IA/42105/2014

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 13 Sep 2016
• Promulgation date: 15 Sep 2016
• Publication date: 1 May 2020
• Last updated on: 1 May 2020

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/42105/2014


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Field House
Decision Promulgated
On 13 September 2016
On 15 September 2016



Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM


Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

SOHAIL [S]
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr R Ahmed, Counsel


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The respondent to this appeal is a citizen of Pakistan. The appellant is the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who has appealed with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, allowing the respondent's appeal against a decision of the appellant, dated 2 October 2014, to refuse his application to vary leave on human rights (article 8) grounds. The First-tier Tribunal found the respondent was entitled to a period of further leave, applying MH (pending family proceedings - discretionary leave) Morocco [2010] UKUT 439 (IAC).
2. It is more convenient to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. I shall therefore refer to Mr [S] as "the appellant" and the Secretary of State as "the respondent".
3. The First-tier Tribunal found as follows:
"27. It is not disputed in this case that the appellant has been successful in establishing indirect contact with his child. It cannot be disputed that this contact has proved to be meaningful. The appellant has started an application for direct contact with his child. From the information given to me there is, at the least, some kind of reasonable prospect that such an appeal would succeed."
4. Permission to appeal was granted to the respondent by the Upper Tribunal on a renewed application because it was arguable the First-tier Tribunal did not factor into its assessment the fact the child was not a British citizen and was not settled in the UK.
5. I was not asked and saw no reason to make an anonymity direction.
6. I heard brief argument on the question of whether the First-tier Tribunal's decision is vitiated by material error of law.
7. I asked Mr Tufan whether the Designated Judge of the First-tier Tribunal had been informed about the status of the mother and child. Mr Tufan did not know but he was able to confirm from his own investigation that the mother had been granted refugee status and the child had leave in line with her.
8. Mr Ahmed rightly pointed out that this information showed there was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal's decision and Mr Tufan did not press his case any further.
9. I find therefore that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law of the kind contended by the respondent. Accordingly it shall stand and the respondent's appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The First-tier Tribunal did not make a material error on a point of law and its decision allowing the appeal on human rights grounds shall stand.
No anonymity direction has been made.


Signed Date 14 September 2016

Judge Froom
Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal