Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-SAR-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/09816/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Liverpool
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 30 November 2016
On 15 December 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLIVE LANE

Between

SAEIDEH BAEIDFAR
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Brown, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, Saeideh Baeidfar, was born on 31 March 1981 and is a female citizen of Iran. She appeals against the decision of the respondent dated 22 June 2015 to refuse to grant her asylum. The First-tier Tribunal (Judge Wedderspoon), in a decision promulgated on 7 June 2016, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. At the hearing at Liverpool on 30 November 2016, Mr McVeety, for the respondent, did not seek to defend the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. He accepted that the judge's findings in respect of the appellant's claimed adherence to the Christian faith were not adequate. At [63], the judge wrote:
The appellant has attended a church in Liverpool and in Manchester regularly since residing in the UK. I accept the appellant has been baptised. However, I find it is reasonably likely the appellant has sought to follow the Christian faith in the UK to bolster her asylum application. I found her witnesses Mr Kelly and Mr McIntyre to be well meaning but in considering the credibility of the appellant the Tribunal can take account [of] but cannot wholly depend upon their opinions as to the sincerity of the appellant's faith. The Tribunal must consider all the matters in the round and the vagueness of the appellant's account about the events in Iran in November 2014 leads the Tribunal to find that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant is a genuine Christian convert.
3. The judge appears to accept [64] that the appellant had "evangelised individuals" or, more particularly, one individual known as ES. The judge comments that, "with such limited evidence the Tribunal concludes that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would seek to evangelise if returned to Iran". It is not entirely clear what the judge means in this context by the expression "with such limited evidence". If the judge was accepting that the appellant had sought to evangelise and had evangelised one individual in Iran, it is not clear by the fact that she had only evangelised one individual should preclude her from engaging in evangelising activities upon her return to Iran; it could be said that even the greatest evangelist has to start somewhere. In any event, the reason given by the judge for rejecting the possibility the appellant would engage in evangelising upon return to Iran does not appear to be consistent with her findings at [63] that the appellant is not a Christian convert at all. Further, the findings at [63] also ignore the fact that the appellant claims to have become a Christian whilst in Iran; read literally, the judge's comment that "it is reasonably likely the appellant has sought to follow the Christian faith in the UK to bolster her asylum application" leaves begging the question as to whether her practise of Christianity in Iran had been similarly bogus. I acknowledge also the observation of Judge Rimington (who granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal) that the judge has somewhat cursorily dismissed "the evidence ... of the religious witnesses contrary to the Dorodian ([01/TH/1537) guidance".
4. For the reasons that I have given, I find that the judge's analysis of the evidence concerning the appellant's claimed Christianity is flawed by legal error. I set aside the decision. None of the findings of fact shall stand. There will need to be a new and thorough fact-finding exercise. That exercise is best conducted in the First-tier Tribunal to which this appeal is returned for the decision to be remade.
Notice of Decision
5. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 7 June 2016 is set aside. None of the findings of fact shall stand. The appeal is returned to the First-tier Tribunal (not Judge Wedderspoon) for that Tribunal to re-make the decision.
6. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 10 December 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane