The decision


IAC-FH-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: HU/07647/2015


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 22 December 2016
On 17 January 2017
Prepared 22 December 2016



Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVEY


Between

h i i
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Subbarafan, Counsel instructed by Sivaramen Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Z Ahmad, Home Office Presenting Officer


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a national of Nigeria, appealed against the Respondent's decision, dated 24 September 2015, to refuse leave to remain pursuant to an application made on 31 July 2015.
2. The matter came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Watson (the judge) who, on 29 June 2016, dismissed the appeal of the Appellant made on human rights grounds. Permission to appeal that decision (D) was given by First-tier Tribunal Judge Osborne on 4 November 2016.
3. The grounds on which permission were granted were essentially that the Judge had not sufficiently or arguably sufficiently dealt with the best interests of the young child M and had failed to in the round assess the best interests of the two children J and M.
4. So far as the issue of the Judge failing to give "due weight to the social services reports" the position is that I was taken to the relevant social work assessment that was carried out as part of a review of what seemed to be care type proceedings. Also, I was addressed about a letter from a social worker, Sally Attfield, concerning the two children (J and M). It is clear from that material that the Appellant plays a significant role in the care and development of the J and M. When the matter came before the Judge he concluded with reference to those materials (D 10) that the consideration of the facts was at the date of the hearing in that respect he was correct and he correctly expressed the account and importance of the consideration of the children's interests having regard to, and applying Section 55 of the BCIA 2009. The criticism is essentially that he did not expressly set out his finding on their best interests. In this respect there is nothing to gainsay the contents of the decision itself and to this extent the exercise the Judge carried out, in considering the welfare of the children, the significance of those matters in the direct consideration of Article 8 ECHR as claimed.
5. It seemed to me that the Judge (D 23) had correctly set out the evidence coming forward from Social Services about the children and as such had given it the weight that he thought it merited in the overall assessment of the evidence as a whole. I do not conclude that there was a material error of law in the assessment of that evidence: Although the grounds make a generality of the point it seems to me that the Judge had done enough. It is trite law that it is not appropriate for this Tribunal to substitute its own views for that of the Judge who has heard the evidence, heard the witnesses and has made an assessment of them unless demonstrably wrong or there is a failure to properly deal with the evidence raised. In this case the Respondent cited to me the case of Muse and Others [2012] EWCA Civ 10 particularly that there should be sufficient and adequate reasons given to properly address the matters raised : A point which applies as much to the Secretary of State as to an Appellant generally.
6. I have carefully considered the analysis that the Judge gave to the children's wellbeing and to the consideration that the Judge gives in the overall assessment of proportionality. I conclude that whilst I might not have written the decision in the same way, the substance of the material advanced was addressed and the Judge was entitled to take the view that he did and the reasons whilst may not be as fulsome as one would wish and hope for, do not indicate an absence of consideration of the evidence or that a different Tribunal considering the same evidence would in all likelihood give rise to a different decision. For those reasons therefore I am satisfied that there is no error of law by the First-tier Tribunal. The Original Tribunal's decision stands.


NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal against the Original Tribunal's decision is dismissed.

ANONYMITY
An anonymity order is required given the involvement of the two children J and M.

DIRECTION REGARDING ANONYMITY - RULE 14 OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (UPPER TRIBUNAL) RULES 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 10 January 2017
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Davey


TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 10January 2017
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Davey