Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-SAR-V2

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/11342/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 24th February 2017
On 2nd March 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D N HARRIS

Between

miss sania iqbal
(no ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss Y Gwashawanhu, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Mr N Bramble, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 24th December 1986. The Appellant applied for asylum based on a fear that if returned to Pakistan she would face mistreatment due to her membership of a particular social group as a woman. That application was refused by the Secretary of State in the Notice of Refusal dated 24th July 2015.
2. The Appellant appealed and the appeal came before a panel of First-tier Tribunal Judges, namely Judge Bradshaw and Judge Easterman sitting at Hatton Cross on 15th April 2016. In a Decision and Reasons dated 8th June 2016 that appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
3. On 23rd June 2016 Grounds of Appeal were lodged to the Upper Tribunal. Those grounds contended that in spite of the Appellant’s difficulties the Tribunal had failed to assess her risk on return to Pakistan with a husband who had been demonstrably violent towards her and whether in those circumstances there would be sufficiency of protection on return. It was submitted that the Tribunal had rendered an incomplete assessment of risk on return and that the Appellant’s actions in reconciling with her husband whilst in the safety of the United Kingdom did not guarantee that she would not face domestic violence on return to Pakistan.
4. On 9th December 2016 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Simpson granted permission to appeal. Judge Simpson noted that the Tribunal dealt adequately with the issue of sufficiency of protection from the Appellant’s brother in Pakistan and had considered all the relevant cases, (as is also the case with internal relocation where the Tribunal’s findings are again valid in relation to the Appellant’s brother). However, Judge Simpson considered that the decision was almost silent as to the risk on return in relation to the Appellant’s husband and while the couple may have reconciled in the UK as a result of the Appellant’s pregnancy, it was arguable that the Tribunal ought to have considered whether there would be sufficient protection available to the Appellant in the event of domestic violence from her husband in Pakistan.
5. It is on that basis that the appeal comes before me to determine whether or not there is a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant appears by her instructed legal representative, Miss Gwashawanhu. Miss Gwashawanhu is familiar with this matter having appeared before the First-tier Tribunal. In addition I am assisted considerably by her in the provision of a copy of the Country of Information Report from Pakistan dated 9th August 2013 which she states was referred to before the First-tier Tribunal Judges and which she considers has been inadequately addressed in the decision. The Home Office appears by her Home Office Presenting Officer, Mr Bramble.
Submission/Discussions
6. Miss Gwashawanhu submits that there is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judges, but that that error is merely limited to the risk on return appertaining to the Appellant’s history of domestic violence. She refers me to the decision, in particular paragraph 42, which sets out the domestic violence that was considered by the First-tier Tribunal Judges and she refers to the evidence which is set out at paragraphs 14 to 20 of the First-tier Tribunal Judges’ decision. I refer Miss Gwashawanhu to paragraph 43 of the decision and she considers that does not undermine the evidence that was before the Tribunal and that the Appellant is entitled to fear that there may be a reoccurrence of domestic violence and that the lacuna in this case is that the Tribunal did not consider whether she would be at risk and has been selective in the consideration of the issues set out in the current COI Report.
7. In response Mr Bramble reminds me that on one hand the Appellant claims to be a victim of domestic violence, but on the other hand has placed her husband as a dependant on her claim and emphasises the two scenarios are not compatible. He asked me to note the position at paragraphs 41 and 42 of the decision, but emphasises that the Tribunal has taken due account of the domestic violence in paragraph 42 and has made findings at paragraph 43. He submits that if I look at those paragraphs I will find that there are clear findings as to the merits of risk of domestic violence and he also asked me to give due consideration to paragraphs 35, 39, 46 and 50, all of which he states address the issue, including case law and the position regarding relocation. He acknowledges that there may be only limited reference to the COIF Report, but reminds me that it is not necessary to recite all the evidence and that he submits the Tribunal has addressed the issues clearly and that the determination covers all relevant areas of the claim.
8. In brief response Miss Gwashawanhu takes me to paragraph 51 of the decision pointing out that that has to be looked at against the light of paragraphs 22 to 24 which set out the Respondent’s case and that the issues addressed in paragraph 50 of the decision do not address domestic violence and asked me to remember that the Appellant would be returning as a lone woman with a child. She does no more beyond that than maintain her original submissions.
The Law
9. Areas of legislative interpretation, failure to follow binding authority or to distinguish it with adequate reasons, ignoring material considerations by taking into account immaterial considerations, reaching irrational conclusions on fact or evaluation or to give legally inadequate reasons for the decision and procedural unfairness, constitute errors of law.
10. It is not an arguable error of law for an Immigration Judge to give too little weight or too much weight to a factor, unless irrationality is alleged. Nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge to fail to deal with every factual issue of argument. Disagreement with an Immigration Judge’s factual conclusion, his appraisal of the evidence or assessment of credibility, or his evaluation of risk does not give rise to an error of law. Unless an Immigration Judge’s assessment of proportionality is arguable as being completely wrong, there is no error of law, nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge not to have regard to evidence of events arising after his decision or for him to have taken no account of evidence which was not before him. Rationality is a very high threshold and a conclusion is not irrational just because some alternative explanation has been rejected or can be said to be possible. Nor is it necessary to consider every possible alternative inference consistent with truthfulness because an Immigration Judge concludes that the story is untrue. If a point of evidence of significance has been ignored or misunderstood, that is a failure to take into account a material consideration.
Findings on Error of Law
11. The issue before me is a narrow one, namely whether or not the panel have made an incomplete assessment of the risk on return so far as it relates to a risk of domestic violence from the Appellant’s husband. Both legal representatives are satisfied that there is no error of law in the manner in which the Tribunal has addressed any prospective risk that was maintained from the Appellant’s brother. I am satisfied having considered the decision, considered the COIF Report and looked in detail at the decision that there are no material errors of law disclosed. It is important that I give my reasons. The Appellant is, it is acknowledged, an educated woman who was closely involved in local matters with her father and lived a life in one local area which it is accepted she is likely to know. It is accepted that her parents have died and it is accepted within paragraphs 41 to 43 that there has been some domestic violence brought upon her by her husband. These issues are referred to at paragraphs 41 and 42. However, the background against which corroborative evidence is lacking is shown at paragraph 42 and it is important to note the conclusions made by the judges at paragraph 43. They state:-
“Her account is inconsistent and even though there is evidence of an assault whilst in detention, the subsequent reconciliation for the very understandable reason of their child who he loves, the total lack of seeking help and support, or even advice about domestic violence and her maintaining him as a dependant on her asylum claim, undermines her claimed future fear that he will abuse her and be free to do so if they return to Pakistan together as a family or that he will tell her brother of their marriage.”
12. That is a telling paragraph. It is a finding that the judges were entitled to make on the factual evidence that they heard. Thereafter, at paragraph 46 they go on to consider the sufficiency of protection and the external evidence from the country guidance authorities. They also go on to make reference to the COIR for Pakistan dated 9th August 2013 and despite the contention made by Miss Gwashawanhu that they have been selective in such consideration, it is clear that they have given full and due consideration to that COI Report.
13. At paragraph 47 the judges look at the position generically so far as it affects the position of women in Pakistan following the decision in KA and at paragraph 50 address the position so far as the Appellant would find herself in upon return and the position relating to internal relocation. They note that the Appellant is well-educated, has several languages and experience of work and business and is resourceful and could find work. They go on to say that she has her husband and although with or without him there is a young child to support, the evidence does not suggest that she would be destitute and that she has friends that can be supportive. They note the inconsistencies, contradictions and general lack of credibility in the Appellant’s account which are mentioned at paragraphs 51 and 52 and make findings that they are entitled to. They also note that it is possible, despite the Appellant’s comments that her husband is a dependant, that she has indicated that she would not wish to return with him. It is noted at paragraph 55 that the best interests of the child are considered and that he would remain with his mother whether she returns to Pakistan alone or with her husband in a family unit.
14. In all these circumstances it seems to me clear that the Tribunal panel have given full consideration, not just to the position regarding the Appellant returning with a purported fear from her brother, but from that of returning to a situation where she could potentially be a victim of domestic violence. They have considered the agencies that are available, they have considered the case law and they have considered the objective evidence. They have also made findings of fact which are not challenged with regard to the level of credibility of the Appellant’s testimony. They have noted that the Appellant’s husband is a dependant on this claim and that at the present time the Appellant remains with her husband and with their child. This is a panel who has given a very thorough consideration to the evidence. In all the circumstances I am satisfied that they have evaluated the claim fully and have considered the position that the Appellant would be in if she were to return, so far as her risk as to domestic violence is concerned. In such circumstances I am not persuaded that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal discloses any material error of law, and whilst I appreciate it will be disappointing to the Appellant, I find that there is no material error of law disclosed in that decision of the panel and the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is maintained.
Notice of Decision
15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal discloses no material error of law and the appeal of the Appellant is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal panel is maintained.
16. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 27 February 2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge D N Harris

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

No application is made for a fee award and none is made.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge D N Harris