The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/19912/2015


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Manchester, Piccadilly
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 4th November 2016
and 1st December 2016
On 12th December 2016



Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MARTIN

Between

MISS RASHEEDAT ADEJUMOKE ABDULRASHEED
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr B Adewisi (4th November) & Mr Bayo (1st December) (Crown and Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr G Harrison (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal to the Upper Tribunal, with permission, by the appellant.
2. The appellant is a Nigerian national born on 28 April 1988. She entered the United Kingdom on 12 October 2013 as a student. On 17 February 2015 she made an application for leave to remain on the basis that she is the parent of a British citizen child in the UK.
3. The child, her son, was born on 3 October 2014. His birth was registered on 7 November 2014 with his father named as Akeem Abiola Ayodele Ojo-Oniyun. The father is a British citizen. The appellant procured for her son a British passport on the basis that he is the son of a British citizen.
4. The Secretary of State refused the application for leave to remain by the mother stating that she had failed to provide DNA evidence to confirm the child's paternity and she had failed to provide evidence that she held sole parental responsibility.
5. The appellant appealed and in the first-tier Tribunal her appeal came before Judge Ransley. Following a hearing on 14 January 2016 Judge Ransley dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 20 January.
6. Judge Ransley considered the appellant's immigration history which she found to be poor and found that the appellant's motive in coming to the UK was to undertake paid employment and not to study, noting the complete lack of documentary evidence to show the appellant had undertaken any studies since arriving.
7. The Judge then noted that the central issue to the appeal related to the paternity of the appellant's child and she noted the appellant's failure to provide any evidence as to that. She considered the appellant's evidence as to her relationship with the child's father and found that lacking credibility. She found there was no evidence to indicate what had been produced to the UK passport authorities in order to obtain the child's passport and dismissed the appeal finding the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof.
8. When the matter first came before me on 4 November I set aside that decision in its entirety. I did so because the simple fact in this case is that the child is a British citizen. What checks the UK authorities undertake when a birth is registered or when a child is issued a British citizen passport is a matter for the UK authorities. However, holding a passport is evidence of British citizenship and indeed Home Office guidance indicates that a child will not be subsequently deprived of a British passport, howsoever it was obtained.
9. The fact that the child is a British citizen renders any further evidence as to his paternity irrelevant. This appeal should have been approached solely on the basis that given the appellant's child is in fact a British citizen then in order to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules the appellant simply need to show that she has sole responsibility for the child or that the child lives with her and not with its father. (Appendix FM E-LTRPT.2.3. (a).
10. Mr Harrison agreed with my analysis.
11. I indicated my decision to the representatives on 4 November and I also indicated that there was no appellant's bundle contained in the file
12. Mr Adewusi thus agreed that the appropriate course was me for me to adjourn for a resumed hearing which would give him time to adduce additional evidence. I gave permission for additional evidence to be adduced.
13. When the matter came before me on 1 December I had been provided with a short bundle. The only document in that bundle relevant to the issue of sole responsibility was a council tax letter dated May 2015 including a 25% discount because the appellant was said to be a single occupier. I indicated that I found I could not place a great deal of reliance upon that letter because on innumerable occasions I have been provided with such letters when appellants are in actual fact living with someone else. I was then handed a letter from an Islamic Association in which the author says he knows the appellant and has done for three years and to the best of his knowledge she lives alone with her son.
14. There was no other evidence whatsoever, despite the time I had given to adduce it. Indeed, despite attending the hearing centre I was told the appellant did not intend to come into the court. I thus heard no oral evidence. Accordingly given the dearth of evidence the Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof, which rested with her, to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that she has sole responsibility for her British national child.
15. I would also add my concerns that it does seem probable that the passport was fraudulently obtained.
Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal containing material errors of law, I set it aside in its entirety. In redeciding the appeal it is dismissed.

No anonymity direction having been requested none is made.


Signed Date 9th December 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Martin