Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-VP-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/12127/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford UT
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 23rd March 2017
On 03rd April 2017

Before

DEPUTY upper tribunal judge ROBERTS

Between

MRS A.J.
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Malik of Thompson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Diwncyz, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Anonymity
Rule 14: The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
An anonymity direction is made because, as this is a protection claim, I consider it appropriate to do so.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant A.J. is a female citizen of Pakistan. Her application for asylum was refused, the decision being made on 28th August 2015. She appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Robson) which in its decision promulgated on 19th July 2016 dismissed the appeal on asylum/humanitarian protection/human rights grounds. The Appellant now appeals with permission to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The Appellant entered the UK on 7th February 2015 in possession of a visit visa, valid until 14th March 2015. At the time of entry, she was accompanied by her three dependent children and her husband. She says now that she does not know the whereabouts of her husband; they separated in February 2015. The reason given for their separation is that her husband would not believe that she could not return to Pakistan. It is possible that he has already returned there. The three children remain with her in the UK.
3. The basis of her claim to asylum is that she belongs to the Pakistani Catholic Christian community. She was born into a Catholic Christian family. Her husband is an ex-parliamentary member and her claim is that she is a well-known person and social worker in her own right.
4. Her problems started initially because her father-in-law had been the federal minister for Christian minorities. Her husband who had been an MP at the time had taken a stance against the blasphemy law. She explained that in 2010 her husband had been involved in a case of two brothers who were accused of blasphemy and who had been shot in front of the court building. He had arranged for an ambulance to take them away and for their subsequent funerals. The Appellant claimed that the Taliban and local Muslims were responsible for the killings and afterwards her house was targeted although she agreed that her husband in fact received police protection until 2013, when he ceased to be an MP.
5. The essence of her claim amounted to this. She worked as a social worker and chairperson for Voice of the Voiceless and had protested against the blasphemy law on local social media. More importantly she had appeared with her family on a television programme and subsequent to that appearance had received a threatening letter and a fatwah. She claimed that despite reporting the matter to the police they had taken no action nor provided adequate support for her or her family.
6. The Respondent refused the claim because she considered that:
the Appellant had discredited herself by embellishing her position
the Appellant had also discredited herself by failing to claim asylum promptly
in any event there existed an internal security network in Pakistan sufficient to provide her protection.
7. The First-tier Tribunal having heard evidence from the Appellant accepted that she is a Catholic Christian but did not accept that her profile was as high as she claimed. Importantly the FtT found that she had not provided credible evidence to show that she had publically taken a stance against the blasphemy law, nor that she had received threatening letters or a fatwah as claimed. The FtT therefore dismissed her appeal.
Error of Law
8. Permission to appeal the FtT’s decision was sought on the basis that it had:
failed to consider all the evidence in the round
failed to apply relevant country guidance
made credibility findings based on issues of implausibility
9. The First-tier Tribunal Judge granting permission considered:
“2. Given that it was part of and relevant to the appellant’s case both as to the credibility that she was targeted and as to risk on return that she had a high profile within the community it is arguable that the judge erred in law in failing explicitly to consider and either place weight on or give reasons for rejecting the evidence from NLD which the Appellant relied on as part of her evidence that she had a high profile (paragraph 6 grounds).”
10. The permission grant went on to say that although there was no restriction on the grounds which may be argued it was considered that there was less force in the other grounds raised.
11. The Secretary of State’s response of 26th January 2017 stated that the Respondent opposed the appeal as it was considered the First-tier Tribunal Judge had:
directed himself appropriately
considered all the evidence as set out in [29 to 32]
considered at length whether the Appellant could be said to be of “high profile” and gave cogent reasons for finding not
in the alternative considered there were a number of avenues of redress that the Appellant had not adopted before the need to seek internal protection.
Thus the matter comes before me to decide whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains such error that it must be set aside and remade.
The Hearing
12. Mr Malik’s submissions on behalf of the Appellant followed the lines of the grounds seeking permission. The main thrust of his submission centred on saying that the FtT Judge had failed to take into account key evidence in the form of the letter from the National Lobbying Delegation (NLD), which showed that the Appellant was a high profile person and therefore would be at risk on return.
13. He added that no consideration had appeared to have been given to the letter from the Salvation Army which confirmed the Appellant as a human rights activist. Nor had any consideration appeared to be given to the letter from Bradford District Care concerning the Appellant’s anxiety/depression and possible suicide risk. The lack of consideration of these matters amounted to a material error requiring the decision to be set aside.
14. Mr Diwncyz on behalf of the Respondent argued that it is clear that the FtT considered all the relevant documentary evidence required to make a sustainable credibility finding. It considered at length whether the Appellant’s claim of receiving a fatwah/being at risk on account of speaking out against the blasphemy laws was a credible one. The FtT found not and gave clear reasons why it did not accept the credibility of the Appellant. In essence the grounds amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision made by the FtT.
Consideration
15. I must first consider whether the FtT erred in law such that its decision should be set aside. I am not satisfied that it did so for the following reasons. Firstly I remind myself that when analysing a decision which contains adverse credibility findings which are the subject of challenge, it is important to remember that the judge saw and heard evidence from the Appellant which I have not, and the judge is only required to give sufficient reasons properly to explain his decision which in this case was to find the Appellant not credible. Whilst the judge’s reasons have to demonstrate a correct understanding and appreciation of the totality of the evidence, it is not necessary for judges to record, analyse, rehearse and repeat each article of evidence in order to give adequate reasons. As will be seen, my overall conclusion in this case is that despite Mr Malik’s submissions to the contrary, I am satisfied that the judge’s decision shows that he looked at the evidence in the round and was entitled to come to the conclusion he reached regarding the Appellant’s credibility.
16. The Appellant’s case is that she was at risk on return to Pakistan because of being a well-known person and social worker who belonged to the Catholic community. The central core of her case is that on account of her high profile and because of speaking out against the blasphemy laws, she had received threats and a fatwah from the Taliban.
17. The judge disbelieved the Appellant’s account of firstly receiving the fatwah. He examined that point in detail and made clear findings that the Appellant’s claim on this point is not credible. It is relevant to note that Mr Malik does not challenge this finding. The judge then considered the Appellant’s claim that she was a high profile person who had spoken out against the blasphemy laws. The judge goes into some detail considering the transcript of the interview which took place in the Winning Soul programme published in January 2015 and notes that the thrust of the interview dealt with her role of helping women. He could find no evidence that she spoke out in that interview against the blasphemy law and therefore no evidence to support the claim of receiving a fatwah following that programme [65].
18. The grounds criticise the judge for a lack of finding on what was described as key evidence, namely the NLD document. I find that it is correct that the judge has not made a specific finding on the evidence contained in the NLD document. The grounds complain that this evidence deserves great weight to be attributed to it and that it amounts to key evidence. I find however that the evidence of the NLD letter, had it been admitted and evaluated would not be sufficient to render unsafe the judge’s numerous findings that the Appellant’s claim was not a credible one. That document amounts to a contract to be an NLD delegate for Church World Services. It does not show that the Appellant is a high profile member. The FtT’s findings on the Appellant’s credibility are findings which stand apart from any observations of findings the judge may have made on the NLD document. In any event the FtT does make reference to it in the body of the decision when setting out the Respondent’s case [16].
19. So far as the letter from the Salvation Army is concerned, I find that it does refer to the Appellant as a human rights activist but this is in the context of describing work in the community. The letter from Bradford District Care I find lacks depth. It contains little detailed analysis regarding the history of her mental health condition beyond recording that the GP referral in September 2015 stated that the Appellant had reported that she and her children had been victimised in Pakistan because of their Christian faith. As such I find that this letter does not advance the Appellant’s claim that she is “high profile”, nor that she has received a fatwah. Again the FtT does refer to both documents at [29] saying that it reviewed them.
20. I find therefore for the foregoing reasons, that the challenge raised in the grounds amounts to a disagreement with the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal. I see no material error requiring the decision to be set aside.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal did not err in law and its decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on asylum/humanitarian protection/human rights grounds stands.

No fee award.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of her family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed C E Roberts Date 02 April 2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Roberts