Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/13563/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 5 September 2016
On 17 October 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVEY

Between

SINGH JAGDEEP
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr A Malik, Counsel, instructed by Malik Law Chambers Solicitors (Bethnal Green Road)
For the Respondent: Mr S Kotas, Senior Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a national of India, date of birth 3 October 1977, appeals against the Respondent's decision dated 3 December 2015 to refuse an asylum claim and refuse leave to remain with reference to the need for humanitarian protection.

2. His appeal against that decision came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Blake who, on 27 June 2016, dismissed the appeal with reference to the asylum and humanitarian protection grounds and also rejected a claim with reference to Article 8 ECHR on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant the consideration of an application outside of the Rules.

3. The initial challenge to the judge's decision is by reference to the considerations in Section 117B(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as amended (the Act). Essentially the point was being made that the relevant evidence had been directed to:- the extent to which the Appellant had been in the United Kingdom, the extent to which he was able to integrate given his time here being about thirteen years; he having entered the United Kingdom in 2003 when he was aged about 26 years. In particular the grounds sought to highlight a potential difference between Upper Tribunal case law, in effect to argue that the matters which the judge considered had failed to give appropriate weight to Section 117B of the Act and there the matter lay. Permission was given to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Foudy on 20 July 2006. I simply note that the analysis of the permission does not disclose on what basis there might have been an arguable flaw in the decision by the judge save that it was granted on the basis of disclosing an arguable error of law.

4. Having considered this matter I am satisfied that the relevant issue is amongst other things addressed by the case of Forman [2015] UKUT 412 and also more recently by the Court of Appeal in Rhuppiah [2016] EWCA Civ 803 particularly at [61] and [62] where the Court of Appeal observed that:
"However, as the FTT observed, it does not follow that because a person is able to speak English that it is in the public interest that they should be given leave to enter or remain. Section 117B(2) simply does not say that. Therefore the FTT was correct to reject the Appellant's argument that Section 117B(2) meant that it was in the public interest that she (the Appellant) should be admitted. Within the scheme of Part 5, her ability to speak English was only a neutral factor."
5. The judge continued,
"However, as the FTT observed, the same reasoning applies in relation to Section 117B(3). Contrary to the Appellant's argument, it does not provide that if she is financially independent it is in the public interest that she be granted leave to remain. It only indicates that it is a negative factor potentially capable of justifying her removal from the UK compatibly with Article 8, if she is not financially dependent. Again under the scheme of Part 5A the fact that a person is financially independent is a neutral factor. As I have indicated, that follows the reasoning of the Tribunal in Forman and indicates that in assessing the public interest those two matters will if met not enhance a claim so much as if they are absente they will further fortify a claim that the public interest should be given the greater weight."
6. It therefore seems to me that whatever may have been the view taken through the Upper Tribunal case law that the position is that these two matters which were particularly relied upon do not ultimately give any real likelihood of a different decision being arrived at by another judge upon the basis of the same or very similar evidence.

7. Accordingly whilst I found the judge's decision contains considerable brevity in analysis of the reasons, not a point being directly taken. Had the matter been looked at by another Tribunal, there seems to me there is no real likelihood that a different decision would have been arrived at.

8. Accordingly I am satisfied that the Original Tribunal's decision discloses no arguable error of law and the Orginal Tribunal's decision stands.

9. No anonymity order was made and none is necessary or appropriate.

NOTICE OF DECISION

10. I dismiss the appeal.

Signed Date 12 October 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Davey