Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/04641/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Determined on the papers at Field House
Determination Promulgated
On Thursday 12 January 2017
On Friday 20 January 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH

Between

MISS KARLENE ELLIS
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a national of Jamaica who appeals against the Respondent's decision dated 13 January 2015 refusing her leave to remain on the basis of her private life and her family life with her partner, Trevor Ellis. Her appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge O'Flynn in a decision promulgated on 1 April 2016 on the basis that there were no insurmountable obstacles to the couple continuing their family life in Jamaica, that the Appellant could not meet the Immigration Rules ("the Rules") in relation to her private life and that there were no compelling circumstances which required consideration outside the Rules.
2. Following a hearing on 22 November 2016, I found an error of law in Judge O'Flynn's decision. The extent of that error was a failure to properly consider the position in relation to the Appellant's partner's mother, Mrs B, who suffered from dementia and for whom the Appellant and her partner acted as carers. My decision promulgated on 23 November 2016 ("the Decision") makes clear that the error found relates only to the position of Mrs B. The Decision is annexed hereto for ease of reference. Indeed, the only basis on which permission to appeal was sought related to the position of Mrs B. But for the error of law which I identified in the Decision relating to Mrs B's position, therefore, I would have upheld Judge O'Flynn's decision.
3. I gave directions at the behest of Counsel who appeared for the Appellant on that occasion to allow the Appellant to update evidence and for both parties to file skeleton arguments. Both parties agreed however that no further oral evidence would be required and I could re-determine the appeal on the papers. The parties were given an opportunity to seek an oral hearing prior to the re-making of the decision. Neither party sought an oral hearing. This matter therefore comes back before me to re-determine the appeal on the papers.
4. The events which followed the Decision are somewhat unfortunate. By a letter dated 21 December 2016, the Appellant's solicitors notified the Tribunal that Mrs B had sadly passed away. Moreover, it appears from that letter that this occurred before the last hearing before me. That no reference was made to this at the hearing was, it seems, due to a failure by Counsel who represented the Appellant on that occasion to note that her brief included reference to this event but she had overlooked it. There is annexed to the solicitor's letter a letter from Counsel addressed to me which apologises for this oversight. Counsel accepts that she may have inadvertently misled the Tribunal by suggesting that Mrs B was still alive at that date. Although I accept what Counsel says about not having made any positive submissions relating to Mrs B's health or life at that time, it was implicit in her request for a direction permitting the Appellant to submit updated evidence in relation to Mrs B that Mrs B was still alive. I accept however the apology and that she did not intend to mislead the Tribunal. I also accept that there was not time to correct the information following the hearing as the Decision was promulgated one day after the hearing. Counsel has acted entirely properly since the last hearing. I do not intend to take any further action in relation to what occurred.
Submissions
5. The Appellant's solicitor's letter accepts (as it must) that the passing of Mrs B is material to this case. It is submitted (without further particulars) that there remain insurmountable obstacles to family life being enjoyed by the Appellant and her partner. Reference is there made to the bundle and skeleton argument submitted for the First-tier Tribunal hearing. Again, no reference is made to any particular document but I have had regard to the evidence in the bundle when reaching my decision.
6. It is also said in the letter that the Appellant "has conducted herself with dignity insofar as declaring the passing of her mother in law and we would be grateful if this is taken into consideration when making a decision on her immigration appeal". Whilst I fully accept that no blame attaches to the Appellant for what occurred in relation to the (non) disclosure of Mrs B's death, the Appellant is of course bound to be truthful in her evidence to the Tribunal. The disclosure is therefore no more than the Tribunal is entitled to expect.
7. The solicitors also ask that I re-make the decision in the circumstances of the initial hearing (by which I assume they mean the circumstances at the time of the hearing before Judge O'Flynn) rather than the circumstances at the date of their letter. Whilst I have sympathy for the Appellant's loss, the issue for me is whether removal will breach the Appellant's Article 8 rights based on current circumstances and not whether it would have done so if circumstances had remained as they were in the past. I therefore decline that invitation and I have re-made the decision based on the circumstances as they are now.
8. I have not received a skeleton argument from the Respondent in compliance with the directions made in the Decision. Given the terms of the letter from the Appellant's solicitor and that there is no updated evidence produced, however, and since the Appellant has herself not filed a skeleton argument as such, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Respondent has not filed anything further. In the circumstances, I have proceeded to re-determine the appeal without hearing further from the Respondent.
The Appellant's case
9. The Appellant is a national of Jamaica. She was born in 1975 and is now aged forty years. She came to the UK for a short period in 2001 as a visitor. During her stay, she met her current partner, Mr Ellis. She returned to Jamaica but came back to the UK in December 2002 again as a visitor. She was then aged twenty-seven years. On this occasion, though, she did not return and she has remained in the UK since. She had leave to remain for a short period between 2003 and 2004 but otherwise has remained as an overstayer.
10. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with Mr Ellis. He is also Jamaican by birth. He claims to have come to the UK from Jamaica with his mother, Mrs B, in 1958, then aged nine. He is now aged sixty-eight years. The Appellant claims that Mr Ellis is British. The Respondent did not accept this. Certainly, he does not have a passport to prove that he is. However, Judge O'Flynn found as a fact that he is. Although I have set aside Judge O'Flynn's decision, I adopt his reasoning at [23] of his decision for reaching that finding. Even without that, I would have made the same finding based on the letter dated 14 May 2007 [AB/42]. It is difficult to read that letter other than as confirmation by the Immigration Service that Mr Ellis has been accepted as a British citizen. Mr Ellis has a number of criminal convictions in the UK and it would be surprising if the Respondent had not sought to deport him had she been able to do so. This letter appears to be recognition that she tried to do so but was constrained to accept that she could not because he is British.
11. Mr Ellis has fathered a number of children in the UK. The precise number appears in some doubt. In one statement it is said that there are twelve. In another, it is claimed that there are twenty-two. It is also claimed that he has a number of grandchildren. Certainly, there is evidence from birth certificates in the Appellant's bundle that there are at least twelve children. They are aged between forty-six years and twenty-two years. The only evidence in relation to contact with any of them comes from Shanta who is the youngest child and who it is said lives with the Appellant and Mr Ellis and from another of Mr Ellis' daughters who has written a short letter in support of the Appellant. The Appellant and Shanta both say that they have a close relationship akin to that of mother and daughter. There are a number of photographs in the bundle which may be intended to show this.
12. The Appellant is not permitted to work. She has though been carrying out work of a voluntary nature and there is some support for this in the bundle. There are also some letters of support from friends of the Appellant and her partner.
13. The Appellant has been convicted of an offence in 2009 for possession of an offensive weapon. She was given a community sentence which she has served. She expresses regret for this offence in her statement. It is accepted by the Respondent that the Appellant has complied with reporting restrictions imposed on her.
14. In terms of ties to Jamaica, the Appellant has a mother there as well as three children who were born in 1994, 1996 and 1997 so are now aged between twenty-two and nineteen years. I note that, when she came to the UK, they were aged between eight and five years. Part of the reason why she wishes to stay in the UK, she says is so that she can give her children a better life than she had.
Discussion and conclusions
15. I deal first with the Appellant's case applying the Rules in relation to her family and private life. In relation to the former, she is unable to satisfy the Rules because of her own status in the UK, unless she is able to meet paragraph EX.1. EX.1.(b) reads as follows:-
"[EX.1.] This paragraph applies if
(a) ?
(b) the applicant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, settled in the UK or in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection, and there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK.
[EX.2.] For the purposes of paragraph EX.1.(b) 'insurmountable obstacles' means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner."
16. In relation to her private life applying paragraph 276ADE, the Appellant could succeed only if she were able to meet paragraph 276ADE(iv) which provides that there must be "very significant obstacles" to her integration in Jamaica.
17. The insurmountable obstacles relied upon before the First-tier Tribunal related to the Appellant's relationship with and care provided to Mrs B. That factor is no longer of any relevance. As I note at [5] above, it remains asserted in the Appellant's solicitor's submissions that there are insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Jamaica but it is not said what those obstacles are.
18. I have found at [10] above that Mr Ellis is a British citizen. That though does not amount to an insurmountable obstacle to the couple living together in Jamaica. No doubt they would prefer to live together in the UK. That is though not the test. As noted at [11] above, although Mr Ellis has children (and possibly grandchildren) in the UK, his children are all adults. There is no evidence as to the ages of any grandchildren. There is very limited evidence of any contact with the children other than with Shanta and Sheresa. In relation to those two children, both have written letters in support of the Appellant. Shanta confirms that the Appellant and she have a mother/daughter relationship and that the Appellant has provided her with stability and guidance. She says that it would give her "great pleasure" if the Appellant were allowed to stay and if she and Mr Ellis could marry and continue the life together. She does not though refer to any major impact on her own life if the Appellant and Mr Ellis were to move to live together in Jamaica. That is to be expected as she too is now a young adult. Sheresa does not live with the couple but says she provides financial support to the Appellant as she is not allowed to work and says that she would continue to do so. She describes the Appellant as "kind hearted". There is though no evidence that if the Appellant and Mr Ellis were to go to live together in Jamaica there would be any significant impact on her personally. She is aged forty-six so that is unsurprising.
19. Mr Ellis was born in Jamaica. He spent the first nine years of his life there. A significant period has elapsed since he left Jamaica. He has lived for the majority of his life in the UK. His own witness statement though does not state what would be the difficulties for him to go back to Jamaica. He has siblings in the UK and as noted above has children (and possibly grandchildren) in the UK. However, other than in relation to his mother, Mrs B, it is not said that those provide reasons why he could not return to Jamaica. There is no evidence from any of those relatives that he provides care for them in a way which would prevent him leaving the UK. There is no evidence that he is in employment in the UK. He indicates that he is retired and in receipt of state pension. He says that he is also self-employed although it is not clear what is the nature of that employment. In any event, that would be unlikely to give rise to insurmountable obstacles to him leaving the UK and relocating to Jamaica.
20. In relation to the Appellant's private life, it is said by Mr Ellis that she has many friends and lots of associations in the UK and there would be "significant obstacles" to her enjoying the same sorts of relationships and life if she was forced to leave the UK. As I have noted at [12] above, there is evidence of some support from voluntary organisations to whom the Appellant has offered her services. There is also some limited expression of support from other friends who attest to their friendship and to the relationship between the Appellant and Mr Ellis. There is nothing in that evidence though to suggest that those are other than ordinary friendships or that they are an obstacle to her integration in Jamaica let alone a very significant obstacle. It is not clear why Mr Ellis believes that the Appellant would be unable to form friendships in Jamaica. Whilst she has been away from that country for some fourteen years and may have therefore lost friendships that she formed before she left, there is no reason why she could not make new friends.
21. That leads me on then to the Appellant's circumstances in Jamaica. She still has relatives there. Her own mother is there. She also has three children living there. Whilst they are now adults, this is not a case where she has no-one to return to. Those ties would undoubtedly assist with reintegration in Jamaica.
22. The Appellant is also said to suffer from a disease which affects her joints and bones so that at times she is unable to walk. She says that she suffers from severe pain but is able to control that by medication. It is not said that she would be unable to obtain the same medication in Jamaica. Although there is some evidential support in relation to her condition, that is limited and there is no medical report dealing with the extent of the disease and the implications on that if the Appellant were to return to Jamaica.
23. For those reasons, the Appellant cannot meet the Rules in relation to her family and private life. There are no insurmountable obstacles to her continuing her family life with Mr Ellis in Jamaica. He cannot be removed if, as I have found, he is British. It is a matter of choice for him whether to accompany the Appellant to Jamaica. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that he could not do so if he so wished. There are no very significant obstacles to the Appellant's integration in Jamaica. This is not a case where she has no-one to return to in that country. She has also lived there for a considerable period before coming to the UK.
24. The factors raised by the Appellant are adequately covered by the Rules in relation to her family and private life. However, for the sake of completeness, I have also considered her case outside the Rules, applying Article 8 ECHR and the test in Razgar. I accept that the Appellant has formed a family and private life and that removal will interfere with that in a way which engages Article 8. The only issue therefore is whether removal is proportionate when the extent of the Appellant's private and family life is balanced against the public interest.
25. When considering that issue, I am bound to have regard to section 117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Immigration control is in the public interest. The Appellant has formed her private and family life whilst in the UK either on a temporary basis or (for the most part) unlawfully. As such, I give little weight to either the family life or the private life of the Appellant. I have already explained when considering the Appellant's case against the Rules why she can continue both her family and private life in Jamaica. Those findings are equally applicable to consideration of the proportionality of the decision to remove her applying Article 8. The decision to refuse the Appellant leave to remain is proportionate.

DECISION
The Appellant's appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds and under the Immigration Rules

Signed Dated: 12 January 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Smith

APPENDIX

ERROR OF LAW DECISION AND DIRECTIONS

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a national of Jamaica who appeals against the Respondent's decision dated 13 January 2015 refusing her leave to remain on the basis of her private life and her family life with her partner, Trevor Ellis. Her appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge O'Flynn in a decision promulgated on 1 April 2016 ("the Decision") on the basis that there were no insurmountable obstacles to the couple continuing their family life in Jamaica, that the Appellant could not meet the Immigration Rules ("the Rules") in relation to her private life and that there were no compelling circumstances which required consideration outside the Rules.
2. The focus of the appeal and the Decision is the care which the Appellant and Mr Ellis provide to Mr Ellis's mother ("Mrs B"), who is an elderly lady with dementia.
3. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge P J M Hollingworth on 12 October 2016 on the basis that the Judge may have erred in failing to take into account Mrs B's rights and in relation to the weight to be given to the evidence regarding her care and what would occur if that care was no longer available. The appeal comes before me to decide whether the Decision contains an error of law and if so to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for redetermination.
The Rules
4. The Appellant cannot meet the Rules in relation to leave to remain as the partner of Mr Ellis unless she can satisfy paragraph EX.1.(b) because she had no leave at the date of application. Paragraph EX.1.(b) reads as follows:-
"[EX.1.] This paragraph applies if
(c) ?
(d) the applicant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, settled in the UK or in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection, and there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK.
[EX.2.] For the purposes of paragraph EX.1.(b) 'insurmountable obstacles' means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner."

Submissions
8. Ms Short for the Appellant formulated her submissions on two bases. Firstly, she criticised the Judge's fact finding on the evidence. Secondly, she submitted that as a result of the Judge's failure to consider the evidence fully, he had fallen into legal error.
9. Ms Short drew my attention to Mr Ellis' witness statement dated 23 October 2015 which summarises his evidence in relation to the availability of alternative care for his mother. That is as follows:-
"[16] ? I have a great number of family members in the United Kingdom and I am looking after my mother together with Karlene as she suffers from dementia. She will not take any medication from anyone except from Karlene and myself. My siblings do not assist in helping my mother and it is of course difficult to cope with the fact that she suffers from dementia. She will only allow Karlene and myself in the house and my mother could certainly suffer significantly if Karlene was forced to leave the country."
10. Ms Short next drew my attention to the letter dated 27 March 2015 from Ms Susan Cross, Care Coordinator for South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. As independent evidence of Mrs B's needs, Ms Short submitted that this evidence should have been given some weight. I therefore set out the content of the letter in full:-
"I am writing as the Care-Coordinator involved with the care of [Mrs B]. She is a lady with Probable Dementia in Alzheimer's Disease who has significant care needs but limited insight into her needs. Due to her lack of insight [Mrs B] will not allow formal carers into her home and currently her son (Trevor Ellis) and his partner (Karlene Ellis) are providing the following: supporting her with her personal and domestic care, medication management, transportation to health appointments and transport to and from daycentre 3 times a week.
In relation to the application for her Karlene Ellis to remain in the UK I can confirm that any care provided by her to [Mrs B] would be very beneficial, may help reduce the significant risks she currently poses and help her to remain living in the community."
Ms Short emphasised in particular the reference to Mrs B's lack of insight into her situation. This is not simply a case of a person requiring physical care but a person who, due to that lack of insight, would not understand the need for her to find alternative care and who would not therefore accept a carer or other members of the family providing the care currently provided by the Appellant and her partner.
11. Ms Short next took me to the relevant passages of the Decision where the Judge purported to deal with this evidence as follows:-
"[17] It is submitted that one of the most important considerations is Trevor Ellis' mother. There was much oral evidence about [Mrs B]. The appellant and her partner (sometimes both or one or the other) visit [Mrs B] five or six days a week. They stay from 7 o'clock in the morning until about 6pm or 7pm. They live abut 10-15 minutes away. They give her medication and food, they bathe her and take her to her club. [Mrs B] suffers from dementia and needs a lot of help. She is on her own from when they leave in the evening until when they arrive in the morning. It is possible to leave her at night but when she sees the daylight she just wants to get up and go. If the appellant and her partner were not able to help there is nobody else who could do it. I have noted a letter confirming that the appellant and her partner do care for his mother.
?
[26] That the appellant and Mr Ellis are the daily carers for his mother, submitted Mrs King, presents a significant obstacle to the couple returning to Jamaica. I heard a great deal of evidence about that and I accept that they play an important part in [Mrs B's] care. However, I note that Mr Ellis stated that is mother 'is supposed to have a carer but she won't let anyone in her house'. There is then, care available. Mr Ellis was asked in examination-in-chief whether any of his siblings would be able to take over the care. He stated 'I'm not sure about my siblings, but I've got young ones who are willing to help.' So there are, then, members of his own family who are willing to assist his mother, to say nothing of her entitlement to a carer.
?
[28] It is difficult to see what the insurmountable obstacle to the appellant and Mr Ellis sharing their life in Jamaica is. It is perfectly clear from the evidence that there are other members of the family who would be willing to help Mr Ellis' mother and, further, it is open to them to arrange for social services to become involved. It may be difficult for her initially to come to terms with new people but, with care, such an arrangement can easily be put in place. Mr Ellis has (I note he was not entirely sure) around 19 or 20 children. He has grandchildren in the UK. However, none of this would prevent Mr Ellis from relocating to Jamaica with his partner. None of his children are minors and, apart from Shante, none of them live with Mr Ellis. Shante is 20 years of age and would be perfectly capable of looking after herself.
?
[31] I now consider whether the appellant's private and/or family life should be considered outside the Rules; I must consider whether there are compelling circumstances in this case. For the same reasons as I have discussed when considering whether there were 'insurmountable obstacles' I cannot find that there are any compelling circumstances in this case. The appellant has been in the UK without leave since 2004. I can take into consideration here that she has left her three children in Jamaica and, it would seem to me, that that is where her true family life should exist. I have taken into careful consideration the fact that the couple look after Mr Ellis' mother but I have found that there are other carers within the family who, as Mr Ellis himself stated, 'would be willing to help'. In the circumstances, there being no compelling circumstances for me to consider, I am satisfied that an Article 8 assessment outside of the Immigration Rules is not required in this appeal."
12. Ms Short submitted that those passages showed that the Judge had failed to consider the practical realities including, as previously mentioned, the fact that Mrs B would not accept any alternative carer. Although there is reference to a letter at [17] confirming that the Appellant and Mr Ellis care for Mrs B, Ms Short submitted that this was either reference to another of the letters produced in evidence confirming the arrangements or at the very least the Judge had failed to engage with the content of the Care Coordinator's letter emphasising the point that Mrs B would not allow another carer in to her home because of her lack of insight.
13. Ms Short submitted that this failure to properly consider the evidence had led the Judge into legal error both in relation to whether there are "insurmountable obstacles" to the Appellant and Mr Ellis continuing their family life in Jamaica and whether removal of the Appellant would breach Article 8 ECHR. In relation to that latter point, Ms Short also submitted that the Judge had failed to take into account Mrs B's Article 8 rights. She accepted that the authority on which she relies in this regard (Beoku-Betts v SSHD [2008] UKHL 39) pre-dates the coming into force of Appendix FM to the Rules and that it is not entirely clear whether and in what way Mrs B's human rights fall within the consideration of "insurmountable obstacles" to the Appellant's family life continuing in Jamaica. She submitted however that the impact on Mrs B of Mr Ellis leaving the UK would cause very serious hardship to him if not also to the Appellant and therefore Mrs B's condition and the impact on her is relevant to that question.
14. Mr Tarlow relied on the Respondent's rule 24 statement. He pointed to the Judge's acceptance at [28] of the Decision that it would be difficult for Mrs B to come to terms with new carers. The Judge was also aware of the letter ([17] of the Decision). The Judge reached a finding which was open to him on the evidence. In relation to the Article 8 rights of Mrs B, Mr Tarlow submitted that, even if those could be relevant to the question of whether there are "insurmountable obstacles" to family life continuing in Jamaica, that consideration could not materially affect the outcome given the other considerations set out in the Decision.
12. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and indicated that I would provide that in writing which I now do. The parties' representatives agreed that, if I were to find an error of law, I could proceed to re-make the decision in this Tribunal. In light of Mrs B's age and medical condition, Ms Short asked for the opportunity to submit updated evidence in relation to Mrs B's position and the care which the Appellant and Mr Ellis now provide to her. She accepted however that I could thereafter re-make the decision (if I found an error of law) on the basis of written submissions and without a further hearing.
Discussion and conclusions
13. The Judge has considered the relevant evidence in relation to the position of Mrs B and the alternative care which would be available to her if the Appellant and Mr Ellis were to go to live in Jamaica. What he has not considered however is Mrs B's willingness to accept alternative care arrangements and in particular what is said by the Care Coordinator about the impact on Mrs B of the absence of the Appellant and Mr Ellis. This is not simply an elderly lady who requires physical care but an elderly lady with dementia who does not have insight into her own condition and would not understand the need to accommodate alternative care arrangements. The main error made by the Judge was to not take into account at all (alternatively to not give appropriate weight to) the comments of the Care Coordinator and therefore to treat the option of alternative care as decisive in relation to whether the Appellant and Mr Ellis could relocate to Jamaica.
14. Whilst it is for the Judge to give whatever weight he/she considers appropriate to the evidence subject to an irrationality challenge, the Judge has been thereby led into legal error by failing to take into account the impact on Mrs B of the Appellant's and more importantly Mr Ellis' absence. Whether the impact on Mrs B is a factor which can weigh in the question of whether there are "insurmountable obstacles" to Mr Ellis leaving the UK to live with the Appellant in Jamaica is perhaps not relevant. I accept that the impact on Mr Ellis of having to leave his mother in the UK in order to go to live with the Appellant in Jamaica might potentially amount to very significant hardship to him. As such, the Judge's failure to take into account the evidence of the Care Coordinator is material to that question.
15. I am less convinced by the challenge to the Judge's findings regarding Article 8 outside the Rules. If there are insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant enjoying family life with Mr Ellis in Jamaica for the reasons set out above, then there is no need to go on to consider whether there are compelling circumstances to justify the grant of leave outside the Rules. However, since, on any view, Beoku-Betts would apply to consideration of Mrs B's rights in an assessment outside the Rules, this might become relevant if the appeal fails under the Rules. At that stage, however, other factors such as the Appellant's immigration history would become relevant. Those factors might well militate against a grant of leave to the Appellant.
16. For the above reasons, the Decision contains an error of law. I therefore set aside the Decision.

DECISION
The First-tier Tribunal Decision did involve the making of an error on a point of law. I set aside the Decision
In relation to the re-making of the decision, I make the following directions:-
1. Within 28 days from the date of promulgation of this decision, the Appellant shall file and serve any additional evidence on which she wishes to rely in relation to the re-making of the decision.
2. Within 28 days from the date of promulgation of this decision, the Appellant shall also file and serve a skeleton argument setting out her submissions for the re-making of the decision.
3. Within 28 days from the date of service of the Appellant's evidence and skeleton argument, the Respondent shall file and serve a skeleton argument responding to the Appellant's skeleton argument.
4. Within 14 days from receipt of the Respondent's skeleton argument, the Appellant may file and serve a further skeleton argument in reply if so advised.
5. The appeal will thereafter be determined on the papers unless within 42 days from the date of promulgation of this decision, either party requests an oral hearing.
6. The parties may apply to the Tribunal on notice to the other party if they seek a variation of these directions or any additional directions.

Signed Dated: 22 November 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Smith