Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/10551/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 22 July 2016
On 11 October 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O'RYAN

Between

MISS LIVERT ZHUWAO
(anonymity direction NOT MADE)

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr W M Bhebhe, Walters Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought by the Appellant against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Hawden-Beal dated 27 April 2016, dismissing the Appellant's asylum appeal. The Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe and entered the United Kingdom in August 2013 as a visitor. In June 2014 she claimed asylum on the basis that in August 2013 her father had called from Zimbabwe telling her to delay her return because the family was in danger from ZANU PF; the family had left the house and the following day it had been gutted by fire. Further, in March 2014 he had called her again and told her not to return because he and the Appellant's brothers had been involved in a blog or Facebook page named 'Baba Jukwa'. Country information establishes that there is a Facebook page of that name in Zimbabwe which is critical of the Mugabe regime and that arrests of a number of persons who were perceived to be associated with it have taken place. The Respondent considered the Appellant's application for asylum and refused it in a decision dated 13 July 2015, finding the Appellant's account not credible.

2. The Appellant pursued an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. The matter came before the judge on 18 April 2016. The judge heard evidence from the Appellant but from no other member of the Appellant's family, notwithstanding that the Appellant has a sister and two brothers in the United Kingdom. The judge disbelieved the Appellant's account for reasons which included the fact that there was no evidence that the Baba Jukwa blog/Facebook page existed prior to 2013, whereas it had been part of the Appellant's case that her father had been involved in that blog since 2008. Further, whereas the Appellant had asserted that Baba Jukwa also operated on Twitter, there was no evidence supporting this. The judge held that no satisfactory reason had been given by the Appellant as to why the father had delayed informing her until March 2014 of the reason behind the raid on the family home. There was also a query as to why, if the Appellant's father merely worked for a beverages company, he was in the position of having any relevant or sensitive information to set out in the blog/Facebook page about the ZANU-PF authorities in any event. Other factors were also set out in the judge's decision, resulting in her conclusion that the Appellant's family had not been involved in posting any material on the Baba Jukwa blog/Facebook page and the Appellant's account was not credible.

3. At paragraph 9 of the judge's decision, she referred to evidence that the Appellant had, after the refusal of her asylum claim, attended vigils outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London. The judge considered that evidence at paragraph 31 of her decision, as follows:

"31. I note that since her asylum claim was refused the Appellant has started to attend the vigil outside the Zimbabwean Embassy because she claims she was interested in human rights. She has revealed that she did not know anything about the vigil outside the embassy until her representative told her. I am satisfied that her attendance at these vigils is an attempt to bolster her claim. If she was really interested she would have been able to find out online about supporting human rights in Zimbabwe before her claim was refused and would not have had to be given the information by her representative.

32. For all of the reasons above I am not satisfied that she has therefore discharged the burden of proof of having a well-founded fear of persecution for any Convention reason".

The judge dismissed the appeal.

4. The Appellant relied on grounds of appeal dated 26 April 2016 setting out Grounds 1(a) and (b), 2(a) and (b), and 3(a), although it seems to us that the same ground is raised at 1(a), 1(b) and 2(b); that whilst the judge was aware of the evidence of the Appellant's participation in sur place activities outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London, no proper assessment was made as to whether such activities gave rise to a real risk of serious harm in Zimbabwe. Permission to appeal was specifically granted on that point by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Brunnen on 23 May 2016. There were two other points raised only obliquely in the grounds of appeal; one is an allegation that the judge proceeded unfairly by raising certain issues in the decision which were not put to the Appellant at the hearing (ground 2(a) and 3(a)), and another that the judge failed to take into account that the Appellant was a minor child at certain points of the relevant account, she being 16 at the time that she received the telephone calls from her father (ground 3(a)). Those separate grounds were described by Judge Brunnen as having no arguable merit but it is to be noted that permission was not specifically refused on those separate grounds.

5. Before us Mr Bhebhe acting for the Appellant has not pursued those second and third grounds in his oral submissions. We find that it was appropriate for him not to do so. Very briefly on the point of procedural fairness, we find that there is nothing in the judge's decision which raised a novel point in relation to the perceived plausibility of the Appellant's account which was not already properly raised in the refusal letter. The Appellant would not have been taken by surprise by any issue relied on by the judge in her decision. Secondly, although the Appellant was 16 at the time that she received the phone calls from her father, we find that she is an educated young woman, the events were shortly prior to her claim for asylum, and we find that there is no merit in any argument that the judge dealt inappropriately with the Appellant, who gave evidence as an adult before her, simply because she had been a minor at a prior point in time during her claim.

6. We deal with the principal point advanced by the Appellant in the following way. Even if it would have been preferable for the judge to have proceeded, having noted the Appellant had been involved in vigils outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London, to have specifically made a finding as to whether that activity would have resulted in a risk of serious harm to the Appellant, we find that the Appellant has been unable to produce to us evidence supporting the contention that any such risk would have arisen as a result. The bundle of evidence supplied to the First-tier Tribunal, which has not been added to before us, did not contain any country information. We asked Mr Bhebhe if there was anything within the relevant country guidance in relation to Zimbabwe (CM Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC)), discussing the potential for a risk of harm to arise as a result of sur place activities in the United Kingdom. He did not draw our attention to any particular passage in CM. Nor does he produce to us any country information at all which supports the proposition that opportunistic activity outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London, which was what the judge found that the Appellant had been engaged in, would give rise to any real risk of harm. We therefore find that whilst it may have been preferable for the judge to have included in her decision a specific finding as to whether any risk would have arisen, there is simply no evidence placed before us which could have supported that claim. We find that any error on the part of the judge was therefore immaterial.

Decision

7. There is no material error of law in the judge's decision. We uphold it. We dismiss the Appellant's appeal.

No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 20 August 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge O'Ryan

We have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 20 August 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge O'Ryan