AA/13329/2015

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 3 Apr 2017
• Promulgation date: 19 Apr 2017
• Publication date: 20 May 2022
• Last updated on: 20 May 2022

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/13329/2015


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Field House
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On 3 April 2017
On 19 April 2017



Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GLEESON

Between

Z E l
(anonymity order made)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr P Lewis instructed by Lawrence Lupin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Clarke, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal made an order pursuant to Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. I continue that order pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008: unless the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall identify the original appellant, whether directly or indirectly. This order applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this order could give rise to contempt of court proceedings.

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge E B Grant, who dismissed his appeal on all grounds. The challenges to the judge’s decision are set out in full in the First-tier Tribunal grounds, which are incorporated by reference into the Upper Tribunal grounds. The Upper Tribunal grounds, which are in the nature of a summary and refocusing of the First-tier grounds.
2. I am satisfied that there are serious errors of fact in the First-tier Tribunal decision, at a level which is capable of amounting to an error of law: in particular, at the last sentence of [74], the assessment of credibility turns on an assertion that all of the appellant’s witnesses said that he had only been to Morocco twice. Evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, including Counsel’s note of the hearing and the typed record of proceedings of the First-tier Tribunal Judge, both indicate that the appellant said that he had returned to Morocco far more often, on at least 7 occasions.
3. Further, at [80], the evidence of one witness about receiving text threats is disbelieved on the basis that it is already established that she is not a credible witness. That is the wrong approach and the judge has unfortunately fallen into the classic Mibanga error of not considering the evidence in the round before reaching a credibility conclusion.
4. For all of these reasons the findings of fact cannot stand. In addition, the appellant’s concerns, expressed in the grounds, concerning the Judge’s analysis of family life also have merit.
5. This decision cannot stand. There is no alternative but to set aside it aside and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing afresh with no findings of fact or credibility preserved.
Conclusions
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
I set aside the decision. The decision will be remade in the First-tier Tribunal.


Signed: Judith A J C Gleeson Date: 13 April 2017
Upper Tribunal Judge Gleeson