children of the family as males were preferred. Her father had not allowed her to undergo FGM.
8. After the death of her father she lived with her father's friend for a short while until he died. She claimed to have been raped by this man. She then went to stay at friends' houses or to live on the streets. Whilst begging she met a lady called F who befriended her. She was told that F could take her to UK where she would receive an education. Her journey was arranged and, on arrival in UK, she went to live with F. However, instead of receiving an education she was held at F's house and made to perform household chores. She was not allowed to leave the house or to use the telephone. She was also threatened that if she tried to escape the police would "get" her. F also assaulted her. However, on an unknown date, she went to a party with a friend where she met a Nigerian man called FE who, because she was upset, said that he would help her to escape from F. She entered into a relationship with FE and, as a result, her daughter was born on 9th July 2013. However, during her pregnancy FE was abusive towards her. He had also told her that his family performed FGM in Nigeria. She could not say whether he was of the Yoruba tribe even though he spoke the dialect.
9. The appellant stated that she feared returning to Nigeria because she and her daughter would be sacrificed by her father's relatives and FE's family would also subject her daughter to FGM.
10. The respondent confirmed that, on 13th February 2015, reference was made to the Trafficking Unit which concluded that the appellant was not a victim of trafficking on account of the adverse credibility conclusions which the respondent reached in conjunction with the overall claim.
11. In concluding that the appellant was not credible the respondent found that the appellant was not a member of a social group as a trafficked person. It was also stated that the appellant's lack of knowledge of the Yoruba tribe and the fact that she was content to answer questions in asylum interview in English led to the conclusion that she was not of that tribe.
12. As to the allegation that the appellant and her daughter would be sacrificed by her father's family and of the risk of FGM for the daughter, the respondent pointed out that the appellant had moved away from her father's family and, in interview, had stated she did not know who they were. The appellant had provided insufficient detail in relation to this aspect of the claim to enable it to be believed. Indeed, the respondent commented that the appellant's claims were "highly speculative". As to the appellant's daughter, the respondent noted that the last time the appellant had spoken to her daughter's father was when she was pregnant. Further, she indicated that she had no contact with anyone in Nigeria. It was not accepted that her ex-partner's family were looking to carry out FGM on her daughter.
13. The respondent also considered internal relocation. It was not considered unreasonable to expect her to move to another area in Nigeria. In this respect the respondent referred to the US Department of State Report on human rights practices of 2011 which showed that the constitution and law provided for freedom of movement and foreign travel. The respondent also noted that the appellant had indicated that she had completed secondary school education. Although she acknowledged that the appellant had a medical problem with her leg, she had lived most of her life in Nigeria and her child had no medical conditions that would impact on an ability to internally relocate.
14. The respondent considered human rights issues. She was not satisfied that the appellant could benefit from the Immigration Rules, particularly those set out in Appendix FM and paragraph 276ADE noting that the appellant's child had only been in the United Kingdom for two years and the appellant for nine years. The respondent considered her obligations under Section 55 of the 2009 Act. However, as the child was Nigerian and the child's father was not involved in her life, it was not considered unduly harsh for the child to return to Nigeria.
15. Further, the respondent was not satisfied that there were any exceptional circumstances in the case which warranted a grant of leave to remain. The appellant's medical condition giving rise to pain in her right leg was not considered to reach the degree of severity defined in N [2005] UKHL 31 and it was noted that objective material indicated that painkillers of the type already taken by the appellant were widely available in Nigeria.
The Appellant's Case and the Hearing
16. The appellant gave evidence through a Yoruba interpreter. She adopted the content of her statement which appears on page 3 of her bundle. In this she confirms the events which were outlined in the respondent's refusal. She claims to have a disabled right leg which resulted in her walking with sticks from the age of about 5. She claims that she is in constant pain. However, whilst in Nigeria she never received treatment for her disability. She confirms that, following the death of her father, she had lived with a friend of his for three or four years but ran away when she was sexually abused by him. She describes how her relationship with F came about and how she paid for her to travel to the United Kingdom but then F started to treat her like a slave and held her prisoner in her home. She was required to take care of F's children and clean the house. She was hit and had water poured over her if she did not get out of bed early enough. She eventually ran away with her former partner, FE, but then eventually realised that her situation was no better as he abused her physically and sexually. She states that, in 2012, she first became pregnant but, because of beatings, she had a miscarriage. In the following year she became pregnant with her daughter but was rejected by FE who deserted her. She wandered the streets until she met someone who suggested to her that she ought to claim asylum but that she needed to do so in Glasgow. The woman she met took her to Victoria Bus Station and bought her a ticket. However, when the appellant went to claim asylum in Glasgow, she was told to return to Croydon. She was given a ticket to return.
17. The appellant said that, during asylum interview, she was ill and exhausted and had to be taken to hospital. However, she was released on the same day and put into temporary accommodation in a hotel before being transferred to Bolton where she has lived ever since. She states that it was only once she had settled in Bolton that she was able to access treatment and support for the remainder of her pregnancy. She indicates that, since giving birth to her daughter on 9th July 2013, she has found it difficult caring for an active child. Her daughter is 3 years of age and now attends a nursery in Bolton during the morning. Her daughter has problems as her speech is not developing as hoped for and she is undergoing hearing checks. As to her own medical condition, the appellant claims that her condition is deteriorating as a result of increased strain being put on her left leg and, when walking, her muscles go into spasm.
18. The appellant asserts that, if returned to Nigeria, now, she cannot see how she could survive. Even without taking into consideration her disability she would have difficulty caring for her daughter as she has no family support network there.
19. During cross-examination the appellant was asked why she had not used a Yoruba interpreter when interviewed by the Home Office. In response she said this was because she was pregnant and stressed she was not aware of anything relating to asylum. She agreed that her English was "pretty good". It was put to her that, during the course of giving evidence, she had pre-empted the Yoruba interpreter by giving her answers in English. When asked about her education she said she was not sure when she had stopped going to school in Nigeria and could not explain why, in response to question 60, she had indicated that she had finished her secondary school education. She also denied having taken any exams, despite saying that she had "passed" in interview. The appellant agreed that she had begged for money or food in Nigeria. When it was pointed out to her that, in interview (question 120 onwards), she had been unable to describe the denominations of Nigerian currency and notes, she said she had fainted before the interview and had attended hospital. The appellant was asked about a contradiction in her evidence about the existence of family members. In question 30 she had indicated that her father had taken her to see family members but, question 107, had said she did not know and had not met any family members. She was therefore asked if she had received any threats from family members. In response she said that, before her father died, she had done but then explained that this was what her father had told her and she agreed she had not met any family members.
20. As to her medical condition the appellant said that she is not due to have any operations and that her pain is being treated. She claimed to wear a leg brace. My attention was drawn to the physiotherapist referral form on page 68 of her bundle to confirm the information.
21. In relation to education the appellant agreed that she had started her education before her father had died. She was therefore referred to the information in the decision on trafficking indicating that secondary education started at the age of 12 when she had said that her father died when she was 10 and she had also indicated that her father had died when she was at secondary school. The appellant said, in relation to this inconsistency, that she was a "bit messed up". She added that primary school was normal when she was younger. It was pointed out to her that, if she had come to the United Kingdom in 2006 she would be 19 years of age on the basis that she was born in 1987. The appellant indicated that she could not remember when she came to the United Kingdom and could not say exactly what her age was.
Submissions
22. Mr McVeety confirmed that the respondent relied on the terms of the refusal letter of 1st June 2015. He emphasised that there were major credibility issues in the case. The appellant's claim to have been trafficked had not been accepted. He also questioned whether the appellant was, actually, a national of Nigeria because of her ignorance of the country's coinage and her inability to remember basic information about her claimed tribe and when she had attended secondary education. He also questioned how she could have survived on the streets of Nigeria from the age of 10 to the age of 19 if her claims were true.
23. As to the objective material (now incorporated into the appellant's latest bundle from page 127) he agreed that there was some evidence or ritual killings in that material, although there was no evidence that firstborn children were targeted. The appellant had not undergone FGM and so it was unlikely that such practices were approved in her family.
24. As to the returnability of the appellant and her child, Mr McVeety emphasised that medical treatment was available in Nigeria bearing in mind that the appellant is only receiving painkillers. The appellant's daughter was not yet 3 years of age and so had not been in the United Kingdom for seven years. She could return to Nigeria to attend school. Family life between the appellant and her child could continue in Nigeria. He agreed that the appeal should be considered on the basis that the appellant was Nigerian although he emphasised the appellant's inability to give basic information about the country. In relation to the human rights claim, particularly the best interests of the appellant's child he made reference to the Court of Appeal decision in EV (Philippines) [2014] EWCA Civ 874 on the basis that the future education of the child would not be a relevant consideration.
25. Mr Nicholson emphasised that it was not in dispute that the appellant was a sole female who had been in the United Kingdom for ten years with a child of 3 years of age. She would return to Nigeria with a congenital defect. He suggested that, in Nigeria, her disability would result in her being stigmatised. He argued that the best interests of the child were to be in the United Kingdom with her mother. My attention was drawn to the supporting evidence showing that the appellant's daughter had established a strong relationship with her peer groups and had enjoyed attending pre-school. It would be difficult for the child to reintegrate along with her mother into Nigerian society.
26. As to the situation in Nigeria Mr Nicholson contended that the background evidence showed that ritual killing and trafficking did occur. He therefore argued that the provisions of paragraph 276ADE(vi) would be met, which, coupled with the respondent's obligations under Section 55, pointed to the child remaining in the United Kingdom. The family should not be put at risk of going to Nigeria because of the appellant's disability and lone female status.
27. Mr Nicholson referred me to evidence in the present bundle and the original bundle to show the existence of exceptional circumstances including ritual killings, superstition, the ill-treatment of children, the existence of cults and secret societies and mutilation, all of which could put the appellant and her child at risk.
28. As to credibility Mr Nicholson argued that the appellant had given satisfactory explanations for some of the perceived inconsistencies, notably that she had been at primary school when her father had died, she had spoken Yoruba at the hearing and her claims of trafficking should be believed. If it were to be found that the appellant were not Nigerian then this would aggravate her problems.

Decision and Reasons
29. The burden of proof is on the appellant to show that she is a refugee or entitled to humanitarian protection or that the respondent's decision is incompatible with her rights under the 1950 Human Rights Convention.
30. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I have looked at the evidence in the round as of now.
31. In considering whether the appellant is a refugee or entitled to humanitarian protection I have taken into consideration all the provisions of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 and paragraphs 327 to 339P, inclusive, of the Immigration Rules, as amended.
32. Only if I am not satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant is a refugee can she have a valid claim for humanitarian protection. If these claims fail but the appellant asserts she is still in need of protection her human rights claim can be considered.
Credibility
33. My consideration of the appellant's claims, taking into consideration the objective material and supporting evidence, leads me to conclude that, whilst I am prepared to accept that she has shown she is of Yoruba ethnicity, her claim to be at risk of sacrifice and FGM for her daughter and to have left Nigeria as a victim of trafficking have not been shown to be credible. My reasons for these conclusions follow.
34. The appellant's claim to be of Yoruba ethnicity and to speak Yoruba is consistent with answers which she has given in screening and asylum interviews. Although the interviews were conducted in English, I find it significant that the appellant has also indicated that she required a Yoruba interpreter for the hearings in which she has been involved in the First-tier Tribunal and subsequently. Whilst the respondent has suggested that the appellant might, through her understanding of English, be able to disguise an inability to speak Yoruba despite the presence of a Yoruba interpreter, I am not satisfied that this suspicion is well-founded. In conjunction with my conclusion I have considered the respondent's suggestion that the appellant may not, actually, be Nigerian. The significance of the appellant being Yoruba is that objective material available through the respondent's Country Information and Guidance for August 2016 is that the tribe is the second largest in Nigeria. Although I acknowledge the significant inconsistencies in the appellant's specific claims about her reasons for leaving Nigeria and risk on return, I am satisfied that she is a Yoruba from Nigeria. Nevertheless, apart from such tribal membership, the appellant has not claimed any specific risk on that account, alone. Indeed, in interview, the appellant showed little knowledge of Yoruba customs which, although not necessarily suggesting that she is not Yoruba, lead me to conclude that she had little interest in Yoruba customs and traditions, which makes it less likely that her father would have been an adherent to any such customs.
35. The appellant's evidence about the claimed threat from members of her family imparted to her by her father is unsubstantiated, there being no evidence to suggest that any relatives attempted to harm her or even to suggest that she should go through FGM which, in any event, she has said her father was opposed to. Indeed, in interview, the appellant stated that she does not know who her father's family are (questions 29 to 30). The risk to the appellant or her daughter from this source either as sacrifice or to undergo FGM has not been shown. In reaching that conclusion I accept that the appellant has produced a copy of the US Department of State Report for 2015 specifically covering both issues. Whilst it is clear that sacrifices and FGM still take place despite being prohibited activity in law in Nigeria, it is not possible, from the lack of detail in the appellant's evidence, to conclude that there is a real risk of harm in that respect to either her or her daughter. She has already indicated that her father was against FGM.
36. The appellant also claims that the family of her former partner in the United Kingdom could subject her daughter to the generally illegal practice FGM, but she has not shown that there has been any threat of such since her relationship came to an end or even that relatives of her former partner even know of the child and the relationship. I should also mention that the objective material to which the appellant refers also refers to legislation in the form of the Child Rights Act of 2003 designed to protect the rights of children.
37. The appellant also claims that, as a disabled person, she would suffer discrimination which would make it difficult for her to survive on return. However, such disability discrimination is the subject of prohibitive federal laws. Vocational training centres in Abuja and Lagos are available to train those with disabilities and to enable them to become self-supporting.
38. The state protection which is available must also be seen against the background of inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence which have already been highlighted in the respondent's refusal and which are evident from the appellant's evidence.
39. I deal, first, with the appellant's claim to have been trafficked to the United Kingdom by a person who befriended her when she claimed to be begging on the streets. It is inconsistent with the appellant's claim to have been educated to secondary level that she would have found herself in that situation. She claims to have left the protection of her father's friend because of sexual assaults made upon her but she has given no evidence of any approach she made to the authorities for protection on that account. I have reached the conclusion that the appellant took the opportunity to travel to the United Kingdom for economic reasons. I also find it unlikely that the appellant would be trafficked into enforced domestic service if her disability was obvious to the extent that, as claimed, she walked with the aid of sticks. A disabled person might be seen as less likely to be able to perform the harsh domestic chores the appellant describes.
40. According to objective material the appellant would have been 18 years of age when she completed her secondary education. Whilst her evidence about her education has been confused it is unlikely that, as someone who had "passed" her exams would be found begging on the streets and met someone who had asked why she was not at school.
41. It is also inconsistent that the appellant would be living with her strict trafficker in UK yet be allowed to attend a party at which she met her former partner. As the respondent has indicated, and I agree, such an opportunity would be inconsistent with the controlling measures which she claimed had been imposed upon her. The appellant also claimed that she was in her relationship with her former partner for about six years. However, if that is so and she separated from him in March 2013, this suggests that she would have been in a relationship with that person from March 2007. Buit, in asylum interview, she indicated that she had been held at her trafficker's home until 2008. Additionally, if the appellant was allowed some freedoms whilst in the United Kingdom she would, I conclude, have had the opportunity to escape and seek protection from the UK authorities but she did not do so. Thus, I find that the appellant was not trafficked to the United Kingdom.
42. In reaching the preceding conclusions I have taken into consideration that the appellant claims to have given inconsistent answers in interview because she was "utterly exhaustive from travelling whilst pregnant". In this respect I note that the appellant's responses which are recorded at the commencement of the interview record show that the appellant volunteered to continue with the interview. When asked if she was feeling well enough to be interviewed she stated:
"Not really, pain in leg, I'm on medication but should be okay. Need to take medication today."
The record does not show that she subsequently complained, initially during interview or at the end, that she needed to stop or required any further medical treatment. This does not suggest to me that she had any particular difficulty in giving her responses even if her answers revealed inconsistencies. Further, the medical evidence produced does not suggest to me that the appellant suffers from any life threatening illness or mental condition which could reflect upon the quality of the evidence she gave. A physiotherapist referral form of 12th July 2016 refers to the appellant suffering from congenital hypotonia with degenerative changes in her right knee joint from a possible old injury. The letter from the advanced orthopaedic practitioner, Kevin Doyle, dated 2nd March 2016 shows that the appellant was being considered for a right knee brace but that she would "not allow much in the way of an assessment due to pain around the knee and leg". None of this suggests any mental impairment.
43. As to the supporting evidence in the form of letters from the three witnesses who are referred to between pages 8 and 12 of the latest bundle, I am satisfied that these contain evidence to support the claim that the appellant and her daughter have a social life in the United Kingdom with assistance from friends but that does not serve to assist me to conclude that the appellant's main claims are otherwise believable. I refer, again, to this evidence in relation to the human rights claim.
44. As I am not satisfied that the appellant came to the United Kingdom for anything other than economic reasons, I cannot be satisfied that she has told the truth about the absence of family members in Nigeria. It follows that I cannot conclude that she will be specifically at risk if returned there as a lone woman with a young child. She is not, therefore, a refugee. I am also unable to conclude that she is entitled to humanitarian protection.
Human Rights
45. I have first considered whether or not the appellant and her child can benefit from human rights protection by applying the Immigration Rules particularly those set out in paragraphs 276ADE and Appendix FM. If I am not so satisfied, then I have sought to identify compelling circumstances existing in the case which would justify a grant of leave to remain outside the Rules. In doing so I apply the judgment of the Court of Appeal in SS (Congo) [2015] EWCA Civ 387 which establishes that test.
46. Making the best interests of the appellant's 3 year old child a primary consideration and noting that Mr Nicholson emphasised that this appeal should be allowed under the provisions of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules, I have referred to that Rule, first. Sub-paragraph (vi) of the Rules states, in relation to an applicant:
"(vi) subject to sub-paragraph (ii), is aged 18 years or above has lived continuously in the UK for less than twenty years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK."
47. The above sub-paragraph can be applied to the appellant who has not been in the United Kingdom for twenty years on the basis that she might meet the "very significant obstacles" test. However, in the light of my findings of credibility I am not satisfied that there are any such very significant obstacles to the appellant's reintegration into Nigeria. She claims that such obstacles exist because of her child. However, the child is 3 years of age, is in good health and has only just started nursery school. Education and the prospect of future education does not create a very significant obstacle as EV (Philippines) makes clear. In Azimi-Moayed and Others (Decisions affecting children; onward appeals) [2013] UKUT 00197 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal found that the best interests of a young child are to remain with its parents or parent. In this case there is no evidence to suggest that the child's father has any interest in the child or that there is any Family Court order in respect of that child who is a Nigerian National. Thus, I conclude that the appellant's child can move with her to Nigeria. Although the supporting evidence in this case, to which I have already referred, suggests that the appellant and her child have formed a private life here with the child settling into her nursery school and making acquaintances there, I conclude that she can also do so in Nigeria where such education now and in the future will be available to her. Thus, I cannot conclude that paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules can benefit either appellant or her child. The other Immigration Rules relating to family life in the United Kingdom cannot benefit the appellant whose partnership has ended and whose child has not been in the United Kingdom for seven years.
48. As to the existence or otherwise of compelling circumstances which might justify a grant of leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules, I have taken into consideration not only the child's best interests but also the claimed medical difficulties from which the appellant suffers. The latter are evidenced by the medical reports which have been submitted, although there is no single report to suggest that the appellant suffers from severe disability arising from her arthritic knee condition or that there is a difficult prognosis. She is treated with painkillers and objective material shows that such treatment can be made available in Nigeria. She can also benefit from schemes aimed at the disabled to fit her for employment. I have also indicated that the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence also lead me to conclude that she has not shown that, on return to Nigeria, she will have no family to turn to for initial assistance. The circumstances of the case do not point to the existence of any compelling circumstances which would warrant a more detailed consideration of the claims outside the Immigration Rules.
49. The provisions of Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (as amended) set out the public interest in human rights cases. In relation to the provisions of that Section the appellant does not have a private life with a qualifying person nor does she have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, that is in this case, a child who has been in the United Kingdom for seven years. Thus, the public interest is in the removal of the appellant and her child.
Notice of Decision
I dismiss the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
Anonymity
I repeat the anonymity direction already made in the Upper Tribunal as follows:
DIRECTION REGARDING ANONYMITY - RULE 14 OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (UPPER TRIBUNAL) RULES 2008
Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/269) I make an anonymity order. Unless the Upper Tribunal or a Court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the original appellant. This direction applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this direction could give rise to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 20/10/2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Garratt

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

As no fee was payable in this case I am unable to make any award.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Garratt