Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/11244/2014

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bennett House, Stoke-on-Trent
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 5th August 2016
On 9th August 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MARTIN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

[I H]
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A McVeety (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)
For the Respondent: Ms D Dhaliwal (instructed by Halliday Reeves)

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal to the Upper Tribunal by the Secretary of State, with permission, in relation to the Decision and Reasons of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hollingworth) promulgated on 15th April 2016 in which he allowed the Appellant's appeal against the Secretary of State's refusal of his asylum claim.
2. The Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe. He had travelled to the United Kingdom in 2001 and applied for asylum for the first time on the 12th October 2002. That claim was on the basis that he and his father were active members of the MDC in Harare. His appeal against the refusal of that that application was heard by Adjudicator Gordon on 26th January 2004 and dismissed on 12th February 2004.
3. The Appellant next appeared before the First-tier Tribunal on 16th July 2008. On that occasion he was appealing against a decision to deport him following a conviction of affray, common assault and damaging property for which he received a combined custodial sentence of eighteen months. That appeal was also dismissed.
4. Hs claim to have been involved in the MDC had been found not to be credible.
5. The appeal before Judge Hollingworth was in relation to a refusal to revoke the deportation order and to refuse a further asylum claim. This time the Appellant claimed to have a significant profile and to be an active member of ROHR in the UK which is a human rights organisation. The Judge accepted his evidence and found that he did have a significant profile and allowed the appeal.
6. The Secretary of State sought and was granted permission to appeal. The grounds as argued before me were that the Judge erred in allowing the appeal and the Appellant had no significant MDC profile which would result in his facing a real risk in Zimbabwe. They relied upon the country guidance case of CM (EM Country Guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC). The grounds argued that the Appellant had been found to have no credible claim as a member of the MDC in Zimbabwe. His own evidence was that ROHR was a human rights organisation and not a political party and as such the Judge erred in finding that he would be at risk on return.
7. It was also argued before me that having previously lost an appeal on the basis that he would not carry out any political activities in Zimbabwe then the same should apply to his current activities and therefore he would not be at risk.
Findings
8. The judgment of Judge Hollingworth is very lengthy and detailed. It explains the chequered history that the appeal had before him including numerous adjournments. It first came before him in April 2015 and was only ultimately and finally heard in April 2016. The Judge was well aware of the previous decisions. At Paragraph 55 he confirmed he took as his starting point the findings in relation to the Appellant's credibility as set out in the previous decisions. However, he also pointed out that the essence of the Appellant's case before him was that he should be granted protection based upon the activities he had carried out in the United Kingdom which would render him at risk if he were to be returned. It is true that the Judge refers to political activity in relation to the Appellant's activities with ROHR and ROHR is documented to be and confirmed by the Appellant to be a human rights organisation rather than a political party. That notwithstanding I do not find that the Judge has made an error of law. It is quite clear at Paragraph 58 that the Judge had considered the considerable evidence in detail and found the evidence of the Appellant's activities would be easily accessible on the internet. He had attended the Zimbabwe vigil which is available on Facebook but the ROHR involvement was the greatest. The Judge found at Paragraph 63 that search results on Google, the vigil website and Facebook means that the Appellant's activities and profile with ROHR, which is significant, would be easily identified. The Judge at Paragraph 65 appreciated that the Appellant's activities were for a human rights organisation rather than a political party. He also correctly identified the country information and country guidance cases, although amended several times, had not concluded that people with a significant profile for human rights organisations would not be at risk in Zimbabwe. The Judge was therefore entitled to find that his profile was significant and that that significant profile would place him at risk.
9. It is not relevant whether or not the Appellant would continue with those activities in Zimbabwe. The risk to him would lie at the airport. The intelligence led enquiries about the Appellant would reveal his activities and it would be at the airport where he would encounter problems. His problems would be with the authorities and therefore internal relocation would not be available.
10. Mr McVeety sought to argue that the Appellant's activities were not genuinely held and were undertaken purely as a means to obtain international protection. That may well be the case but it is now trite law that a person's motives are irrelevant if the result of the activities in fact places them at risk. The Judge in this case found that they did and I can discern no material error of law in the Judge's reasoning which is detailed and thorough.

Notice of Decision

The Secretary of State's appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

There has been no application for an anonymity order and I do not make one

Signed Date 8th August 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Martin