The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/11167/2014


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Manchester
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 11th August 2016
On 17th August 2016




Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MARTIN

Between

MARYAM [L]
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:

For the Appellant: Dr E Mynott (Latitude law)
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal to the Upper Tribunal, with permission, by the Appellant in relation to a Decision and Reasons of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Ransley) promulgated on 14th April 2015.

2. The Appellant is a female citizen of Iran born on the 9th April 1979.

3. She claimed that she was born a Muslim but never considered herself to be a practising Muslim. She was introduced by a female friend to the Baha'i faith in April 2011 and she decided to convert. She did not undergo any particular ritual when she converted and attended a total of five meetings.

4. At the fifth meeting, in April 2012, at the house of another Baha'i member the Appellant with the other attendees was arrested. She was detained for three weeks during which time she was interrogated. She did not give them the answers they were looking for and was beaten. She was released after three weeks subject to a condition that she report fortnightly. Three months later she was released from the reporting requirement. She then had no further problems with the Iranian authorities and she applied for a student visa for the United Kingdom. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 31st October 2012 and studied for a Masters degree in biomedical sciences at Sheffield Hallam University which she was awarded on the 21st February 2014.

5. In November 2013 she had been informed by a friend that her friend, [F], who had introduced her to Baha'i, had been arrested. The Appellant understood her to have informed Ettelat about the Appellant's conversion to Baha'i. In January 2014 the Ettelat contacted her father indicating that the Appellant was required to start reporting again. She was then told by her father in mid July 2014 that she had been put on a list of individuals to be arrested.

6. The Judge in the First-tier Tribunal found the Appellant had sought to change her story to cover up internal inconsistencies in her evidence which damaged her credibility. She noted that the Appellant had produced no members of the Baha'i in the United Kingdom to support her claim that she was a Baha'i. The Judge noted that no medical report had been provided to substantiate her claim that she had been beaten. The Judge found that the documentary evidence in terms of photographs did not corroborate her claim and found that she had not satisfied her even on the low standard of proof that she had converted from Islam to Baha'i. At paragraph 38 of the Decision and Reasons, after the Judge had found the Appellant to be without credibility, she accepted the Presenting Officer's submission that the expert report was of little assistance because it was largely of a generic nature. Also she found it not helpful because the expert's conclusion that the Appellant would face a real risk on return to Iran was based on the premise that her asylum account is true. On that basis she found the expert's report of little assistance to the Appellant.

7. Permission to appeal was initially refused by a Judge of the First - tier Tribunal but then allowed by a Judge in the Upper Tribunal on the basis that it was arguable that the Judge erred in her approach to the expert report in so far as that report was required to be considered in the context of assessing credibility and not simply rejected ex post facto because it simply found the Appellant's account was credible.

8. It was the Judge's treatment of the expert report that was the main plank of the argument before me with regard to the issue of whether the Judge had made a material error of law. Dr Mynott referred me to the various negative findings and the findings start from paragraph 20 of the Decision and Reasons but it is only at paragraph 36 right at the end that the Judge makes any reference to the expert evidence.

9. The Secretary of State refused the application on the basis that she did not accept that the Appellant had converted to the Baha'i faith or what had happened to her in Iran.

10. Dr Mynott took me to the expert's report which he argued contained a great deal of evidence material to whether or not the Appellant was a Baha'i. At paragraphs 98 and 99 of the report the expert deals with how the Appellant practised her faith in the United Kingdom and why she would not practise openly.

11. One of the reasons given in the letter of Refusal rejecting the claim is in connection with the Appellant's explanation that there are spies in the United Kingdom reporting to the Iranian authorities. That issue is dealt with at paragraph 72 of the expert's report. This is relevant to the way in which the appellant practises her faith in the United Kingdom.

12. He also referred me to paragraph 14 of the report which refers to the monitoring of persons who follow the Baha'i religion.

13. Paragraphs 16 to 19 relates to the procedures of the Iranian authorities and the way in which they release detainees subject to reporting conditions and at paragraph 25 he gives reasons why releasing a detainee on bail is plausible.

14. Overall the expert has dealt with the Appellant's claims as to what happened to her in Iran and given his opinion on their plausibility.

15. Mr McVeety argued that the Judge had not found against the Appellant on the basis of a lack of plausibility of her claims but on the basis of inconsistencies.

16. I am persuaded that the Judge made a material error of law in her treatment of the expert report. It certainly has the appearance of her having made adverse credibility findings without reference to that report and in particular there has been no assessment of the Appellant's claims about what took place in Iran which is dealt with at length in the report. The expert's report should have been included as part of the overall credibility assessment in accordance with established case law.

17. As credibility is at the heart of this claim I set aside the Decision in its entirety.

18. After hearing submissions from both representatives, noting the substantial credibility findings that need to be made, it was agreed that the appropriate course was to remit the matter to the First - tier Tribunal for a full re hearing on all issues.

19. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed to the extent that the First -tier Tribunal's Decision is set aside and the matter remitted to the First - tier Tribunal for a full rehearing.

20. There was no application for an anonymity direction and I see no justification for making one.


Signed Date 16th August 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Martin