Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-LW-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/12314/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 20 December 2016
On 20 January 2017

Before

DR H H STOREY
JUDGE OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

Between

florence ede
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Miss O Ukachi-Lois, Counsel instructed by Charles Allotey & Co
Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Fijiwala, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. On 24 June 2016 First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Behan dismissed the appeal of the appellant, a citizen of Nigeria, aged 75, against a decision made by the respondent on 11 March 2015 refusing her leave to remain on human rights grounds and giving directions for removal. The appellant had first come to the UK in the 1960s for several years. In 2002 she came back for a short visit but overstayed. Beginning in 2010, she has made several applications and representations prior to the decision under challenge.

2. The grounds are discursive but amount to the submission that the judge erred in concluding that there were no significant obstacles to the appellant's integration into Nigeria and that, having accepted that the appellant enjoyed a family life with her cousins in the UK and a private life based on lengthy residence, the judge erred in stating that little weight could be attached to her private life. In amplifying the appellant's grounds Miss Ukachi-Lois said that there were three areas where the judge made significant findings of fact which should have led him to allow the appellant's appeal under the Immigration Rules and also outside the Rules: first that she enjoyed family life with her cousins in the UK and could show strong private life considerations arising from her age, frailty, debilitating illness and restricted mobility; second that she was a dependent on her cousins in the UK; and third, that in Nigeria she had no significant ties because her relationship with her son had broken down and there was no family support network, only 'distant' relations. Miss Ukachi-Lois submitted that these findings, taken cumulatively, sufficed to show very significant obstacles within the meaning of paragraph 276ADE. Miss Ukachi-Lois also highlighted the point that despite describing the appellant's evidence regarding her family in Nigeria as "opaque", the judge went on to accept that this may have been because of difficulties of memory and/or the fact that the appellant was struggling with pain.

3. Miss Fijiwala emphasised that the Court of Appeal has held in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [14] that the concept of integration is a broad one and that the term:

"calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life"

Miss Fijiwala submitted that the appellant's grounds did not rise above a series of mere disagreements with the judge's findings.

4. Having considered the parties' submissions, I have concluded that Miss Fijiwala is correct to characterise the grounds as a series of mere disagreements with the judge's findings of fact. Miss Ukachi-Lois is right to highlight that the judge made a number of findings indicative of there being obstacles to the appellant's integration in Nigeria - her age, her poor health and restricted mobility, her lack of a family network there, the fact she had not had recourse to public funds, her close ties with cousins in the UK on whom she was financially and emotionally dependent, being the main such indicators. However, as Sales LJ has emphasised in Kamara, there is no basis for interference in an FtT decision if it is within the "lawful parameters of legitimate evaluative judgement". It may be that another judge on the same evidence may have been persuaded that the obstacles facing the appellant in integrating in Nigeria were very significant; but the assessment by Judge Behan was certainly within the range of reasonable responses. The judge clearly had regard to factors indicating that the appellant would face obstacles - I have enumerated the most important of these. But both in relation to paragraph 276ADE and the appellant's circumstances outside the Rules, the judge also took into account, and was entitled to attach more weight to, the following factors: that even though she had no close family there and no family support network there - only distant relatives - the appellant had lived in Nigeria for some 60 years; that she was familiar with the country's culture and traditions; that she spoke the languages used there; that it was reasonable to expect her cousins who supported her financially in the UK, to assist her financially in Nigeria (it is pertinent to note that previously in Nigeria she had lived in rented accommodation); that even though she had a family life in the UK, little weight could be attached to her private life because it had been established when her immigration status was precarious; that even though she has several debilitating medical conditions and her mobility is restricted and she has discomfort and pain, she has no life-threatening medical conditions and would be able to access medical treatment in Nigeria.

5. As regards the contention that the judge fell into inconsistency in his findings in respect of the appellant's family and private life, I see nothing untoward in the judge's conclusions on the one hand that the appellant had strong family life ties with her cousins but that little weight could be attached to her private life. To the contrary, the latter finding was required by s.117B(4)(a) NIAA 2002 as amended.

6. Amongst the various factors the judge took into account, it is clear that particular weight was attached to the fact that the appellant's cousins had confirmed that they would support her financially and emotionally in Nigeria. At [11] the judge also said this:

"11. The Respondent also noted that the appellant does not live with her cousins and there was no evidence that the help they provide is a medical necessity or could not be provided by someone else. Healthcare is available in Nigeria and the UK is not under an obligation to treat the appellant's ailments. There was no evidence to support the assertion the appellant and her son are estranged."

7. As a consequence the fact that the appellant would lack the support of family members in Nigeria was properly found to be not determinative, since the support from cousins in the UK would go a long way to practically ensuring she could live there without hardship and with some degree of emotional support.

8. For the above reasons I conclude that the judge did not materially err in law. His decision to dismiss the appellant's appeal is upheld.

No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date

Dr H H Storey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal