Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: DA/00667/2014

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 30 January 2017
On 13 March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CRAIG

Between

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Appellant
and

MR D
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant (Secretary of State): Mr T Melvin, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent (Mr D): Mr C Lane, Counsel, instructed by Rodman Pearce, Solicitors

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This was a re-hearing of Mr D’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State to deport him to Ghana. This appeal has been re-heard following a hearing before me on 4 April 2016, when I found that a decision of First-tier Tribunal Hollingworth, who had allowed Mr D’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deport him to Ghana had contained a material error of law such that the decision had to be re-made. I gave a written decision following that hearing and much of that decision will be incorporated within this decision. As was the case in my earlier decision, for ease of reference I shall throughout this decision refer to the Secretary of State who was the original respondent as “the Secretary of State” and to Mr D, who was the original appellant, as “the claimant”.
2. Judge Hollingworth had made an anonymity direction and as there has been no application before me on behalf of the Secretary of State to discharge that direction, I shall not do so. Accordingly, unless and until a Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, the claimant continues to be granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
3. The claimant is a national of Ghana who was born in November 1965 and so is now 51 years old. He arrived in this country when he was aged around 11 and other than returning briefly to Ghana for about two months about 30 years ago, he has lived in this country ever since. He has a very poor criminal record, having amassed some ten convictions covering a total of 31 offences. These cover the period from October 1987 until June 2011 and include five offences against the person, six theft and kindred offences, one public disorder offence, one offence relating to police and one drugs offence. It also includes the offences which gave rise to the decision to deport him, to which I will turn in a moment. Although the claimant suffers from a mental illness (paranoid schizophrenia) and has learning difficulties, he was obviously found to have the requisite mens rea such that he could properly be convicted of these offences. Regarding the offences which gave rise to the decision to deport him, pursuant to the Rules on automatic deportation, these were his convictions for seventeen sexual offences against a child who was very young indeed (starting from when she was 3 years old) in the late 1980s and 1990. I will need to refer to these offences in a little more detail below. Even though the offences were very old and even though account was taken of the claimant’s mental difficulties, he was still sentenced to a period of three years and four months’ imprisonment. It needs also to be recorded that all the reports which have been prepared on this claimant have considered that he remains a danger to children, although it is not suggested that the particular offences of which he was convicted have been repeated.
4. Since completing his criminal sentence, the claimant remained in immigration custody for a period in excess of three years and the reports which were before the Tribunal (certainly until very recently indeed) suggested that he was institutionalised. It was not disputed on behalf of the Secretary of State that the claimant is schizophrenic and has what are euphemistically described as learning difficulties, in that his capacity to integrate within society is considerably less than someone who does not have the mental difficulties which he has.
5. The claimant appealed against the Secretary of State’s decision to deport him and his appeal was initially allowed by First-tier Tribunal Gurung-Thapa on 14 July 2014 but that decision was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede in the Upper Tribunal in a Decision and Reasons promulgated on 20 May 2015. Although the claimant had initially appealed on Articles 2 and 3 grounds as well as under Article 8, his appeal had only been allowed under Article 8 and the appeal under Articles 2 and 3 has subsequently been abandoned. This is of some relevance in this appeal.
6. Following Judge Kebede’s decision, allowing the Secretary of State’s appeal, the appeal was remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal on Article 8 grounds alone although some of the findings of fact made by Judge Gurung-Thapa were preserved. I will refer to these findings below.
7. The remitted appeal then came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollingworth in July 2015 which hearing was adjourned part-heard to 18 November 2015, following which Judge Hollingworth gave his decision in which he allowed the claimant’s appeal. The basis upon which Judge Hollingworth allowed the appeal was that the claimant came within the provisions of paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules in that he had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, was socially and culturally integrated in the UK and there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Ghana were he to be deported there. The judge did not go on to consider whether in the event that paragraph 399A did not apply, there would have been compelling circumstances which would have made the deportation of the claimant not proportionate anyway.
8. The Secretary of State appealed against this decision and as noted above, I found that there had been a material error of law in Judge Hollingworth’s decision, such that it had to be re-made. My reasons for so finding were set out in my earlier decision and I summarise these reasons below.
9. Judge Hollingworth’s finding in essence was as follows. Although the claimant in objective terms could not be said to have been socially and culturally integrated, because of his mental capacity or rather lack of capacity, he had integrated to the extent that he was capable of. At paragraph 47 of his Decision, Judge Hollingworth found as follows:
“Objectively and without more the conclusion must be that the behaviour of the appellant, illustrated by his offending, has been the antithesis of social integration”.
10. However, at paragraph 57, having considered that “in balancing the objective and subjective assessments of social and cultural integration... the attainability of social and cultural integration must also be taken into account”, the judge went on to find as follows:
“The ascribable limits to attainability in relation to social and cultural integration have been achieved by this appellant in the period of some three and a half decades which he has spent in the United Kingdom. The effluxion of time has demonstrated the existence of the parameters to which I refer.”
11. Essentially therefore the judge found that the claimant had integrated to the extent that he could have done, and that this was sufficient to meet the condition set out within paragraph 399A that before the provisions of that paragraph applied he “was socially and culturally integrated” within the UK. This is a precondition in the Rules before one can then consider whether or not because there would be very significant obstacles to the claimant’s integration into Ghana his removal there would be disproportionate.
12. I found that this finding was inadequately reasoned and in any event in my judgment the precondition within paragraph 399A that an applicant had to have been not only lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life but also had to be socially and culturally integrated in the UK was not subject to qualification in the way in which the judge found.
13. It is of note in this case that when considering whether or not there would be “very significant obstacles” to the claimant’s integration into Ghana (as required under paragraph 399A(c) of the Rules) the judge found at paragraph 68 that because “I do not find that the appellant would receive the degree of supervision needed to enable him to integrate into the community in Ghana [and] the consequence of this would be that the appellant would inevitably and rapidly be placed in either a psychiatric hospital or a Prayer Camp”, it followed that “I do not find on the balance of probabilities that the appellant would be able to achieve integration”. This was because “the confinement of the appellant in the psychiatric hospital or a Prayer Camp would [not] represent integration into Ghanaian society”.
14. The judge went on to state in terms that “I find that it would represent the antithesis of that”.
15. This was of course similar wording to that used by the judge to describe how an objective observer would consider the claimant’s integration or non-integration into UK society. The judge also on an alternative basis, at paragraph 70, found as follows:
“I find on an alternative basis that if the appellant did not receive supervision on the strict basis required that he would commit further criminal offences and be imprisoned. I find that this would not constitute integration into Ghanaian society.”
16. I noted in my decision as to error of law that the judge’s consideration of integration seemed to have been influenced by his finding that although the claimant had integrated as well as he could into society in this country in light of his limitations, he would be less able to integrate into Ghanaian society because he would not receive as high a level of support in that country as he might be expected to in this country, particularly concerning taking the drugs which he needed to control his schizophrenia, in particular Clozapine for which in this country he would have ongoing support not just from his sister but also from a mental health team. I accepted the argument advanced on behalf of the Secretary of State at that hearing that Judge Hollingworth had not adequately set out his reasons for finding that despite having apparently not taken sufficient medication in this country to enable him to avoid committing offences (which in any event is a rather sweeping finding given the nature and number of his offences, which is a matter to which I will return below) he was nonetheless to be regarded as integrated in this country while for that very same reason he was to be considered as unable to integrate into Ghanaian society on return to that country.
17. Having found that there was an error of law in Judge Hollingworth’s decision, in light of the previous findings of fact which had previously been made and that this appeal had already been considered twice in the First-tier Tribunal, I considered that the appropriate course was for the decision to be re-made in the Upper Tribunal, which was a course which neither party opposed. I accordingly gave directions that the claimant would be given permission to adduce further evidence relating to the issues of whether or not he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Ghana (if it was held that he was socially and culturally integrated in this country) and also as to whether or not it would in any event be proportionate for him to be deported to Ghana. I gave consequential directions as to the service of any evidence by the Secretary of State and as to the relisting of the appeal.
18. Because it was anticipated that the claimant would remain in immigration detention (it being part of his case that he was institutionalised) the resumed hearing was listed at the Royal Courts of Justice in order to facilitate his appearance. However, when the resumed hearing was due to take place, on 26 September 2016 to the surprise not only of the Tribunal, but also of Mr Lane, the claimant’s Counsel, who was continuing to represent the claimant and Mr Melvin, then representing the Secretary of State, we were informed that in fact the claimant had been released from detention some three weeks earlier, on 5 September 2016 and was currently residing in supported, non-secure accommodation in Finchley. Although the claimant’s solicitors were apparently aware of this, neither Mr Lane nor Mr Melvin had been informed prior to the hearing and neither party had informed the Tribunal. Having obtained instructions, Mr Lane informed the Tribunal that the claimant’s solicitors had not been involved in the decision, but that an organisation which was assisting the claimant in conjunction with social services had managed to find suitable accommodation for him. Mr Lane was not able in the limited time available to him to ascertain the basis upon which the decision to release the claimant from immigration custody had been taken and the family apparently did not know either.
19. It was, however, evident to both Mr Melvin and Mr Lane that the decision to release the claimant could not (or certainly should not) have been taken without a more up-to-date evaluation of his circumstances, such that this Tribunal could not realistically make a decision in this appeal without having regard to the reasons why he had been released. Certainly, given that the most recent psychiatric report then before the Tribunal was dated July 2014, both parties agreed that the Tribunal would benefit from further medical evidence, and both requested that that hearing be adjourned pending production of such a report or reports as might be made available. Because public funding was necessary for the obtaining of further medical evidence, it was necessary to adjourn the hearing further for a sufficient period to enable this report to be obtained. I also gave the claimant permission (through Counsel acting on his behalf) to file an application for the appointment of a litigation friend, and subsequently the claimant’s sister has been so appointed.
20. Before the hearing in September 2016, a supplementary bundle had been submitted to the Tribunal on behalf of the claimant, containing in particular a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Abdul Qayyum dated 16 December 2016. However, the circumstances in which it was considered appropriate to release him into the community remain unclear.
21. It had been anticipated that the applicant would attend the hearing, but apparently a matter of days before the hearing he was “admitted informally” to Pine Ward – Park Royal Mental Health Centre, “following a deterioration on his mental health systems” (as stated in a letter from Mr Bakopoulou of Shine dated 23 January 2017). Apparently it was subsequently felt necessary to section the claimant under the Mental Health Acts in order to provide treatment which he needed. So the current position is that he has been sectioned and is in hospital.
The Hearing
22. At the hearing, in addition to the documents originally before the Tribunal, I was provided with an claimant’s bundle, a supplementary bundle and then a further supplementary bundle. I was also provided with a separate bundle containing the various determinations/decisions previously made in respect of this claimant.
23. I was also very helpfully provided with skeleton arguments which had been prepared respectively by Mr Lane on behalf of the claimant and Mr Melvin on behalf of the Secretary of State.
24. At the hearing, I heard evidence from Ms Pibworth, the claimant’s sister (and litigation friend) who was cross-examined. I also heard submissions on behalf of both parties. While I will not set out below everything which was said during the course of the hearing, I have nonetheless had regard to all the evidence which was given and the submissions which were made, as well as to all the documents which were before me, whether or not the same is specifically referred to below.
25. At paragraph 3 of the skeleton argument prepared on behalf of the claimant, Mr Lane noted that in the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede, in which Judge Gurung-Thapa’s decision had been set aside, her findings of fact had been preserved. Mr Lane had stated the findings of fact to be as follows:
(i) There are support systems that would be in place in the UK to prevent a relapse in the claimant’s mental health and to stop his re-offending;
(ii) The claimant returned to Ghana once, in 1988, for a period of three weeks;
(iii) There is no contact at present maintained with extended family members living in Ghana;
(iv) There is no evidence that the claimant is familiar with the culture and way of life in Ghana;
(v) There is no evidence to suggest that the claimant has a “connection” to life in Ghana;
(vi) The claimant has considerable family ties in the UK, although his father has not been around in his up-bringing;
(vii) It is the claimant’s sister who has played the most significant part in the claimant’s life and has a high level of concern for him;
(viii) The claimant has a substantial private life in the UK due to his family ties, length of residence, secondary education, and by virtue of having received and continuing to receive medical treatment for his mental health since at least 1996; and
(ix) The claimant will need to continue taking Clozapine for the foreseeable future and have on-going support through a mental health team.
26. It is in my judgment necessary to set out precisely what Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede stated with regard to the preserved facts, which was at paragraph 14 of her determination, and was as follows:
“14. Accordingly the case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the appellant’s Article 8 claim to be considered afresh. As agreed by the parties, the findings of fact made by Judge Gurung-Thapa are to be preserved. That is, of course, subject to findings made on any new evidence produced for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. The judge’s decision in relation to Articles 2 and 3 has not been challenged and therefore stands. It is for the First-tier Tribunal to make fresh findings in regard to paragraphs 399A and 398 of the rules.”
27. This paragraph appears after the judge having noted at paragraph 11 that Judge Gurung-Thapa had
“accepted that there was no continuing contact with those family members [living in Ghana] but considered that that did not mean that contact would not be established in order to derive support from them in addition to the financial assistance of the family members in the United Kingdom, in the event of the appellant returning to Ghana”,
which Judge Kebede found “was plainly relevant to her findings on Article 8 when considering the appellant’s ties to Ghana for the purposes of paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules”. Judge Kebede also, at paragraph 12 specifically did not accept Judge Gurung-Thapa’s finding that the claimant necessarily had no “continuing connection” to life in Ghana, because “Strasbourg jurisprudence... required that an assessment of ties had an objective as well as a subjective dimension and ...that assessment had to consider what lay within the choice of a claimant to achieve and whether dormant ties could be revived”. Also, as noted above, Judge Kebede had specifically stated that any preserved findings would have to be subject to any findings on new evidence adduced for the next hearing, which must be taken to include consideration of any new evidence now adduced for the purposes of the hearing before me.
The Claimant’s Case
28. The claimant’s primary submission, set out within the skeleton argument and maintained in the oral submissions before me, is that he is entitled to benefit from the provisions contained within paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules. The relevant parts of the Rules with regard to this submission are as follows:
“398. Where a person claims that their deportation would be contrary to the UK's obligations under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, and
...
(b) the deportation of the person from the UK is conducive to the public good and in the public interest because they have been convicted of an offence for which they have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years but at least twelve months;
...
The Secretary of State in assessing that claim will consider whether paragraph 399 or 399A applies and, if it does not, the public interest in deportation will only be outweighed by other factors where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in paragraph 399 and 399A...
399A. This paragraph applies where paragraph 398 (b)... applies if –
(a) the person has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life; and
(b) he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK; and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into the country to which it is proposed he is deported.”
29. It is clear that the claimant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, coming here at the age of 11 and remaining with leave ever since. Mr Lane submits on his behalf that although clearly he “has significant mental health problems [which] impacts upon his ability to integrate” (see paragraph 10 of the skeleton argument) nonetheless he should be treated as being integrated into UK society because his private life coupled with the level of support he has received in this country is such that he has effectively integrated to the extent that he is able.
30. If returned to Ghana, which is a country with which he no longer has any connection at all, and where such family as he has have said that they will not provide support, the likelihood is that he will either be incarcerated because of offences he will commit (particularly if he does not take the medication which he would be assisted in taking in this country) or would be placed in a “Prayer Camp”; in either event, he would be unable to integrate within Ghanaian society, even to the (albeit limited) extent that he has been able to in this country.
31. Alternatively, even if this Tribunal were to hold that the test to be applied when assessing whether the claimant was integrated in the UK was a wholly objective test, it would still not be proportionate in all the circumstances of this case to deport him to Ghana, because the adverse consequences to him would outweigh the public interest in effecting his removal. In oral argument, Mr Lane summarised the claimant’s case in this regard as follows. He had been out of Ghana so long that he had lost any ties he may previously have had in that country; he has had a private life in this country, which is relied upon; on return to Ghana he would lack effective psychiatric treatment and would most likely be placed in a “Prayer Camp” where his needs would effectively be ignored. The combination of these factors impinge to such a high degree on his Article 8 rights that even if the Tribunal finds that he is not in objective terms integrated in the UK, they still amount to compelling reasons why it would be disproportionate to remove him to Ghana, notwithstanding the great public interest in so doing. Mr Lane did however accept that there was “no getting away from” the fact that there was a risk identified in the OASys Report which would be occasioned by enabling him to live in the community. However, it was suggested that this could be lessened by regular visits from the police. Although there was still a risk, it could be managed because the risk was known and people were working with him. The consequences to the claimant if he were deported to Ghana were sufficiently bleak as to render that return, in all the circumstances of this case, disproportionate.
The Secretary of State’s Case
32. The Secretary of State’s position can be summarised very briefly indeed. Mr Melvin, on behalf of the Secretary of State, submitted first that it was clear, in light of this claimant’s extensive history of criminal offending that he has not integrated either socially or culturally into the UK; he did not accept either that the circumstances in which the claimant would find himself in Ghana were anywhere near as bleak as was asserted. Although the claimant’s extended family who were currently in Ghana had said that they would like to assist but were unable to, it would certainly be possible for the family to obtain accommodation and care for the claimant, with the assistance of funds provided by his family in the UK, thereby enabling him to integrate as well as he could into Ghana.
33. Although it had been argued on behalf of the claimant that the state in the UK has assumed the care of the claimant, while he had been treated in this country, there had been no acceptance of responsibility for his care. It was entirely proportionate to deport him in view of the serious nature of his offences and the risk he posed to the public.
Discussion
34. I start by considering whether or not this claimant can properly be said to be “socially and culturally integrated in the UK” as he would have to be for the provision of paragraph 399A to have effect. The way Mr Lane has advanced the claimant’s case before me in oral argument is that there is a subjective element which has to be considered with regard to whether or not a person is integrated. He submits that the question this Tribunal should ask is what level of integration could a person be expected to attain, both here and where they would be removed to. He suggests that because the level of integration which the claimant has been able to attain in the UK, with the support which has been available to him, is greater than that which he would be able to attain in Ghana, he should be treated as having been integrated in this country (to the extent he was able) but would not be integrated on return to Ghana.
35. A line must be drawn somewhere above which a person may properly be said to be integrated but below which he is not. In effect the argument being submitted on behalf of this claimant is that the line should be drawn below that level of integration which had been attained in this country, but above the lower level of integration he would be able to attain in Ghana. The level of integration he would be able to attain in Ghana would, on the claimant’s case, be much lower because the likelihood is that once he had been in Ghana for a brief period of time, because he would not receive the support necessary to ensure he takes his medication and is able to live in the community, he would either be incarcerated in a prison or in a Prayer Camp.
36. While I would not suggest for a moment that a person with learning difficulties or mental illness cannot for these reasons be said to be integrated, I do not accept either that in this case the claimant can be said to have integrated “as well as he is able” (which seems to have been the basis upon which Judge Hollingworth considered that for the purposes of paragraph 399A he could be said to be integrated). Ms Pibworth’s evidence (and I accept entirely that she was a witness of truth) was that the claimant had effectively been thrown out of home when he was very young, but it is his criminal behaviour since then which shows his lack of integration. It is notable, as I have remarked above, that in respect of all his convictions (which are numerous) he was obviously found fit to plead, which means that the courts have considered that he had the requisite intent to justify his convictions. He lacks insight into his offending (as all the psychiatric reports make clear) but a person who, in addition to his other offences, considers it acceptable (or if he does not, does it anyway) to abuse a 3 year old child in the way which he did for a number of years (and who then claims that he thought she was 14) cannot be said to be “integrated” into society in any meaningful sense of that word. As Judge Hollingworth remarked (albeit that he then went on to find, in the decision which I have set aside, that he was integrated) that is indeed the “antithesis” of integration.
37. It follows that the provisions of paragraph 399A will not apply, and it therefore follows, pursuant to paragraph 398 (and having regard also to the new part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002) that “the public interest in deportation will only be outweighed by other factors where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in paragraphs 399 and 399A”.
38. The claimant’s alternative case is that in this case there are such compelling factors. It is accordingly necessary for the Tribunal to carry out a proportionality exercise, but bearing in mind throughout what is now set out within paragraph 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, wherein it is stated in terms that save where one of the exceptions apply (and these exceptions are those which are set out in paragraph 399 and 399A of the Rules which for the reasons already given do not apply in this case) “the public interest requires [the foreign criminal’s] deportation” (see Section 117C(3)). It has been made clear in a number of decisions, which it is not necessary to set out within this Decision, that although exceptionally there may be cases where deportation would still be in breach of a person’s Article 8 rights, and thus unlawful, these circumstances would be very rare indeed, and they would have to be very compelling (see in particular the most recent decision of the Court of Appeal in EJA v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 10). I accordingly now turn to consider this appeal on its specific facts in order to decide whether or not the reasons why this claimant should not be deported are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the public interest in deporting him.
39. My starting point must be, as stated at paragraph 117C(1) of the 2002 Act that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. I also have in mind that as set out at Section 117C(2) “the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal”. In this case, the claimant’s sentence for the offences against the very young girl was reduced significantly both because by the time of conviction and sentence the offences were very old and also because of his learning difficulties and mental illness. The offences themselves, which I do not propose to discuss in any detail, were vile, and I have no doubt whatsoever that but for the factors to which I have just alluded, the sentence would have been significantly higher. The revulsion felt by members of society towards people who commit offences of this gravity against young children is enormous, and is an important factor, as is also the need to deter others who might otherwise be tempted to commit such offences, by making it clear that if they are not British citizens, the almost inevitable consequence will be that if they are caught they will be deported.
40. I also have in mind that this claimant continues to present a high risk to young girls if he is allowed to remain in the UK, and I have in mind in particular the psychiatric report prepared on his behalf by Dr Qayyum dated as recently as 16 December last year, in which Dr Qayyum has stated that “[the claimant’s] insight into his sexual offending was poor” and that “he described some of them indifferently”. Dr Qayyum also stated that “as regards to the sexual activity with the 3 year old he said that she was 14 and he intended to marry her when she reached 18” and then reinforced this later by saying that “he has significant sexual offending history but continues to believe that his victim was not a three but rather a fourteen years old” and, importantly, that “his risk profile includes further risk of sexual offending”. He will pose this risk notwithstanding the support he would continue to receive in this country.
41. I have had regard to the evidence of Ms Pibworth, whose evidence, as I have already indicated, I found to be wholly truthful, and also to the information provided by the various members of his extended family in Ghana. It is clear that Ms Pibworth would do all she could to ensure that her brother is as well looked after in Ghana as he could be, and to this extent would provide some financial assistance and might even return with him to see that he is settled. However, she would not be able to remain and although his family in Ghana might be able to provide some limited assistance in terms of securing initial accommodation and help and so on, it is probable that they would not thereafter become intimately involved with his day-to-day needs. It is therefore possible, although this is speculative, that his behaviour might be less controlled after return to Ghana than it might be were he to remain (although even that is not entirely clear as he has now had to be sectioned under the Mental Health Acts, after a short period of release into the community).
42. Although Mr Lane has referred me to parts of the evidence relating to the regime in Prayer Camps and so on, which he says is where this claimant would be likely to end up, the claimant’s claim under Article 3 was dismissed and has not been revived in this hearing. Accordingly, even though the conditions which the claimant might experience on return to Ghana might well be such as to render his level of integration into Ghanaian society even lower than it might be said to be in this country, it cannot be said to be so severe as to engage his Article 3 rights.
43. On the one hand therefore I have to consider the very large public interest in removing from this country a person who, especially if living in the community, represents a significant risk to children, and whose removal would give expression to the revulsion felt by society towards those who commit offences of this nature and might also deter other potential foreign criminals from committing such offences, but set against this is the lower level of care which the claimant would likely receive in Ghana as compared to that which he is receiving in this country. I do not consider it irrelevant that the care he is receiving in this country is not only at a considerable cost to the public but also carries with it the significant risk of harm to young girls in particular. It may well be the case that in Ghana the priority would be to remove this claimant from being in a position where others are at risk, whereas in this country more priority is given to his individual wellbeing, even if this increases the risk to society in general. That, in my judgment, does not come close to amounting to a “compelling reason” why, exceptionally, this claimant should not be deported despite the clear public interest in effecting his removal.
44. As I consider that the public interest in deporting the claimant outweighs by a very large margin the reasons why he should not be deported, it follows that his appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision
I set aside the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollingworth as containing a material error of law and re-make the decision as follows:
The claimant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deport him is dismissed.

Signed:

Upper Tribunal Judge Craig Date : 9 March 2017