The decision


Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/13279/2015
AA/13281/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester Piccadilly
Decision Promulgated
On 27 February 2017
On 7 March 2017

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIRRELL

Between
TAHIR PARVAIZ
TAHIR SUNDAS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Brown counsel instructed by Amjad Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Abomi Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. I have considered whether any parties require the protection of an anonymity direction. No anonymity direction was made previously in respect of this Appellant. Having considered all the circumstances and evidence I do not consider it necessary to make an anonymity direction.
2. The Appellants are a father and daughter, born on 8 June 1967 and 1 July 1995 respectively and they are nationals of Pakistan.
3. In order to avoid confusion, the parties are referred to as they were in the First-tier Tribunal.
4. This is an appeal by the Appellants against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alty promulgated on 22 July 2017 which dismissed the Appellants appeals against the decision of the Respondent dated 13 November 2015 to dismiss the Appellants claims for refugee protection.
The Judge’s Decision
5. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. First-tier Tribunal Judge Alty (“the Judge”) dismissed the appeals against the Respondent’s decision.
6. Grounds of appeal were lodged which argued that the Judge erred in that she:
(a) Failed to give adequate reasons for the rejection of material documents relied on.
(b) Drew adverse inferences from lack of corroborative evidence.
(c) Failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the evidence of Sundas Tahir.
7. On 11 August 2016 First tier Tribunal Judge Shimmin refused permission to appeal. The application was renewed and on 12 October 2016 Upper Tribunal Judge Allen gave permission in respect of ground 1 only stating that the other grounds were matters of disagreement only.
8. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr Brown on behalf of the Appellant:
(a) He referred to the affidavits of Mohammad Anwar (page 197-198); Gul Ahmed (201-202); Mohammad Boota (199-200) who all gave evidence that there was an incident involving firing on 11 June 2011 which the Judge did not deal with.
(b) In relation the incident on 8 February 2012 he referred to the affidavits of Adil Hussain (page 205) ; Jehangir Hussain (page 209);Zafar Iqbal (page 211); Ghulam Hussain (page 213) and Chaudhary Jahangir the Chief Public Prosecutor (page 228) and did not make adequate findings for why he rejected them.
(c) Findings in relation to these witnesses would impact on the overall credibility findings.
9. On behalf of the Respondent Ms Abomi submitted that:
(a) She relied on the Rule 24 response.
(b) The Judge gave adequate reasons for her findings.
(c) The Judge gave adequate reasons at paragraphs 40-45 why she rejected the documents. She was not required to address every document individually.
10. In reply Mr Brown on behalf of the Appellants submitted:
(a) The Judge set out the evidence in issue at paragraph 37 but her findings at paragraph 40 do not adequately address all of the evidence making finidings about some but not all of the evidence.
The Law
11. Errors of legislative interpretation, failure to follow binding authority or to distinguish it with adequate reasons, ignoring material considerations by taking into account immaterial considerations, reaching irrational conclusions on facts or evaluation or giving legally inadequate reasons for the decision and procedural unfairness, constitute errors of law.
12. It is not an arguable error of law for an Immigration Judge to give too little weight or too much weight to a factor, unless irrationality is alleged. Nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge to fail to deal with every factual issue under argument. Disagreement with an Immigrations Judge’s factual conclusions, his appraisal of the evidence or assessment of credibility, or his evaluation of risk does not give rise to an error of law.
13. More recently in relation to adequacy of reasons in VV (grounds of appeal) Lithuania [2016] UKUT 00053 (IAC) it was held that (i) An application for permission to appeal on the grounds of inadequacy of reasoning in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal must generally demonstrate by reference to the material and arguments placed before that Tribunal that (a) the matter involved a substantial issue between the parties at first instance and (b) that the Tribunal either failed to deal with that matter at all, or gave reasons on that point which are so unclear that they may well conceal an error of law. (ii) Given that parties are under a duty to help further the overriding objective and to co-operate with the Upper Tribunal, those drafting grounds of appeal (a) should proceed on the basis that decisions of the First-tier Tribunal are to be read fairly and as a whole and without excessive legalism; (b) should not seek to argue that a particular consideration was not taken into account by the Tribunal when it can be seen from the decision read fairly and as a whole that it was (and the real disagreement is with the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence or the merits); and (c) should not challenge the adequacy of the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal without demonstrating how the principles in (i) above have been breached, by reference to the materials placed before that Tribunal and the important or substantial issues which it was asked to determine in that particular case.
Finding on Material Error
14. Having heard those submissions I reached the conclusion that the Tribunal made no material errors of law.
15. Permission was given in respect of one ground only that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons for her rejection of the documents relied on in support of the Appellants claim to be at risk on return from the Pakistan Muslim League (Noon) following incidents at a polling station on 26 June 2011, at his home on 8 February 2012 and a further incident on12 June 2012.
16. In relation to the argument that insufficient reasons were given I remind myself that at paragraph 49 of MA (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 49 it was said that “Where a tribunal has referred to considering all the evidence, a reviewing body should be very slow to conclude that that tribunal overlooked some factor, simply because the factor is not explicitly referred to in the determination concerned”.
17. Mr Brown properly conceded that the Judge had set out the documents that she had considered. Indeed the Judge set out in some detail all of the documentary evidence at paragraph 13. The Judge made clear at paragraph 30-31 that while she accepted that the first Appellants brother was affiliated to Choudhry Ali Shaan a political figure in Pakistan she did not find credible his account of the circumstances giving rise to his fear of Noon who were opposed to Mr Shaan.
18. She set out a number of detailed and well-reasoned adverse credibility findings which must be read as a whole and against which her consideration of the documents must then be considered. Thus at paragraph at paragraph 32 she found undermining the absence of photographic evidence the Appellant claimed existed to link him to Mr Shaan; at paragraph 33 she found that the first Appellants recollection of the first incident relied on was lacking in clarity; at paragraph 34 she found his account undermined by the fact that having claimed that his family were at risk from Noon he came on a visit to the UK leaving his wife and children in Pakistan; at paragraph 35 she found that the second Appellant could only give accounts of the first two incidents based on what the first Appellant had told her. She also found that the Appellants credibility was undermined by their late claim for asylum coming as it did over a year after the first Appellant claimed to have received a warning him of an increased risk to his safety in Pakistan.
19. The Judge then turned at paragraph 36 to the documentary evidence and again at paragraph 37 she clearly and specifically identified each of the affidavits relied on by Mr Brown. While not forming part of her findings I must take into account that, even if accepted at face value, these were affidavits from witnesses who did not attend court and whose evidence was not subject to testing under cross examination so that the Judge was deprived of the opportunity to resolve any issues or concerns she had about their evidence and its reliability by clarifying her concerns with those witnesses against the background of her other adverse credibility findings.
20. I am satisfied that the Judge set out at paragraph 40 onwards adequate reasons why she did not find that the documents listed were reliable: those documents included the affidavits and the letter from the Chief Prosecutor which she had previously identified. Her assessment of all of the documents must, I am satisfied be read as a whole and against the background of her more general adverse credibility findings referred to above and against the background material before her that obtaining fraudulent documents in Pakistan is a simple task.
21. Thus on the basis of document verification reports she found at paragraphs 41-43 that the FIRs produced in respect of the incidents in question were unreliable. She was entitled at paragraph 45 to find that the submission of unreliable FIRS damaged the Appellants credibility as a whole and undermined the veracity of the other documents submitted given the ‘context’ in which they were relied on.
22. While finding that the Judge gave adequate reasons for her rejection of the affidavits referred to I also remind myself that she also considered the Appellants case at its highest at paragraph 52 onwards, that the Appellants were at risk from Noon: her findings as to adequacy of state protection(paragraph52-53) and the reasonableness of relocation (paragraph 54) were unchallenged and therefore any inadequacy in her assessment of the documentary material could not have made a material outcome to her decision.
23. I was therefore satisfied that the Judge’s determination when read as a whole set out findings that were sustainable and sufficiently detailed and based on cogent reasoning.
CONCLUSION
24. I therefore found that no errors of law have been established and that the Judge’s determination should stand.

DECISION
25. The appeal is dismissed.


Signed Date 6.3.2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Birrell