Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/11724/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester Piccadilly
Decision Promulgated
On 4 November 2016
On 18 November 2016

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIRRELL

Between
R N
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Thomas for Compass Immigration Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr A Mc Vitie Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. There was in place an anonymity direction and that shall continue.
2. In order to avoid confusion, the parties are referred to as they were in the First-tier Tribunal.
3. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Fox promulgated on 22 July 2016 which dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the decision of the Respondent to remove the Appellant from the UK following the decision to refuse the Appellant's claim for asylum.
Background
4. The Appellant was born on 25 January 1996 and is a national of Iran.
5. On 30 July 2014 the Appellant applied for asylum on the basis of his political activities in Iran. Since the Appellant arrived in the UK he claims to have converted to Christianity.
6. On 13 August 2015 the Secretary of State refused the Appellant's application.

The Judge's Decision
7. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. First-tier Tribunal Judge Fox ("the Judge") dismissed the appeal against the Respondent's decision.
8. Grounds of appeal were lodged in essence arguing that the Judge had placed insufficient weight on material evidence when reaching adverse conclusions: had placed insufficient weight on the evidence of Reverend Threlfall; failed to give adequate weight to the documents produced although she appeared to accept that the documents showed that the Appellant had divorced.
9. On 16 August 2016 First-tier Tribunal Judge Pullig gave permission to appeal on all grounds.
10. At the hearing I heard submissions from Ms Thomas on behalf of the Appellant that :
(a) The Judge failed to properly assess the documentary evidence in that she appeared to accept that the Appellant had changed his name and divorced but placed no weight on the other documents.
(b) The Judge failed to assess the Appellants explanation as given in his witness statement for failing to refer to his 2011 detention in the Screening Interview.
(c) In relation to Reverend Threlfall it was clear she had regular contact with the Appellant although another colleague conducted the Bible Studies and conversion process.
11. On behalf of the Respondent Mr Mc Vitie submitted that :
(a) In relation to the claimed conversion the weight the Judge gave to the evidence of the Reverend was a matter for her and she gave reasons why she gave limited weight to the evidence adduced. Her evidence was second hand as she does not speak Farsi. The reason given for the Ministers non attendance given the importance of the appeal was poor to non existent. The decision to give little weight to the Reverends evidence was open to her.
(b) The Judge was not accepting that any of the documents produced were reliable and gave reasons and does not find that the documents in relation to the name change and divorce were reliable.
(c) In relation to the Appellants failure to mention the 2011 detention it was clear that the Judge had read the witness statement but concluded that the explanation did not satisfy her.
(d) The Judges approach to the documents was correct: she looked at them in the round and gave them the weight she felt was appropriate.
12. In reply Ms Thomas on behalf of the Appellant submitted that paragraph 40 appeared to suggest that the Judge accepted the Appellant was divorced and had changed his name.
The Law
13. Errors of legislative interpretation, failure to follow binding authority or to distinguish it with adequate reasons, ignoring material considerations by taking into account immaterial considerations, reaching irrational conclusions on facts or evaluation or giving legally inadequate reasons for the decision and procedural unfairness, constitute errors of law.
14. It is not an arguable error of law for an Immigration Judge to give too little weight or too much weight to a factor, unless irrationality is alleged. Nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge to fail to deal with every factual issue under argument. Disagreement with an Immigrations Judge's factual conclusions, his appraisal of the evidence or assessment of credibility, or his evaluation of risk does not give rise to an error of law. Unless an Immigration Judge's assessment of proportionality is arguable as being completely wrong, there is no error of law, nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge not to have regard to evidence of events arising after his decision or for him to have taken no account of evidence that was not before him. Rationality is a very high threshold and a conclusion is not irrational just because some alternative explanation has been rejected or can be said to be possible. Nor is it necessary to consider every possible alternative inference consistent with truthfulness because an Immigration judge concludes that the story told is untrue. If a point of evidence of significance has been ignored or misunderstood, that is a failure to take into account a material consideration.
15. In relation to credibility generally in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367 Buxton LJ said this in relation to challenging such findings:

"Where, as in this case, complaint is made of the reasoning of an adjudicator in respect of a question of fact (that is to say credibility), particular care is necessary to ensure that the criticism is as to the fundamental approach of the adjudicator, and does not merely reflect a feeling on the part of the appellate tribunal that it might itself have taken a different view of the matter from that that appealed to the adjudicator."
16. In relation to how decisions are written I remind myself of Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 Lord Hoffmann said at p. 1372 that "The exigencies of daily court room life are such that reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed......."

Finding on Material Error
17. Having heard those submissions, I reached the conclusion that the Tribunal made no material errors of law.
18. It is always important to read a decision as a whole rather than focusing on a paragraph out of context.I am satisfied that the argument that there is a contradiction in the Judges findings in relation to documents between paragraph 40 and paragraph 53 which is a conclusion about documents is not made out when the decision is read as a whole. The Judge starts her findings at paragraph 38 by stating that she did not find that the Appellant had established his case to the requisite standard of proof. She then sets out what she describes as his core account at paragraphs 38 onwards and it is clear to me that she highlights what she considers to be those aspects of the claim that are incredible and why they do not meet the standard of proof and that his claim in relation to his divorce and name change is one of those assertions that she does not accept. Thus in a detailed assessment of the evidence she highlighted those areas of the claim that clearly caused her not to accept that the Appellant was a credible witness as to his core claim:
(a) That the Appellant had been dismissed from the Iranian Engineering Company in 2012 for anti authority activities (para 39) yet managed to secure a more senior role with his new employer the Tehran Telecommunications Country.
(b) Although he claimed he was dismissed from his new employment he was able to remain at home without incident until he left Iran on 29 July 2014 using his own passport.
(c) The Appellant was divorced on 12 April 2014 and registered a change of name and yet while making such fundamental changes to his personal life and formal identity this aroused no attention from the authorities.
(d) The passivity of the authorities was considered in the context of his employer's decision to communicate his activities to third parties.
(e) The Appellants employers only investigated his activities a month after dismissing him.
(f) While the Appellant claimed that the police would not be involved in his illegal activities this was inconsistent with the core of his claim that he would be at risk on return.
(a) The Appellant was able to leave Iran using his own passport without being detained. There was no evidence that his father had any problem returning to Iran or had had any problems since his return and this was incredible.
(b) The Appellant failed to mention his detention and torture from March 2011 to April 2011 in his screening interview and his failure to do so without a reasonable explanation undermines his credibility.
(c) It was not credible that in spite of evidence of recent travel and his illegal activities the authorities would give him 10 days to surrender to bail.
19. In relation to the overall assessment of documents the Judge was entitled to take into account in paragraph 53 the fact that the documents were not originals and the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Iran. She also took into account at paragraph 44 and 47 his explanation that he received his copy documents by email from his sister because the authorities monitor the postal service and the originals could not be posted was inconsistent with the background material and his own claim to have come to the attention of the authorities on two occasions and the fact that he has kept in touch with his family by email since he has been in the UK when. Given those findings it was open to the Judge that the documents could not be relied on to establish that the Appellant was of interest to the authorities.
20. In relation to the argument that the Judge failed to take into account the Appellants evidence both oral and in his witness statement in assessing why he had not referred in his Screening Interview to his detention in March to April 2011 I am satisfied that this argument is unsustainable. She refers to the Appellants bundle of documents and heard oral evidence from him which she summarises and she was not required to detail each in her decision. It is nevertheless clear that she read the witness statement and she was entitled to conclude that given his arrest , detention and torture in 2011 were traumatic events his failure to refer to them undermined his credibility.
21. In relation to the evidence of the Reverend Threlfall is clear from reading the decision and her detailed assessment of the Reverends evidence at 59-69 that the Judge did not regard her adverse credibility findings as to the core account were determinative of the assessment of the Appellants conversion to Christianity. The Judge was however entitled to place what weight she felt was appropriate on the evidence of the Reverend. I am satisfied that she gave adequate reasons why looked at in the round she gave limited weight to the Reverends evidence
(a) In relation to his conversion the Appellant was vague and evasive about the plight of Christians in Iran and only appeared t acknowledge that he was at risk as an apostate.
(b) She took into account the evidence of the Reverend who gave oral evidence as to the procedures followed for converts but noted that the Reverend did not personally oversee the Appellants conversion as that was the responsibility of another minister who did not give evidence and that did not assist the Appellant.
(c) She found that the Appellant had contrived his conversion to support his claim and given the period of this deception she found this undermined his general credibility.
22. It would also have been open to her to find as Mr Mc Vitie suggested that the failure of the minister who was personally involved with the Appellant, who was presumably an Iranian as he spoke Farsi, was very surprising in the light of the guidance in Dorodian , the vital importance of his evidence given the risk to him on return that was claimed and the rather vague explanation as to why he could not attend. I am satisfied that the Judge was entitled to reject the claim that the Appellant was a genuine convert and gave well reasoned findings for that conclusion.
23. I remind myself of what was said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons: set aside) Afghanistan [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) about the requirement for sufficient reasons to be given in a decision in headnote (1) : "Although there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions on the central issue on which an appeal is determined, those reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the judge."
24. I was therefore satisfied that the Judge's determination when read as a whole set out findings that were sustainable and sufficiently detailed and based on cogent reasoning.

CONCLUSION
25. I therefore found that no errors of law have been established and that the Judge's determination should stand.
DECISION
26. The appeal is dismissed.
27. Under Rule 14(1) the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) rules 2008 9as amended) the Appellant can be granted anonymity throughout these proceedings, unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise. An order for anonymity was made in the First-tier and shall continue.
28.

Signed Date 18.11.2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Birrell