Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-CJ-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/29599/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Liverpool
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 22 December 2016
On 30 January 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLIVE LANE

Between

Sumon Chanda
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION not made)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr Harrison, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, Sumon Chanda, was born on 1 August 1984 and is a male citizen of Bangladesh. On 14 August 2015 a decision was made to refuse to vary the appellant's leave to remain in the United Kingdom and also to remove him by way of directions under Section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Judge M Davies) which, in a decision promulgated on 19 April 2016, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. The grounds of appeal are brief. The appellant asserts that "the respondent failed to establish a fraud with the required standard of proof and this was not adequately dealt with by the FTTJ". Further, the judge had failed to give adequate reasons as to why he believed the respondent's allegation had been proved. There had been no finding on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
3. Mr Chanda attended the Upper Tribunal hearing. He was not legally represented. He explained that he had encountered a number of difficulties in his time in the United Kingdom and that he was now "left with nothing". He made no further submissions.
4. The respondent had refused to vary the appellant's leave to remain because she considered that the appellant had produced false documents concerning attendance upon an approved course of study. The appellant claimed that he had obtained a degree through London University by attending a college (which was now closed) in Manchester. He submitted a certificate dated 26 July 2011 purportedly issued by the University of London indicating that he had completed the approved course of study for the degree of bachelor of arts (business management). The Secretary of State had made enquiries of the transcripts office of London University and produced a letter from that office dated 20 March 2015 part of which reads,
I would like to inform you that the copy of certificate and transcripts that you have provided were not produced by the University of London central offices and bear a number of discrepancies when compared to authentic documents. I can therefore confirm that the documents are not genuine. We would also like to confirm we cannot trace the above-named individual as having graduated from the University of London.
5. Judge Davies had found that he was "satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the respondent can discharge the burden of proof upon him (sic)". He considered it was,
More probable than not the appellant when applying for further leave to remain in the United Kingdom had produced false documents claiming them to be genuine documents from the University of London. ? [the appellant] has produced no evidence whatsoever to counter the allegation made by the respondent.
6. I consider that the issue in this appeal has been correctly addressed by Mr Tufan on behalf of the Secretary of State in the Rule 24 statement of 3 November 2016. It is clear that Judge Davies believed that the initial burden of proof rested upon the respondent who was making the allegation that the appellant had produced a false document. But that allegation required evidence to support it and the judge found (correctly in law) that the letter from the transcripts office constituted such evidence. Thereafter, it was for the appellant to discharge the burden of proving that he had obtained a degree from the University of London. The appellant acknowledges before the Upper Tribunal that he has not produced such evidence; he simply told me that he had no reason to believe that the certificate which he had obtained was false. Further, the appellant did not attend the First-tier Tribunal hearing; insofar as the appellant has been able to offer any explanation, the Upper Tribunal has received more evidence than Judge Davies who was obliged to determine the appeal in the First-tier Tribunal having only received submissions and the documentary evidence adduced by the Secretary of State. I cannot see that Judge Davies has erred in his analysis and, even if he has done so, then, if I were to remake the decision in the Upper Tribunal, I would dismiss the appellant's appeal. The Secretary of State has made an allegation and has supported it with evidence which the appellant has not attempted to contradict. In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
7. This appeal is dismissed.
8. No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Date 20 January 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 20 January 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane