AA/09800/2012
- Case title:
- Appellant name:
- Status of case: Unreported
- Hearing date:
- Promulgation date:
- Publication date:
- Last updated on:
- Country:
- Judges:
The decision
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/09800/2012
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House
Determination Sent
on 19th June 2013
On 24th June 2013
Before
LORD BURNS
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
Between
SHOWKER SHAWKAT ABDULMAJID
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Rendle instructed by Wai Leung Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cockrill, written following a hearing at Taylor House on the 4th April 2013, in which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal against a direction for his removal to Iran which accompanied the refusal of his application for further leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Iran who was found to have a date of birth of 1st January 1995. Details of his claim are set out at paragraphs 9 and 10 of the determination. In summary, he claims to be at risk as a result of working in a photocopy shop run by a third party, Ahmad, who was arrested by the Pasdar (Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution) detained, ill treated, and then released. The photocopier in the shop was destroyed. The appellant claims he was informed by his uncle that Ahmad had been working for the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDPI) and that Pasdar were aware he worked for Ahmed in the shop. The appellant claims his uncle told him he will be detained and tortured and that he could not return to his own home. His home was subsequently raided by Pasdar as a result of which it was decided he should leave Iran which he did with the help of an agent. The appellant’s mother and younger brother remain in Iran. The appellant clams he cannot return due to the adverse interest taken in him by the Iranian authorities.
3. Judge Cockrill accepted the appellant worked in the shop, for the reasons given in paragraph 22 of the determination, but found he had entered the United Kingdom as an economic migrant. Judge Cockrill states:
“…I accept, therefore, a good deal of what the appellant has told me. I do not accept though what really is central to his account which relates to Ahmed. I think the appellant has not been truthful when he described witnessing Ahmed being taken away from the shop, showing signs of injury, by the Pasdar. I think that that whole element has been added to provide a mechanism for the appellant to leave Iran.”
4. The reason for such a finding is disclosed in paragraph 23 in which Judge Cockrill finds:
23. I stress that there I no information that I find reliable which points to Ahmad ever having been arrested and detained. I do not accept that the authorities have come to the appellant’s parental home to try and track him down.
5. As the appellant’s claim was dependant upon the Tribunal accepting his account in relation to Ahmed’s detention in connection with the KDPI a finding no such event occurred was fatal to the appeal, as it broke the chain of causation.
Discussion
6. Permission to appeal was sought and granted on the basis the Judge had “provided an absence of reasoning to justify the adverse findings”.
7. We accept that most of the appellant’s claim was found to be credible and adequate reasons were given for why this was so. This does not mean, however, that all of the claim should have been accepted by the Judge as being credible. In Karanakaran [2000] Imm A R 282 there are set out the four categories of evidence that decision makers may have to take into account when assessing the future risk facing an appellant on return to his home country:
1) evidence they are certain about;
2) evidence they think is probably true;
3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence, even if they could not go so far as to say it is probably true;
4) evidence to which they are not willing to attach any credence at all.
8. The evidence regarding the appellant’s family and employment circumstances fell was found to fall within category 1 or 2 and that relating the detention of Ahmed and resultant risk to the appellant in category 4.
9. The grounds allege inadequate reasons were given but we find no merit in such a submission. The reason the claim was rejected is clearly given in paragraph 23, namely that insufficient reliable evidence had been provided to substantiate the claim. The source of the information relating to Ahmed was said by the appellant in his witness statement to be something his uncle had been told by an unnamed third party. It is therefore hearsay evidence. The Judge did not reject the evidence on this basis but found the quality of that evidence was not good enough to prove the claim. In R (Ullah) v SSHD (CIS 4/12/03) the Court of Appeal said that the Secretary of State could not be precluded from advancing his case on the basis of an interview note between an immigration officer and a witness simply because the witness was not called and there was no witness statement. It was evidence, albeit hearsay in form, to which the judge was entitled to have regard. The weight to be attached to it was, however, a different matter.
10. Weight to be given to any evidence is a matter for a judge provided it is shown the judge has considered that evidence with appropriate care and given adequate reasons to support findings made –see SS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 155. We find the Judge was entitled to attach the weight he did to the evidence relating to this aspect of the claim and that adequate reasons were given for why little weight was attached to such evidence. The finding the appellant had not substantiated his claim to be at risk as a result of the poor quality of the evidence is within the range of findings open to the Judge. No error of law is proved.
Decision
11. There is no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision. The determination shall stand.
Anonymity.
12. The First-tier Tribunal did not make an order pursuant to rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005.
Signed……………………………………………….
Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson
Dated the 20th June 2013