AA/12941/2010
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The decision
IAC-BFD- ML
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/12941/2010
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Bradford
Determination Promulgated
On 2nd December 2013
On 27th December 2013
Prepared 17th December 2013
Before
upper tribunal JUDGE roberts
Between
mr z z K M
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G Patel, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mrs R Pettersen, Home Office Presenting Officer
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant Z Z K M was born on 24th September 1991 and is a citizen of Myanmar (Burma). He arrived in the United Kingdom on 30th September 2009 as a student on a visa valid until 10th November 2010. He returned to Burma on 11th July 2010 but re-entered the United Kingdom on 2nd August 2010 and claimed asylum on arrival.
2. On 1st September 2010 a decision was made to refuse him asylum. The Appellant appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. His appeal was heard initially by Immigration Judge Jones (as he then was) sitting at Bradford on 18th October 2010. Judge Jones dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted and eventually the matter was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing.
4. The rehearing came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Hemingway on 19th September 2013. In a determination promulgated on 1st October 2013, Judge Hemingway dismissed the Appellant’s case on all grounds. The Appellant now appeals with permission to the Upper Tribunal.
5. The facts of the Appellant’s claim are contained in paragraphs 7 to 15 of Judge Hemingway’s determination and are set out here;
“The Appellant lived with his family in a place called Waw. He observes in his initial statement “My family and I are Hindu Buddhists and we are of Indian race”. His father is a former member of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which is opposed to the military regime in Myanmar. However, he resigned his membership in 2003 after pressure to do so from the authorities. His father, a businessman, made charitable donations to the poor. However, this caused him to have difficulties with the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a pro-government organisation in Myanmar, who wanted to take credit for the donations his father made. His father would not cooperate with them in this regard.
… in July 2007, he left home to attend a finishing school in Yangon which is 70 miles from Waw. He was aged 16 years at the time. Whilst in Yangon he took part in some anti-regime demonstrations in September of 2007. On 26th September 2007 members of the authorities attacked some of the demonstrators and, in the rush to safety, the Appellant fell and sustained an injury to his left elbow. He was, though, with the assistance of others, able to avoid arrest.
He returned to Waw and came under pressure to join the USDA but declined. His parents thought that this would cause him difficulties so he returned to Yangon in December of 2007 and stayed with his uncle. His parents, continuing to be concerned about his safety, made arrangements for him to take English classes in Yangon with a view to sending him abroad. Thereafter, having passed an English language examination in December 2008, his visa was obtained and he came to the UK to study at the London School of Management. He completed a one year diploma in business management on 8th June 2010. Upon completion of the diploma course, he intended to return to Burma and assist with the family business. On 4th July 2010 he telephoned his family and his elder sister told him that his family had a problem but was reluctant to give him any details. The Appellant says that when she did try to explain matters to him “the telephone line was cut off”. … he made further attempts to contact his sister but was unable to do so. He then telephoned his uncle in Yangon who told him “my father has a problem in Burma and told me not to come back”. [He] could not get any more detail from his uncle and decided, in the circumstances, that he would have to return to find out what the situation was.
[ ] having returned, he discovered that the problem related to his father who had intended to donate 1,000 bottles of water to inhabitants of a village. The authorities had asked his father to put a USDA flag on the truck being used to transport the water. His father had no option to agree but when the truck arrived in the village he decided to remove the flag because he did not wish to be associated with USDA. The next day he was told by the authorities that removing the flag constituted a crime and that it was regarded as an insult to the government. He was forced to sign a statement saying he would not remove such a flag in future. After a short period of detention he was released. However, the authorities had subsequently taken some further water bottles from one of his father’s shops and had been calling at the family home, every night, to check who was staying there. This was the situation the Appellant found upon his return in July 2010.
[ ], at the time of his return, a former teacher of his one U Maung Thein would visit. He is, says the Appellant, a close friend of his father’s and an elected member of the NLD. He discussed with the Appellant the Myanmar 2008 draft Constitution. The Appellant explains that the draft Constitution is meant to come into force after elections take place in Myanmar and that U Maung Thein made him realise that the draft Constitution “was in favour of the military government”. … he organised a group of ten other people, whom he trusted, to meet in order to discuss the draft Constitution with U Maung Thein. The meetings would take place at U Maung Thein’s house or at the house of another of the group members.
[ ], whilst this was going on, the authorities had continued to come to his family home at night. They did so on 30th July 2010 and discovered some notes the Appellant had made regarding the Constitution. They arrested the Appellant. He says he was beaten when questioned at a police station he was taken to. He was released but required to sign every day at the police station. He was also banned from travelling outside of Waw. Upon release the Appellant learnt that U Maung Thein had been arrested. His parents were concerned for his safety and said he should go to the UK as soon as possible. He telephoned his uncle in Yangon who assisted in arranging his departure from the UK. He fulfilled his signing commitment on 1st August 2010 and then travelled to Yangon. His uncle took him to Yangon International Airport and told him that he had arranged for his safe departure. … he boarded the plane and travelled to the UK.
[ ], around November 2010, he became involved in oppositionist political activity whilst in the UK. He became involved with a group called Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) and has attended a number of demonstrations outside the Burmese Embassy in London.
[ ] he is now in a relationship with one Aung Myo Thant who is a male national of Myanmar and who has been recognised as a refugee in the UK”.
6. Having reviewed the evidence, Judge Hemingway found that the Appellant’s appeal turned in the main on credibility issues. In paragraphs 34 to 60 of his determination, the Judge goes into great detail explaining why he found the Appellant’s account not credible.
7. Judge Hemingway also had to consider a sur place claim and a claim of homosexuality. Both those grounds had arisen since the date of Judge Jones’ determination. Judge Hemingway found, so far as the sur place activities were concerned, that the Appellant was “opportunistic” rather than genuine. Likewise he found the claim of homosexuality was not made out. A clear finding was made that he did not accept that the Appellant’s claimed homosexuality was genuine but once again, he was being “opportunistic”.
8. This comprehensive disbelief in the credibility of the Appellant’s claim led the Judge to the conclusion that the Appellant’s appeal should be dismissed on all grounds.
9. The grounds seeking permission set out eight separate strands which collectively mount a challenge to the credibility findings of Judge Hemingway. It is said that this amounts to a failure to give the case the “anxious scrutiny” it requires.
10. Having considered the written grounds Judge Appleyard in granting permission stated;
“The grounds seeking permission to appeal run to sixteen paragraphs. Their essence is that the credibility analysis is flawed. It is asserted that the judge has misunderstood the appellant’s evidence and has wrongly been speculative in coming to his conclusions.
Whilst some of the grounds have more merit in them than others they are all arguable and I emphasise that I am granting permission on all the grounds raised”.
The Upper Tribunal Hearing
11. In addressing me, Miss Patel who was the author of the grounds seeking permission, essentially relied upon and followed the lines of those grounds. She went through the paragraphs as set out in the chronological order of the grounds. She had nothing further to add to them other than to sum up and emphasise that the Judge had failed to put matters to the Appellant, failed to seek clarification, and had been given to speculation.
12. Mrs Pettersen on behalf of the Respondent responded saying that the grounds seeking permission amounted to no more than a series of disagreements with Judge Hemingway’s careful and detailed fact finding and conclusions.
Has the Judge Erred?
13. The grounds seeking permission ran to 16 paragraphs. They make criticism of the Judge’s determination under three broad headings.
(i) The Judge failed to put matters to the Appellant and/or seek clarification (paragraphs 36, 44 and 45).
(ii) The Judge had been given to speculation (paragraphs 39, 40 and 42);
(iii) The Judge had reached conclusions on fundamentally flawed findings (paragraphs 47 to 51.
In addition the Judge had failed to engage appropriately with the evidence given by the Appellant’s witness
14. In my consideration, I follow the broad outline above. Paragraph 36 states that the Appellant claimed to have participated in opposition demonstrations when 16 years of age. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s own father had encountered difficulties with the authorities. The Appellant would have been aware of this. The judge notes and queries that the Appellant did not explain why he would put himself at such significant risk. The judge is entitled in the course of his deliberations to comment on a significant shortfall in the evidence. It is up to the Appellant to make his case. The Judge was entitled to assess that evidence and reach a conclusion that the Appellant did not participate in such demonstrations as claimed.
15. Even if the Judge were wrong about that there has been no challenge to paragraph 38 of the determination. This concerns whether or not there were frequent requests for the Appellant to join USDA. The Judge notes that the Appellant was inconsistent about a simple and straightforward matter. Whilst the Judge acknowledges that this may not be wholly central to the account it is nevertheless an inconsistency which causes damage to the appellants overall credibility.
16. So far as paragraphs 44 and 45 are concerned the Judge goes into great detail explaining why the Appellant’s credibility is damaged. He points out the Appellant’s account lacks detail which it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to know. He forms an assessment that this lack of detail damages the Appellant’s credibility. This is not speculation; it is an assessment of the quality of evidence before him.
17. A further challenge was mounted on the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s sur place activities. It was advanced in the grounds that the assessment is fundamentally flawed on this basis:
“At paragraphs 47 to 51 the FTTJ considers the Appellant’s sur place activities in the UK and concludes that he has sought to involve himself opportunistically. It is respectfully submitted that the FTTJ’s approach to the accepted evidence before him that the Appellant had by the time of the hearing before him attended well over 15 demonstrations from November 2010 to August 2013 in front of the Burmese Embassy is fundamentally flawed”.
This ground in my judgment is misconceived. The Judge sets out clearly in paragraph 50 of his determination why he came to the conclusion that he did. In doing so he acknowledges in paragraph 51 that the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had attended such demonstrations and that there was evidence of photographs seemingly taken at different gatherings. He also acknowledged that there was no evidence from other BDC members addressing the Appellant’s claimed involvement as a member or organiser of the meetings.
18. The Judge did not require additional evidence from BDC, since it is for the Appellant himself to make out his own case and to seek to discharge the burden of proof. However whilst it is trite law that an asylum seeker is not required to corroborate a claim, legitimate concerns may still arise in proceedings before the Tribunal where an appellant safely residing in the UK and who has the advice and assistance of professional representatives, fails to obtain such evidence, which in all likelihood is available to him. Judge Hemingway was entitled to draw upon this in forming his conclusions. There is no fundamental error there.
19. The final challenge to Judge Hemingway’s determination revolves around the Appellant’s claim of homosexuality. The Judge found as a fact that the Appellant is not homosexual. In paragraph 56 the Judge assesses the evidence before him including the oral evidence of the Appellant’s witness. The Judge clearly and fully explains his reasoning for finding the Appellant’s claimed homosexuality is not made out. There is nothing perverse or irrational in these findings. They are based on an assessment of the evidence he heard. They are not the findings which the Appellant would have liked but they are not fundamentally flawed as claimed. The Judge goes into great detail in paragraph 56 explaining the inconsistencies in evidence that he found between the Appellant and his claimed gay partner. He noted in particular that there was a lack of detail by both the Appellant and his claimed partner over the history, development and nature of the relationship. That brevity of information concerned the Judge. When there was factored in a clear inconsistency in the oral evidence as to who knew about the claimed relationship, the Judge was fully entitled to reach the finding he did.
20. In bringing all these strands together I conclude the determination of Judge Hemingway is a careful and detailed one. He has given sustainable reasons which were fully open to him on the evidence, for concluding that he could not place reliance upon the Appellant’s account. There was ample justification for those conclusions which have been drawn from not only the oral evidence but the background material. The grounds of appeal amount to no more than a series of disagreements with the findings and reasoning of the Judge. Those findings and reasonings are legally adequate and take proper account of the background material. In conclusion therefore I am not satisfied that there is any error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
DECISION
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on asylum, Humanitarian Protection and Article 8 ECHR, therefore stands.
Direction regarding anonymity – rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005
The appellant is granted anonymity throughout these proceedings, unless and until the Tribunal directs otherwise. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of Court proceedings.
Signature Dated
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Fee Award
The appeal is dismissed and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature Dated
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/12941/2010
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Bradford
Determination Promulgated
On 2nd December 2013
On 27th December 2013
Prepared 17th December 2013
Before
upper tribunal JUDGE roberts
Between
mr z z K M
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G Patel, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mrs R Pettersen, Home Office Presenting Officer
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant Z Z K M was born on 24th September 1991 and is a citizen of Myanmar (Burma). He arrived in the United Kingdom on 30th September 2009 as a student on a visa valid until 10th November 2010. He returned to Burma on 11th July 2010 but re-entered the United Kingdom on 2nd August 2010 and claimed asylum on arrival.
2. On 1st September 2010 a decision was made to refuse him asylum. The Appellant appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. His appeal was heard initially by Immigration Judge Jones (as he then was) sitting at Bradford on 18th October 2010. Judge Jones dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted and eventually the matter was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing.
4. The rehearing came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Hemingway on 19th September 2013. In a determination promulgated on 1st October 2013, Judge Hemingway dismissed the Appellant’s case on all grounds. The Appellant now appeals with permission to the Upper Tribunal.
5. The facts of the Appellant’s claim are contained in paragraphs 7 to 15 of Judge Hemingway’s determination and are set out here;
“The Appellant lived with his family in a place called Waw. He observes in his initial statement “My family and I are Hindu Buddhists and we are of Indian race”. His father is a former member of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which is opposed to the military regime in Myanmar. However, he resigned his membership in 2003 after pressure to do so from the authorities. His father, a businessman, made charitable donations to the poor. However, this caused him to have difficulties with the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a pro-government organisation in Myanmar, who wanted to take credit for the donations his father made. His father would not cooperate with them in this regard.
… in July 2007, he left home to attend a finishing school in Yangon which is 70 miles from Waw. He was aged 16 years at the time. Whilst in Yangon he took part in some anti-regime demonstrations in September of 2007. On 26th September 2007 members of the authorities attacked some of the demonstrators and, in the rush to safety, the Appellant fell and sustained an injury to his left elbow. He was, though, with the assistance of others, able to avoid arrest.
He returned to Waw and came under pressure to join the USDA but declined. His parents thought that this would cause him difficulties so he returned to Yangon in December of 2007 and stayed with his uncle. His parents, continuing to be concerned about his safety, made arrangements for him to take English classes in Yangon with a view to sending him abroad. Thereafter, having passed an English language examination in December 2008, his visa was obtained and he came to the UK to study at the London School of Management. He completed a one year diploma in business management on 8th June 2010. Upon completion of the diploma course, he intended to return to Burma and assist with the family business. On 4th July 2010 he telephoned his family and his elder sister told him that his family had a problem but was reluctant to give him any details. The Appellant says that when she did try to explain matters to him “the telephone line was cut off”. … he made further attempts to contact his sister but was unable to do so. He then telephoned his uncle in Yangon who told him “my father has a problem in Burma and told me not to come back”. [He] could not get any more detail from his uncle and decided, in the circumstances, that he would have to return to find out what the situation was.
[ ] having returned, he discovered that the problem related to his father who had intended to donate 1,000 bottles of water to inhabitants of a village. The authorities had asked his father to put a USDA flag on the truck being used to transport the water. His father had no option to agree but when the truck arrived in the village he decided to remove the flag because he did not wish to be associated with USDA. The next day he was told by the authorities that removing the flag constituted a crime and that it was regarded as an insult to the government. He was forced to sign a statement saying he would not remove such a flag in future. After a short period of detention he was released. However, the authorities had subsequently taken some further water bottles from one of his father’s shops and had been calling at the family home, every night, to check who was staying there. This was the situation the Appellant found upon his return in July 2010.
[ ], at the time of his return, a former teacher of his one U Maung Thein would visit. He is, says the Appellant, a close friend of his father’s and an elected member of the NLD. He discussed with the Appellant the Myanmar 2008 draft Constitution. The Appellant explains that the draft Constitution is meant to come into force after elections take place in Myanmar and that U Maung Thein made him realise that the draft Constitution “was in favour of the military government”. … he organised a group of ten other people, whom he trusted, to meet in order to discuss the draft Constitution with U Maung Thein. The meetings would take place at U Maung Thein’s house or at the house of another of the group members.
[ ], whilst this was going on, the authorities had continued to come to his family home at night. They did so on 30th July 2010 and discovered some notes the Appellant had made regarding the Constitution. They arrested the Appellant. He says he was beaten when questioned at a police station he was taken to. He was released but required to sign every day at the police station. He was also banned from travelling outside of Waw. Upon release the Appellant learnt that U Maung Thein had been arrested. His parents were concerned for his safety and said he should go to the UK as soon as possible. He telephoned his uncle in Yangon who assisted in arranging his departure from the UK. He fulfilled his signing commitment on 1st August 2010 and then travelled to Yangon. His uncle took him to Yangon International Airport and told him that he had arranged for his safe departure. … he boarded the plane and travelled to the UK.
[ ], around November 2010, he became involved in oppositionist political activity whilst in the UK. He became involved with a group called Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) and has attended a number of demonstrations outside the Burmese Embassy in London.
[ ] he is now in a relationship with one Aung Myo Thant who is a male national of Myanmar and who has been recognised as a refugee in the UK”.
6. Having reviewed the evidence, Judge Hemingway found that the Appellant’s appeal turned in the main on credibility issues. In paragraphs 34 to 60 of his determination, the Judge goes into great detail explaining why he found the Appellant’s account not credible.
7. Judge Hemingway also had to consider a sur place claim and a claim of homosexuality. Both those grounds had arisen since the date of Judge Jones’ determination. Judge Hemingway found, so far as the sur place activities were concerned, that the Appellant was “opportunistic” rather than genuine. Likewise he found the claim of homosexuality was not made out. A clear finding was made that he did not accept that the Appellant’s claimed homosexuality was genuine but once again, he was being “opportunistic”.
8. This comprehensive disbelief in the credibility of the Appellant’s claim led the Judge to the conclusion that the Appellant’s appeal should be dismissed on all grounds.
9. The grounds seeking permission set out eight separate strands which collectively mount a challenge to the credibility findings of Judge Hemingway. It is said that this amounts to a failure to give the case the “anxious scrutiny” it requires.
10. Having considered the written grounds Judge Appleyard in granting permission stated;
“The grounds seeking permission to appeal run to sixteen paragraphs. Their essence is that the credibility analysis is flawed. It is asserted that the judge has misunderstood the appellant’s evidence and has wrongly been speculative in coming to his conclusions.
Whilst some of the grounds have more merit in them than others they are all arguable and I emphasise that I am granting permission on all the grounds raised”.
The Upper Tribunal Hearing
11. In addressing me, Miss Patel who was the author of the grounds seeking permission, essentially relied upon and followed the lines of those grounds. She went through the paragraphs as set out in the chronological order of the grounds. She had nothing further to add to them other than to sum up and emphasise that the Judge had failed to put matters to the Appellant, failed to seek clarification, and had been given to speculation.
12. Mrs Pettersen on behalf of the Respondent responded saying that the grounds seeking permission amounted to no more than a series of disagreements with Judge Hemingway’s careful and detailed fact finding and conclusions.
Has the Judge Erred?
13. The grounds seeking permission ran to 16 paragraphs. They make criticism of the Judge’s determination under three broad headings.
(i) The Judge failed to put matters to the Appellant and/or seek clarification (paragraphs 36, 44 and 45).
(ii) The Judge had been given to speculation (paragraphs 39, 40 and 42);
(iii) The Judge had reached conclusions on fundamentally flawed findings (paragraphs 47 to 51.
In addition the Judge had failed to engage appropriately with the evidence given by the Appellant’s witness
14. In my consideration, I follow the broad outline above. Paragraph 36 states that the Appellant claimed to have participated in opposition demonstrations when 16 years of age. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s own father had encountered difficulties with the authorities. The Appellant would have been aware of this. The judge notes and queries that the Appellant did not explain why he would put himself at such significant risk. The judge is entitled in the course of his deliberations to comment on a significant shortfall in the evidence. It is up to the Appellant to make his case. The Judge was entitled to assess that evidence and reach a conclusion that the Appellant did not participate in such demonstrations as claimed.
15. Even if the Judge were wrong about that there has been no challenge to paragraph 38 of the determination. This concerns whether or not there were frequent requests for the Appellant to join USDA. The Judge notes that the Appellant was inconsistent about a simple and straightforward matter. Whilst the Judge acknowledges that this may not be wholly central to the account it is nevertheless an inconsistency which causes damage to the appellants overall credibility.
16. So far as paragraphs 44 and 45 are concerned the Judge goes into great detail explaining why the Appellant’s credibility is damaged. He points out the Appellant’s account lacks detail which it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to know. He forms an assessment that this lack of detail damages the Appellant’s credibility. This is not speculation; it is an assessment of the quality of evidence before him.
17. A further challenge was mounted on the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s sur place activities. It was advanced in the grounds that the assessment is fundamentally flawed on this basis:
“At paragraphs 47 to 51 the FTTJ considers the Appellant’s sur place activities in the UK and concludes that he has sought to involve himself opportunistically. It is respectfully submitted that the FTTJ’s approach to the accepted evidence before him that the Appellant had by the time of the hearing before him attended well over 15 demonstrations from November 2010 to August 2013 in front of the Burmese Embassy is fundamentally flawed”.
This ground in my judgment is misconceived. The Judge sets out clearly in paragraph 50 of his determination why he came to the conclusion that he did. In doing so he acknowledges in paragraph 51 that the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had attended such demonstrations and that there was evidence of photographs seemingly taken at different gatherings. He also acknowledged that there was no evidence from other BDC members addressing the Appellant’s claimed involvement as a member or organiser of the meetings.
18. The Judge did not require additional evidence from BDC, since it is for the Appellant himself to make out his own case and to seek to discharge the burden of proof. However whilst it is trite law that an asylum seeker is not required to corroborate a claim, legitimate concerns may still arise in proceedings before the Tribunal where an appellant safely residing in the UK and who has the advice and assistance of professional representatives, fails to obtain such evidence, which in all likelihood is available to him. Judge Hemingway was entitled to draw upon this in forming his conclusions. There is no fundamental error there.
19. The final challenge to Judge Hemingway’s determination revolves around the Appellant’s claim of homosexuality. The Judge found as a fact that the Appellant is not homosexual. In paragraph 56 the Judge assesses the evidence before him including the oral evidence of the Appellant’s witness. The Judge clearly and fully explains his reasoning for finding the Appellant’s claimed homosexuality is not made out. There is nothing perverse or irrational in these findings. They are based on an assessment of the evidence he heard. They are not the findings which the Appellant would have liked but they are not fundamentally flawed as claimed. The Judge goes into great detail in paragraph 56 explaining the inconsistencies in evidence that he found between the Appellant and his claimed gay partner. He noted in particular that there was a lack of detail by both the Appellant and his claimed partner over the history, development and nature of the relationship. That brevity of information concerned the Judge. When there was factored in a clear inconsistency in the oral evidence as to who knew about the claimed relationship, the Judge was fully entitled to reach the finding he did.
20. In bringing all these strands together I conclude the determination of Judge Hemingway is a careful and detailed one. He has given sustainable reasons which were fully open to him on the evidence, for concluding that he could not place reliance upon the Appellant’s account. There was ample justification for those conclusions which have been drawn from not only the oral evidence but the background material. The grounds of appeal amount to no more than a series of disagreements with the findings and reasoning of the Judge. Those findings and reasonings are legally adequate and take proper account of the background material. In conclusion therefore I am not satisfied that there is any error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
DECISION
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on asylum, Humanitarian Protection and Article 8 ECHR, therefore stands.
Direction regarding anonymity – rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005
The appellant is granted anonymity throughout these proceedings, unless and until the Tribunal directs otherwise. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of Court proceedings.
Signature Dated
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Fee Award
The appeal is dismissed and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature Dated
Judge of the Upper Tribunal