The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: AA/16278/2009


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Bradford
Date Sent
On 15 November 2013
On 19 December 2013



Before

MR C M G OCKELTON, VICE PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROBERTS


Between

ZENE SOUGUI
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: T. Hussain, instructed by Duncan Lewis & Co. Solicitors
For the Respondent: R Pettersen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. We can deal with this appeal quite briefly. The appellant is a national of Chad, married to a wife who has Egyptian nationality. He came to the United Kingdom, entered illegally, and claimed asylum. He was refused asylum and directions were given for his removal to “Chad and Egypt” (sic).
2. He appealed. First-tier Tribunal Judge Turnock examined the evidence relating to his claimed fear of persecution in Chad with care and concluded that the appellant’s account was credible and that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason there. Although there were hints of the appellant’s having had Saudi Arabian nationality too, there appears to have been no evidence suggesting that he had any other nationality than that of Chad. In particular, he was not a national of Egypt.
3. The judge dismissed the appeal primarily because he took the view that the return of the appellant to Egypt would not expose him to risk of persecution or violate his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The appellant sought and was granted permission to appeal to this Tribunal.
4. That was in April 2010. We have seen notices of hearing before this Tribunal on 20 July 2010, 12 October 2010 and 10 February 2011; only the last appears to have been effective. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wynne did nothing more than decide that the First-tier Tribunal made errors in its interpretation of the evidence, sufficient for him to set the determination aside. He did so, and gave directions, but he did not determine the appeal. He has now retired and we formally make whatever transfer order is necessary to enable us to determine it.
5. A critical part of Judge Wynne’s direction, which has not subsequently been contested, is that the Upper Tribunal’s consideration of the appeal should be on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal’s “findings of fact as to the Appellant being at risk on return to Chad are preserved”. It follows that since at latest mid-February 2011 when that was sent to the parties, it has been clear that the appellant is a refugee within the meaning of the Convention, being outside his (only) country of nationality for well-founded fear of being persecuted there. The question of his return to Egypt therefore would have to be considered not, as originally set up by the Secretary of State, on the basis that as a person who had no good claim to asylum he could be removed to Egypt, but on the basis that his removal to Egypt would be the removal of a Convention refugee.
6. At our suggestion and after taking instructions Ms Pettersen told us that she was amending the Notice of Decision by deleting the words “and Egypt”. That is, in our view, entirely appropriate. By reference to the amended Notice and in view of the preserved findings, the appellant has established that his removal as a consequence of the decision under appeal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention. He is, and is entitled to be recognised as, a refugee.
7. The First-tier Tribunal’s determination having already been set aside we substitute a determination allowing the appellant’s appeal.


C M G OCKELTON
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Date: 3 December 2013