Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/10878/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 8 August 2016
On 28th September 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

A--- B---
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant did not appear and was not represented
For the Respondent: Mr K Norton, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Breach of this order can be punished as a contempt of court. I make this order because the Appellant is the victim of sex trafficking organised by his father. The public have no legitimate interest in his identity and he is entitled to privacy.
2. This is an appeal by a young person who is a citizen of Albania. He is 18 years old. He will soon be 19 years old. He appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State that he was a refugee or otherwise entitled to international protection.
3. The case was called on at approximately noon but there was no answer. My clerk tried to telephone the solicitors identified as representing the appellant but could not make contact. This is the second time this appellant's representatives have failed to appear. On an earlier occasion they made a mistake about the date. As far as I am aware this is not a case where there is any skeleton argument or bundle served for the Upper Tribunal.
4. Mr Norton has information suggesting that the appellant is not able to come because he is in custody. Mr Norton passed that on in good faith to offer an explanation for the appellant's absence. He made it plain that he did not know it to be right and I make it plain that I have not assumed that that is right or assumed that, if it is right, it is for any reason that is to the appellant's detriment. I simply regard it as a further indication that he was not expecting to attend the hearing and had offered no explanation to the Tribunal.
5. In the circumstances I decided to go ahead in his absence and decide the appeal.
6. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Holmes. He was particularly concerned that it was not apparent from the Decision and Reasons why the appeal had been dismissed. I read out the last part of his grant in paragraph 3:
"The judge ought arguably to have then analysed the account in the light of the country guidance on Albania to ascertain from whom the appellant faced a risk of harm, and whether this was an issue local to his home area or one that could be avoided by internal relocation, and whether this was a risk of harm against which there was adequate state protection. It is arguable that the decision fails to do so, and that the approach to whether the appellant could be a member of a particular social group was itself flawed."
7. I make it plain that I am not persuaded that the First-tier Tribunal Judge is right in his analysis of whether the appellant is a member of a particular social group. That is only important if he is wrong to find that the person does not need international protection. A member of a particular social group is not a refugee unless he risks persecution as a consequence.
8. This is a case where much of the appellant's evidence has been believed. Certainly it is accepted, although it is a shocking finding to have to make, that the appellant is a victim of sex trafficking and the trafficker was his own father, although as Mr Norton has pointed out, the appellant as not been trafficked into the United Kingdom but trafficked from Albania to Kosovo. The United Kingdom's obligations towards him as a victim are not necessarily the same in each case.
9. There are certain findings that are very significant. One of them is that the appellant's father has been prosecuted and sent to prison for an offence of violence. The First-tier Tribunal took the point that this suggested that the appellant's father did not have influence with the local police but was subject to the ordinary criminal law and there is no reason to think that that has changed.
10. That is a very pertinent finding when deciding whether the person is at risk now. It seems clear that the First-tier Tribunal accepted there would potentially be a degree of risk if he came across his father but also clear from the First-tier Tribunal's analysis of the case that the appellant could look to the authorities in Albania for effective protection.
11. I am not sure that the reputation of the authorities in Albania is such that everybody who might be at risk in that country can be confident of effective protection. I am certainly open to the argument that there may be some source of corruption which would mean that effective protection would not be available. However, I see no basis for concluding that this is such a case when it is plain that the person who is the source of risk has been convicted and sent to prison for criminal behaviour in the past.
12. I see no basis for undermining the judge's conclusion that there is effective protection available in Albania on the facts of this case for this particular appellant and once that is established there is no basis for deciding he needs international protection. I see no material error in the decision complained of. It follows therefore I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
13. This appeal is dismissed.

Signed

Jonathan Perkins
Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Dated 26 September 2016