Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/27517/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On 17th November 2016
On 05th December 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GLEESON

Between

MJC
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an order pursuant to Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. I continue that order pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008: unless the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall identify the original appellant, whether directly or indirectly. This order applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this order could give rise to contempt of court proceedings.
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse her leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of her private life under paragraph 276ADE of the Rules or pursuant to Article 8 outside the Rules.
2. On the morning of the hearing, I received a message that the appellant's Counsel had been taken ill at Tottenham on her way to Court, coupled with a request for an adjournment. The appellant herself was present, and is a vulnerable person.
3. Since I am satisfied that the error of law is apparent on the face of the decision (the lack of a finding as to whether the appellant has spent more than half her life in the United Kingdom) I did not consider it necessary or proportionate to adjourn the appeal hearing. The paragraph 276ADE decision turns on whether the appellant has spent more than half her life in the United Kingdom and there is no clear finding on that point in the First-tier Tribunal decision. For the respondent, Mr Tufan did not seek to argue that the findings of fact were adequate, on that point.
4. The grounds of appeal also rely on a want of reasoning in relation to Section 117(3), 117(5) and 117A(1)(a) and (2) in the First-tier Tribunal decision and observe that the appellant was a minor when she was forced to enter the United Kingdom and her precarious state was no fault of her own. The appellant further contends that the finding of the Tribunal that under paragraph 117B(3) she is not financially independent is unduly harsh and unreasonable. It is not necessary for me to reach a finding on those grounds.
5. In the light of the inadequate findings of fact I consider that it is appropriate to allow this appeal and remit it to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing afresh with no findings of fact or credibility maintained.
Conclusions
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
I set aside the decision. The decision in this appeal will be remade in the First-tier Tribunal on a date to be fixed.

Signed: Judith A J C Gleeson Date: 2 December 2016
Upper Tribunal Judge Gleeson