Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/08852/2012

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Date Sent
On 4th July 2013
On 15th July 2013

?????????????

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

YARAS RASAEV
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr K Gayle, Counsel instructed on behalf of Elder Rahimi Solicitors (London)
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a citizen of the Russian Federation born on 8th January 1985. He appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Bart-Stewart) who in a determination promulgated on 30th April 2013 dismissed his appeal against the Respondent's decision of 14th September 2012 to refuse to grant asylum under paragraph 336 of the Immigration Rules HC 395 (as amended) and a decision to remove him from the United Kingdom as an illegal entrant by way of directions under paragraphs 8-10 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
The background to the appeal:
2. The history of the appeal is as follows. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom on 10th May 2010 having left Makhachkala on 2nd May 2010, travelling to Riga in Latvia with the assistance of an agent and then travelling from Latvia by lorry to the United Kingdom. He claimed asylum on 10th May 2010.
3. The basis of his claim is that he is a Russian national from Chechnya and claimed that as a result of having been arrested by way of an illegal detention in 2008 until January 2009 after trying to reclaim his family home, when he had been forced to sign papers which he had not been allowed to read, charges had been fabricated against him that he was a rebel and that he feared arrest, imprisonment and torture if returned to the Russian Federation.
4. In the Appellant's account, he had given details concerning the death of his parents and following this having to live with his grandmother in Makhachkala, Dagestan and that having no legal right to live there was returned to Chechnya in April 2003 after having been detained. He remained in Chechnya between 2003 and 2004, not able to work but living with a woman called Alina until in May 2004 he travelled to Breslan where he worked as a porter until September 2004. He then returned to Makhachkala, Dagestan and had no problems with the authorities between 2004 and 2008.
5. In October 2008, on his return to Chechnya to obtain documents so that he could live and study, and upon return to the family home he found that a policeman had moved into the property. He was not able to live in that property and it was claimed had no assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Grosni when he had sought to complain. He was beaten, arrested and detained for a period of three months and made to sign documents that he was not allowed to read before being told to go. He then returned to his grandmother's home, found his birth certificate amongst his mother's possessions but had made arrangements in 2010 to leave Russia.
6. The Respondent in a refusal letter dated 14th September 2012 considered the factual aspect of the Appellant's claim and did so in the light of country materials relevant to the Russian Federation and in particular, dealing with trial processes in Russia, the ability of citizens to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities in Russia including the number of independent and non-governmental organisations capable of advancing any complaints, freedom of movement within the Russian Federation and the ability to obtain documentation, such as internal passports and the ability to register as a resident in the Russian Federation.
7. In considering the Appellant's claim, the Respondent did not accept as credible the account given by the Appellant concerning the material facts for a number of reasons. The Respondent dealt with a number of issues in the refusal letter including the availability and sufficiency of protection, accessing protection from other agencies, the issue of internal relocation and the ability for the Appellant to obtain necessary documentation in Russia to enable internal relocation. Article 8 was also considered in the refusal letter. The Respondent did not find that the Appellant had demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution and refused his application.
8. The Appellant exercised his right to appeal and this led to the appeal coming before the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Beg) on 29th October 2012. Mr Gayle, who represents the Appellant in these proceedings represented the Appellant at that hearing. Judge Beg dismissed the appeal under the Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds. An application was made for permission to appeal which was originally refused on 28th November 2012 on the basis that the grounds amounted to nothing more than a lengthy attempt to re-argue matters that had been determined. An application was made for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and permission was granted on 13th December 2012. In that grant of permission, the judge stated at paragraph 2 that he was minded to find an error of law and set aside the determination and remit it to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing "any written objection to that course must be submitted to the Upper Tribunal no later than 3rd January." On 18th February 2013, Upper Tribunal Judge Lane noted that there had been no objection from either party thus the determination was set aside for error of law and the appeal was "remitted to be heard afresh by the First-tier Tribunal on all issues, including credibility."
9. Thus the appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Bart-Stewart) for a second time on 12th April 2013. The Appellant was again represented by Mr Gayle, and the Respondent by a Presenting Officer. The judge heard oral evidence of the Appellant and for that to be the subject of cross-examination.
10. In a determination promulgated on 30th April 2013, the judge dismissed his appeal. In a comprehensive determination, he considered the factual account given by the Appellant and set out the findings of fact at paragraphs 29 to 41. The judge did not find the Appellant's account to be a credible one but in considering the core aspect of his claim (relating to his illegal detention for a period of three months after trying to reclaim the family home and being forced to sign papers which were then used to fabricate charges against him of being a rebel demonstrated by the subpoenas provided later on), were not accepted as credible by the judge for the reasons given. The judge also dealt with other issues concerning his claim to have had no official documentation and thus found his account to lack credibility providing that at the time he left the Russian Federation he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In the alternative, the judge considered the issue of internal relocation at paragraph 41 and considered that if he could not return to his home area (which she did not accept) he could internally relocate within the Russian Federation, a matter that had been dealt with at length in the refusal letter.
11. The Appellant sought permission to appeal that decision and on 22nd May 2013 permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Poole for the following reasons:-
"1. The Appellant is a citizen of Russia. He claimed asylum but that claim was rejected by the Respondent. He appealed that decision and the appeal came before the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Bart-Stewart sitting at Taylor House on 12th April 2013. For reasons set out in a determination the judge did not find the Appellant's claim credible and dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
2. The Appellant now seeks leave to appeal on a number of grounds which could be viewed as simply disagreement with the judge over her findings of fact. It is also suggested that the judge displayed a 'worrying lack of knowledge' by indicating that she had not heard of Dagestan. There is no reference to that in the determination and no statement from the representative confirming that comment. I note that the grounds seeking leave have not been prepared by Counsel who appeared. I therefore ignore that suggestion. However there is general comment that the judge misdirected herself with regard to the standard of proof. Reference is made in the grounds to various paragraphs of the determination. Paragraph 2 of the determination refers to the burden of proof and whilst the words 'standard of proof' are not used reference is made to 'substantial grounds for believing.' That could well be sufficient. However at paragraph 29 reference is made to the judge not being satisfied 'upon the balance of probabilities.' That raises concerns. However that same paragraph does refer to the lower standard but it is just arguable that the judge did indeed adopt too high a standard of proof.
3. For that reason leave is granted."
The error of law hearing:
12. Thus the matter came before the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant was represented by Mr Gayle, who had appeared before the First-tier Tribunal on the previous two occasions and Ms Isherwood on behalf of the Secretary of State. Mr Gayle relied upon the written grounds for permission and supplemented them with oral submissions by taking the Tribunal through each paragraph of the determination in the same way as they were referred to in the grounds for permission. Whilst the permission grounds make it clear that the only reason that permission was granted was in respect of the assertion that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof, Mr Gayle relied upon the other issues namely that the judge failed to provide sufficient and/or sustainable reasons for the adverse credibility findings made by the judge.
13. Mr Gayle submitted that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof namely the balance of probabilities at paragraph 29 and this materially affected the judge's analysis of the Appellant's credibility in the determination thus the determination was flawed as a whole.
14. In respect of paragraph 30, he submitted that the judge ignored the fact that there was no right to occupy and re-register a property and ignored the Appellant's efforts to get the register corrected. At paragraphs 30 to 32, the judge did not take into account the evidence historically relating to Chechans and in respect of paragraph 33 the finding was an unsustainable one and demonstrated a failure to grasp the core of the Appellant's account. He did not claim that he was suspected of being a Chechan rebel and thus he would not have been questioned about that at the time of his detention. In respect of paragraph 34, the judge failed to consider the Appellant's evidence. The Appellant was a child when his parents died therefore he would not know that his grandmother was aware of the birth certificate in her belongings. If she had known, she would have used it to assist the Appellant to become registered.
15. Similar submissions were made in respect of paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 as set out in the grounds. At paragraph 39 Mr Gayle reiterated his submission concerning the judge adopting the wrong standard of proof and that there would be nothing implausible about an Appellant being made to sign a document that he had not read. Thus he submitted that when the credibility findings were read as a whole, the judge began on the wrong premise and furthermore failed to provide sufficient or sustainable reasons for the adverse credibility findings that she had given in her determination when dismissing the appeal.
16. Ms Isherwood on behalf of the Secretary of State relied upon the Rule 24 response dated 6th June 2013. In that document, the Respondent opposed the Appellant's appeal stating that the First-tier Tribunal Judge directed herself appropriately and had applied the correct standard of proof and that the grounds were "no more than a disagreement with the outcome." In respect of this, she submitted that a careful reading of the determination as a whole demonstrated that the judge did not apply the wrong standard of proof despite the slip made by her at paragraph 29 referring to "the balance of probabilities." At paragraph 2 she referred to substantial grounds for believing and also at paragraph 29, she referred to the "lower standard" that clearly reflected the correct burden of proof and therefore it cannot be said that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof when making an assessment of credibility.
17. In respect of credibility, whilst Mr Gayle had submitted that the judge had not taken into account a variety of matters, for example, in respect of paragraph 30 that a third party to occupy and re-register a property in Chechnya, there had been no reference made throughout the submissions to any objective material to indicate that the judge was wrong in making the findings that she did. A careful consideration of the Appellant's bundle demonstrated that there was very little objective material put forward on behalf of the Appellant in comparison with a large amount of objective material that was set out in the Respondent's bundle and referred to at length in the refusal letter. Ms Isherwood went through the various paragraphs in the same way as Mr Gayle had indicating that the findings of fact made by the judge were entirely open to her on the evidence that was before her and that it had not been demonstrated that there was any error of law in those findings but that the grounds were simply a disagreement with the findings reached.
18. Mr Gayle by way of reply, submitted that there had not been a slip at paragraph 29 and that when she referred to the "lower standard of proof" it may have been a reference to the balance of probabilities by reference to the criminal standard. In respect to the submission that he made relating to the Appellant's use of aunt and uncle in which it was submitted that they were not relatives in the sense of being an aunt and uncle but that that was a term commonly used as a mark of respect for elders in many cultures, whilst he could not point to any objective evidence in relation to this, it was a matter that should have been in the judge's knowledge. He submitted that the judge's approach to credibility demonstrated that there was a flawed approach overall thus the determination should be set aside.
19. I reserved my decision.
My assessment:
20. The grounds advanced on behalf of the Appellant by Mr Gayle are two-fold; firstly, the analysis of the First-tier Tribunal Judge was undermined by the reliance on an incorrect standard of proof and secondly there was a failure to provide sufficient and/or sustainable reasons for the adverse credibility findings that were given. Mr Gayle in his submissions and in the written grounds makes reference to paragraphs 29 to 41 of the findings of fact of the judge.
21. I should set out the basis of the factual account of the Appellant. The Appellant was born on 8th January 1985 in Noviy Aldy, Chechnya and was a Russian national of Chechan ethnicity. It was claimed by him that his father was killed on 5th February 2000 after going to the house of a friend whom he had heard had been killed by soldiers. His brother left with him and had not been seen or heard of since that date. It was said that his mother was also killed in February 2000 whilst travelling to the home village from Mahkachkla where she was staying with the Appellant's grandmother. She travelled back to Chechnya after hearing of her husband's death.
22. In May 2000, after the death of his parents and disappearance of his brother, he moved to live with his grandmother in Mahkachkla in Dagestan and lived there from May 2000 until May 2010. As he had no legal right to reside there because he was not registered and had no documents or an internal passport, he worked illegally in the construction industry but otherwise was supported by his grandmother. He had no contact with the authorities between May 2000 and April 2003.
23. In April 2003 he was detained by the police and held in an unknown police station for one week. He was not questioned but was beaten several times and was taken back to Chechnya in a car with a woman called Alina and left in the Zavodskoi borough. He went to live with this lady and her daughter and did not work or leave the house because he was too scared. He was supported by various humanitarian organisations providing him with supplies and blankets. He did not attempt to register or apply for documentation because he was afraid.
24. In May 2004 he travelled to Beslan in Ossetia as a clandestine in the back of a potato lorry. On arrival there, he lived in a container in a market where he worked as a porter. He did this until September 2004 and then he left because the authorities checked people's documents. The Appellant returned to Mahkachkla. He had no problems with the authorities between September 2004 and 2008.
25. In October 2008 the Appellant returned to Chechnya because he wanted to get documents and live there and study. He intended to prove who he was because he intended to live in his father's house and use the authorisation for the house. When he returned to the family home he found a policeman had moved into the property with his family. The Appellant went to the government body responsible for housing in order to get an official document to prove that the house belonged to him. He was told that they did not want to get involved in the dispute and refused to give him documents. The housing authority told him that the policeman had registered the house under his own name. The Appellant travelled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Grosni to complain but was not allowed in. He did not seek independent legal advice about his situation. He returned to the house attempting to rally the neighbours but they refused. He was arrested and taken to a police station and locked in the basement for a period of three months. He was not charged or questioned at any time during that detention and was beaten on five occasions. Before he was released on 30th January 2009 he was made to sign several documents which he was not allowed to read. He was told to "get lost" when he was released. He returned to his grandmother's house in Mahkachkla on the same day. She died on 10th March 2010.
26. In April 2009 he found his birth certificate amongst his mother's possessions in the grandmother's house. He did not attempt to register himself using the document because he had made arrangements to leave and travel to the UK. In April a friend introduced him to an agent named Vakha who had asked for 6,000 US dollars to facilitate the journey but accepted gold and jewellery from the Appellant. He left on 2nd May 2010.
27. Since he left Russia, the public prosecutor's office have issued two subpoenas asking him to attend their office to provide "an explanation" or face criminal proceedings if he failed to comply.
28. The Appellant fears that as a result of his illegal detention after trying to reclaim the family home, having been forced to sign papers that he was not allowed to read the policeman who had taken his home had used influence to fabricate charges against him of being a Chechan rebel thus the subpoenas relate to fabricated charges. The judge dealt with the Appellant's factual account at paragraphs 4 to 9 of the determination. At paragraphs 18 to 21 the judge summarised the Appellant's evidence, including his asylum statement dated 8th October 2010, an appeal statement dated 17th October 2010 and a statement dated 28th March 2013. In the appeal statement he commented on the reasons for refusal letter (and was set out in detail at paragraph 19). At paragraph 20, the judge set out the further evidence of the Appellant in his statements and at paragraph 21 dealt with the Appellant's core concern relating to the subpoenas that had been issued namely that his details were on an official database throughout the Russian Federation that he was wanted by the authorities. Thus he was forced to sign papers that he was not allowed to read, he was certain that a policeman who stole his home had used his influence to fabricate charges of being a rebel against him. As the judge said, "he has no formal interaction with the Chechan authorities therefore the subpoenas must relate to fabricated charges." Those statements were then adopted as his evidence-in-chief. The determination at paragraphs 23 to 27 set out the evidence before the judge that was elicited through cross-examination of the Appellant and also from questions asked by the judge by way of clarification.
29. It is also clear from the determination that the judge set out at length in the same way as she did with the Appellant's evidence, the Respondent's reasons for refusing the application that was set out in a letter dated 14th September 2012. It was set out in paragraphs 10 to 16. It is right to observe that the refusal letter was a comprehensive document of fifteen pages that made reference to a number of issues including the Appellant's credibility but also the objective evidence relevant to consideration of his claim including that of registration in the Russian Federation, the obtaining of internal passports (which the Appellant stated he could not obtain) and the issue of internal relocation. It is entirely clear from reading the determination as a whole, that the judge gave careful consideration to all of the evidence that was placed before her. Whilst it is submitted in general terms that the judge displayed "a worrying lack of knowledge for a decision maker in this jurisdiction" on the basis that she had never heard of "Dagestan" and that "many of her findings betray a failure to understand core aspects of the Appellant's account (see paragraph 3 of the grounds) that is unwarranted. It is clear from the determination that the judge understood what was the core aspect of the account and indeed at paragraph 21 set out, what the Appellant had said in his final statement, drawing together the factual account he had given that he was at risk of persecution as a result now of having been served with subpoenas which he claimed had been generated by the policeman who had obtained his property and that as he had been forced to sign papers that he had not been allowed to read, they had led to fabricated charges that he would be a Chechan rebel and this formed the core now of his risk on return. As noted in the grant of permission, there was no statement from the representative confirming the comment and the grounds had not been prepared by Counsel who appeared thus the suggestion set out at paragraph 3 was ignored when granting permission. I agree. However, it has been asserted on behalf of the Appellant that the findings of the judge do betray a failure to understand the core aspects of the Appellant's account.
30. It is advanced on behalf of the Appellant that the determination should be set aside as a whole because the judge applied the wrong standard of proof. As Mr Gayle submits, at paragraph 29 of the determination the judge stated "I am not satisfied upon the balance of probabilities ..." It is therefore submitted that the judge adopted the wrong standard of proof for an asylum claim which was a material error of law.
31. In my judgment, the determination should be read as a whole when making an assessment of the approach adopted by the judge concerned concerning evidential issues and the assessment of credibility. It is clear at paragraph 2 of the determination that the judge dealt with the legal issues such as burden and standard of proof. She correctly noted that the burden of proof was upon the Appellant. It is also right to observe that when considering humanitarian protection, the judge noted that the Appellant had to show "that there are substantial grounds for believing" relating to that issue. At paragraph 29, (which is the paragraph relied upon by Mr Gayle) where the judge states "I am not satisfied upon the balance of probabilities the Appellant has shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason," does not take into account the second part of paragraph 29 in which the judge makes it clear that when considering the account she has applied "the lower standard." The judge states, "the Appellant's account while broadly consistent is primarily speculative in nature and I do not consider that even on the lower standard objectively amounts to persecution." Thus whilst she began by stating the "balance of probabilities", it is clear that the judge did apply what she described as "even on the lower standard" the correct standard of proof when considering the factual account of the Appellant and making her assessment of credibility as a whole. In those circumstances, I consider that the judge did make a slip at paragraph 29 by stating the balance of probabilities when it is clear when the determination is read as a whole, by her reference to "substantial grounds for believing" paragraph 2 and paragraph 29 "even on the lower standard" demonstrates that she did adopt the correct standard of proof. Whilst Mr Gayle in his reply submitted that she may have been referring to the criminal standard when stating the "lower standard" by reference to the balance of probabilities, I reject that submission. It is entirely clear from reading the determination that it is not likely that she would have been referring to the criminal standard at any time in her determination.
32. I therefore turn to the second ground advanced on behalf of the Appellant in which it is said that the judge failed to give sufficient and or sustainable reasons for the adverse credibility findings that she made. The judge's findings of fact are set out at paragraphs 30 to 42.
"30. The Appellant said that he and his family left their home in 2000. Both his parents were dead and his brother disappeared. The Appellant went to his grandmother's house in a neighbouring part of the Russian Federation and did not return to his home area until six years later. By that time he says the property was occupied by another person. On his own evidence therefore the property would appear to a third party to be abandoned and even if the policeman occupied the property without permission and then was able to have it registered in his name this in itself is not evidence of him being powerful. I find this no more than an opportunistic act by a third party.
31. By the time the Appellant returned to the property the policeman had obtained documentation to show that officially the property was now his and the Appellant concedes that he himself has had no evidence himself to support his claim. In the circumstances it would not be unreasonable for the authorities not to intervene.
32. With regards to his detention, his evidence is that he was accused of being a thief and in oral evidence in answer to my question he said that the policeman accused him of being a thief. He does not suggest that the policeman was previously known to him and even if the policeman did call other police and have him arrested this in itself is not evidence of persecution. There is no evidence that this was other than the random act of an individual. The policeman had taken possession of a property. The Appellant had no evidence to show that he had any entitlement to the property. Even if he was arrested and detained this would not be evidence of persecution.
33. There is no objective evidence for the Appellant's claim that he would be considered as a rebel. He claims to have been detained for three months. I find it implausible that for the whole three months he was never asked any questions and never told why he was there. It undermines the credibility of the claim that he was detained for three months. He then said he was released and told to go away. This does not suggest that he was of continuing interest. It is not credible that he was not questioned if he was of interest especially if he claims that they thought him to be a Chechan rebel. I do not accept that he was detained.
34. The Appellant does not give any credible explanation with regards to his claim to have no official documentation and being unaware that such documentation existed until after the death of his grandmother. Throughout his claim he gives an account of having difficulty in working and living officially because he had no papers yet he says that at no time did he ask his grandmother with whom he lived from 2000 whether she had any documents. The Appellant was born in 1985 and so was still a minor when he went to live with his grandmother. He says that his mother left papers with his grandmother. Most of his account is pure speculation. He said that he thinks his mother took the documents there for safekeeping during the war and he thinks his grandmother did not know the documents were there. It was not plausible that having had difficulty he did not ask his grandmother about steps he could take to regularise his position. It is not credible his grandmother did not know what documents she held for his mother.
35. The Appellant claims that in 2003 he was sent back to Chechnya by police as he did not have a propiska. No plausible explanation is given for why the police would send him to Chechnya if he had no documents showing that he is from that area.
36. I do not accept as credible the Appellant's claim that he is wanted by the authorities as a suspected Chechan rebel. I also do not accept as plausible the claim that the alleged subpoenas were sent to him by a neighbour. In his original witness statement he says he went to the village to try and get the neighbours to confirm it was his family home and they refused to become involved. It therefore stretches credulity to suggest that two years later he should write to his neighbour, Adam.
37. His claim in his recent statement that he has no relatives in the Russian Federation and that his uncle and aunt are neighbours lacks credibility. A translation of the letter is at page C45 of the Respondent's bundle. The contents of the letter suggest that it is from someone close to the Appellant. The letter refers to another paper sent after he left in February 2000 and subpoenas. There is no reference of the Appellant returning to Chechnya in 2008 neither is there any reference to the policeman or anybody else occupying his property. The Appellant says that the area is a small village and everybody knows everything. In these circumstances this is a surprising omission.
38. With regards to the alleged subpoenas as stated in the refusal letter, these merely invite the Appellant to attend the public prosecutor's office to provide an explanation. There is no indication of what is being investigated although the Appellant is also asked to provide documents to confirm his identity and his place of permanent residence. There is nothing in the document to suggest that the Appellant has committed any offence and as the Appellant claims to never have had any identification documents or being registered it is surprising that the documents should refer to him as a citizen of Chechnya, give a date of birth and confirm his residence at the same address where he said he lived with his family. This too I find undermines his claim that there is no official documentation establishing his residence and that he would not be able to register were he to return to Chechnya. Applying Tanveer Ahmed I attach no weight to these documents as anything other than self-serving produced to bolster the claim after the first refusal.
39. I do not accept as plausible his claim that he has signed documents which can be used against him suggest that he is a rebel.
40. The Appellant's evidence is that having found his birth certificate his intention was to travel to the United Kingdom. He has never had secure employment and following the death of his grandmother instead of registering himself in Dagestan he instead made enquiries about coming to the United Kingdom for which he paid a considerable sum of money. I find that the Appellant's account lacks credibility and at the time he left the Russian Federation he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
41. In light of RM, the Appellant as a young Chechan male is not at risk of persecution or a breach of Article 3 on return to Russia or in Chechnya merely as a result of his ethnicity. Further RM refers to a viable internal relocation option in Ingushetia. The letter from the Appellant's uncle makes reference to a certificate from Ingushetia which suggests that his family already have some connection there as refugees and refers to everything being 'more or less normal.' Both his aunt and uncle are in employment and whilst the letter suggests that there were problems because of the war it does not suggest ongoing problems. The Appellant said that he wrote to them after his asylum claim was initially refused. This suggests that he remains in contact with his family members and his claim in his witness statement in October 2010 that he had no family and everyone was killed and he felt that he had no choice to try and find a safe country where he could rebuild his life is not a truthful statement."
33. Mr Gayle, has identified by reference to each paragraph, matters which he maintains demonstrate that the judge gave insufficient reasons for her decision or were perverse findings. I have considered those paragraphs identified by Mr Gayle but I read them in the light of the evidence and the decision when read as a whole.
34. At paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 33, 36 and 38 the judge deals with the core of the Appellant's account as to the events in October 2008 when the Appellant returned to Chechnya intending to live in the family home, but found a policeman living there and his claim to have been locked up in a basement of a police station for three months and then released in 2009. It also deals with his account of being at risk of persecution on account of being illegally detained after trying to reclaim the family home, having been forced to sign papers that he was not allowed to read and that the policeman who stole his home had used his influence to fabricate charges against the Appellant of being a rebel which is the reason for the subpoenas being issued against him.
35. At paragraph 30, the judge considered the Appellant's factual account when making her assessment of his claim. Namely, that the Appellant had said that he and his family had left their home in the year 2000, both his parents were dead and his brother had disappeared and that the Appellant had gone to his grandmother's house in a neighbouring part of the Russian Federation and had not returned home until six years later. As the judge records
"By that time he says that the property was occupied by another person. On his own evidence therefore the property would appear to a third party to be abandoned and even if the policeman occupied the property without permission and then was able to have it registered in his name this in itself is not evidence of him being powerful. I find this no more than an opportunistic act by a third party."
36. As to the evidence of him being powerful, this relates back to the oral evidence that she heard noted at paragraph 26 that the Appellant thought that he was powerful simply on the basis that a simple policeman could not have written a house from one person's name to another and live in the house. It is asserted on behalf of the Appellant that the judge's analysis was flawed because "yet there is no right for a third party to occupy and re-register property in Chechnya." It is further asserted that the judge ignored the Appellant's evidence pertaining to his efforts to have the property register corrected. As pointed out by Ms Isherwood, there was no objective evidence put before the Tribunal on behalf of the Appellant to support that submission that there was no right for a third party to occupy and re-register the property in Chechnya.
37. The judge at paragraph 30 considered the Appellant's account and by reference to what the judge stated was "on his own evidence" that the property would appear to be abandoned, the property not being lived in for a substantial period of time. It was noted in the Appellant's interview that he had been in the property between the years 2000 and 2003 but had not obtained the documents then (question 118) relating to the ownership of the home and furthermore that he had stayed in Chechnya between 2003 and 2004 but had not made any attempt to reclaim the house at that stage. The Appellant's account in interview was that he did not want to stay there because of the dangers (question 119). It was therefore open to the judge to find on the evidence before her that it was no more than an opportunistic act by a third party.
38. At paragraph 31 the judge dealt with the Appellant's account that he had gone to the housing authority who had refused to intervene. In this context, it is clear that the judge considered the Appellant's own evidence where she stated "the Appellant can see that he himself had no evidence to support his claim," thus her finding that in those circumstances it would not be unreasonable for the authorities not to intervene, was a matter entirely open to the judge to find having considered the Appellant's own evidence.
39. At paragraph 32, it is asserted that the judge incorrectly asserted that there was no evidence to show the Appellant's entitlement to the property and thus the judge misunderstood the policeman's motivation in having the Appellant arrested.
40. I reject that. Paragraph 32 was not an incorrect assertion, as the judge records it was based on the Appellant's own evidence set out at paragraph 31 that he had no evidence to support his claim thus, when the judge referred to the Appellant "having no evidence to show that he has no entitlement to the property," was referring back to paragraph 31 which was the Appellant's own evidence. The judge was entitled to rely upon that evidence when reaching a conclusion concerning the property.
41. In the grounds it is asserted that the judge showed a flawed analysis on the basis that there was official documentation held by the Chechan authorities to show the property had belonged to the Appellant's family and the crux of the case was the policeman had used his influence thus the judge completely missed that aspect of the account. I reject that submission. It is entirely clear from reading paragraphs 30 and 31 and also paragraph 32 (in which the judge noted that the Appellant had no evidence to show that he had any entitlement to the property), they were matters that were entirely open for the judge to find taken from the evidence of this appeal as a whole.
42. What is being said in the grounds in relation to each paragraph is simply a disagreement with the findings of fact made.
43. Paragraphs 33, 32 and 38, deal with the alleged detention and being of interest to the authorities. As to the circumstances of the detention, the Appellant's account of being forced to sign documents subsequently being used to fabricate charges that he is a rebel, were considered. The judge found that there was no objective evidence that he would be considered a rebel (paragraph 33) that presumably arises out of the matters relating to the property. She also found that it was implausible that the Appellant would be detained for three months but would never be asked any questions or never told why he was there. The judge found that that undermined his credibility of being detained for a prolonged period of three months. The judge considered the evidence of the Appellant that he was released and told "to go away" and found that that evidence did not suggest that he was of any "continuing interest." Thus she did not accept his detention.
44. It is asserted that the judge's finding that it was implausible that he was not interrogated during his three month detention about being a Chechen rebel demonstrated a failure to comprehend the Appellant's account. Careful consideration of the determination as a whole and by particular reference to paragraph 21 where she sets out the core part of his account concerning the fabrication of charges of a rebel, demonstrate that the judge clearly had in mind what the core account of the Appellant was.
45. At paragraph 33, when she was taking into account the Appellant's alleged detention, it was entirely open to the judge to consider the circumstances of that detention relating to his arrest generally. She found it implausible that for the whole of the three months when he was detained that he was never asked any questions or never told why he was there ( this was taken from the Appellants own evidence). That does not simply relate to whether or not he was a Chechen rebel but relates to the failure to being questioned at any time. It was the judge's view that it was not credible that they would subsequently attempt to fabricate a claim he was a rebel if no evidence was even elicited from his 3 months in detention. She did not find that it was credible that someone, who was later to fabricate evidence would not have asked him any questions whatsoever during a prolonged detention of a three month period.
46. Furthermore, the judge made a finding that the circumstances of his release, demonstrated that he was not of any continuing interest namely that he was released and was told "to go away." That was not consistent with the Appellant's core account that after being released in 2009, two subpoenas were then issued a significant time later on 9th December 2010 and 2nd or 29th December 2010.
47. At paragraph 38, she dealt with the two subpoenas that were provided by the Appellant. In respect of the documentation that was placed before the Tribunal in the form of a letter and also from the two subpoenas, it is submitted on behalf of the Appellant in the grounds that the judge failed to follow the guidelines laid down in Tanveer Ahmed where it was held "only rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence." It is asserted that no such evidence was presented at the hearing of the appeal therefore the decision to place no weight on the documents was a material error of law. I reject that submission also.
48. When considering documentation, I remind myself of the guidance given in the decision of the Tribunal in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 in which the Tribunal acknowledged the argument that "documents and information contained in them may be either genuine or false; documents may be genuine but that information itself may be false; documents may not be genuine but the information may nonetheless be true." The Tribunal in that case went on to state
"It is trite in immigration and asylum law that we must not judge what is or is not likely to happen in other countries by reference to our perception of what is normal within in the United Kingdom. The principle applies as much to documents as to any other form of evidence. We know from experience and country information that there are countries where it is easy and often relatively inexpensive to obtain 'forged' documents. Some of them are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Some are 'genuine' to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. ? The permutations of truth, untruth, validity and 'genuineness' are enormous. At its simplest we need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true. They are separate questions. It is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is 'forged' or even 'not genuine'."
The only question is whether the document is one upon which reliance should properly be placed. Such documentation should be not looked at in isolation but should be assessed along with other pieces of evidence and therefore "in the round".
49. It is entirely clear from the determination when read as a whole that the judge did follow the guidance in Tanveer Ahmed. She gave reasons that were open to her for not attaching weight to those subpoenas that had arrived subsequently the first one dated 9th December 2010, and the second 29th December 2010, bearing in mind that the Appellant was imprisoned allegedly for three months from October 2008 having been released in January 2009 and thus there was a long period of time before those documents had been allegedly issued. Nonetheless the judge considered those documents by making an assessment of their contents in the light of the Appellant's account.
50. At paragraph 38, she notes as to the content of those subpeonas, they invite the Appellant to attend the public prosecutor's office to provide an explanation. The judge correctly observed that there was no indication of what was being investigated in either of those subpoenas and that there was nothing in the document to suggest that the Appellant had committed any offence. The judge was entitled to take those matters into account when making an assessment of the reliability. There was no allegation of forgery being made on behalf of the Respondent or by any other person it was simply a matter of considering those documents and their reliability and the judge gave reasons as to why she attached no weight to them.
51. Furthermore, at that paragraph she considered the contents of the subpoena in the light of the issue of documentation generally and when making an assessment of their weight. She took into account other parts of its contents relating to the Appellant being referred to as a citizen of Chechnya, giving his date of birth and confirming his residence as the same address where he said he lived with his family which in fact is the address where the policeman was living.
52. She was entitled to consider those matters when making an assessment of the weight of those documents in the light of the Appellant's account as a whole in which he had claimed he had never had access to documents concerning his residence in Chechnya and the Russian Federation. It is of note that the Appellant, who sought to rely upon those documents, produced no objective material to support their content and form nor was there any evidence led by the Appellant to authenticate such documentation.
53. Thus judge found at paragraph 38 having considered the contents of the subpoenas that in the light of the Appellant's claim to never have had any identification documents or having been registered, it was surprising that the document should refer to him as a citizen of Chechnya, give a date of birth and confirm his residence at the same address where he said he lived with his family (this was the property in which the policeman was currently living). The judge found "this too I find undermines his claim that there is no official documentation establishing his residence and that he would not be able to register if he were he returned to Chechnya."
54. In those circumstances, those findings were entirely open to the judge and it has not been demonstrated that there was any error of law.
55. At paragraph 34 the judge dealt with the issue of documentation further. At this paragraph, the judge considers that the Appellant did not give any credible explanation with regards to his claim to have had no official documentation or being unaware that such documentation existed until after the death of his grandmother.
56. The judge correctly observed that throughout his claim he gave an account of having difficulty working and living officially because he had no papers, yet at no time did he ask his grandmother with whom he lived from 2000 whether she had any documents. The Appellant was born in 1985 and was a minor when he went to live with his grandmother. The judge considered that his account was "pure speculation" and records what the Appellant had said about the issue of documentation, namely, that he thought his mother had taken the documents there for safekeeping and thought that his grandmother did not know the documents were there. The judge considered that evidence and rejected it. She found that it was "not plausible that having had difficulty he did not ask his grandmother about the steps he could take to regularise the position." She also found, "it is not credible his grandmother did not know what documents she held for his mother." The judge later at paragraph 40 dealt with the documentation that in fact he did have. It had been the Appellant's evidence that he found his birth certificate amongst his mother's possession in his grandmother's house in April 2009 and as the judge observed at paragraph 40,
"He has never had secure employment and following the death of his grandmother instead of registering himself in Dagestan he instead made enquiries about coming to the United Kingdom for which he paid a considerable sum of money. I find that the Appellant's account lacks credibility and at the time he left the Russian Federation he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason."
57. Thus the judge found that his conduct, after finding the birth certificate that was a relevant document in establishing his identity and would be instrumental in being able to register in that area, instead of taking the opportunity to register himself in Dagestan, he made enquiries about coming to the United Kingdom.
58. The grounds generally refer by reference to particular paragraphs that the judge demonstrated a flawed analysis of aspects of the Appellant's case, did not take into account the Appellant's evidence and did not give sufficient reasons. In respect of the issue of documentation, it is submitted that the judge's findings at paragraph 34 in which the judge considered the Appellant's conduct and chronological account of having lived with his grandmother for a substantial period of time yet asking at no time whether she had any documents relevant to him as a perverse finding. I reject that submission. There is no perversity about that finding or any of the judges findings whatsoever. It was entirely open to the judge to consider the Appellant's account of subsequently finding the birth certificate amongst his mother's possessions at the grandmother's house in April 2009 set against his account that he had lived with her from 2000 (apart from certain periods) yet he had not asked her at any time whether she had any documents.
59. Furthermore, the judge found it was not credible that his grandmother, knowing of all the difficulties that there would be in relation to failure to demonstrate your identity and your residence, did not know what documents he held for his mother. And as regards paragraph 40, it was entirely open to the judge to find that the Appellant had not given a credible account concerning what documentation he had when she considered his account to have found the birth certificate in April 2009 yet instead of using it to register himself in Dagestan, which had been a problem according to his account, he preferred to make enquiries about coming to the United Kingdom for which he "paid a considerable sum of money." I do not find that it has been demonstrated that those findings of fact were not open to the judge on the evidence.
60. I have considered with care the challenges made to each individual paragraph as set out in the grounds and relied upon by Mr Gayle in his oral submissions. Having done so, I am satisfied that the matters raised are simply a disagreement with the findings of fact reached by the judge. I consider that those findings were made on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and were entirely sustainable reasons given from the evidence placed before the judge. I have given regard to the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Muse and Others v The ECO [2012] EWCH Civ 10 on challenges to the adequacy of the judge's reasons. In South Bucks District Council v Porter (2) [2004] UKHL 33, cited with approval by the Court of Appeal at paragraph 33, Lord Brown said:
"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable a reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principle important controversial issues,' disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision maker erred in law, for example, by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily been drawn. The reasons need only refer to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration."
The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Shizad (Sufficiency of Reasons: Set Aside) [2013] UKUT 0085 similarly refers to the need to give brief reasons on the central issue, and reminds us that there is a need to read the decision as a whole and see if it makes sense having regard to the material accepted by the judge, it goes on to point out that where there has been no misdirection in law, an adequate fact-finding process, then a decision should not be set aside, even if the reasons provided fall short, unless the conclusions are perverse on the evidence available. I have considered with care the decision as a whole of the First-tier Tribunal and do not find that there is any merit in the grounds advanced on behalf of the Appellant. Thus I find that it has not been demonstrated that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law and the decision shall therefore stand.
Decision
The original Tribunal did not make an error of law; the decision shall stand.

Signed Date 11/7/2013

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds