Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: DC/00016/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at: Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On: 20th March 2017
On: 29th March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi
(anonymity direction not made)
Appellant
And

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C. Litchfield, Counsel instructed by Defank Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D. Clarke, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria, date of birth 13 August 1981.

2. On the 9 December 2015 the Respondent served the Appellant with notice that she had decided to make an order to deprive him of his British citizenship. The Appellant appealed against that decision and on the 10th November 2016 the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Nicholls) dismissed the appeal. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to this Tribunal. On the 1st February 2016 a panel comprising The President the Hon. Mr Justice McCloskey and Mr Justice Lavender found the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to contain a material error of law. In brief summary the Tribunal had found that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the appeal; the panel found that it had indeed had jurisdiction and set its decision aside. The matter has now come before me for remaking.

Background and Matters in Issue

3. The history of this matter can be summarised in this agreed chronology of material events:

26 August 1998 An application for entry clearance was made in the name
Adeyemi Omobenga Lajuwomi (AOL). He was issued
with 6 months leave to enter as a student.

3 May 2001 Application for 6 months further leave to enter as a
student made by AOL. Granted.

Application for further leave to remain as a student in
name of AOL granted.

7 July 2009 Application made in name of AOL for indefinite leave to
remain. Granted.

12 June 2013 Application made by AOL to naturalise as a British
citizen.

19 August 2013 British citizenship granted to AOL (certificate of
naturalisation issued)

27 September 2013 British passport issued to AOL

9 April 2014 The Appellant’s wife Oghenetejiri Caroline Lajuwomi was
stopped on entry at London Heathrow. She presented a
photocopy of a false British passport in the name of Oneal
Omatseye Lajuwomi (OOL), who was recorded as being born in London on the 13 August 1981. She told officers that this document related to her husband. The Appellant made a telephone call to the officers during which he confirmed that the woman in custody was his wife. He gave the details of his genuine British passport in the name of AOL. Mrs Lajuwomi was permitted to enter the UK on her visitor visa. She gave birth to her second child on the 25th April 2014 at Chase Farm hospital, where she paid private fees.

20 April 2014 The Appellant was stopped and questioned whilst
passing through Heathrow. He was using his British
passport in the name of AOL. He confirmed that he had
vouched for his wife on the 9 April 2014. The Appellant
was searched and officers found in his luggage an
affidavit drawn up in Nigeria on the 23rd May 2013 which
“merged the identities” of AOL and OOL.

9 December 2015 The Respondent issues a notice to Appellant informing
him that she intends to make an order to deprive him of
his British citizenship under s 40 of the British Nationality
Act 1981 (as amended). The reason for the decision is that
the Appellant has shown, by his use of a false instrument,
that he is not of good character. Had the caseworker who
dealt with his naturalisation application known that he
was using a false British passport he would not have
granted the certificate.

13th May 2016 The Respondent signed the order depriving the Appellant
of his British citizenship, with reference to s40 (3) BNA
1981.

4. As will be apparent from the foregoing, the evidence of the alleged deception – the use of a false British passport in the name of Oneal Omotseye Lajuwomi – did not come to light until some eight months after the Appellant had been naturalised as a British citizen in the name Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi.

5. The parties before me agreed that the burden of proof lay on the Respondent to demonstrate that at the date of the application for citizenship the Appellant had concealed a material fact, namely that he was not of good character. The power to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship derives from s40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, the material parts of which reads:

40. Deprivation of citizenship.
(1) In this section a reference to a person’s “ citizenship status ” is a reference to his status as—
(a) a British citizen,
(b) a British overseas territories citizen,
(c) a British Overseas citizen,
(d) a British National (Overseas),
(e) a British protected person, or
(f) a British subject.

2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.

(3) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of—
(a) fraud,
(b) false representation, or
(c) concealment of a material fact.

….
(5) Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying—
(a) that the Secretary of State has decided to make an order,
(b) the reasons for the order, and
(c) the person’s right of appeal under section 40A(1) or under section 2B of the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68).

6. As found by the HHJs McCloskey and Lavender, there is a right of appeal against the decision served on the 9th December 2015:

40A Deprivation of citizenship: appeal
(1)A person who is given notice under section 40(5) of a decision to make an order in respect of him under section 40 may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal.

The Evidence

The Appellant’s Account

7. The Appellant’s account is set out in his witness statement dated 18th October 2016 and in his oral evidence before me.

8. The Appellant states that during 2014 there were problems in his marriage. He suspected that his wife was having an affair and when she told him that she was pregnant with their second child he doubted the paternity. They were both in Nigeria at the time but living separately, after he had moved out. His wife asked him for medical expenses and he refused to pay these because he did not believe that the child was his. As the estimated date of delivery drew closer his wife asked him for evidence of his British nationality. This was because she wanted to travel to the UK to have the baby. She believed that a copy of his passport would help her gain entry and reduce her hospital bills. The Appellant refused to give this to her. He was later to discover that without his knowledge his wife had approached an agent in Nigeria to help her with her visa application. She had given the agent the Appellant’s details and a photograph and he had in turn produced the copy of the passport in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi. When she presented this document on arrival at Heathrow, she had been detained.

9. A few hours after she was supposed to have arrived in the UK the Appellant received a telephone call from her family members in Nigeria. They were worried that they had not heard from her. The Appellant called immigration and spoke to an officer. He was told that she was being held there and asked for his details. He told them that his name was Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi and gave the details of his (properly issued) British passport. They let his wife in.

10. On the 20th April 2014 the Appellant decided to come to the UK himself. After his wife’s ordeal he decided to make up with her. He was stopped going through Heathrow. At paragraph 5 of his witness statement the Appellant sets out what happened next:

“I recall that upon my arrival to the UK on 20 April 2014, I was held up for a few minutes by the port immigration officers at Heathrow airport and questioned in brief (presented with) false passports attached at Annex D. Being my first time of sighting the document, I was in total shock. I told the officers I had never sighted it before and then asked them where it was from. They told me they could not reveal the information. The passport bore my details and contained a passport picture of me which I took sometimes between 2012 and 2013. I recognise the passport picture being the same one I used for my statutory declaration made in Nigeria on the 23rd May 2013. I however maintained my ignorance about the passport and also noted the passport did not bear my signature. After about 25 minutes, I was told I could take my leave so I left the airport”

11. The Appellant visited his wife in hospital in London a few days later. He states that she there confessed to having obtained the false document from the agent. She had been worried that she would not be admitted so was desperate to get something in writing to confirm that her husband was British. She had believed that the agent had got the passport from a genuine source. The Appellant was angry with her but relieved that it was not some third party using his identity. Asked whether he believed her about this the Appellant said that he did. Mr Clarke queried how she could have possibly believed that the passport was genuine; it purported to have been issued in 2005 long before the Appellant was granted British nationality, and the signature was not his. The Appellant said that his wife did not know the details of his immigration history and had never seen his signature.

12. In response to questions from me the Appellant said that after this he had tried to call the Home Office on a number of occasions to discuss the false passport but never managed to get through to the correct department. He was not too concerned however because the officer at Heathrow had reassured him that he was not in trouble and had let him in. He did not write a letter because he did not know which department to send it to. The Appellant, his wife and child all travelled back to Nigeria some time later.

13. Having failed to get any answers from the Home Office the Appellant thought no more about it until in August 2016 he was prevented from boarding a flight to London at Amsterdam airport. The Appellant was not told what the problem was and he had no idea. In oral evidence he told me that it did not occur to him that it could have anything to do with the false passport he had been shown in April 2014. He called the British embassy and went there in person. The Appellant was confused and tried to call the Home Office as well. He received no answers. Still very confused he decided to try and get in via the Eurostar at Brussels. As he tried to board the train he was asked to wait whilst a senior immigration officer looked at his case. He writes “I waited patiently until I received with immense shock and sadness the news from a very unfriendly immigration officer” that his citizenship had been revoked.

14. In his oral evidence the Appellant was asked about his change of name. He explained that he had been known since birth as Adeyemi Omugbenga Lajuwomi but had wanted to change his name to reflect the name that his grandmother had wanted for him, and also the Irish name of his Godmother who had cared for him as a child. That was why he wanted to change his name to Oneal Omatseye, and why he had executed a deed poll to that effect in the UK in July 2011. He states that he gave the new name, and informed the Home Office of his change of name, when he applied for his sons’ British passports in 2014. He had sworn the affidavit in Nigeria in May 2013 because he wanted to change his documents in Nigeria to the same name. He had also wanted to change his name in his British passport but because of all this he didn’t want to confuse matters any further. He didn’t want one set of nationality papers in his birth name, and another set in his new name. This could cause him problems since he generally travelled with both passports to avoid visa charges going in and out of Nigeria and the UK.

The Appellant’s Wife’s Evidence

15. The Appellant’s wife Oghenetejeri Lajuwomi has provided a written statement dated 17th January 2017. She admits that she obtained the copy of the passport in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi and that she did not do it intentionally to get him into trouble. She did it because she was visiting the UK in 2014 to “take a break from Nigeria”. She was worried that the due date for delivery of her baby might be whilst she was here and so she asked the Appellant for confirmation of his status. He refused to give it to her so she approached an agent. She supplied the agent with the details and a passport photograph. She states that when she received the document she had “undoubtedly assumed that it was authentic”. When told by the immigration officer that it was not genuine, Mrs Lajuwomi professed to be “genuinely shocked” to find it was counterfeit.

The Documentary Evidence

16. The Respondent produced a copy of the Appellant’s application for naturalisation, dated as received at the Home Office in June 2013 (the exact date is illegible). The form is completed in the name Omogbenga Adeyemi Lajuwomi. At Q1.8 the Appellant was asked “If you are or have ever been known by any name or names apart from those mentioned above, please give details here”. The box provided for an answer has been left blank.

17. The Respondent’s bundle contains a copy of a British passport, issued in the name of Omogbenga Adeyemi Lajuwomi on the 27th September 2013, and valid until the 27th September 2023.

18. I have been shown the copy British passport that was produced by Mrs Lajuwomi at Heathrow on the 9th April 2014. It is in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi, and purports to have been issued on the 14th June 2005, valid until the 14th June 2015. It bears a photograph agreed to be the Appellant, but a signature that is different from that given by him on other documents.

19. The Respondent has produced an internal email sent by Immigration Officer Richard Braybrook to a colleague in the ‘deprivation screening team’ on the 21st April 2014. Mr Braybook explains that on the 9th April 2014 a woman was stopped at Heathrow Terminal 4 and that she produced a copied page of a passport in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi. He writes

“For reasons that I have yet to fathom this was not referred for prosecution on the night and the woman was landed. However in the course of the enquiry the woman’s husband called and gave his name as Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi born 13 August 1981 and gave details of the genuine GBR passport issued to the subject of this email. A report was circulated giving these details to enable a stop of Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi born 13 August 1981.

On 20 April 2014 a man came through TN3 using these details and was stopped. He confirmed to the officer that he was the man who had called concerning TN4/4761106 but made no reference to the identity Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi or the false document. In his bag, however, was a Nigerian affidavit made in May 2013 (one month before his application for naturalisation) which merged these 2 identities….”

20. The affidavit found in the Appellant’s baggage at Heathrow on the 20th April 2014 was produced in copy form before me. It is dated the 23rd May 2013 and bears a photograph of a man agreed to be the Appellant. It reads as follows:

“I, Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi, male, Nigerian citizen, Christian, residing at 21 Omorinre Johnson St, Lekki Phase 1 Lekki, Lagos, do hereby declare an oath and say as follows:-

1. That I am the above-named person.
2. That I am Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi.
3. That I am the same person Omobenga Adeyemi Lajuwomi.
4. That Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi and Omobenga Adeyemi Lajuwomi are my names.
5. That this affidavit is now required for record purposes.
6. That I make this affidavit in good faith and in accordance with the Oaths Law of Lagos State of 2004”

21. At hearing I was shown three original Nigerian passports, all issued in the name of Omogbenga Adeyemi Lajuwomi. The dates of validity on these passports was as follows. The first was dated 30th April 2001 to 29th April 2006. The bundles contain a copy of this passport and the pages showing UK residence stamps that confer leave to remain as a student from 3rd May 2001 to 30th September 2002 ‘no recourse to public funds/work and any changes must be authorised’. A second residence permit, with the same restrictions, was granted on the 31st December 2002 valid until the 31st March 2003. The second passport was dated 9th Jan 2009 to 8th Jan 2014, and I was shown a third valid from the 10th Oct 2016 to 9th Oct 2021. I was told that there were copies of these documents in the bundles. Unfortunately, I could not find them. The Respondent’s bundle did contain a copy of a front page of a Nigerian passport issued to Adeyemi Omogbenga Lajuwomi on the 12th Jan 2015, valid until the 11th Jan 2020. This had not been drawn to my attention at the hearing and I was therefore given no explanation as to why the Appellant apparently had two Nigerian passports in the same name issued concurrently, the one in the bundle (January 2015-January 2020) and the one I was shown at hearing (October 2016-October 2021). To confuse matters further there are photocopies of UK residents’ permits in the Respondent’s bundle which do not appear to correspond to any of the Nigerian passports, or copies thereof, that I have been shown. There was for instance a permit conferring limited leave to remain issued on the 8th March 2007 and valid until the 31st March 2008, and another issued on the 28th March 2008 and valid until the 31st May 2009. It is not immediately obvious what passport these endorsements might have been placed in.

22. The Appellant has produced a copy of a UK executed Deed Poll dated 1st July 2011. This Deed Poll contains a statement by the Appellant that he does “absolutely and entirely renounce, relinquish and abandon” the use of his former name Adeyemi Omubenga Lajuwomi. From that time forward he is to be known as Oneal Omatseye Omagbenga Lajuwomi.

23. The British birth certificates of the Appellant’s two sons are provided in the bundle. On both the father is identified as Oneal Omatseye Omagbemiga Lajuwomi. The first is dated 7th July 2011 and the second 1st May 2014.

Discussion and Findings

24. I remind myself that the burden of proof ultimately lies with the Respondent, who must show, to the higher end of the spectrum of the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant did conceal a material fact when he made his application, namely that he had procured a false document in an alternative identity. In addressing this question I must first be satisfied that the Respondent has discharged the evidential burden of proof. It is then for the Appellant to demonstrate that there is an innocent explanation for the evidence produced, that is to say he gives an account which satisfies the minimum level of plausibility. In the final analysis I must determine whether the Secretary of State has shown that, taking all of the evidence into account, the Appellant's prima facie innocent explanation is to be rejected, and that it is more likely than not that the Appellant concealed his bad character.

The Evidential Burden

25. I am satisfied that the Secretary of State has produced evidence capable of raising the reasonable inference that the Appellant has behaved dishonestly. That evidence is as follows:

a) The false passport in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi. This document was purportedly issued in 2005 when the Appellant had leave to remain as a student, was not entitled to public funds and had restricted rights to work. Although he denies having ever used it, the document would prima facie enable him to circumvent those restrictions, to claim benefits and work when not entitled to do so;

b) The Nigerian affidavit in his possession at Heathrow on the 20th April 2014 confirmed that Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi is an identity used by the Appellant since at least May 2013;

c) The Appellant’s application for naturalisation submitted in June 2013 makes no mention of the name Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi. Despite the Appellant having officially adopted that name as his own in both the UK (in July 2011) and Nigeria (just the month before) he did not disclose it when asked whether he has ever used any other name.

The Appellant’s Explanation

26. The Appellant squarely blames his wife for the use of the false instrument. It was found in her possession and she has now admitted that it was she who obtained it from an agent in Lagos. He points out that the photograph on the passport is the same one that was used on his affidavit in 2013 and he submits that this proves that it could not have been obtained in 2005. The Appellant further points out that there is no evidence that he himself was ever in possession of that false passport. There is nothing to suggest that he is anything other than of good character. There is no evidence at all of any benefit fraud or that he ever worked beyond the hours that he was permitted to by the terms of his limited leave to remain in the period prior to 7th July 2009, when he was granted ILR.

My Overall Assessment

27. What I have is definite evidence that someone has produced a false instrument, namely the photocopied front sheet of what purports to be a British passport in the name of Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi, a name officially associated with the Appellant. I must decide whether it is more likely than not that the Appellant was somehow involved in the procurement and/or use of that document before he applied to naturalise as a British national in June 2013.

28. The explanation I have been given about how and why that document was produced, and why the Appellant has two names, is riddled with inconsistencies.

29. First, the Appellant’s evidence about his change of name is internally incoherent. On the 1st July 2011 he declared, by deed poll in the UK, that he wanted to “absolutely and entirely renounce, relinquish and abandon” the use of his former name Adeyemi Omubenga Lajuwomi. From that time forward he was to be known as Oneal Omatseye Omagbenga Lajuwomi. He explained in his evidence that he decided to do that because he wanted to honour his Irish godmother by adopting her name ‘O’Neal’ and his grandmother, who had named him Omatseye. This was a matter meant a lot to him, and that was why he went to the trouble of changing his name as a matter of law. Six days after the deed poll was executed he registered the birth of his first child using his new name. Three years later, on the 1st May 2014, he would use that name again, upon the registration of birth of his second child. The appearance of the name Oneal Omatseye Lajuwomi on those birth certificates stands out in the evidence before me as the only time that the Appellant used that name, in any capacity.

30. The Appellant’s evidence before me was that in May 2013 he went through a similar procedure to officially adopt the new name in Nigeria. He explained that this was so that he could harmonise his use of the new name in both the UK and Nigeria. I was not given any explanation as to why it took the Appellant two years to undergo this legal process in Nigeria, but in any event what is apparent is that the Appellant completely disregarded the legal effect of both deed poll and affidavit and continued to use his birth name. Subsequent to both legal declarations he applied to naturalise as a British citizen using the name Adeyemi Omugbenga Lajuwomi and failed to declare, when directly asked, whether he had ever used any other name. The omission to declare the use of the other name, in a form submitted in June 2013, was patently dishonest. The Appellant has diligently filled out that naturalisation form. He is clearly an educated and clever man. I do not accept that he could possibly have misunderstood the question, or forgotten that he had legally changed his name in two countries, in one just a matter of weeks earlier. Nor did he mention that he had a new legal name when he subsequently applied for a British passport, nor when he applied for new Nigerian passport in either 2015 or 2016, or conceivably both. The Appellant’s explanation for this behaviour, so obviously incongruent with his change of name, was that he did not want to “confuse things” after the document fell into the hands of the immigration authorities. I reject that as an explanation because the applications for naturalisation and a British passport occurred before anyone was aware of its existence.

31. Second, the Appellant’s evidence about how he came to know about the false document, and his reaction to it, is wholly implausible. The Appellant states that it was first shown to him by immigration officers on the 20th April 2014 when he passed through Heathrow Terminal 3. He describes the “total shock” that he felt when he saw it, because although it bore his (new) name and photograph, he knew that it was not his. He was, somewhat inexplicably, allowed to pass through immigration control and proceed into London where his son was born a few days later. From her labour bed, it is said, his wife confessed that she had obtained it from an agent in Lagos. The Appellant claims that he was saddened by what he was told by his wife, but relieved that he was not the victim of an identify fraud. As his witness statement was silent about what action he might have taken to deal with this problem, I asked the question myself at the close of evidence. He said that he had tried to call the Home Office on a number of occasions but gave up because he could never get through. On the Appellant’s evidence he remained concerned, but not unduly so because the immigration officers had not seemed too bothered and had assured him that there was no problem. I find that to be incredible. This is said to be a man of good character, who has complied with immigration control and has managed to naturalise as a British citizen, confronted with evidence that his wife has been innocently duped by fraudsters in Nigeria. Were that the case I am satisfied that the Appellant would have taken all steps he could to deal openly with the Home Office and exonerate himself and his wife. He would not have given up after a few phone calls to the wrong department. He did not write a letter. He did not approach the police, or take legal advice. I agree with Mr Clarke that the logical explanation for this inaction on his part was because he had something to hide.

32. The Appellant went on to tell me that he felt “immense shock and sadness” when he was prevented from boarding a flight to London in Amsterdam some two years later. He said that he was in “total confusion” and had no idea at all why there might be a block on his use of his British passport. I asked him to clarify this evidence: did it not occur to him that it might be something to do with the fact that UK immigration were in possession of a false British passport connected to him? He denied that. He maintained that he was confused and surprised and that was why he proceeded from the airport in Holland to the Eurostar terminal in Belgium to try and “sort it out”. There is no evidence, other than the Appellant’s, that he telephoned the Home Office from Amsterdam or sought the help of British consulate services. What we know is that he was apprehended trying to board the Eurostar. I find that it more likely than not that the Appellant went to Brussels in the hope that he could circumvent the immigration controls he faced at the airport in Holland.

33. Third, the account given by Mrs Lajuwomi is not credible. The Appellant confirmed in his oral evidence that he accepts the account given by his wife. Various reasons have been given as to why Mrs Lajuwomi felt she needed confirmation that her husband was British. The grounds of appeal drafted by the Appellant’s representative explain that she obtained the document in her “desperation” because she was going to the UK to have her baby and wanted it in anticipation that hospital fees would be waived or reduced if the father was British. In his evidence the Appellant said that she needed it to ensure that she got into the country. Mrs Lajuwomi herself states that she wanted it “in case” the baby was born in the UK and she needed it to register the birth. I would observe that none of those competing explanations make sense. The fact that her husband was British would not have assisted her at the hospital, since she was a foreign national was liable to pay for her medical care. She did not need it to gain entry to the UK, since she was travelling on a valid visit visa. It is extremely doubtful that a Registrar would have accepted as evidence of paternity and nationality an un-notarised photocopy of a single page of a passport of a man who was not there.

34. Setting those doubts aside I am still left with the proposition that Mrs Lajuwomi genuinely believed that the photocopied page she was given by this agent was obtained from official records. This despite, I am told, the fact that she gave the agent the photograph of her husband that appeared on the document, that it was valid from 2005 and bore a signature that was not his. I see from Mrs Lajuwomi’s visa applications forms that she is a banker, employed by Standard Chartered, and that she studied in the UK between 2006 and 2009. She is therefore an educated woman used to dealing with documentation, who has herself travelled internationally. Given that, I do not believe that she would have accepted this document to be genuine. It would have been obvious from the use of the photograph alone that the document could not be real. In his evidence the Appellant told Mr Clarke that his wife could not know that the signature on the passport was not his, since she had never seen his signature. That I find to be unlikely. They been married since 2011 and would have encountered numerous situations in which he would have signed his name in front of her, not least when they registered their son’s birth, and upon their marriage itself. Similarly, the Appellant claims that his wife would not have been aware of the details of his immigration status. Again I consider it to be extremely unlikely that she would not have been aware of when her husband became a British citizen. That was an event of some significance, and they had at that point been married for over two years. An educated person, looking at the issue date of 2005 on the face of the document, would have known that this could not be correct. I find it more likely than not that Mrs Lajuwomi knew that the document was false. The fact that the Appellant has endorsed and adopted her evidence undermines his own credibility.

35. There are only two people who might conceivably benefit from the existence of that false document: the Appellant, and/or his wife.

36. What the Appellant might want it for is relatively straightforward. The Appellant lived in this country between 1998 and 2009 with only limited leave. He was unable to work more than heavily restricted hours and was not entitled to claim any public funds. Mr Clarke asks me to infer from this, and the purported date of issue of 2005 on the passport, that the Appellant was using this other identity in order to gain some financial benefit to which he was not otherwise entitled. He could have continued using the document to claim benefits even after he naturalised himself. This inference is supported by the fact that the only time that the Appellant ever used the identity of Oneal Omotseye Lajuwomi was in order to register the births of his British children in 2011 and 2014. The birth certificates would stand as prima facie evidence that they were his children, and thus expand the family’s capacity to claim benefits. Whilst relying on these matters to establish motive on the part of the Appellant, Mr Clarke properly acknowledged that he had no proof that anyone using that name had ever in fact claimed benefits or paid national insurance contributions as an employed person. I weigh this in the balance.

37. In respect of Mrs Lajuwomi it might be thought that she did not need to use it at all. As I note above, the different explanations given as to why she might have approached an agent in Lagos are all problematic. Her evidence, endorsed by the Appellant, that she believed it to be a true copy of a genuine document, is patently untrue.

38. Having considered all of that evidence in the round I cannot be satisfied that the Appellant has managed to provide a coherent innocent explanation for the existence of a false British passport bearing his name and photograph. His case is that his wife needed that document for various reasons. On balance, I reject all of those. He submits that his wife was innocently duped. I reject that also. I find that the only person who had anything to gain by the procurement and use of this document was the Appellant himself. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that most likely explanation for the document’s existence is that it was obtained by the Appellant.

39. The question remains: was the document obtained by the Appellant prior to his application for naturalisation in June 2013? In her submissions Ms Litchfield placed some emphasis on the fact that the photograph of the Appellant used on the false document was the same as that attached to the Nigerian affidavit dated May 2013. This, she submitted, showed at the least that it was unlikely that it was produced as long ago as 2005. She contrasted the photograph with one used on an earlier Nigerian passport, in which the Appellant clearly had more hair. I accept that there is likely to have been a marked difference between the Appellant’s appearance in 2005 and that in 2013. I accept it unlikely that the document was “issued” in its present form in 2005. I do not however accept that the photograph means it can only have been produced in or after May 2013. The photograph might have been taken at any point in the preceding years. The fact that it appeared on the May 2013 affidavit does not mean that it was taken that month. All we have is a photocopy and it may of course be the case that the passport “issued” in 2005 was in existence long before the photograph was taken and was later changed. We simply cannot know.

40. What we know is that the Appellant gained official recognition as a British citizen in June 2013. We know that the photograph which appears on the false document was taken prior to that date. We know that the Appellant had taken steps to adopt the name that appears on the false document as long ago as 2011. We know that he dishonestly failed to mention his new name when he made the application. Taking those matters in the round with the credibility findings that I have already made I am satisfied that the Respondent has shown it to be more likely than not that this document was procured and/or used by the Appellant prior to his application for naturalisation in June 2013. I make that finding mindful of the serious consequences of the deprivation of citizenship, and that the standard is to the higher end of the balance of probabilities.

41. This was a case involving deception. The Appellant’s wife and children are all resident in Nigeria. Given that Ms Litchfield expressly declined to make any submissions about proportionality or the potential consequences of deprivation. She accepted that if the central charge was made out, the appeal must fail.

Decision

42. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law and it has been set aside.

43. The decision is remade as follows:

“The appeal is dismissed”.

44. There is no order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce

25th March 2017