Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: da/00362/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at the Royal Courts of Justice
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 09 January 2017
On 17 January 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

DENISS CMOKOVS
(anonymity direction NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: not represented

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal AA Wilson promulgated on 24 November 2016 in which he allowed the appeal of Mr Deniss Cmokovs (hereinafter 'the Claimant') against the SSHD's decision of 22 July 2016 to make a deportation order against him under Regulations 19(3)(b) and 21 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (the 2006 Regulations).
Background
2. The Claimant is a national of Latvia, born on 28 March 1983. He claims to have first entered the United Kingdom in 2003 but returned to Latvia in 2004. He re-entered the United Kingdom shortly after Latvia joined the EU in May 2004. He has remained in the United Kingdom ever since. The judge noted that the Claimant had worked as a labourer doing painting and decorating, and had also be self-employed. He had been registered for employment as a jobseeker. He sublet property in the UK and had not claimed public benefits.
3. Between 21 March 2006 and 15 June 2016 the Claimant received 38 convictions for 58 offences. These included 2 offences against property (2007 to 2009), 40 theft and kindred offences (2006 to 2016), 15 offences relating to police/courts/prison (2006 to 2016) and one drugs offence (2012). The Claimant also received a reprimand/warning/caution on 21 May 2005. The PNC (Police National Computer) printout detailing the Claimant's convictions indicated that he received a number of fines and deferred sentences of imprisonment in respect of a significant number of shoplifting offences. He additionally received a number of community sentences. The PNC indicated that he breached a significant number of community sentences.
4. The PNC referred to a number of custodial sentences received by the Claimant. On 31 August 2007 he was sentenced to 40 days imprisonment. The SSHD's decision under appeal suggests that this sentence was deferred but the PNC does not reflect this. I note a Home Office letter at C1 of the SSHD's bundle, dated 19 October 2007 and addressed to the Claimant at HMP Aberdeen, indicating that he received a prison sentence of 5 months, 27 days on 31 August 2007 in relation to an offence of theft. There is also contained in the SSHD's bundle (at B12 to B3) correspondence confirming that the Claimant was recommended by the Peterhead Sheriff Court for deportation on the same occasion. It is unclear to me from where the reference to '5 months, 27 days' originates but, having regard to the PNC, I am satisfied that the Claimant did receive a custodial sentence of at least 40 days imprisonment on 31 August 2007 and that this sentence, unlike others received in 2007, was not deferred. On 19 October 2007 he was served with a warning letter notifying him that the SSHD had decided to take no further action on this occasion, although with a warning that she may not be prepared to exercise such leniency should he come to her adverse attention in the future.
5. On 12 May 2008 the Claimant received a sentence of 4 months imprisonment in relation to a shoplifting offence that was committed on 27 April 2008. On 13 June 2008 the Claimant was served with a letter indicating that the SSHD had given consideration to this conviction but decided, again, to take no further action against him. The same warning as to future criminal activities by the Claimant was issued. On 1 August 2012 the Claimant was sentenced to 2 periods of 90 days imprisonment. On 23 August 2013 he received a sentence of 42 days imprisonment. On 6 August 2014 he was sentenced to 21 days imprisonment, and on 15 June 2016 he received a total of 1 month's imprisonment in relation to offences of theft from a motor vehicle and going equipped for theft.
6. Having set out the Claimant's immigration history and the details of his numerous criminal convictions the SSHD rejected the Claimant's assertion that he had resided in the United Kingdom in accordance with the 2006 Regulations for a continuous period of five years. The SSHD did not therefore consider that the Claimant had acquired a permanent right of residence. Nor was it accepted that he had been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for 10 years as he failed to provide any evidence to confirm the exact length of his residence in the UK and provided no evidence to show that he had exercised Treaty rights for a continuous period of 10 years in accordance with the 2006 Regulations. As a consequence the SSHD was not satisfied that the Claimant was entitled to the enhanced protection under Regulation 21(3) or (4) of the 2006 Regulations.
7. The SSHD then considered the principles relating to deportation decisions as set out in regulation 21(5) of the 2006 Regulations. The Claimant was said to be a persistent offender with an appalling criminal record in the UK. His previous convictions failed to act as a deterrent and he had shown a blatant disregard for the law. There was said to be a pattern of acquisitive offending and 15 offences relating to police/courts/prisons and offences against property. The Claimant was considered to pose a risk of harm to shopkeepers and the general public due to the nature of his repeat offending. His conviction history was said to indicate an antisocial attitude towards the public and community. He had shown no remorse for his behaviour. His history of failure to comply with community orders indicated a continued risk of harm to the public. Having concluded that the Claimant was unable to support himself and his lifestyle without resorting to criminal activities, and in the absence of any evidence that he had been exercising Treaty rights, the SSHD satisfied herself that the Claimant was likely to offend again on his release. In the absence of sufficient evidence that he had adequately addressed all the reasons for his offending behaviour the SSHD concluded that the Claimant had a propensity to reoffend and that he represented a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the public to justify his deportation on grounds of public policy.
8. The SSHD then considered whether the Claimant's deportation was proportionate within the terms of regulation 21(5)(a) of the 2006 Regulations and noted that he was born in Latvia, spent his youth and formative years in that country, was now 33 years old and in good health. There was said to be no evidence to substantiate the Claimant's assertion to have a child in the UK. By the Claimant's own admission he had not, in any event, seen his child for 7 or 8 years, although he claimed to have some Internet contact on a monthly basis. The SSHD again noted the absence of evidence of the Claimant's employment and rejected his claim to have engaged in regular or lawful employment in the UK. The SSHD did not accept that the Claimant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. There was no evidence that he made a positive contribution to society and he provided no evidence of significant ties to the community. His antisocial behaviour indicated the opposite. It was not accepted there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Latvia given that he lived there until adulthood. The Claimant also had family in Latvia (in his Current Circumstances Proforma the Claimant indicated that his mother lived in Latvia and that he spoke to her weekly) and there was no reason why he would be unable to re-establish a life on return to Latvia.
9. The SSHD considered the case of Essa [2012] EWCA Civ 1718, relating to the prospects of rehabilitation, but noted the absence of evidence that the Claimant had undertaken any rehabilitative work while in custody. The SSHD acknowledged the Claimant's assertion that he had a brother in the UK but the brother's presence did not prevent the Claimant from committing further offences. The SSHD believed the Claimant could work towards rehabilitation in Latvia with the support of his family members living there. Given the threat posed by the Claimant to the public, the SSHD considered that his personal circumstances did not preclude his deportation. The SSHD went on to consider whether her decision breached Article 8 ECHR, but concluded that it did not. The SSHD certified the matter under Regulation 24AA of the 2006 Regulations but took no action to remove the Claimant from the UK prior to the date of his appeal. The SSHD also issued a certificate under s.94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which prevents the Claimant from appealing the refusal of his human rights claim until he has left the UK if this would not cause a breach of s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
10. The Claimant was not represented in his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal. The judge found he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under Article 8. Noting that the SSHD had not attempted to remove the Claimant from the UK, and in light of an invitation from the Presenting Officer, the appeal under the 2006 Regulations proceeded. The First-tier Tribunal judge heard oral evidence from the Claimant and considered an HMRC a letter, dated 25 August 2016, relating to the Claimant's national insurance record.
11. In his decision the judge stated, at [4], that the time spent by the Claimant in prison did not constitute residence. The judge set out the pertinent aspects of the Claimant's criminality and immigration history. The judge noted that the HMRC letter of 25 August 2016 showed that the Claimant had 8 qualifying years of NIC contributions up to 5 April 2016. This was said by the judge to be similar to the employment record contended by the Claimant which showed "? periodic gaps but nevertheless substantial periods of contribution." The judge was satisfied the Claimant had been in the UK since 2004 and that he had been physically present for more than 10 years in the UK.
12. Having set out the relevant provisions of Regulations 15, 19 and 21 of the 2006 Regulations the judge asked himself whether the Claimant had been "? effectively part of the community of the United Kingdom or his criminality is such that he never really has established any community position within the UK." The judge noted that the Claimant gave his evidence in English and his claim to have a child in the UK. The judge noted the Claimant was a persistent offender. At [10] the judge was satisfied that the Claimant had been in the UK for a continuous period of at least 10 years prior to the relevant decision. The judge indicated that the degree of integration in the United Kingdom by an EU citizen had been considered by the Court of Appeal in AA(Nigeria) [2015] EWCA Civ 1249. The judge then stated, "It therefore follows the [Claimant] cannot be removed from the United Kingdom unless the [SSHD] can show that there [are] imperative grounds of public security."
13. At [11], noting that the Claimant had established a pattern of convictions involving shoplifting and obstruction of police officers, the judge was not persuaded that the Claimant's conduct was so serious so as to amount to imperative grounds of public security.
14. The judge proceeded to consider whether, if the Claimant was not entitled to the highest level of protection, the SSHD had established the existence of serious grounds of public policy or public security requiring the Claimant's deportation. The judge concluded that there were serious grounds of public policy justifying his deportation and was satisfied that such a decision was proportionate having regard to the specific warnings previously given to the Claimant, the pattern of antisocial behaviour accompanying the Claimant's thefts, the fact that drugs had played a substantial part in the Claimant's criminality, and the absence of any satisfactory evidence that the Claimant had changed his behaviour. In so doing the judge took into account the Claimant's prospects of rehabilitation and his assertion to have a brother in the UK. The appeal was allowed by the judge on the basis that the Claimant had resided in the UK for a continuous period of 10 years and that there were no imperative grounds of public security justifying his deportation.
The grounds of appeal and the grant of permission
15. The SSHD's Grounds asserted that the judge was not entitled to conclude that the Claimant accumulated 5 years continuous residence given that the evidence upon which the judge relied showed periodic gaps in the payment of NIC contributions, and given that the periods of imprisonment interrupted the continuous residence by the Claimant. It was further submitted that the judge failed to take into account the Supreme Court decision in SSHD v Franco Vomero (Italy) [2016] UKSC 49 (FV(Italy)) when determining whether the Claimant was entitled to the imperative grounds level of protection. The Grounds asserted that permanent residence was required before someone could avail themselves of the highest level of protection and that the Supreme Court had issued a reference to the CJEU in respect of this point. The Grounds additionally asserted that, in any event, the judge erred by failing to determine whether the Claimant had sufficient integrative links within the UK as a result of his 10 years residence. In the absence of any lawful assessment of the Claimant's overall integrative links, and in light of the findings by the judge at [13], it was submitted that the judge had materially erred in law.
16. In granting permission Designated judge of the First-tier Tribunal Murry stated,
"At paragraph 6 of the decision the judge finds the [Claimant] has been physically present in the UK for over 10 years. He seems not to have taken into account his time in prison or they gaps in his employment in this calculation. At paragraph 10 the judge states that the [Claimant] has been in the UK for a continuous period of 10 years. It is not clear whether this is correct. At paragraph 13 the judge deals of the situation had the [Claimant] not been in the UK for 5 years and finds his removal would be justified that was the case. At paragraph 9 the judge considers whether the [Claimant] has been effectively part of the community of the UK. It is not clear what his view on this is, as there are pros and cons mentioned in this paragraph. There are arguable errors of law in the judge's decision."
The Upper Tribunal hearing
17. The Claimant was not represented at the Upper Tribunal hearing. I confirmed at the outset that he was sufficiently proficient in English so as to follow and engage in a meaningful way with the proceedings. I explained to the Claimant the purpose of the error of law hearing and how the hearing would proceed. I indicated that, following the submissions by the Home Office, I would summarise the Presenting Officer's arguments so that the Claimant was fully aware of the points raised by the SSHD and to enable him to respond accordingly.
18. Mr Tufan adopted the grounds of appeal. He submitted that the Claimant had not attained permanent residence in light of his periods of imprisonment. More significantly, the judge had erred in his approach to the relevance of the periods of imprisonment when determining whether the Claimant was entitled to the highest level of protection. The judge failed to assess whether the Claimant demonstrated sufficient integrative links to prevent his periods of imprisonment interrupting his acquisition of a continuous period of 10 years residence.
19. In reply the Claimant indicated that he entered the United Kingdom in 2003 as a student and lived in the UK since 2004. He claimed that he had worked but had also worked under a different National Insurance number. He referred to the family he had in the United Kingdom - his ex-wife, his girlfriend, his brother and his brother's children. None of these individuals lived in London. When asked whether he had been imprisoned in 2007 and 2008 the Claimant said he couldn't remember but he thought he had been imprisoned.
20. Having considered the judge's decision, the submissions made and the relevant authorities, I indicated that the FTT judge had materially erred in his legal approach both to the question whether the Claimant had acquired permanent residence, and whether the Claimant was entitled to the highest level of protection. My reasons, given in summary at the hearing, were that the periods of the Claimant's imprisonment, in principle, interrupted his ability to acquire 10 years continuous residence and that the judge did not adequately consider whether the Claimant had demonstrated sufficient integrative links with the United Kingdom, despite his various terms of imprisonment, as part of an overall assessment.
21. I indicated that I would remake the decision. To this end I took into account further documentary evidence provided by the Claimant relating to his brother, and further evidence relating to his girlfriend. The Claimant provided an NHS appointment letter relating to Mr Nikolays Cmokovs (the Claimant's brother), with a residential address in Lancashire, dated 30 June 2016. Also provided were a letter from the employer of the Claimant's brother, dated 12 July 2016, and some utility and council tax bills relating to the Claimant's brother. I additionally took into account the HMRC documents previously served by the Claimant.
22. In his further oral evidence the Claimant indicated that his brother lived in Lancashire and was not present at the hearing because he worked and his wife worked and also looked after their children. If released the Claimant's brother would find the Claimant a job. The Claimant's girlfriend was on holiday. The Claimant had not asked her to write a letter or statement for the Tribunal. The Claimant provided two enveloped letters, apparently written in Russian, and post-marked at the end of 2016. These were said to have been sent by the Claimant's girlfriend to him at his removal centre. Their relationship began in 2012. His girlfriend was working in the UK and was a student as well. She was also Latvian and still had family in Latvia. When asked whether there was any reason why she could not return with him to Latvia in order to maintain their relationship the Claimant said that he didn't think there was any reason but again referred to her employment and her studies. There were no questions asked by Mr Tufan.
23. Mr Tufan who submitted that the Claimant was not entitled either to the imperative grounds of protection or the medium level of protection enjoyed by those who had acquired permanent residence. The Claimant was described as a recidivist and had been offending since arriving in the UK. He posed a present and serious threats to the public. I was reminded that, at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, no-one gave evidence on the Claimant's behalf. There was no evidence that he had a child in the UK and he accepted himself that he had not seen the child for a long time. There was no satisfactory evidence from the girlfriend and she was not here today. There was no evidence that the girlfriend and the Claimant had cohabited.
24. The Claimant submitted that his brother had children and claimed that his mother now lived in Russia. There were no sufficient public policy grounds to warrant his deportation and he had changed his character.
Discussion
25. I am satisfied that the judge was not entitled to conclude that the Claimant acquired a permanent right of residence. This is because the Claimant's periods of imprisonment prevented him from accumulating 5 years continuous residence in accordance with the 2006 Regulations. At paragraphs 4 and 5 of this decision I have set out the Claimant's various periods of imprisonment, based on the PNC printout and the warning letters sent to him in 2007 and 2008. The Claimant could not remember whether he had been imprisoned in 2007 or 2008 but he believed he had. I am satisfied, based on the aforementioned evidence, that he was imprisoned in 2007 and 2008. The Claimant entered the United Kingdom as an EU citizen shortly after May 2004. He was imprisoned in 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016. There has been no period of 5 years continuous residence without imprisonment. In Onuekwere v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Directive 2004/38/EC) Case C-378/12, at [22] the CJEU stated that it was clear from the very terms and the purpose of Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 that periods of imprisonment cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of the acquisition of a right of permanent residence for the purposes of that provision (implemented by Regulation 15 of the 2006 Regulations). Further, that articles 16(2) and (3) "must be interpreted as meaning that continuity of residence is interrupted by periods of imprisonment in the host member state" (para 32). This approach was endorsed by the Supreme Court in FV(Italy). It follows that the Claimant had not acquired a permanent right of residence as his periods of custody interrupted the continuity of his residence.
26. It was not disputed by Mr Tufan that the Claimant has physically resided in the United Kingdom for over 10 years (since 2004). The Grounds of Appeal, which Mr Tufan adopted, argued that the Claimant was only entitled to the highest level of protection if he had first achieved permanent residence. A majority of the Supreme Court favoured the view that possession of a right of permanent residence was not needed in order to enjoy enhanced protection under article 28(3)(a) (the equivalent of Regulation 21(4)(a) of the 2006 Regulations). However, as a minority regarded the position as being at least unclear, the Court referred this question to the CJEU. Given the indication of the majority of the Supreme Court, and the wording of the relevant Directive and the manner of its incorporation into the corresponding Regulation, I am satisfied that the Claimant does not need to achieve permanent residence in order to avail himself of the imperative level of protection. This 'error of law' has not been made out.
27. I am however satisfied that the judge erred in law in concluding that the Claimant had acquired the highest level of protection. This is because the judge failed to consider whether the Claimant's various periods of imprisonment interrupted his accumulation of 10 years residence, and failed to consider whether his integrative links with the United Kingdom, in light of his periods of imprisonment, were such as to prevent his imprisonment, in principle, from interrupting the continuity of his residence.
28. The expulsion decision was made on 22 July 2016. According to MG (prison - Article 28(3)(a) of Citizen's Directive) Portugal [2014] UKUT 392 (IAC), which considered the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C- 400/12 (SSHD v MG) with respect to the meaning of the "enhanced protection" provision, the 10 year period should be calculated by counting back from the date of the expulsion decision. This was the approach taken by the First-tier Tribunal judge. But the CJEU case also made clear that, in principle, periods of imprisonment interrupted the continuity of the period of residence. In Ahmed Warsame v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 16 counsel for the SSHD accepted that there is a "maybe" category of cases under MG where a person has resided in the host state during the ten years prior to imprisonment, depending on an overall assessment of whether integrating links have been broken, and that in such cases it might be relevant to determine, by way of overall assessment, the degree of integration in the host member state or the extent to which links with the original member state have been broken.
29. The Claimant may therefore potentially fall within the 'maybe' category of cases where a period of imprisonment during the relevant 10 years does not necessarily prevent him from qualifying for enhanced protection if he was sufficiently integrated, although a period of imprisonment has a negative impact in so far as establishing integration is concerned.
30. Nowhere in his decision does the judge contemplate the interruption of the Claimant's 10 years residence by his periods of imprisonment. Nor is there any assessment by the judge as to whether the nature and degree of the Claimant's integration was sufficient to warrant the application of the enhanced test (on the basis that the Claimant fell within the 'maybe' category identified in Warsame at [9] and [10]).
31. In my judgement the First-tier Tribunal decision does not contain a legally adequate analysis of whether the Claimant's integration was of a degree sufficient to attract the operation of the highest level of protection, notwithstanding his incarceration for several shorts periods which, in principle, would have interrupted the continuity of his 10 year period of residence. There is no adequate assessment of the personal, family, cultural, social, financial and occupational roots developed by the Claimant since his arrival in the UK. The failure by the judge to undertake this vital consideration, necessary to ascertain whether the Claimant's integration is sufficient to attract the highest level of protection in light of his criminality, renders the decision legally unsustainable.
Remaking the decision
32. Having concluded that the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a legally adequate analysis of the Claimant's integrating links during his 10 years residence prior to the deportation decision, I proceeded to remake the decision taking account of the evidence adduced by the Claimant of his links with the UK.
33. The Claimant was able to produce only limited evidence of his employment in the United Kingdom. I am nevertheless satisfied, based on the HMRC document provided by the Claimant, that he has worked in the United Kingdom (as evidenced by his attaining 8 qualifying NIC years). It is also clear that the Claimant speaks English. These were both points the First-tier Tribunal held in the Claimant's favour and I do the same.
34. The Claimant claimed to have a girlfriend in the UK. He did provide some evidence in support of this assertion. There were two letters, contained in envelopes sent to his removal centre and date-stamped the end of 2016. The letters however were in Russian and there were no translations. The Claimant had not asked his girlfriend to provide a letter or statement to the Tribunal in support of their claimed relationship. When asked why his girlfriend was not present at the hearing the Claimant said she was still on holiday. There was no evidence in support of this assertion. The Claimant claimed he and his girlfriend had been in a relationship since 2012 but I note that in his Current Circumstances Proforma, signed and dated by the Claimant on 8 June 2016, he made no mention of his girlfriend. He indicated on the 1st page of this document that he previously resided in a council house and shared the address with a 'friend'. Despite having no legal representation the Claimant is proficient in English and was made aware of the date and purpose of the Upper Tribunal hearing. At his hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the Claimant had also claimed to have a girlfriend but she provided no letter or statement to that Tribunal and she did not attend the First-tier Tribunal hearing. Having regard to this evidence in the round I am not satisfied that the Claimant does have a girlfriend in the UK.
35. Even if I am wrong in my conclusion and the Claimant does have a girlfriend, he indicated at the Upper Tribunal hearing that she was Latvian and that she still had family in Latvia. She was said to be working in the UK and was a student. When asked whether there was anything preventing their relationship from continuing in Latvia the Claimant said that he didn't think there was any reason why she could not return to Latvia.
36. The Claimant produced some evidence relating to his brother, including a letter addressed to the brother from his employer, some utility and council tax bills and a NHS letter. This confirms that someone with the Claimant's surname is resident in the United Kingdom. I am prepared to accept that the Claimant does have a brother in the United Kingdom. There is however no other evidence relating to the relationship between the Claimant and his brother or his brother's family. Significantly, there is little evidence to suggest that the Claimant and his brother are in regular contact.
37. There is no evidence of the Claimant's relationship with his son other than his own assertion. On his own admission the Claimant has not seen his son for 7 or 8 years and they only communicate via the Internet. There is no evidence of such communication. In the circumstances I do not accept that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with any child in the UK.
38. There is no satisfactory evidence of the nature and extent of any private life established by the Claimant in the United Kingdom. There are, for example, no statements or letters of support from friends or colleagues, and no evidence whatsoever of any contribution, other than through his NI contributions, that the Claimant has made to society. There is nothing to indicate he owns property or has any stake in his community.
39. The extent of the Claimant's criminality undermines any assertion by him that he has established strong integrating links during his 12 years residence. He has engaged in a multitude of antisocial activities and has been imprisoned on six different occasions. I take account of the fact that his sentences of imprisonment have been short (ranging from 4 months to 21 days), that his offending has been towards the lower end of the spectrum, and that he had resided in the United Kingdom for over 12 years prior to the deportation decision. I am however unable to conclude, having engaged in an overall assessment, that the Claimant's criminality has not interrupted his accumulation of 10 years residence. I am consequently satisfied that the Claimant is not entitled to the highest level of protection.
40. For the reasons I have already given at paragraph 25 of this decision I am satisfied the Claimant has not acquired a permanent right of residence.
41. The decision to deport the Claimant must be taken in accordance with the principles enunciated in regulation 21(5) of the 2006 Regulations. I am satisfied that the decision was taken based exclusively on the Claimant's personal conduct. I have no doubt that the Claimant's personal conduct represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. The Claimant is a persistent offender who has failed to take advantage of any of the opportunities offered to him through various community sentences and drug rehabilitation orders. The Claimant's acquisitive offending threatens social cohesion and the financial integrity of businesses. I am wholly satisfied that he has a propensity to reoffend, despite his assertion that he is a reformed character. There is nothing in the Claimant's background or the evidence he has provided to indicate that he has taken any steps to reduce the risk of further offending. In reaching this conclusion I have not taken into account matters isolated from the particulars of his case, nor do I reach my decision based on his previous criminal convictions alone.
42. I have considered the proportionality of the Claimant's deportation in light of his personal and family circumstances. I have found, for the detailed reasons given above, that the Claimant has no genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner or children in the UK, and there is nothing to indicate that his relationship with his adult sibling contains any elements of reliance or dependency. The applicant is a 33-year-old man who has not identified any significant health issues. I do note however that he was a heroin addict and, when completing his pro forma, indicated that he took methadone daily. There is nothing before me to suggest that appropriate treatment for his drug use would not be available in Latvia. I accept, as did the First-tier Tribunal, that the Claimant has been working in the UK but this work has been irregular. He has integrated into society in the UK to the extent that he is proficient in English and has experience of manual labour. There is however no other evidence of the nature or extent of his integration into society.
43. The Claimant speaks Russian and maintains that his mother no longer lives in Latvia. He claims to have little in common with Latvian society. He was however born in Latvia and has lived in that country for most of his life, including his formative years. He is a national Latvia. I am not satisfied that he has lost, to any significant extent, his social and cultural ties, at least in relation to the large ethnic Russian community in Latvia.
44. I have also considered whether the Claimant's associations with the UK make this country best placed to facilitate his rehabilitation. There is no evidence that the Claimant has undertaken any form of rehabilitation in the UK and the absence of any strong familial relationships or friendships in the UK does not suggest that his deportation to Latvia would deprive him of any meaningful opportunity at rehabilitation.
45. For all the above reasons I am satisfied that it would not be disproportionate to deport the Claimant, on grounds of public policy and public security, given the present threat he poses to the fundamental interests of society.

The First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.
I have re-made the decision and I have dismissed the Claimant's appeal

13 January 2017
Signed Date

Upper Tribunal Judge Blum