Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: aa/12452/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 4th August 2016
On 31st August 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J G MACDONALD

Between

MR Koy Jonas Koy
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION not made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr I Palmer, Counsel instructed by Roelens Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr L Tarlow, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of the Ivory Coast whose claim to require international protection was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mayall in a decision promulgated on 3rd May 2016. The judge did not find the Appellant to be a credible witness and therefore dismissed the appeal.
2. The grounds of application state that the judge made irrational findings on the Appellant's political activity and focussed mainly on the lack of assessment of the medical evidence which it is said to be a "striking error" by the judge. Other grounds were put forward. Permission to appeal was initially refused by First-tier Tribunal Holmes but subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Kopieczek in a decision dated 27th June 2016.
3. In particular Judge Kopieczek found the grounds arguable in terms of the judge's consideration of the evidence said to be from the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) relied on in support of the Appellant's claimed political involvement, and also in relation to the judge's consideration of the medical evidence.
4. Thus the matter came before me on the above date.
5. Mr Palmer focussed on the grounds allowed by Upper Tribunal Judge Kopieczek. While it could be said the judge had given a number of reasons for disbelieving the Appellant the fact of the matter was that he had ignored other matters set out in the grounds rendering the decision unsafe; as such the decision should be set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
6. Mr Tarlow was without papers and had nothing to add to the decision of the judge.
7. I reserved my decision.
Conclusions
8. This is a case where if the Appellant is a credible witness the appeal must be allowed - see paragraph 57 of the judge's decision referring to the concession made by the Home Office. In passing I should say that contrary to the grounds the judge did apply the correct standard of proof - see paragraphs 59 and 60 of the decision.
9. It is also true, as said by Mr Palmer, that the judge gave a number of reasons for disbelieving the Appellant. The problem with the decision is that the judge has effectively ignored the medical evidence. What the judge did note was that there was no evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist with a diagnosis of PTSD while there was a letter from his GP which suggested he was suffering from that condition. This was based largely upon his self-reported symptoms (paragraph 61). However as the grounds point out the judge had before him a letter from South West London and St George's Wandsworth IAPT where it was said that he did present with features of PTSD. In addition at the appeal hearing before the judge Counsel had served upon the court and Presenting Officer a report from Dr Lechi dated 26th January 2016 which provided further details of PTSD, scarring and clinical depression. The report also confirmed the antidepressant medication he was taking and the fact that he had been referred to Wolfson Neurorehabilitation Centre for further assessment and management. It was clear that both the GP and the psychologist believed that the Appellant needed treatment for PTSD and memory difficulties which were closely associated with that condition. Given those reports it was essential for the judge to apply anxious scrutiny to them to see whether they had played any part in the apparently inconsistent account given by the Appellant. Not to do so was a material error in law.
10. I consider there is also mileage in the argument under Grounds of Appeal 2(i) namely that the judge failed to evaluate the corroboration provided by Mr de Bogou. He had confirmed Mr Bayeto's signature in his earlier letter where the FPI confirmed the Appellant's long-standing membership with that organisation. It is arguable that the judge did not give proper consideration to this aspect as this was also an important evidential issue which required a finding.
11. However it is because of the lack of findings in relation to the medical evidence which render this decision unsafe.
12. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is therefore set aside in its entirety. No findings of the First-tier Tribunal are to stand. Under Section 12(2)(b)(i) of the 2007 Act and of Practice Statement 7.2 the nature and extent of the judicial fact-finding necessary for the decision to be remade is such that it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.

I set aside the decision.

I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. It is not necessary at this stage to make an anonymity direction.

Signed Dated 30th August 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge J G Macdonald