Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: HU/15164/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Remote Hearing by MS Teams
On 10th August 2021
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On the 18th January 2022

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

HASINA BEGUM
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARy OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr P Saini, Counsel instructed by Louis Kennedy Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs H Aboni, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 27th August 2019 to refuse her application for leave to remain in the UK on the basis of her private life and on Article 8 grounds, was allowed by Judge Young-Harry for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 11th November 2019.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bulpitt on 26th March 2020. Following a hearing before me on 1st December 2020, I set aside the decision of Judge Young-Harry for reasons set out in my error of law decision. I found the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge is tainted by a material error of law and that the appropriate course is for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
3. The resumed hearing before me on 10th August 2021 took the form of a remote hearing using Microsoft Teams. I sat at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre. I was addressed by the representatives and the hearing was conducted in exactly the same way as it would be if the parties had attended for a face-to-face hearing. I was satisfied that no party has been prejudiced; and that, insofar as there has been any restriction on a right or interest, it is justified as necessary and proportionate. I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with a remote hearing because of the need to take precautions against the spread of Covid-19, and to avoid delay. I was satisfied that a remote hearing would ensure the matter is dealt with fairly and justly in a way that is proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues that arise, and the anticipated costs and resources of the parties. At the end of the hearing I was satisfied that both parties had been able to participate fully in the proceedings.
4. In my error of law decision, I preserved the finding made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry, at paragraph [15] of her decision that the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh.
5. I directed that the appellant was to file and serve any application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Procedure Rules 2008 withing 7 days of my decision being sent to the parties. The appellant’s representatives were subsequently granted an extension of time to comply with that direction until 4pm on 24th May 2021.
6. At 18:54hrs on Friday 6th August 2021 the appellant’s representatives sent to the Tribunal, by email, a bundle of statements and documents relied upon by the appellant. There was no application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. At 10:18am on the day of the resumed hearing before me, the appellant’s representatives sent a further email providing a copy of a letter addressed to the appellant from the Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service dated 6th April 2021.
The issues
7. In the respondent’s decision of 27th August 2019, the respondent concluded that the appellant cannot satisfy the requirements for leave to remain on the grounds of private life set out in paragraph 276ADE(1) of the immigration rules. The respondent accepts the application does not fall for refusal on the grounds of suitability. As I have already said, I preserved the finding made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry that the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh.
8. The appellant has appealed the respondent’s decision to refuse her application under s82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the ground that the decision is unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The appellant must satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that Article 8 ECHR is engaged. If it is, the burden shifts to the respondent to establish that the decision is proportionate.
Application to adduce further evidence
9. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Saini applied for permission to rely upon the witness statements and documents sent to the respondent and the Upper Tribunal after close of business on Friday 6th August 2021 and upon the letter from Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service that was sent to the respondent and the Tribunal on the morning of the hearing. After a short adjournment so that he could take instructions, Mr Saini explained that the letter from Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service was received by the appellant in April 2021, but the appellant had been asked by her solicitors to provide a more detailed report regarding her mental health. They believed something more beneficial might be forthcoming, but the appellant has been unable to provide any further evidence regarding her health. He submits there was a delay in securing the evidence set out in the additional bundle comprising of 16 pages because of difficulties relating to obtaining information from Bangladesh due to the current pandemic. He submits the evidence is relevant because it refers to matters that post-date the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry and is capable of establishing that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh now, based upon more recent events.
10. Mrs Aboni opposed the application and urged me not to admit the witness statements that were not served in accordance with the directions made by the Tribunal. She submits that in my error of law decision it is clear that the finding made by Judge Young-Harry that the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh, is preserved and I should proceed upon that basis. She submits there is no international protection claim before me and if the appellant now claims she is at risk upon return to Bangladesh, it is open to her to make that claim. She submits the NHS letters add nothing to the claim and she does not object to that evidence being admitted and considered by me.
11. The Tribunal is empowered to permit new or further evidence to be admitted in the remaking of a decision, but no application has been made by the appellant in accordance with Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 as directed. The appellant and her sister have signed a witness statement referring to events that have occurred since the decision of Judge Young-Harry. I have sympathy with the submissions made by Mrs Aboni, and I have not been provided a satisfactory explanation, as to why no application to adduce evidence in accordance with the Tribunal Rules, has been made. The appellant’s representatives have demonstrated a blatant disregard for the directions issued by the Tribunal.
12. However, despite my concerns about the failure of the appellant’s representatives to comply with the directions made and the leisurely manner in which the appellant and her representatives appear to act, I am satisfied that it is in accordance with the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, for me to have regard to all the evidence that is before me. The evidence is limited, and Mrs Aboni accepted that she can deal with the evidence by cross examination and in submissions.
The evidence before me
13. It is entirely impractical for me to refer in this decision to all the evidence that is before the Tribunal. I have before me the evidence contained in the appellant’s bundle that was before the First-tier Tribunal previously, the additional evidence served by the appellant and sent to the Tribunal by email on 6th August 2021 comprising of 16 pages, and the letter from Salma Miah of Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service dated 6th April 2021. For the avoidance of any doubt in reaching my decision I have had regard to all of the evidence before me whether that evidence is expressly referred to or not, in this decision.
14. At the hearing before me I heard oral evidence from the appellant and her sister Nasima Begaum. Regrettably, although they were plainly aware that the appellant was to give evidence remotely and would be doing so from her home, the appellant’s representatives failed to ensure the appellant had been provided a copy of the bundle that had belatedly been filed with the Tribunal and served upon the respondent. There was a lengthy delay during which Mr Saini liaised with his instructing solicitors to arrange for a copy of the bundle to provided to the appellant electronically, so that she had the relevant documents before her.
15. The appellant and her sister gave their evidence remotely via the Microsoft Teams platform with the assistance of a Bengali Sylheti interpreter arranged by the Tribunal. Prior to each of them giving evidence, the interpreter introduced himself and I was satisfied that the interpreter and witnesses were properly able to communicate with each other.
The evidence
16. The appellant adopted her witness statement dated 6th August 2021 and confirmed to me that the content of that statement is true and correct. She refers to a non-molestation order dated 2nd March 2020 and states that order was a great relief to her. She claims her ex-husband remained quiet until 1st September 2020 and that after that, he started threatening her and her sister and family over the phone. She claims that as he is getting more aggressive and abusive they have contacted the police. On the advice of the police they have now switched telephone number and cancelled the land line. The appellant claims her ex-husband is also threatening her parents back home. She claims he is “..contacting my father directly and indirectly with threatening and abusive language and as soon as he stops attending the calls, he sends some local hooligans to our home.”. The appellant claims her father has reported “the incident” at Bishwanath Thana police station. She claims that it does not seem the police have taken any appropriate action so far. The appellant also refers to her ongoing anxiety and depression and states that she is still prescribed medication. She claims her ex-husband is still a threat to her and her family in the UK and in Bangladesh. She claims that because he is financially well of and has strong political and other contacts in Bangladesh, she will end up in a “difficult situation”.
17. To clarify matters I asked the appellant to explain how she had made the witness statement that she had adopted. She explained that the statement had been typed by her niece, Tahmina Akhtar. She said that her niece knew what to type because the appellant told her what to type and her niece had typed everything that she had said as she was speaking. The statement had been typed three or four days prior to the hearing and the statement had been read back to the appellant by her niece.
18. In cross-examination, the appellant said that her sister had also made a statement at about the same time and that her niece had also typed that statement. In re-examination, the appellant claimed that it was only her and her niece that were in the room when her statement had been typed, and nobody else was present. When Mr Saini asked her how her sister had come to make a statement in exactly the same terms as her, she said that after she had made her statement she did not know what her sister had told the appellant’s niece to write.
19. The appellant’s sister, Nasima Begum was then called to give evidence. She confirmed that the statement at page 1 of the bundle is a copy of the statement made by her. She confirmed the signature at the end of the statement is her signature and that the statement had been read back to her in a language that she understood. She confirmed the content of the statement is true and correct. Nasima Begum confirmed her statement had been typed by her daughter (i.e. the appellant’s niece). She was asked by Mr Saini how her daughter knew what to write. She said that she knew everything about the appellant and told her daughter what to write. She claims that she has not seen the appellant’s statement. She could not recall whether she made her statement first or the appellant had made her statement first. When Mr Saini pointed out that the parties and I had noted that the statements are in exactly the same terms and asked if there was an explanation for that, she claimed that she knows about the appellant “A to Z” and the appellant lives with her and that is why she had provided the statement. She said that she relied upon her daughter to type the statement because she does not speak English and that the appellant’s solicitors had not prepared the statement because they charge money. There was no cross-examination by Mrs Aboni.
20. I have been provided with a witness statement from Nesabor Ali, the appellant’s father, in support of this appeal. The statement is dated 3rd August 2021 and is written in English. Mr Ali claims that since arriving in the United Kingdom his daughter has been a victim of domestic violence from her ex-husband and his family. He claims that although his daughter was evicted from the marital home, her ex-husband is still threatening her directly and indirectly. He refers to a non-molestation order secured by his daughter restraining her ex-husband from making any threats or contacting her directly or indirectly. He claims the order remained in force until 23:59hrs on 1st September 2020. He claims that as soon as the order expired, the appellant’s ex-husband again started his revengeful behaviour, threatening his daughters in the UK and also by calling him in Bangladesh. He states that in “last March” some hooligans came near his home at night and started shouting at him with abusive language and they warned him; “we will see you later”. He states that he has made a complaint about the incident and phone calls to the duty office of the Bishwanath Thana police station and has provided an extract of that complaint. He states that his daughter approached her family solicitors in the UK and has been advised to seek a fresh non-molestation application which is now listed for hearing on 7th September 2021. He claims the appellant’s ex-husband is financially and physically powerful and he does not wish his daughter to end up in any more trouble. He has attached what he claims to be the extract of a ‘general diary’ report dated 19th March 2021. The report states that on 15th November 2020, he received a telephone call on his mobile from an unknown number. It is said that a stranger threatened him and said; “I will not let you live in peace and I will forbid you to sleep…. I will not let your daughter Hasina live in the country…”. The extract of the report goes on to state that on 18th March 2021, two or three people stood in the dark next to his house and shouted loudly “I will see you later”. After saying that they quickly left.
21. I have also been provided with:
a. A letter from the Heathfield Family Centre dated 26th March 2021. The letter confirms the appellant has been a patient at the practice since September 2015 and she suffers from anxiety and depression. It is said she is reviewed on a regular basis and has been referred for further counselling to Birmingham Healthy Minds where she had CBT sessions. The letter confirms the appellant is currently on ‘Amitriptyline and Sertraline medications’.
b. A letter from Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service dated 16th March 2021 providing the appellant with a telephone appointment for 6th April 2021.
c. A letter dated 6th April 2021 addressed to the appellant from Salma Miah, a High Intensity Worker CBT Therapist at Birmingham Healthy Minds. The letter confirms that at the initial assessment, the appellant described symptoms of low mood and worry. It appears to have been agreed that the main focus of the intervention with Birmingham Healthy Minds will be to manage mood and worry. The letter confirms the appellant will be offered up to 4 individual appointments with a Psychological Wellbeing Practitioner using cognitive behavioural therapy principles, in which the appellant can learn skills and coping strategies that may help her manage her symptoms of anxiety and low mood. The letter refers to a follow-up telephone appointment arranged for 20th April 2021.
d. A letter from Legal Solicitors to Louis Kennedy Solicitors dated 28th July 2021 confirming they have been instructed by the appellant that she and her family in Bangladesh were receiving numerous threats from her ex-husband and the appellant has reported this matter to the police. It is said that in accordance with their client’s instructions, they have made an application for a non-molestation order and the court will consider the application at a hearing on 7th September 2021. It is said that a copy of the application has been served upon Mr Miah.

The parties submissions
22. On behalf of the respondent, Mrs Aboni relied upon the respondent’s decision dated 27th August 2019. She submits that although the appellant was previously granted a short period of leave to remain under the domestic violence concession, the appellant has failed to establish that her marriage broke down as a result of domestic violence. She submits Judge Young Harry previously found that the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh and although the appellant now claims that her family in the UK and her father in Bangladesh have continued to have problems with the appellant’s ex-husband, there is no satisfactory evidence of the further problems relied upon. There is no evidence before the Tribunal of the Non-Molestation Order made in March 2020 that is referred to in the statements and although there is a brief letter from solicitors acting on behalf of the appellant that refers to a pending application, there is no evidence before the Tribunal of the incidents that gave rise to that application. Mrs Aboni submits I should attach little weight to the claims made by the appellant and her sister in their witness statements. Their statements are in identical terms. She submits I should also attach little weight to the statement from the appellant’s father and the ‘diary report’ referred to. She invites me to find the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh. She cannot therefore satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph 276ADE of the immigration rules. The respondent accepts the appellant has some mental health problems, but the evidence concerning the appellant’s mental health and any on-going treatment is limited. Mrs Aboni submits that in any event, the appellant has failed to establish that she would be unable to access treatment in Bangladesh where she will have the support of her family. She submits that any private life established by the appellant has been established when her immigration status has been precarious and in the end, her removal would not be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining immigration control.
23. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Saini submits the witness statements of the appellant, her sister and her father are not fabricated and are deserving of weight. He submits there is reliable evidence before the Tribunal regarding the mental health of the appellant and the treatment and medication that she continues to receive. He submits the appellant’s GP has confirmed that she suffers from anxiety and depression and is reviewed on a regular basis. The GP confirms the appellant has been referred for further counselling, and there is evidence of the appellant having been sent an appointment for 6th April 2020. He referred me to the letter from Birmingham and Solihull Women’s Aid dated 21st October 2019 that was previously before the First-tier Tribunal relating to the support previously provided to the appellant’s and refers to the appellant being extremely depressed because of the violence and verbal abuse she was subjected to. I was also referred to the letter from Dr S Raghavan dated 13th March 2017 that was also previously before the First-tier Tribunal. Dr Raghavan confirms that the impact of the abuse that she has been subjected to has left the appellant very depressed and upset, requiring medication in the form of anti-depressants. Mr Saini submits the appellant is again awaiting cognitive behavioural therapy. Mr Saini submits there was previously evidence before the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant had been granted a Non-Molestation Order against her ex-husband by the Family Court. He referred me to a copy of the order made by District Judge Dickinson on 31st October 2019 and which remained in force until 23:59 on 30th April 2020. Mr Saini was unable to confirm the circumstances under which that order was made. He was unable to confirm whether there had been a hearing attended by Mr Khalis Miah, or whether any findings were made by the Family Court. I asked Mr Saini if I have been provided with a copy of the non-molestation order that is referred to in the witness statements of the appellant and her sister, that is said to have been dated 2nd March 2020 and which the appellant claims remained in force until 1st September 2020. He confirmed that there is no such order in the papers before me. Mr Saini submits the appellant’s claim that she and her family have been subjected to further abuse and threats is supported by the letter from Legal Solicitors dated 28th July 2021 which confirms that there has been a further application for a Non-Molestation Order that has been set down for hearing on 7th September 2021. He accepts that I have not been provided with a copy of the application made by the appellant, or any of the statements made in support of that application. There is equally no evidence before me of any interim or ex-parte orders having been made by the Family Court in respect of that application. Mr Saini submits that the appellant lives with her sister and has a strong support network in the UK. To that extent, the appellant has established a strong private life in the UK. He submits that when the evidence is considered as a whole, the appellant has established that there would be very significant obstacles to her integration into Bangladesh, and that in any event, her removal to Bangladesh would be disproportionate. He accepts there is no evidence before me regarding the healthcare that would be available to the appellant in Bangladesh. He submits I should allow the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Findings and conclusions
24. The appellant entered the United Kingdom lawfully with entry clearance as the spouse of a person present and settled in the UK in October 2014. She has lived in the UK since, albeit, without any lawful entitlement to be in the UK since 17th June 2016. I find the appellant has established a private life in the UK and Article 8 is plainly engaged. I also find that the decision to refuse the appellant leave to remain has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. I accept that the interference is in accordance with the law, and that the interference is necessary to protect the legitimate aim of immigration control and the economic well-being of the country. The issue in this appeal is whether the decision to refuse leave to remain is proportionate to the legitimate aim, which requires a fact sensitive assessment.
25. In reaching my decision I have considered whether the appellant’s account of events is internally consistent and consistent with any other relevant information. I have had regard to the ingredients of her account of events, and her story as a whole, by reference to the evidence available to the Tribunal.
The requirements of the Immigration Rules
26. Although the appellant’s ability to satisfy the immigration rules is not the question to be determined, it is capable of being a weighty factor when deciding whether the refusal is proportionate to the legitimate aim of enforcing immigration control. As set out by the Court of Appeal in TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, compliance with the immigration rules would usually mean that there is nothing on the respondent’s side of the scales to show that the refusal of the claim could be justified. Conversely, if the rules are not met, although not determinative, that is a factor which strengthens the weight to be attached to the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
27. The appellant does not claim to have established a family life in the UK. The requirements to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life are set out in paragraph 276ADE of the immigration rules. In her decision of 27th August 2019, the respondent accepts the application does not fall for refusal on grounds of suitability. The question is whether the appellant has, as Mr Saini submits, established that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Bangladesh.
28. In my error of law decision, I preserved the finding made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry in her decision promulgated on 11th November 2019 that the appellant has failed to show that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh. At the hearing before me, I permitted the appellant to rely upon the additional evidence served by the appellant and sent to the Tribunal by email on 6th August 2021 comprising of 16 pages and the letter from Salma Miah of Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service dated 6th April 2021. Nothing within that additional evidence undermines the finding made by First-tier Judge Young-Harry in November 2019 and the decision of Judge Young-Harry properly stands as an assessment of the claim that the appellant was making at the time of that decision.
29. The appellant’s witness statement dated 6th August 2021 refers to matters that post-date the decision of Judge Young-Harry and I have considered whether that evidence is sufficient for me to now conclude the appellant would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh.
30. The appellant refers to a Non-Molestation Order dated 2nd March 2020, but there is no evidence before me of such an order having been made by the Family Court. Before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant relied upon a Non-Molestation Order made on 31st October 2019 and which remained in force until 30th April 2020. The order is silent as to whether the order was made following a contested hearing and as to any findings made by the Family Court. There is no evidence before me of an application to the Family Court leading to an order dated 2nd March 2020, and there is no evidence before me as to the events that led to any such application. The appellant claims her ex-husband was quiet until 1st September 2020 and that he then started threatening her and her sister over the telephone. She does not elaborate at all or provide any evidence regarding the telephone calls received, or the threats made to her. She claims that because her ex-husband was becoming more aggressive and abusive they contacted the police. She states that on the advice of the police, they ‘cancelled’ the landline, but does not explain when that was. A crime reference number is provided, but I have no further evidence before me regarding the report made to the police. There is in any event, no evidence of the appellant having encountered any further threats or abusive behaviour towards her, after the landline was cancelled.
31. The appellant claims her ex-husband has also threatened her parents in Bangladesh. She claims he has been contacting her father directly and indirectly with threatening and abusive language, and that he sends “some local hooligans” to their house. She states that due to the continuing harassment her father has reported the incident at Bishwanath Thana, and she refers to an extract of a ‘case diary’, a copy of which is at page 7 of the appellant’s additional bundle. The appellant claims that her ex-husband is financially well off and has strong political and other contacts in Bangladesh. Finally, the appellant claims that she has submitted a further application to the Family Court for a Non-Molestation Order because of on-going threats and harassment. I have been provided with a copy of a letter from Legal Solicitors dated 28th July 2021 in which they confirm that they have been instructed by the appellant that she and her family in Bangladesh were receiving numerous threats from her ex-husband. They say that in accordance with the appellant’s instructions they have made an application for a non-molestation order. I have not been provided with any further information regarding that application, or the evidence relied upon by the appellant in support of the application.
32. In reaching my decision, I have considered the evidence of the appellant’s sister and matters set out in the witness statement of Nesabor Ali. I have considered the extent to which their evidence lends support to the claims made by the appellant. I have had the opportunity of hearing the oral evidence of the appellant and her sister and I do not find either of them to be credible. At the hearing before me the appellant claimed that her witness statement had been typed by her niece and that her niece had typed what the appellant had said. It was read back to her in a language that she understood. She confirmed that only her niece was present when the statement was made. A similar account was given by Nasima Begum of the way in which she made her statement.
33. Although I accept that the appellant and her sister, who both clearly have a limited understanding of the English language, were assisted by the appellant’s niece, who typed the statements, I attach little weight to the content of the statements, particularly in relation to matters that are not corroborated by other reliable evidence. The witness statement of Nasima Begum is in all material respects, identical to the statement of the appellant and I find that neither the appellant nor her sister have been truthful as to how their witness statements were prepared. I am not satisfied that the matters set out in the witness statements are a true and accurate recollection of events. It is beyond co-incidence that the appellant and her sister would recount events, which according to their evidence, was provided entirely independently of each other, to the appellant’s niece who simply typed their statements, in exactly the same way. Neither the appellant nor her sister was able to explain in their oral evidence before me, why the statements are identical.
34. In his witness statement, Nesabor Ali claims the appellant’s husband is still threatening her directly and indirectly. He too refers to a non-molestation order that expired on 1st September 2020. He claims that after the order expired, the appellant’s husband began threatening his daughters in the UK and calling him in Bangladesh. He claims that in March 2021, some hooligans came near his home at night and shouted at him with abusive language and warned him “We will see you later”. The phone calls and incident in March 2021 have been reported to the Duty Office of the Bishwanath Thana Police Station. He claims the appellant’s husband is “financially and physically powerful”.
35. I attach little weight to his evidence. The statement is written in the English Language and is not accompanied by a certificate of translation. I note that the appellant and her sister have lived in the United Kingdom for several years and still require the assistance of an interpreter. In his submissions before me, Mr Saini was unable to confirm whether the appellant’s father can read and write in English. It is in my judgement unlikely that the appellant’s father, who has lived all of his life in Bangladesh, has a sufficient understanding of the English language such that he is able to make a statement in the form before me, without the assistance of an interpreter. His evidence regarding the threats made to his daughters in the UK, ‘directly and indirectly’ is devoid of any meaningful detail and can only be based upon what he has been told by the appellant. I have not been provided with the original of the “general diary” extract in the form it was provided to the appellant’s father and the copy document that I have, does not contain any discernible official stamps or heading such that I can be satisfied that it is a genuine copy of an extract recorded in an official document held by the authorities in Bangladesh. In any event, the ‘General Diary’ extract that is referred to, refers to a telephone call received from a stranger on his mobile phone on 15th November 2020, in which he was told, “I will not let your daughter Hasina live in the country”. No explanation is provided as to why that threatening phone call was not reported in any form until March 2021. It appears to be possible to make such a report because the extract that is relied upon by the appellant states “In this case, the general diary is essential for future security…”. Similarly, there is nothing in the evidence before me that explains how the appellant’s father links two or three people stood in the dark next to his house shouting loudly “I will see you later”, before quickly leaving, to the appellant’s ex-husband, or to the earlier threat that he claims to have received on his mobile phone from a stranger, on 15th November 2020, some four months earlier.
36. The appellant, her sister and their father make very vague and broad assertions, that are entirely lacking in detail. The claims now made that the appellant’s ex-husband is financially well off, and has strong political and other contacts in Bangladesh, again lacks any detail, and more importantly, is at odds with the appellant’s previous evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. In her witness statement dated 4th November 2019, the appellant claimed (at paragraph 9), that her ex-husband threatened to have her killed in Bangladesh as he has relatives there. If, as she now claims, he has strong political and other contacts in Bangladesh, it is surprising that she did not refer to those connections previously. The appellant’s father simply refers to her ex-husband being “financially and physically powerful” and makes no reference to him having any political influence. He does not suggest that the police were not prepared to consider the report that he made regarding the appellant’s ex-husband. I reject the appellant’s evidence that her ex-husband has strong political and other contacts in Bangladesh. In my judgement, the statements of the appellant, her sister and her father do not represent a true and accurate account of events, but seek to advance a fabricated claim that the appellant and her family have continued to be subjected to threats and abuse. In my judgement, the claims now made by the appellant are made in a cynical attempt to undermine the preserved finding, and to persuade the Tribunal that she would now face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh.
37. In any event, the appellant would have to establish something more than mere inconvenience or upheaval. In the end, the task of the Tribunal, is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether it regards them as "very significant". Even if I had accepted the appellant’s claims as set out in her statement, in my judgement the appellant fails to establish that she would now face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh. Taking the claims made at their highest, it is entirely unsurprising that the Police in Bangladesh have been unable to take any action in view of the very vague and limited information provided to them.
38. I have also carefully considered the limited evidence before me regarding the appellant’s mental health. I have reminded myself of the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal previously. In the letter dated 13th March 2017, Dr Raghavan confirms the appellant was seen by a GP on 7th September 2015 where she stated that she was a victim of domestic abuse and her husband had taken her passport. It is said that the impact of the abuse has left the appellant very depressed and unable to sleep. She was started on antidepressants. It is said that the stress and symptoms of depression were triggered by the abuse that the appellant claimed to have been subjected to at the hands of her ex-husband and her mother-in-law. Dr Raghavan noted that the appellant was feeling very anxious and extremely low due to the abuse she had suffered. The letters from the Heathfield Family Centre dated 17th March 2017, and 11th August 2017 are to similar effect. They confirm the appellant had been referred for further management for stress and depression with the mental health team. The letter from Birmingham and Solihull Women’s Aid dated 21st October 2019 confirms the appellant received support in 2016 and 2017, and that a further referral was made by the appellant’s GP on 4th September 2019. The author of the letter confirms that she had met with the appellant on two occasions since the referral and that she will continue meeting with the appellant to allow her to continue to talk about her experiences and that she will be referred to specialist domestic violence counselling, when a place is available. The appellant’s GP, Dr Raghavan confirms in his letter dated 4th October 2019 that the appellant has been suffering with anxiety and depression for some time. He sets out the medication prescribed. In the additional evidence relied upon by the appellant at the hearing before me, the appellant has provided copies of prescriptions issued to her during 2021. The letter from the Heathfield Family Centre dated 26th March 2021 again confirms that the appellant suffers with anxiety and depression and that she is reviewed on a regular basis. I have been provided with a copy of a letter sent to the appellant by Birmingham Healthy Minds IAPT Service offering her an appointment on 6th April 2021. The subsequent letter sent to the appellant by Salma Miah dated 6th April 2021 confirms that during the initial assessment the appellant described symptoms of low mood and worry. The letter confirms that the focus of the intervention with Birmingham Healthy Minds will be to manage mood and worry and the appellant will be offered up to 4 individual appointments with a Psychological Wellbeing Practitioner using cognitive behavioural therapy principles in which the appellant can learn skills and coping strategies to help manage her symptoms of anxiety and low mood in more helpful ways and to understand her difficulties better. The letter confirms that a follow-up telephone appointment had been arranged for 20th April 2021, but despite the passage of time I have not been provided with any further evidence from Birmingham Healthy Minds concerning that follow-up appointment, or any individual appointments the appellant has attended with a Psychological Wellbeing Practitioner.
39. The letters from the Heathfield Family Centre, Birmingham & Solihull Womens’ Aid and Birmingham Healthy Minds refer to the anxiety and depression suffered by the appellant. Although I have not been provided with any medico-legal report containing any formal diagnosis made by an appropriately qualified expert following clinical examination, I am prepared to accept for the purposes of this decision that the appellant has symptoms of anxiety and depression for which she is in receipt of medication and that she has from time-to-time received support and assistance from Birmingham Healthy Minds. The extent of that support and how the appellant has benefited from the cognitive behavioural therapy offered to her, is unclear. In any event, Mr Saini accepts there is no evidence before me that the appellant would be unable to access mental health services in Bangladesh, where she will in my judgment, have the additional support of her family.
40. It is now well established that Article 8 is not Article 3 with merely a lower threshold: it does not provide some sort of safety net where a medical case fails to satisfy the Article 3 criteria. Insofar as the appellant here relies upon Article 8 claim so that she can continue with treatment in the UK, that in itself is insufficient to establish an Article 8 claim.
41. Having considered all the evidence before me in the round, I find the appellant has failed to establish that she would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Bangladesh. The appellant’s parents remain in Bangladesh. The appellant speaks Bengali. She was born and brought up in Bangladesh. I am satisfied that the appellant is enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in Bangladeshi society is carried on and that she has a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis there, and to build up a variety of human relationships to give substance to her Article 8 rights. I find that she does not satisfy the requirements for leave to remain on the grounds of private life set out in paragraph 276ADE of the immigration rules.
42. In reaching my decision, I have also had regard to the public interest considerations set out in s117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest. I remind myself that s117B(4) of the 2002 Act provides that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully. S117B(5) ) of the 2002 Act provides that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when their immigration status is precarious.
43. The appellant lived in Bangladesh until October 2014 and plainly spent the formative years of her life in Bangladesh with her parents. I find she has clearly remained in contact with her family. I find the appellant would have the support of her immediate family in Bangladesh. I have no doubt the appellant would prefer to continue her life in the UK and considers the UK to be her home and where her future lies. I have carefully considered whether despite my finding that the appellant cannot satisfy the requirements of the immigration rules, the decision to refuse leave to remain is nevertheless disproportionate. The factors that I consider in the balancing exercise that particularly weigh in favour of the appellant are:
a. The length of residence in the UK since October 2014.
b. The fact that the appellant entered the UK lawfully, as the partner of a person present and settled in the UK with leave valid until 25th December 2016. In September 2015, she made an application for leave to remain under the domestic violence concession and on 23rd September 2015, she was granted leave to remain until 22nd December 2015.
c. The appellant’s application did not fall for refusal under the suitability criteria set out in the immigration rules.
d. The appellant’s relationship with her sister and her family in the UK. Although those relationships do not amount to ‘family life’, the appellant’s sister has been a source of support for the appellant following the unfortunate breakdown of her marriage.
e. The evidence before me that the appellant is receiving some support in respect of her mental health and has been referred for cognitive behavioural therapy.
44. The factors that I consider in the balancing exercise that particularly weigh against the appellant are:
a. The appellant’s presence in the UK has throughout been precarious and since May 2016, has been unlawful.
b. The appellant has family in Bangladesh who she remains in contact with and who will, I find, provide support to her upon her return to Bangladesh.
c. The absence of any evidence that even begins to suggest that the appellant will be unable to access medication and support for her mental health.
45. In my final analysis, I find the appellant’s protected rights, whether considered collectively with rights of others that she has formed associations with, or individually, are not in my judgement such as to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s removal having regard to the policy of the respondent as expressed in the immigration rules. For the reasons that I have set out, I am satisfied that on the facts here, the decision to refuse leave to remain is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control. In the circumstances I dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
46. I dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds.

Signed V. Mandalia Date 16th August 2021

Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia