Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-LW-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/14464/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 15th December 2016
On 16th January 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J G MACDONALD

Between

mr syed Moin-Ud-Din
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION not made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr P Duffy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan who arrived here on 1st September 2011 with Tier 4 student leave valid to 26th January 2015. He subsequently claimed he was unable to complete his studies because the college had been suspended and then its licence revoked in April 2014.
2. He applied for leave to remain outside the Rules explaining that he had been unable to find a new sponsor because the Respondent, despite his request, had not sent him a curtailment letter. His appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Oliver.
3. The judge found the Appellant's evidence to be highly unsatisfactory (paragraph 10) for reasons given. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
4. Grounds of application were lodged. They said that the sponsor licence was not revoked until 2014 and therefore the Appellant's annual leave remained valid and thus the Appellant "was unable to require a 60 days curtailment letter".
5. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Kelly in a decision dated 19th September 2016 which said that it was not arguable, even upon the Appellant's own case, that he had been deprived of the opportunity to seek a CAS certificate from an alternative college due to the Respondent's supposed failure to issue him with a 60 day curtailment notice.
6. Grounds for permission to appeal were renewed to the Upper Tribunal, it being said in the grounds that "It is duty of Respondent to send a curtailment letter to all the students of such institute". Those grounds were found to be arguable by Upper Tribunal Judge Pitt in a decision dated 16th November 2016.
7. A Rule 24 notice was lodged submitting that there was no evidence that the college had ever been suspended and therefore there was no duty upon the Secretary of State to provide 60 days variation of leave.
8. Furthermore, to provide such a letter would have been inconsistent with the Home Office's own policy guidance as stated in the refusal letter, namely that at the time of the request there was less than 60 days leave remaining, so the Home Office would not have been able to issue a 60 day curtailment notification.
9. Thus the matter came before me.
10. The Appellant was unrepresented and said he should have been allowed 60 days by the Home Office in terms of their policy. He narrated the history of what had happened. He needed the 60 day letter. In terms of paragraph 7 of the judge's decision he had not contacted the Home Office in writing as stated there, but rather by telephone.
11. For the Respondent, Mr Duffy, said the policy had not been produced. The policy did not say that in every case a 60 day letter had to be given to every student. The Appellant had had some eleven months in which to obtain a further CAS and therefore, even granting him a 60 day letter would not have made any difference.
12. The judge had correctly analysed the position and made no error in law.
13. I reserved my decision.
Conclusion
14. It is within judicial knowledge that the Home Office do operate a policy in that, in certain circumstances, a claimant will be allowed a period of 60 days to obtain a further college at which they can study; the precise terms of that policy are plainly not within judicial knowledge. As Mr Duffy pointed out, this does not mean that every single appellant will be afforded an opportunity to obtain a further college.
15. The case for the appellant is that the Home Office breached their own policy but, for reasons which are unexplained, the claimant and/or his solicitors have never produced the terms of the policy. It has not served the appellant well to maintain in the grounds that it was the "duty" of the Respondent to send a curtailment letter when the policy that is said to lie behind such an alleged "duty" was not provided or exhibited to the First -Tier or Upper Tribunal.
16. Absent the policy and in these circumstances it is difficult to see how the First - tier Tribunal judge could have come to a different decision. For reasons given he found the appellant's evidence to be highly unsatisfactory. There was a considerable delay in the appellant contacting the Respondent. The judge was entitled to conclude that his actions were not those of a genuine student. As Mr Duffy indicated the appellant had had almost a year to apply to a further college and had not done so.
17. In all the circumstances there was no error in law by the judge in dismissing the appeal. As such the judge's decision must stand.

Notice of Decision
18. The making of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
19. I do not set aside the decision.
20. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge J G Macdonald

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge J G Macdonald