Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2023-LON-002929
JR-2024-LON-002724
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of
(1) Md BILAL AHMED
(2) ALI AKBOR
Applicants
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

ORDER

Before Upper Tribunal Judge Neville, sitting at Field House on 15 April 2026

Upon no party attending the hearing or being represented

It is ordered:

(1) The applications for judicial review are dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) Pursuant to the order of UTJ Hoffman on 18 March 2026, liability for costs will be separately decided.
(3) Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.
Reasons: No application having been made for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to rule 44(4B) the Tribunal must grant or refuse permission itself. Permission is refused because an appeal would have no real prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.
Signed: UTJ Neville

Dated: 15 April 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 28/04/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: JR-2023-LON-002929;
JR-2024-LON-002724
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

28 April 2026
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

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Between

THE KING
on the application of
1. Md BILAL AHMED
2. ALI AKBOR
Applicants
- and -

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

No party attended or was represented

Hearing date: 15 April 2026

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J U D G M E N T
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1. This judgment concerns applications for judicial review brought by two Bangladeshi nationals challenging decisions of the respondent to refuse their respective applications for visit visas. In each case, the respondent was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine visitor who would leave the United Kingdom at the end of the proposed visit.
Procedure
2. These two cases were dealt with alongside three others because they form part of a broader group of claims brought by the same firm of solicitors, ZYBA Law, in which the Tribunal identified a pattern of materially similar documents relied upon by applicants in support of their visit visa applications.
3. In the annexed judgment handed down on 10 November 2025 (“the Judgment”), and amended on 10 December 2025, the Tribunal (composed of UTJ Lindsley and UTJ Hoffman) found at [66] that the applicants had each relied on false documents when applying for entry clearance, likely obtained with the assistance of a firm based in Bangladesh known as Vision Sylhet Consultancy, and had continued to rely on those documents in support of their judicial review proceedings.
4. Following the handing down of that judgment, a case management hearing was listed on 18 March 2026 to consider how the remaining affected cases should be disposed of. By that stage, all but two of the applicants had indicated that they no longer sought to pursue their judicial review claims, and ZYBA Law had removed themselves from the record. With the exception of two applicants who wished to continue with their claims, the remaining applicants – including Mr Ahmed and Mr Akbor – were not represented at the case management hearing. It was accordingly directed that their cases proceed to a substantive hearing.
5. Neither Mr Ahmed nor Mr Akbor have engaged with the proceedings since attempting to withdraw the proceedings; in its Judgment the Tribunal refused to consent to that withdrawal. I need not set out any further background, which is already set out in the Judgment and is comprehensive and detailed. I take it all into account (insofar as necessary treating the issues considered in the Judgment as having been decided under rule 5(3)(e)), together with the other documents provided by the parties. Nonetheless, it should be noted that ZYBA Law maintain that they did not notice that several of their clients had relied on very similar documents in support of their visa applications, and they deny any involvement with Vision Sylhet Consultancy.
6. Given that the applicants had indicated last summer that they no longer wished to pursue their judicial review claims, and ZYBA Law had come off record, they were, unsurprisingly, not represented at the substantive hearing. By agreement with the respondent at the 18 March 2026 case management hearing, she too was not represented.
Consideration
7. I need only set out a brief summary of the applicants’ grounds.
8. Mr Ahmed contended that the respondent failed to have proper regard to the evidence relating to his financial circumstances; that the respondent’s assessment of those circumstances was unreasonable; and that the respondent erred in finding that he had not demonstrated an ability to meet the reasonable costs of his trip.
9. Mr Akbor was granted permission to rely on three grounds. On his behalf, it was submitted that the respondent failed to have proper regard to his financial circumstances and family ties; failed to consider the relevant facts and policy; and that the decision was procedurally improper and/or otherwise unreasonable.
10. The applications must be refused, for two reasons. First, I agree with the respondent’s position that, in light of the finding that the applicants each relied on fraudulent documents in support of their applications, and by extension their judicial review claims, their claims should be dismissed irrespective of the merits of the grounds advanced. Support for discretionary refusal of relief when a claim is brought as an abuse of process can be found in R (Mount Cook Land Limited) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 at [46]; Land Securities Plc & Ors v Fladgate Fielder (A Firm) [2009] EWCA Civ 1402 at [89]. It is difficult to conceive of conduct more readily characterised as abusive than this, and to grant any remedy in response to it would be inimical to the interests of justice and damage the integrity of judicial review as a check on executive decision-making.
11. Second, were the grounds meritorious and the decisions quashed, where false documents are submitted in support of an immigration application the respondent is required by the Immigration Rules to refuse it on that basis. The same outcome can therefore be seen as inevitable without any substantive consideration of the grounds, and I dismiss both applications on that additional basis.
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ANNEX

Case Nos: JR-2023-LON-002929
JR-2024-LON-002724
JR-2024-LON-003112
JR-2024-LON-003146
JR-2025-LON-001964
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

10th November 2025
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the applications of
MD BILAL AHMED
ALI AKBOR
KAGIM UDDIN
YASIR ARAFAT
TASLIMA AKTER JHUMA
Applicants
- and -

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

No appearance for the applicants

Ms Samantha Broadfoot KC and Mr Thomas Yarrow
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 2nd October 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Hoffman:

Introduction

1. This judgment has been prepared following a hearing concerning several applications for permission to apply for judicial review brought by a firm of solicitors called ZYBA Law. In each of the cases, the applicants, who are all nationals of Bangladesh, seek permission to challenge a decision of the respondent refusing their applications for visas to come to the UK as visitors.

2. As set out in an order sealed on 12 June 2025, the purpose of the hearing is to consider the following questions:

(1) Whether, on the balance of probabilities, any of the documents put before the Upper Tribunal in the cohort of visit visa judicial review applications identified in these judicial review proceedings1 contain misrepresentation of the facts, are fraudulent or are otherwise dishonest;

(2) What professional obligations, if any, does a solicitor have to detect the use of fraud by their clients bringing judicial review proceedings, in particular the reliance on fraudulent material or dishonest statements, in advance of bringing legal proceedings; and

(3) What professional obligations, if any, do solicitors have in cases where, after they have brought legal proceedings, they are notified by the respondent, the Upper Tribunal or another potentially reliable source that their clients may be relying on fraudulent or unreliable evidence.

3. This judgment is accordingly divided into three parts. Part I considers the fraud issue. Part II considers the professional obligations on solicitors where there are signs that their client or clients may be relying on fraud or misrepresentation before the Tribunal. Finally, Part III considers whether ZYBA Law have acted in breach of their professional obligations in these proceedings.

Background

4. On 7 March 2025, I granted Mr Akbor permission to apply for judicial review at an oral hearing. However, while preparing for a renewal hearing in the case of Mr Uddin later the same month, I noticed similarities between the documents relied upon by the two applicants in their visit visa applications. Both applicants were represented by the same firm of solicitors. I raised my concerns that this might amount to indicia of fraud with counsel for the parties at Mr Uddin’s permission hearing on 27 March 2025. I subsequently made an order, sealed on 28 March 2025, joining the two cases, requiring ZYBA Law to answer several questions relating to the documents produced on behalf of the applicants, and directing there to be a further hearing to consider the matter.

5. On 12 May 2025, an order was made joining Mr Ahmed’s claim after the respondent had notified the Tribunal that he too sought to rely on similar documents to the other applicants.

6. Following various applications made on behalf of the applicants and ZYBA Law, Mr Zakir Hussain, the practitioner responsible for the firm, complied with the order directing him to answer questions in a letter dated 19 May 2025. Following further directions made on 21 May 2025, Mr Hussain sent a further letter to the Tribunal on 23 May.

7. A hearing then took place before us on 11 June 2025. By that point, Mr Arafat’s case had also been joined with the other three by order of Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan. The four applicants were represented by Mr Alan Payne KC while ZYBA Law were separately represented by Mr Zane Malik KC. The respondent was represented by Mr Yarrow. The purpose of the hearing was to consider three issues. The first was whether on the balance of probabilities false evidence had been put before the Tribunal in support of the applicants’ judicial review claims. The second was whether there is an obligation on solicitors to identify whether their clients are seeking to rely on fraudulent documents either in advance of, or after, having been given information that the documents might be fraudulent. The third was how the Tribunal should proceed in the individual cases. At the hearing, Mr Payne accepted that the documents raised a suspicion of fraud that required an explanation in the individual cases. However, he submitted that his clients would like to have the issue of whether they had relied on fraudulent documents considered at a separate hearing so that they – and, if so advised, ZYBA Law – could first have the opportunity to file evidence to assist the Tribunal in making its findings. Mr Malik agreed with that approach.

8. Consequently, the hearing on 11 June 2025 was adjourned and on 12 June 2025 the Tribunal issued directions confirming that a further hearing would be listed to address the three issues identified in paragraph 2 above. Directions were also made, including giving all the index applicants listed in the table annexed to this judgment2 28 days to file any evidence on which they wished to rely. The parties were also required to file and serve skeleton arguments no later than 10 days before the next hearing, which was listed for 2 October 2025.

9. As ZYBA Law had been unwilling to assist the Tribunal in identifying how many of their cases involved the documents identified as being of concern without being expressly ordered to do so, the order of 12 June 2025 also stayed all judicial review claims brought by the firm against a refusal of visit visa pending the outcome of the 2 October 2025 hearing, with individual applicants at liberty to apply to exempt themselves.

10. As none of the applicants had filed any evidence by the deadline given in the 12 June 2025 order, on application by the respondent, the Tribunal made an unless order on 4 August 2025 giving them an extension until 4 pm on 11 August 2025 to do so. A failure to meet that deadline would debar the applicants from relying on any evidence at the hearing. Again, none of the applicants filed any evidence. Instead, ZYBA Law wrote to the Tribunal on 11 August 2025 to say that

“the applicants, individually, had expressed their reluctance to proceed with their respective applications, given the current circumstances. The main reasons cited by the applicants were the additional delays in them receiving final determination with no assurance of when a substantive hearing may take place, given the October hearing is understood to not be a final hearing. Additionally, the applicants have also cited the increased costs, that were not anticipated initially, and have noted that we can provide them with no assurance of what costs would be recovered even if they were ultimately successful in their respective applications.

To confirm, from the outset of when these discussions took place, although we understood their concerns and the perfectly valid reasons that they had provided as to why they wished to withdraw from the proceedings, we have encouraged the applicants to continue with the proceedings until final outcome [sic]. However, we of course had to provide a balance to that encouragement so as not to appear forceful and it is of course not within our power, nor would it be appropriate, for us to compel them to continue their participation.”

11. The letter went on to say that the applicants had provided confirmation that they no longer wished to proceed with their respective judicial review claims but that “Zyba Law intend to continue our participation in the proceedings and will try and assist the Upper Tribunal the best that we can.” Additionally, ZYBA Law wrote,

“having discussed the matter with the applicants and it being confirmed that they did not wish to participate further in the proceedings despite being told that the Upper Tribunal will proceed even if they wished to withdraw, we have asked if they will, as a gesture of goodwill, agree to providing further information that may assist the Upper Tribunal with the concerns that the Upper Tribunal has raised. To clarify, knowing what the concerns are of the Upper Tribunal, we are proposing to obtain specific information from the applicants, and present it to the Upper Tribunal, to assist the Upper Tribunal in dealing with the relevant concerns that have been indicated during the course of these matters.

We can confirm that the applicants have agreed to provide specific information that we may seek, as a gesture of goodwill, but have been clear that their underlying positions remain the same which is that they are withdrawing from the proceedings and do not intend to formally participate any further with their respective applications.

We now write to enquire as to whether the Upper Tribunal would like us to do this and collate relevant information and forward it on to the Upper Tribunal with the intention that this would assist the Upper Tribunal going forward given the applicants’ decisions that they will not be proceeding with their respective applications.”

12. The assertion that as a “gesture of goodwill” the applicants would be willing to file information “to assist the Upper Tribunal” if “the Upper Tribunal would like [them] to do this” appeared to take no account of the fact that the applicants had failed to meet two deadlines to file such evidence. A Tribunal legal officer therefore emailed ZYBA Law on 20 August 2025 explaining to them that the applicants were now debarred from filing any evidence for the October hearing under the terms of the unless order. No application was made by the applicants to vary that order.

13. Therefore, by 11 August 2025, not only had none of the applicants in the four joined index cases filed any evidence on the issue of fraud, but also none of the other 20 applicants permitted to do so under the terms of the 12 June 2025 order had done so either.

14. On 17 September 2025, Judge Lindsley granted the respondent’s application for Mrs Jhuma’s case to be joined with the other four. The particular relevance of Mrs Jhuma’s case to the issue of a solicitor’s duties to the Tribunal is discussed in more detail below.

15. On 23 September 2025, a Tribunal legal officer emailed ZYBA Law chasing them for their skeleton argument which should have been filed by 22 September. On 26 September 2025, Mr Shafiul Tauhid, a solicitor at the firm, replied to say that,

“we have sought counsels [sic] advice and it appears that there is no order in Jhuma case [sic] for a Skeleton Argument (nor even provision for a skeleton to be served) and, in the other four cases, we are not in a position to file one given that the claims have been withdrawn by the Applicants. Therefore, there would be no Skeleton Argument from our end.”

16. After having again been chased for their skeleton argument for the hearing, on 29 September 2025 Mr Tauhid emailed the Tribunal to say that the four linked applicants “have withdrawn their claim [sic] and, as such, Counsel is without instructions for the purposes of drafting a skeleton argument.” As we discuss below, the applicants had not in fact withdrawn their applications because the Tribunal had not consented to this.

The first four cases

17. The first four applicants’ cases can be summarised as follows:

a. Mr Bilal Ahmed applied for a visit visa on 8 June 2023. The application was initially refused on 21 June 2023 but reconsidered after the applicant sent a pre-action protocol (PAP) letter to the respondent and refused again on 8 November 2023. The instant judicial review claim was issued in the Upper Tribunal on 28 December 2023. Permission was refused by Upper Tribunal Judge Lane on 28 May 2024. His decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal. By consent order, sealed by the Court on 30 January 2025, the case was remitted to the Upper Tribunal for determination of the application for judicial review at a substantive hearing. On 6 May 2025, I made an order joining the case into the present proceedings.

b. Mr Ali Akbor applied for a visit visa on 19 June 2023. The application was initially refused on 28 July 2023 and, following PAP challenges, refused again on 27 November 2023, 4 March 2024, and ultimately on 17 July 2024. The instant judicial review was issued on 11 October 2024. Permission was refused on the papers and renewed to an oral permission hearing at which I granted permission on three grounds in an order sealed on 18 March 2025. On 28 March 2025, I made an order joining the case into the present proceedings.

c. Mr Kagim Uddin applied for a visit visa on 24 August 2023. The application was initially refused on 27 September 2023 and following PAP challenges refused again on 30 January 2024, 1 March 2024, 15 May 2024 and ultimately 14 August 2024. The instant judicial review claim was issued in the Upper Tribunal on 12 November 2024. Permission was refused on the papers and renewed to an oral permission hearing before me on 27 March 2025. By order of 28 March 2025, the permission decision was adjourned and the case joined into the present proceedings.

d. Mr Yasir Arafat applied for a visit visa on 15 September 2023. The application was initially refused on 26 September 2023 and following PAP challenges and judicial review proceedings refused again on 29 November 2023, 31 January 2024, and ultimately 6 September 2024. The instant judicial review was issued in the Upper Tribunal on 15 November 2024. Permission was refused on the papers and renewed to an oral permission hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan on 9 April 2025. By order of Judge Canavan, dated 9 April 2025, the permission decision was adjourned and the case joined into the present proceedings.

Mrs Jhuma’s case

18. The circumstances surrounding Mrs Jhuma’s case are slightly different. She applied for a visit visa on 13 December 2022. Her application was initially refused on 9 January 2023 and, following reconsiderations, again on 2 May 2023 and 14 August 2023. She was unsuccessful in obtaining permission to apply for judicial review of the third decision. For reasons that are unclear from the papers before us, the respondent then reconsidered the application for a fourth time but refused it again on 20 May 2024. That decision led to a second application for judicial review which was settled by way of consent on 10 February 2025 with the respondent agreeing to reconsider her decision within three months. On 14 April 2025, ZYBA Law wrote to the respondent asking that they treat the letter as a human rights claim. The letter said that Mrs Jhuma was seeking entry as a partner of a person present in the UK outside of the Immigration Rules, but it did not expressly state that it was intended to be a variation of her visit visa application made on 13 December 2022. Furthermore, we note that she had not completed the appropriate application form for a family visa nor had she paid the requisite fee, which is significantly higher than that for a visit visa.

19. On 6 May 2025, the respondent refused Mrs Jhuma’s application for a fifth time on the basis that she had provided a false marriage certificate in support of her application. Importantly, the decision did not address the purported human rights claim made on 14 April 2025 but considered and refused the application for a visit visa. That decision led to the current application for permission to apply for judicial review.

20. Despite this respondent having clearly refused Mrs Jhuma’s application for a visit visa, the judicial review claim form and the grounds of claim simply referred to the decision as having refused the applicant’s application for “Leave to Enter”. It was not expressly stated in what capacity the applicant was seeking leave to enter. In order to appreciate that Mrs Jhuma had initially applied for a visit visa, the reader would have to look at the respondent’s decision and the visa application form included in the bundle.

21. As well as not explaining in the claim form or the grounds of claim what sort of leave to enter Mrs Jhuma had applied for, at section 8 of the claim form Mrs Jhuma applied for her case to be exempt from the general stay on ZYBA Law’s visit visa cases:

“The Applicant respectfully seeks an exemption from the stay Order dated 12 June 2025 (JR-2023-LON-002929, JR-2024-LON-002724, JR-2024-LON-003112 & JR-2024-LON-003146) as this claim is not similar to the concerns raised in the above numbered claims, which consist of the following:

1 . The cover letter is substantially similar.
2. The Applicant’ s telephone number in his visa application form is the same - 8801748898794 .
3. Financial Statements have been prepared by MJR & Associates.
4. The letter from family purporting to explain loan repayments is similar.
5. Evidence from business and cultural associations are similarly worded.

As indicated in the Order of 12 June 2025, the stay is aimed at only those Judicial Review (JR) claims that have the above similarities so that they can benefit from any findings made in relation to the linked cases. Therefore, as this JR Claim is not one that shares any of the above similarities, the Applicant respectfully seeks permission that this claim progress in the usual way and not be stayed until a yet to be listed hearing in October 2025 as this
would be in the interests of justice.”

22. At section 11 of the claim form, the statement of truth was signed by Mr Tauhid on behalf of ZYBA Law.

23. However, on 8 July 2025 the Government Legal Department (GLD) wrote to the Tribunal with regards to Mrs Jhuma’s application to be exempt from the stay. GLD explained that Mrs Jhuma’s assertion that her case did not share similarities with the joined cases was wrong and, in fact, she had submitted documents with her application for entry clearance that were of concern. They consisted of the covering letter to the British High Commission; a letter from Mrs Jhuma’s sister purporting to explain the repayment of a loan; and letters from cultural associations in support of her character. All three had been left out of Mrs Jhuma’s judicial review bundle. GLD argued that these documents were substantially similar to the documents in issue in the stayed cases and that Mrs Jhuma’s case therefore fell within the terms of the stay order. On 10 July 2025, the respondent filed her acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence and appended the documents missing from Mrs Jhuma’s judicial review bundle.

24. On 1 August 2025, Mrs Jhuma made an application to reply to the summary grounds of defence. It was submitted on her behalf that she was not challenging a visit visa refusal but a refusal of her human rights claim; she was not relying on the documents appended to the acknowledgement of service because they were “irrelevant to this Judicial Review claim”; and “the original covering letter [to the visit visa application] is not similarly worded if compared with, for example, [Mr Akbor’s]”.

25. In an order sealed on 11 August 2025, I granted Mrs Jhuma permission to rely on her response to the summary grounds of defence but refused her application to be exempt from the general stay. Furthermore, I directed Mr Hussain to file a serve a signed witness statement within seven days explaining:

a. why the claim form, grounds of claim and reply to the summary grounds of defence failed to mention and/or denied that the applicant was challenging the refusal of a visit visa application;
b. whether there were any other documents provided with the visa application that had not been disclosed in the judicial review bundle; and
c. why the documents that had been disclosed were deemed to be relevant; and who at ZYBA Law authorised the above.

26. Mr Hussain was also directed to provide the case references for any other claims in which a similar approach of not disclosing documents contained in the visit visa application had been taken.

27. In response, Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid filed witness statements and a bundle of documents on 18 August 2025. In his witness statement, Mr Hussain:

a. Apologised for the error in failing to specifically mention that Mrs Jhuma had made a visit visa application in the claim form and grounds.
b. Denied that he had read the grounds before they were filed.
c. Explained that he understood that the reasoning behind the failure to mention that Mrs Jhuma had made a visit visa application was because the proceedings intended to challenge the respondent’s failure to make a decision on what they understood to be a variation of her visit visa application.
d. Denied that there had been any ill intentions or efforts to hide the history to the application.
e. Apologised for “any perceived confusing wording” in the reply to the summary grounds of defence which denied that Mrs Jhuma had made a visit visa application.
f. Explained that Mr Hussain had discussed the matter with Mr Tauhid at length and provided him with advice and guidance to ensure that a similar thing does not happen again.
g. Explained that Mr Tauhid had only included documents in the judicial review bundle that he believed were relevant to the human rights application, although it was accepted that that the correct approach would have been to disclose all the documents submitted to with the visa application.
h. Confirmed that he had confidence that Mr Tauhid’s decisions were not influenced by him trying to get around the general stay on the firm’s visit visa cases.
i. Apologised for suggesting in the reply to the summary grounds that the only visit visa cases subject to the general stay were those where the applicants had relied upon all five of the document types mentioned in the 28 March 2025 order.

28. In his own witness statement, Mr Tauhid:

a. Explained that the reason why the claim form, grounds of claim and reply to the summary grounds of defence did not expressly mention the fact that Mrs Jhuma had made a visit visa application was because “there is no challenge in these proceedings to the decision taken in response to that application. Rather the decision being challenged was the failure in the 6 May 2025 decision to consider the Human Rights claim made on 14 April 2025.”
b. It was his understanding that the 14 April 2025 letter varied the existing visit visa application and turned it into a human rights decision.
c. He did not provide a chronology of events in the grounds because the challenge was to the refusal of the human rights application.
d. Included in the judicial review bundle was the decision of 6 May 2025 which did set out a chronology of the various applications made and reconsidered.
e. The reply to the summary grounds “made it clear that the challenge was not to refusal of a visitor’s visa…but rather to the refusal of the human rights claim. This was not a denial that a visitor visa application had been made…but rather an explanation that the challenge was not to the refusal of that application but to the refusal of the Human Rights claim.”
f. Confirmed that other documents submitted by Mrs Jhuma in support of her visa application had also not been included in the judicial review bundle, namely:

i. Her marriage certificate;
ii. Her husband’s passport and invitation letter;
iii. Her employment letter, employment ID, business card and bank statement;
iv. Land registry documents, valuation certificate and inheritance certificate;
v. Family members’ IDs; and
vi. Hotel booking confirmation.

g. The applicant had made her human rights application on 14 April 2025, two months before the Tribunal stayed ZYBA Law’s visit visa cases and he therefore had no reason to limit the disclosure of documents to avoid the order. Therefore, when he issued the judicial review claim on 17 June 2025, he relied only on the same evidence as the human rights claim.
h. Accepted that had he instead disclosed all the documents submitted with the visa application this “would not have put the Tribunal in inconvenience”, which was something he now apologised for.
i. He had varied Mrs Jhuma’s visit visa application to a human rights claim following her husband’s immigration appeal having been allowed. He now understood that all the documents put in from the start of the application should have been disclosed but the failure to do so had nothing to do with the stay order.
j. Explained that he had not seen the disputed documents before except for the covering letter to the visa application form, although he was aware about the existence of the documents because they were listed in the covering letter.
k. Maintained that he acted in good faith.
l. Provided a list of other cases where he had not disclosed documents highlighted as being concern by the Tribunal.

29. On 5 September 2025, the respondent made an application to join Mrs Jhuma’s claim to the index ZYBA Law cases for the purposes of the 2 October 2025 hearing. She also made an application to cross-examine Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid. In a reply dated 4 September 2025 but filed on 8 September 2025, ZYBA Law opposed the respondent’s application arguing that it was misconceived because, in summary, (a) it was denied Mrs Jhuma’s case was similar to the other cases; (b) insufficient reasons had been given by the respondent for why she wanted to cross-examine Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid; and (c) it was for the Tribunal and not the respondent to decide whether any additional information was required from Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid beyond what is said in their witness statements.

30. In an order sealed on 17 September 2025, Judge Lindsley granted the respondent’s application and directed Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid to confirm by email whether they would attend the hearing on 2 October 2025 as witnesses.

31. On 23 September 2025, Mrs Jhuma made an application for an oral hearing to consider her arguments to “vary” the order of 17 September 2025, replacing it with one to refuse the respondent’s application. I refused the application for an oral hearing in an order sealed on 25 September 2025 (amended under the slip rule the same day) and considered and refused the applicant’s application to vary Judge Lindsley’s order on the papers. Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid were asked once again to confirm whether they would attend the hearing on 2 October 2025 as witnesses.

32. Mr Tauhid emailed the Tribunal on 29 September 2025 and repeated the assertion made in his 23 September 2025 email that the applicants had withdrawn their claims and he explained that neither he nor Mr Hussain intended to attend the hearing on 2 October 2025 to give witness evidence:

“It is noted that Mr Zakir Hussain or Mr Shafiul Tauhid are asked to confirm whether, despite having been given no indication as to what they will be asked, they wish to attend the hearing on 2 October 2025 to be cross examined on matters potentially arising in connection with points 1(b) and (c) of the order dated 12 June 2025. The order of 12 June 2025 was made in the context of the other four proceedings which have now been withdrawn. This invitation (and indeed the reference to points 1(b) and (c) of the order dated 12 June 2025) is made of days before the hearing with no details as to the matters which either the Upper Tribunal or the Secretary of State intend to ask Mr Zakir Hussain or Mr Shafiul Tauhid and no time or provision for a statement. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the witness statements adduced by Mr Zakir Hussain or Mr Shafiul Tauhid in the Jhuma proceedings, at the direction of the Upper Tribunal, do not deal with points 1(b) and (c) of the order dated 12 June 2025; but rather a mistaken application to lift a stay. In the circumstances, and for reasons which will be set out in further detail, in light of the patently unfair approach to inviting witnesses who have provided statements in relation to the lifting of a stay to attend Court to be cross examined on other matters without having provided a statement on these matters, Mr Zakir Hussain or Mr Shafiul do not feel comfortable attending Court on 2 October 2025.”

33. Mr Tauhid’s reference to the first four applicants having “withdrawn” their applications appears to have been a reference to a letter sent by ZYBA Law to the Tribunal on 11 August 2025. However, an applicant cannot withdraw an application for judicial review without the Tribunal’s consent: see rule 17(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the Procedure Rules”). Therefore, at the time his email had been sent, all five claims were still extant. We consider the applications for withdrawal below at paragraphs 40 to 42.

The hearing

34. As foreshadowed in a letter sent by ZYBA Law to the Tribunal on 1 October 2025, no counsel attended the hearing on behalf of the applicants or ZYBA Law. The reasons given for this were that ZYBA Law had no instructions to represent their clients at the hearing; and Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid had decided not to attend the hearing in order to be cross-examined by the respondent in relation to their conduct in Mrs Jhuma’s case.

35. Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid gave two reasons for their non-attendance at the hearing. The first was that it

“would be prejudicial and patently unfair to expect us to attend the hearing and tender ourselves for cross-examination without any witness statements from us, and without any confirmation (or indeed indication) of the areas the Respondent wishes to explore in cross-examination.”

The second was that Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid had

“other professional commitments that day. It is not possible for them to attend the hearing without causing prejudice to their other clients who require their services on 2 October 2025.”

36. We find the first reason given for their non-attendance to give evidence to be disingenuous. The respondent’s application to cross-examine the solicitors was filed in response to the witness statements they had made in the Jhuma case regarding the application to exempt their client from the general stay. It was therefore obvious that the respondent intended to question them about the contents of their statements and, therefore, no further statements were necessary. With regards to the second reason, we merely observe that it is surprising that having been aware of the hearing date since 17 June 2025, and having previously written a letter explaining that they intended “to continue [their] participation in the proceedings and will try to assist the Upper Tribunal the best that [we] can”, Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid nevertheless made alternative arrangements for the day of the hearing and decided that they were more important than complying with the order granting the respondent’s application to cross-examine them.

37. The respondent was represented at the hearing by Ms Broadfoot and Mr Yarrow at the hearing and we therefore heard submissions from them only.

Preliminary issues

38. At the outset of the hearing, we dealt with two preliminary issues.

The order of 25 September 2025

39. The first related to an assertion made by Mr Tauhid in his email of 29 September 2025 that it had not been open to the Tribunal to amend the order of 25 September 2025 under the slip rule. That order refused Mrs Jhuma’s application for an oral hearing to consider her application to vary Judge Lindsley’s order of 17 September 2025 as well as refusing the underlying application to vary the order. The original version of the 25 September order did not expressly state that the application for an oral hearing had been refused – it declared that “The application is refused” – although it was implicit that it had been. At the hearing, we reaffirmed that the position of the Upper Tribunal was that both the application for an oral hearing and the application to vary the order of 25 September 2025 had been refused.

The applications to withdraw

40. The second issue was the applicants’ applications to withdraw their claims. It is unclear from ZYBA Law’s letter of 11 August 2025 whether only Mr Ahmed, Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin and Mr Arafat intended to withdraw their claims or whether the other applicants listed in the annex who still had active cases also wished to do so. In any event, in their letter of 1 October 2025, ZYBA Law acknowledge that withdrawal can only take place with the Tribunal’s consent, but they submit that the default position is that the Tribunal will consent to withdrawal: see R (on the application of EK and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rule 17 Withdrawal) [2025] UKUT 00089 (IAC). While that is correct, as Judge Mandalia and I also explained in EK and Others at [40]:

“Ordinarily the Tribunal will have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it should consent to the withdrawal where there is nothing to be gained by the case proceeding when notice of withdrawal of the case or any part of it is given. That might be described as the ‘default position’. It is not however inconsistent with the [Procedure Rules] and the purpose of the rules for the Tribunal to refuse consent if it considers it appropriate in all the circumstances. An abuse of the Tribunal’s process is a powerful factor for refusing consent to withdraw but given the breadth of the discretion in the Tribunal Rules it would be wrong to treat abuse of process as either a necessary or an exclusive criterion.”

41. In the present cases, we are satisfied that it is appropriate to refuse the Tribunal’s consent under rule 17(2). We have had regard to the reasons given by the applicants as to why they wish to withdraw their claims. The first four applicants say that they wish to withdraw because of uncertainties about when their cases will be finally determined and the cost implications. In Mrs Jhuma’s case, the explanation given is that she wishes to withdraw her challenge to the respondent’s decision so that she can make a new application for leave to enter on human rights grounds. However, there are strong countervailing reasons for not allowing the applicants to withdraw their claims.

42. The resources of the Tribunal are finite and it is in the public interest that cases brought before it are not advanced in furtherance of fraudulent or misleading purpose by an applicant, whether that is on individual basis or as part of a wider attempt to circumvent immigration controls. As Mr Payne accepted at the last hearing, the Tribunal has identified matters arising out of these claims that raise a suspicion of fraud. In circumstances where there is an indication that the Tribunal’s processes may be being abused, permitting the applicants to withdraw their claims now would prevent the Tribunal from properly scrutinising their documents and deciding for itself whether there is evidence of fraudulent conduct. That would be contrary to the interests of justice, not least in circumstances where there are several other cases that have been stayed pending resolution of the issue.

Discussion

Part I: The fraud issue

43. The burden is on the respondent to prove to the civil standard that the documents are fraudulent: see DK & RK (ETS: SSHD evidence; proof) India [2022] UKUT 00112 (IAC). She submits that there is a prima facie case that the applicants have relied on fraudulent or dishonest material. Having carried out a holistic assessment of the documents before us, for the following reasons, we would agree.

The visa application forms and covering letters

44. First, the visit visa application form asks an applicant to provide their telephone number. But in several of the cases brought by ZYBA Law, the applicants have each given the same telephone number ending *794. This includes Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin, Mr Arafat, Mr Ahmed, Mr Nozir Ali, Mr Mohammed Amir Ali and Mr Uddin MD Amin. Mr Hussain confirmed in his response to the directions of 21 May 2025 that this telephone number belongs to a company called Vision Sylhet Consultancy. The dialling code reveals that the company is based in Bangladesh. Ms Broadfoot submitted that this was strong evidence that each of these applicants had used that firm to assist them with their visa applications.

45. Second, all of the applicants provided covering letters addressed to the British High Commission, New Delhi with their visa application forms. As Ms Broadfoot submitted, while not identical, they are all structured in a similar way. They begin with an introductory paragraph explaining why the applicant wishes to come to the UK, usually using stock phrases professing a passion for or love of travelling, a love of British culture, or a dream of wanting to visit the UK. They conclude by asking for permission to grant them “a visa for a short visit” so that they can have a “good” or “great” time in the UK and “create” “some” or “lasting” “memories”. The letters usually list the places in the UK that the applicant wishes to visit. The letters then have paragraphs dealing with their income, savings and investments, assets, social activities, family ties to Bangladesh, and their accommodation in the UK.

46. Because of the similarities we are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the letters have been written by the same person or else are based on a template. For example, Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin and Mr Ahmed’s letters all refer to them being “fascinated” or “fond” of British culture and food and all state that travelling is “a passion” of theirs. Both Mr Akbor and Mr Uddin list the same attractions, in the same order, that they wish to visit: the London Eye, Tower Bridge, the Tower of London, London Aquarium, and London Zoo. There are other curious aspects to the letters. For example, Mr Ahmed, Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin and Mr M.T. Howlader give the address at which they will be staying in the UK and describe it as being “in the heart of London”. However, the address provided by Mr Akbor is in West Bromwich and the one provided by Mr Howlader is in Barry, Wales.

47. We are therefore satisfied from the use of Vision Sylhet Consultancy’s telephone number in several of the applications as well as the striking similarities between the covering letters to the visa applications relied upon in all the cases that it is more likely than not that Vision Sylhet Consultancy has been involved in all of the applicants’ visit visa applications.

48. While Ms Broadfoot accepted that, in principle, there was nothing wrong with an applicant using an agent to help them with a visa application, she submitted that there was evidence from another case that suggested Vision Sylhet Consultancy’s services went beyond providing mere assistance. She argued that this evidence showed that Vision Sylhet Consultancy manufactured supporting documents for its clients. The evidence relates to an application for a visit visa made by a man who, so far as we are aware, has not sought to challenge the refusal of his application by way of judicial review. These documents are included at Exhibit E to the witness statement of Mr Asher Bennett, a GLD lawyer, dated 4 June 2025. While the documents are redacted to conceal the applicant’s personal details, it is clear that he has relied upon several documents familiar to the present cases, including a covering letter addressed to the British High Commission, New Delhi, letters of support from local associations, and a property valuation report prepared by Prime Development & Consultant. Also disclosed by the respondent is a copy of an interview transcript. This shows that the applicant was questioned by an immigration official at the British High Commission in Dhaka about his application on 13 May 2025. The following points of relevance emerge from the questioning:

a. The applicant explains that his hotel in the UK was booked by “Vision Sylhet agency”.
b. The applicant’s visa application form was completed by Vision Sylhet.
c. Asked what help Vision Sylhet gave him, the applicant lists the following: filling in the visa application form; arranging documents; translation; appealing; and paying the visa fee.
d. According to his visa application form, the applicant’s job consisted of inventory management, equipment management and computer troubleshooting. However, when questioned, he was unable to explain what inventory management and equipment management entail, how he troubleshoots a computer problem or what computer operating system he uses. He goes on to admit that he knows nothing about computers.
e. Asked who provided his employment documents, the applicant answered, “I don’t know who wrote it.”
f. Asked what documents he supplied to Vision Sylhet, the applicant answered, “Just my ID card.”

49. Ms Broadfoot submitted that this interview transcript is evidence that the applicant simply provided Vision Sylhet Consultancy with his ID card and they produced everything else submitted with his visa application. However, we note that while the applicant did say that the only document he gave to Vision Sylhet Consultancy was his ID card, the interviewing officer did not press him on whether this meant all the other documents submitted with his visa application had been fraudulently produced by his agent. Certainly, the applicant’s inability to explain what his job entailed or who had prepared the evidence of his employment suggests that he was not being truthful in his application so far as his work is concerned, but we are cautious not to draw any strong inferences about this so far as it relates to the cases before us. We do accept that the interview transcript raises some questions about the way in which Vision Sylhet Consultancy operates but, ultimately, the lack of follow up questions by the interviewing officer means that this was a missed opportunity to obtain more concrete information. We therefore find we can attach only limited weight to the transcript as evidence that the agency procures false documents for its clients.

The letters regarding loan repayments

50. When considering applications for visit visas made from Bangladesh, it is common for the respondent to scrutinise an applicant’s bank statements. She generally does this for two reasons. First, because this will show whether the applicant has sufficient funds to pay for their trip to the UK. And second, so that she can satisfy herself that the applicant has sufficient economic ties to their home country to make it likely they will return home at their end of their visit. The respondent will pay attention to any unexplained large deposits paid into the applicant’s bank account in case they have been made in order to artificially inflate the balance.

51. A common feature of the present cases is that all five of the conjoined applicants has sought to explain such large deposits as the repayment of loan that they had made to a family member, friend or business associate. In order to evidence this, they have each provided with their visa applications a short letter from said relative, friend or associate purporting to confirm the repayment of the loan. As Ms Broadfoot submitted, these letters are almost identical. The letter gives the name and address of the person in question, confirms the amount lent to them (usually in cash) and says that it was repaid to the applicant by way of a bank transfer. The author of the letter then confirms that they have attached their NID (the Bangladeshi national identity card) “for your record”. Often, the letters are not signed by hand but use a font that resembles handwriting, or they are not signed at all. The letters produced by the first four applicants include an identical typographical error: “serval” instead of “several”. These letters can also be found in the cases of Mr MD Nozir Ali, Mr Mizanur Rahman, Mr Mohammed Amir Ali, Mr Uddin MD Amin, Mr Salamun Ahmed, Mr MD S Ahmed, Mr MD Fahad Miah, Mr A Saleh Numan, Mr A A A Chowdhury, Mr MD Imamul Islam, MD Ripon Miah, Mr R Miah and Mr Mofijur Rahman.

52. On balance, we find that it is more likely than not that these letters, similar as they are, have all been provided by Vision Sylhet Consultancy, at least in template form. We accept that Bangladesh is a cash-based society and that it is not inconceivable that a person might call in a loan before they intend to travel to another country and that they want this repaid to them electronically so that they have a record of the transaction. However, we are satisfied that these letters are so prevalent across this cohort of applications that it casts doubt on their genuineness.

The MJR & Associates reports

53. Another common feature of these cases is that many of the applicants rely on statements of their assets and liabilities prepared by the same company in Sylhet, MJR & Associates. These reports are provided to satisfy the respondent that the applicants have a viable business and/or sufficient assets to return to in Bangladesh. The applicants who have relied on such a report include Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin, Mr Bilal Ahmed, Mr Nozir Ali, Mohammed Amir Ali, Mr Uddin MD Amin and Mr Shimul Ahmed.

54. It would be a remarkable coincidence if all the applicants, who live in different parts of Bangladesh, had each instructed MJR & Associates individually. It therefore appears to us that the most likely explanations are that (a) Vision Sylhet Consultancy referred the applicants to this company to assist them in obtaining evidence to support their applications; or (b) these reports have been fabricated. That scenario (b) is the more plausible explanation is supported by the fact that one applicant, Mr Saif Uddin, has relied upon a report seemingly produced a different company, MR Accounting Services. However, a close inspection of that report reveals that despite having a different business name and office address, the telephone number and email address for MR Accounting Services are the same as that used on the MJR & Associates reports.

Trade and cultural association letters

55. All of the applicants have sought to rely on letters purportedly written by trade, cultural or charitable organisations in order to demonstrate their good character and ties to their home country.

56. Ms Broadfoot submitted that despite being from different organisations, the wording of the letters is similar in style and content. They are often in the form of a certificate or short letter and in their translated forms at least frequently feature a heading stating, “To Whom It May Concern”, as might be expected. However, many feature near identical phrases, one of the most frequently used being, "As far as I am concerned he is not involved in any anti-state or anti-social activities”. Sometimes the English language version of the documents says “ante” instead of “anti” which suggests that they have been translated by the same person. An alternative phrase used is, “he is not involved in any activities against the state and society”. Other common wording includes, “I wish him all the best and success in life” and “I wish him all the best and a bright a future”. Different charitable organisations refer to applicants being “directly and indirectly involved” with them, which we find to be a curious phrase. A letter of support relied upon by Mr M.T. Howlader from the Munshiganj Welfare Society refers to him as being a woman, although we do not discount that this may be an error in translation.

57. We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the similarities between documents from different organisations submitted by different applicants does suggest that they have come from the same source.

Land valuation documents

58. In several cases brought by ZYBA Law, the applicants have relied upon land valuation reports to demonstrate the value of their properties in Bangladesh. Such evidence is usually relied upon to demonstrate both the applicant’s financial status in Bangladesh as well as their ties to the country. The applicants relying on these reports include Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin, Mr Arafat, Mr M.T. Howlader, Mr Salamun Ahmed, Mr Saif Uddin, Mr Enam Uddin, Mr Sagar Bapari, Mr Mizanur Rahman and Mr MD Imamul Islam. The most common source of these reports is a company called Kunjo Development & Consultant based in Sylhet. However, reports from other companies are also relied upon: Dream Land Property Developer in Chhatak, Trust Development & Consultant in Sylhet, Clifton Development Ltd in Dhaka, Arif Associate in Chhatak and Prime Development & Consultant in Sylhet. We note that the contents of these letters are very similar in style, structure and content regardless of which company purportedly wrote them. For example, each has the same heading, “Sub: Property Valuation”, and all end with, “We assume Fair Market Price” or “We assume present fair market price”, although we accept that may be standard wording for such reports in Bangladesh. More telling are the headers used by each company, which all include an identical description of the company’s services, including the same typographical error: “Architects, Plan, Design, Estimate, Soil Test, Pilling [sic], Site Supervision & Supplier”. We assume that “pilling” should be “piling”.

59. Our attention was also drawn to two other points that the respondent submits cast doubt on the genuineness of the valuation reports:

a. Reports from Trust Development & Consultant and Prime Development & Consultant, despite being having been made by two separate companies, include the same repeated typographical errors: “dicimal” instead of “decimal”.

b. Despite Kunjo Development & Consultant’s office being in Sylhet, Mr Arafat has purportedly instructed them to value his family’s property in Dinajpur despite his home address being almost 12 hours away from Sylhet by car according to Google Maps.

60. We are satisfied that the similarities in the documents mean that it is more likely than not that they have come from the same source.

Whether the respondent has made out a prima facie case of fraud?

61. For all the reasons given above, having considered the various indicia in the round, we are satisfied that the respondent has made out a prima facie case that the documents relied upon by the applicants are more likely than not to be the result of fraud or misrepresentation.

Have the applicants provided an innocent explanation?

62. Having found a prima facie case of fraud, the next step is to consider any innocent explanation provided by the applicants. However, none of the applicants has provided one.

63. While Mr Payne requested at the case management hearing on 11 June 2025 that the applicants be granted the opportunity to file evidence to prove that the documents they have submitted are genuine, as we have already explained, none of the applicants has chosen to file any evidence. Nor have they filed a skeleton argument. In our view, it should not have been difficult for an applicant to provide evidence to explain the documents they submitted as part of their visa applications. For example, they could have provided a witness statement explaining why they included Vision Sylhet Consultancy’s phone number in their application forms, what services that company provided to them, and how they obtained the various documents and reports in support of their applications. Conceivably, they could also have obtained a witness statement from someone in authority at Vision Sylhet Consultancy explaining how their business operates. But as things stand, we have no explanation or evidence before us to cast doubt on any of the respondent’s concerns about the documents.

Conclusion: whether the fraud is proven to the civil standard?

64. Having given careful consideration to the submissions made by Ms Broadfoot and the documents before us, we find on the balance of probabilities that all of the applicants listed in the annex to this judgment have relied upon fraudulent or misrepresentative documents in their applications for visit visas and, by extension, their applications for judicial review. We summarise our reasons below:

a. We are satisfied that it is more likely than not that all of the applicants listed in the annex to this judgment has paid Vision Sylhet Consultancy to assist them with their visa applications. This is supported by the use of Vision Sylhet Consultancy’s phone number in several of the application forms and obvious similarities in many of the documents relied upon by the applicants, including the similar covering letters to the British High Commission, New Delhi; the almost identical letters confirming the repayment of a loan; and the consistent reliance on financial reports prepared by MJR & Associates and the same handful of land valuation companies.

b. While there is nothing wrong in principle with an agent assisting someone with their visa application, which might include providing applicants with template letters to complete or recommendations for companies they might approach to provide evidence to support their applications, none of the applicants has provided evidence to say that is what happened, and there are clear indicators that Vision Sylhet Consultancy may have strayed beyond that. We find that we can attach some, albeit limited weight, to the interview record from 13 May 2025 to the extent that it suggests the applicant in that case may have provided Vision Sylhet Consultancy with only his ID card, and his visa application made assertions about his job that the applicant was unable to explain to the interviewing officer. But what we find to be more persuasive are the various factors relating to the supporting documents relied upon by the applicants that were set out by Ms Broadfoot.

c. This includes the fact that many of the applicants rely on financial reports written by MJR & Associates regardless of where they live in Bangladesh. While, as we acknowledge above, there might be an innocent explanation for this – e.g. that the applicants were referred to MJR & Associates by Vision Sylhet Consultancy – the fact that one applicant has produced a similar report from a different company, MR Accounting Services, that includes the same telephone number and email address for MJR & Associates leads us to doubt the provenance of these documents.

d. There is also the reliance on letters of support from business, cultural and charitable organisations. Despite being from multiple organisations, the letters are similarly structured and use the same or similar phrases so frequently that we are satisfied they more likely than not have originated from the same source.

e. We also place weight on the fact that many of the applicants have relied on property valuation reports purportedly written by different companies but where each company’s letterhead includes the same list of services, in the same order and with the same typographical error (“pilling” instead of “piling”). In at least some of the reports ostensibly prepared by two different companies there is a further identical typographical error (“dicimal” instead of “decimal”).

f. Regarding the loan repayments, we find that it is a remarkable coincidence that so many of the applicants have lent money to friends and relatives that has then been repaid just prior to their applications for visit visas and that they have used near identical letters, some including the same typographical error, to evidence the repayment. We bear in mind that it is possible that all of the applicants mentioned above did lend money to acquaintances in cash (Bangladesh primarily being a cash economy) and that they called in these loans before they wanted to travel to the UK and arranged for this to happen electronically so that they would have a record for the respondent. But having considered this evidence in the round, we are satisfied on balance that these letters, which feature in so many of the cases brough by ZYBA Law, do not evidence genuine loan repayments into the applicant’s bank accounts. The logical explanation is that they are designed to provide an explanation for a large deposit made into the applicant’s bank account in order to convince the respondent that the applicant has more funds available to them than is the actual case.

65. In reaching our conclusion on the documents, we have also taken judicial notice of the contents of the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Documentation, Bangladesh, November 2024 (Version 4.0) which, at paragraph 5.1.1 quotes from the GAN Integrity’s Bangladesh Risk report from November 2020. That says that Bangladesh “routinely finds itself among the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption is pervasive at all levels of society”. Paragraph 5.2.1 of the same report quotes from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, itself relying on a Danish National ID Centre fact-finding mission, which found that “[t]he credibility of Bangladeshi documents is generally low. This is primarily due to the high level of corruption in Bangladesh…”, while paragraph 6.1 refers to the Swedish embassy in Dhaka stating that

“it was easy to obtain genuine documents with false information. It was also possible to obtain forged documents. This applied to all types of documents, such as birth certificates, death certificates, marriage certificates, divorce papers, extracts from police records, documents from the notary public, judgments and decisions of lower or higher courts, currencies, driving licences, NID cards, seaman’s book, passport, etc.”

66. We are therefore satisfied that it is more likely than not that the applicants have relied upon fraudulent or dishonest documents, most likely provided to them by Vision Sylhet Consultancy, in order to make their applications for visit visas and (with the exception of Mrs Jhuma who failed to disclose them) that they have continued to rely on these fraudulent documents in order to support their applications for judicial review.

Part II: Obligations on solicitors

67. We therefore turn to consider questions (2) and (3).

68. We have proceeded to make the following findings in the absence of any engagement or submissions on behalf of ZYBA Law despite them having been afforded the opportunity to participate. We have, however, had regard to the contents of ZYBA Law’s letters to the Tribunal, including Mr Hussain’s letter dated 19 May 2025 which responded to questions put to him in the 28 March 2025 order. That letter gives some insight into what he believes a solicitor’s duties to be. We are also grateful to Ms Broadfoot for her submissions on these matters and found the respondent’s skeleton argument to be of great assistance.

The parties’ duties to the Tribunal

69. As the presidential panel explained in the opening paragraph of R (on the application for Shrestha and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Hamid jurisdiction: nature and purposes) [2018] UKUT 00242 (IAC):

“The Upper Tribunal, like the High Court, has inherent jurisdiction to govern its own procedure. Part of that jurisdiction includes ensuring that lawyers conduct themselves according to proper standards of behaviour: R (Hamid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin). In (R (on the application of Butt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 264 (Admin), a subsequent case concerning the Hamid jurisdiction, Sir Brian Leveson, President of the Queen’s Bench Division, pointed out that “in these days of austerity, the court simply cannot afford to spend unnecessary time on processing abusive applications …” (paragraph 4).”

70. Accordingly, if the Tribunal has concerns that there is pattern of potential fraud in cases brought before it, it has the power to hold hearings to consider any matter, issue directions, require evidence or submissions, and make rulings as may be appropriate in the circumstances: see rules 5(3) and 15(1) of the Procedure Rules.

71. Rule 2(4) of the Procedure Rules imposes a duty on parties to proceedings to help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective and co-operate with the Tribunal generally. Therefore, in circumstances where the Tribunal identifies areas of concern in cases before it, legal representatives are required to assist the Tribunal as it deems reasonably necessary short of disclosing any legally privileged information.

The duty of candour

72. The standard rules of disclosure in litigation do not apply to judicial review proceedings and disclosure is not required unless the Court (or Tribunal) orders otherwise: see paragraph 11.2 of Practice Direction 54A of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Instead, the duty of candour applies. While this is often thought of in terms of a public authority’s obligations, which are very high (see R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 1) [2002] EWCA Civ 1409), it applies equally to both parties throughout the proceedings.

73. The principles arising from the duty of candour were summarised by Fordham J in R (on the application of Police Superintendents’ Association) v Police Remuneration Review Body [2024] 1 W.L.R. 166 at [15]:

“For the purposes of analysing the issue with which I am concerned, I can identify the following as relevant Principles. For ease of later cross-referencing, I will give each Principle a label. I will identify, for each, some of the supporting sources, to which I will add references to the JR Guide 2022 and to passages in Gardner and JM:

(1) The ‘Standard Disclosure’ Principle. In judicial review, unlike most civil claims (CPR31), the parties are not generally required to give standard disclosure of documents (CPR PD54A §10.2), which means simply giving or offloading lots of documents is unnecessary and inappropriate (Hoareau §§19-20). (JR Guide 2022 §15.1.1; Gardner §22)

(2) The ‘Just Disposal’ Principle. In judicial review, the test for ordering disclosure of specific documents or categories of documents (CPR31.12(1)) is necessity to resolve the matter fairly and justly (Tweed §3), a test also governing requests in judicial review for further information (CPR18.1: see R (Bredenkamp) v SSFCA [2013] EWHC 2480 (Admin) §19) and cross-examination. (JR Guide 2022 §§7.6.2, 11.2.2; Gardner §§25, 27, 29 and 35)

(3) The ‘Candid Disclosure’ Principle. Judicial review is conducted with all cards face upwards on the table (Huddleston 945F), meaning full and fair disclosure of all ‘relevant material’ so the court can decide whether the public authority acted lawfully (Bancoult §192), based on an underlying principle that public authorities are engaged in a common enterprise with the court to fulfil the public interest in upholding the rule of law (Hoareau §20). (JR Guide 2022 §15.3.5, Gardner at §20; JM §90)

(4) The ‘Information-Too’ Principle. Candid disclosure also requires that relevant facts be identified in witness statement evidence, insofar as unapparent from disclosed contemporaneous documents (Belize §86), which means breach of the duty can lie in non-disclosure of a material document or the omission or obscuring in a witness statement of a fact or identified significance of a fact or document (Citizens UK §106(4)). (JR Guide 2022 §15.3.5; Gardner §21)

(5) The ‘Relevant Material’ Principle. Candid disclosure is required of (a) those materials reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision (Graham §18), (b) full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue that the court must decide (Quark §50[;] Citizens UK §106(3); Hoareau §20) and (c) a true and comprehensive account of the way in which relevant decisions in the case were arrived at (Quark §50; Downes §21) including the underlying reasoning (CPR PD54A §10.1). (JR Guide 2022 §§15.3.1, 15.3.4; Gardner §20; JM §90)

(6) The ‘Non-Selectivity’ Principle. Candid disclosure must not be selective but must include the unwelcome along with the helpful (Taylor §60; Graham §18; Hoareau §21). (JR Guide 2022 §15.3.5)

(7) The ‘Best Evidence’ Principle. Documents should be produced, not gisted or a secondary account given, since the document is the best evidence of what it says: Tweed §4; Hoareau §24; National Association §§47, 49). (JR Guide 2022 §15.1.3; Gardner §21)

(8) The ‘Redaction’ Principle. Documents need not be disclosed in their entirety but can be redacted (Tweed §33) for public interest immunity, confidentiality, legal professional privilege or statutory restriction. (JR Guide 2022 §15.5.1)

(9) The ‘Permission-Stage’ Principle. The duty of candour applies prior to – and for – the Court’s consideration of whether to grant permission for judicial review, though what is required to discharge the duty at the substantive stage will be more extensive (Terra Services §§9, 14), and the limited nature of disclosed material could inform a decision to grant permission (R (Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd) v Coventry City Council [2013] EWHC 3366 (Admin) [2014] ACD 48 §25). (JR Guide 2022 §15.3.2)

(10) The ‘Unpleaded-Grounds’ Principle. The duty of candour extends to documents and information which will assist the claimant’s case or may give rise to further grounds of challenge which might not otherwise occur to the claimant: De Smith’s Judicial Review (9th edition) at §16-026; Treasury Solicitor’s Guidance [2010] JR 177 at §1.2; R (K, A & B) v SSD [2014] EWHC 4343 (Admin) §11; after R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052, 1058C-D (cited in Graham §18).”

74. The President of the Upper Tribunal considered the duty of candour on applicants and the misuse of the Tribunal’s processes in R (on the application for Bilal Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (candour/reassessment duties; ETS: alternative remedy) IJR [2014] UKUT 00439 (IAC). At [15], the President emphasised that “All practitioners providing professional services in this field must familiarise themselves with the existence and content of this duty and give full effect thereto.” At [16], he quoted from an earlier authority of the High Court:

“In R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 3103 (Admin), a renewed claim for judicial review, Collins J observed, at [8]:

“……. it was not until the Acknowledgement of Service that the full history was disclosed. It is essential that those who bring judicial review proceedings appreciate that there is a duty of candour. That means that they must put before the Judge all relevant material and in particular any material which may be adverse, or may appear to be adverse. They must not leave the situation that the Judge does not have the full picture in order to make the relevant decision”

[My emphasis.]

His Lordship added the following stern warning, which I gratefully adopt in full, at [10]:

“I make it clear that there is ample authority which indicates that the Court is entitled to, and will in certain cases, refuse permission purely on the basis of such a breach. Whether or not there might be an arguable claim, ……. [this] can result in a refusal of permission.”

And at [11]:

“Furthermore, it is a breach of the obligation of the solicitors and Counsel if there has been a failure to include material which is relevant and particularly if that material is or may be adverse to the claimant. If such a breach occurs, it is open to the Court, and the Court will have no hesitation in so doing, to make an order that the solicitors in question, and possibly Counsel if Counsel is also shown to have been in breach of his duty, pay the costs incurred by the Secretary of State in producing an Acknowledgement of Service personally and ……. possibly the oral renewal as well.”

Practitioners should take note that this approach applies fully in judicial review proceedings in this Chamber.”

A solicitor’s professional obligations

75. First, all solicitors in England and Wales must comply with the Solicitors Regulations Authority’s (SRA) Principles. These are described by the SRA as follows: “The SRA Principles comprise the fundamental tenets of ethical behaviour that we expect all those that we regulate to uphold.”

76. The principles are that

“You act:

1) in a way that upholds the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and the proper administration of justice
2) in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the solicitors' profession and in legal services provided by authorised persons.
3) with independence.
4) with honesty.
5) with integrity.
6) in a way that encourages equality, diversity and inclusion.
7) in the best interests of each client.”

77. “Integrity” – principle 5 – is subject to extensive guidance reflecting the caselaw on this issue, which makes it clear that integrity “is a much broader concept than dishonesty” and it could include, for example, recklessly but not dishonestly misleading the court. The Guidance refers to and applies the distinction between integrity and dishonesty set out by Carr J (as she then was) in Williams v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2017] EWHC 1478 (Admin) stating, at [54]:

“I proceed on the basis, both on the authorities and as a matter of principle, that, in the field of solicitors' regulation, the concepts of dishonesty and want of integrity are indeed separate and distinct. Want of integrity arises when, objectively judged, a solicitor fails to meet the high professional standards to be expected of a solicitor. It does not require the subjective element of conscious wrongdoing.” (Underlining added)

78. Second, there is the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors and, third, as a separate document, the Code of Conduct for Firms. There is overlap in that some provisions are the same.

79. Relevant provisions of the Solicitors Code of Conduct include:

a. Chapter 1 Maintaining Trust and Acting Fairly, para. 1.4: "You do not mislead or attempt to mislead your clients, the court or others, either by your own acts or omissions or allowing or being complicit in the acts or omissions of others (including your client)."
b. Chapter 2 Dispute Resolution and Proceedings before Courts, Tribunals and Inquiries, para. 2.2: “You do not seek to influence the substance of evidence, including generating false evidence or persuading witnesses to change their evidence.”
c. Para.2.4: “You only make assertions or put forward statements, representations or submissions to the court or others which are properly arguable.”
d. Para.2.6: “You do not waste the court's time.”
e. Para.2.7: “You draw the court's attention to relevant cases and statutory provisions, or procedural irregularities of which you are aware, and which are likely to have a material effect on the outcome of the proceedings.”
f. Chapter 3 Service and Competence, para.3.3: “You maintain your competence to carry out your role and keep your professional knowledge and skills up to date.”
g. Para.3.5: “Where you supervise or manage others providing legal services: a) you remain accountable for the work carried out through them; and b) you effectively supervise work being done for clients.
h. Para.3.6: You ensure that the individuals you manage are competent to carry out their role, and keep their professional knowledge and skills, as well as understanding of their legal, ethical and regulatory obligations, up to date”
i. There are specific provisions on Confidentiality and Disclosure at paragraphs 6.3 to 6.5 along with Guidance on this. In short, the general rule is that client consent is required but there is no confidence as to the disclosure of an iniquity.

80. In the Code of Conduct for Firms:

a. Para.1.4 is the same as that set out above.
b. Paras.4.3 and 4.4 relate to ensuring those working for the firm are competent to carry out their role and that there are effective systems for supervising clients’ matters.

Legal professional privilege

81. Legal professional privilege entitles a party to withhold from disclosure communications with their legal representative made for the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice or which has come into existence for the dominant purpose of being used in connection with actual or pending legal proceedings. However, legal professional privilege does not arise in relation to a fraud, crime or other iniquity, including underhand conduct which is in breach of a duty of good faith or contrary to public policy or the interests of justice: see Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] K.B. 1038 at [53] to [55]. A lawyer does not need to be a party to, or be aware of, the iniquity for this principle to apply: see [56].

82. In Al Sadeq, Popplewell LJ said at [58]:

“…Such privilege is not prevented from attaching merely because the solicitor is engaged to conduct litigation by putting forward an account of events which the client knows to be untrue, and which therefore involves a deliberate strategy to mislead the other party and the court, and to commit perjury…Accordingly the touchstone in distinguishing such cases from those where the exception applies is whether the iniquity puts the conduct outside of the normal scope of such professional engagement or is an abuse of the relationship which falls within the ordinary course of such engagement.”

83. At [59], he gave the following example of a case where a party was not entitled to assert privilege:

“59 Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (No 6) [2005] 1 WLR 2734 was an example of conduct falling on the abusive side of the line, such that the iniquity exception applied. That litigation had a tortuous procedural history involving a number of trials and appeals. The disclosure ordered was for the purposes of an imminent trial (the so called Perjury II trial) in which Kuwait Airways was seeking to set aside an earlier judgment on the grounds that findings on which it was based, namely that Iraqi Airways’ conduct attracted state immunity from a particular date, had been procured by fraudulently perjured oral evidence and the manufacturing of forged documents and deliberate suppression of genuine documents. Such iniquitous conduct on the part of Iraqi Airways had already been proved in the so called Perjury I trial. David Steel J ordered disclosure of categories of documents (both in the hands of the solicitors, and held internally) relating to the preparations for the oral evidence of six witnesses, and the activity to conceal relevant documents, including those relating to the disclosure process. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision. Longmore LJ, with whom Ward LJ agreed, said at para 39:

“no privilege can exist in communications between Iraqi Airways Co and their previous English solicitors (let alone Iraqi Airways Co’s internal documentation) in relation to the tactics of and the evidence given in the main action or in the Perjury I action where the fraud was established.”

And at para 40:

“The present case is far from the ordinary run of cases envisaged by Glidewell LJ and is much more than a mere case where, in the words of Lord Goff [in Ex p Francis & Francis] a client gives wrong information to his solicitor which ‘if acted upon would lead to the commission of Perjury’. Here there was a widespread conspiracy to deceive the English court which was acted upon and has been proved to have led not only to perjury but to forgery and the perversion of justice on a remarkable and almost unprecedented scale.””

84. The Court in Al Sadeq also had to consider the legal threshold at which the iniquity exception applied: whether it was in cases where there was “prima facie case”, “strong prima facie case” or “very strong prima facie case” of fraud. At [63], Popplewell LJ

“reached the conclusion that save in exceptional cases, the merits threshold for the iniquity exception is the balance of probabilities test: the existence of the iniquity must be more likely than not on the material available to the decision-maker, whether that be the party or legal adviser determining whether to withhold disclosure, or the court on any application in which the issue arises and that in an interlocutory context there is no distinction between cases in which the iniquity is one of the issues in the proceedings and those where it is not. This, in my view, is what cases speaking of a prima facie case have had in mind, and what is meant by prima facie case in this context (whatever it may mean in other contexts).”

And at [98]:

“Gibbins [[2004] EWCA Crim 311] is therefore authority for the proposition that the test of prima facie case is a test of the balance of probabilities, to be conducted on the basis of the material available at the interlocutory stage at which the decision falls to be made; and that there is no useful purpose in glossing prima facie case with the epithet strong when so understood. A prima facie case is a case which allows a conclusion on a provisional (i e prima facie) basis that the iniquity exists. That is a conclusion to be reached on the civil standard of proof of the balance of probabilities.”

Acting when there are indicia of fraud

85. As explained above, legal privilege is not prevented from attaching to correspondence between a solicitor and a client merely because a solicitor is instructed to put forward an account of events which the client knows to be untrue. Similarly, there is no prohibition on a solicitor acting for a client in litigation in such circumstances. However, there is clear authority that circumstances may arise in which a solicitor cannot act for a client without first satisfying themselves that the client is not seeking to use their services to perpetrate a fraud.

86. In the Scottish case of Frank Houlgate Investment Company Limited v Biggart Baillie LLP [2010] S.L.T. 527; [2009] CSOH 165 (overturned on appeal on a different basis), the pursuers, who were an investment company, had been defrauded in a financial transaction by a man using the name John M Cameron. They subsequently brought a professional negligence claim against Mr Cameron’s solicitors, Biggart Baillie LLP. It was alleged that the firm had failed to notify the pursuers that they had become aware that Mr Cameron was not the owner of a property he had put forward as security for the financial transaction. Biggart Baillie argued that they owed no duty of care to the pursuers. The Court of Session held that a solicitor acting for one party in a conveyancing transaction would not normally owe a duty of care to the other party although an exception might arise where a solicitor acting for one party chose to answer an inquiry made by the other party. Another circumstance where the Court found that a solicitor would be liable to another party is where a solicitor becomes aware that their client is seeking to defraud the other party to a transaction yet continues to act in a way that furthers that fraud. At [21], Lord Drummond Young said:

“In the third place, the general rule relates only to a solicitor’s duty of care. If the solicitor becomes aware of dishonesty on the part of his client that amounts to a fraud on the other party to the transaction, he will plainly be under a duty to ensure that he does not further that fraud in any way. If he does anything in furtherance of the fraud, he will be liable to the other party to the transaction as a participant in the fraud. It is essential that the dishonesty should affect the other party in the transaction; it is self-evident that a solicitor may act for someone who is or has been dishonest, provided that he does not in any way further a dishonest purpose. Thus a solicitor may, for example, help his client to extricate himself from the consequences of a fraud, but in doing so he must be entirely honest about the fraud in all his dealings with other parties. More precisely, I consider that this form of liability will arise in any case where the solicitor becomes aware of facts from which the dishonesty of his client can reasonably be inferred….”

87. In Zulfiqar Ali v Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited [2021] EWHC 2709 (Admin), Mr Ali sought to appeal the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s (SDT) decision to strike him off the Roll of Solicitors. Mr Ali had been found guilty of misconduct arising from two matters, one of which was having acted for a property developer in a conveyancing transaction relating to the purchase of flats which “bore the hallmarks” of fraud. It was not suggested by the SDT that Mr Ali himself had acted fraudulently. However, it was satisfied that he had facilitated transactions on behalf of his client which raised “red flags” of fraud. Upholding the SDT’s findings on this point, Morris J said at [122]:

“Where there are "indicia" of fraud or possible fraud, it is professional misconduct to act, or continue to act, without carrying out further enquiries to satisfy oneself that the transaction is not fraudulent. In such a case there is a heightened need for due diligence to be undertaken: Bryant v Law Society [2007] EWHC 3043 (Admin) at §172.”

88. We take the following from these authorities:

a. A solicitor may act in the ordinary course of events for a client, even if the client is putting forward an account that the client knows to be untrue. Unless there is indicia of fraud, and as long as the solicitor is acting in accordance with their professional obligations, there is no obligation on them to proactively make enquiries to satisfy themselves that their client is telling them the truth. However, where there are “red flags” that bear the “the hallmarks of fraud”, the solicitor cannot continue to act for their client without first making enquiries to satisfy themselves that they are not being instructed to help further the fraudulent conduct. To continue to act would be in breach of their professional obligations.

b. A solicitor may also act for a client to help them extricate themselves from the consequences of a fraud that they have perpetrated. In doing so, the solicitor must be open and honest about the fraud in their dealings with other parties.

89. To illustrate, Mrs Jhuma’s visit visa application was refused because the respondent decided that she had relied upon a fraudulent marriage certificate. By accepting her instructions to challenge that decision on the basis that she maintained the marriage certificate was genuine ZYBA Law will have been properly acting in the ordinary course of their engagement. However, once they became aware of red flags that she along with other clients of theirs may have been part of a wider attempt to deceive the respondent into granting visit visas, there would have been an obligation on ZYBA Law to make reasonable enquires to satisfy themselves that their services were not being used in furtherance of that wider fraud.

90. Having summarised the authorities and a solicitor’s professional obligations, we can answer Questions (2) and (3) in the following way.

What professional obligations, if any, does a solicitor have to detect the use of fraud by their clients bringing judicial review proceedings, in particular the reliance on fraudulent material or dishonest statements, in advance of bringing legal proceedings?
91. A solicitor may act in the ordinary course of events for a client, even if the client is putting forward an account that the client knows to be untrue, providing that they do not further a dishonest purpose. Unless there are indicia of fraud, and as long as the solicitor is acting in accordance with their professional obligations, there is no requirement for them to proactively make enquiries to satisfy themselves that their client is telling them the truth. However, where there are “red flags” that suggest the client is seeking to use the solicitor’s services in furtherance of a fraud, the solicitor cannot continue to act for their client without first making enquiries to satisfy themselves that the conduct is not fraudulent. To continue to act would be a breach of their professional obligations: see Zulfiqar Ali and Houlgate.
92. Indicia of fraud would in our view encompass circumstances where a solicitor is, or should be, aware that several clients of the same nationality who have made applications for entry under the same immigration rule are relying on identical or substantially similar documents, and there is no obvious innocent explanation for this that means further enquiries are not needed. If there is no obvious innocent explanation, then in our view this should raise a red flag that the solicitor’s services may be being used in furtherance of a serious fraud. Whether it is reasonable to expect a solicitor to have noticed the indicia of fraud will depend on factors including the number of solicitors working for the firm and the time period over which the clients were taken on. For example, if a firm employs many solicitors and the clients are taken on infrequently over a long period, it may be unreasonable to expect a solicitor to pick up on any similarities in the documents. Conversely, where the firm is small and the clients were taken on over a short period of time or regularly over an extended period, it would more likely be reasonable to expect the solicitor to pick up on red flags.

What professional obligations, if any, do solicitors have in cases where, after they have brought legal proceedings, they are notified by the respondent, the Upper Tribunal or another potentially reliable source that their clients may be relying on fraudulent or unreliable evidence?
93. Parties to proceedings have a duty under the Procedure Rules to assist the Tribunal in furthering the overriding objective.
94. Furthermore, the duty of candour in judicial review applies equally to applicants and the respondent throughout the currency of the proceedings. Both parties are required to be open and honest in their dealings with the Tribunal. This includes candid disclosure of all relevant material and facts that are reasonably required by the Tribunal for it to arrive at an accurate decision. They must be presented in a full and accurate way, if necessary, in a witness statement if the facts are not apparent from the documentary evidence. The duty applies equally to evidence that may be helpful or unhelpful to the disclosing party. A breach of candour can arise where a party fails to disclose a material document or through omission or other method seeks to obscure a relevant fact: see Police Superintendents’ Association v Police Remuneration Review Body.
95. Legal professional privilege will not apply to documents and communications where, on the balance of probabilities, there is a prima facie case that a party has relied upon iniquitous conduct: see Al Sadeq. It is irrelevant whether that conduct is one of the issues in the proceedings or not. Consequently, where the iniquity exception applies, such documents may be disclosable under the duty of candour or be subject to a disclosure order made by the Tribunal.
96. The iniquity exception does not apply merely because a client instructs a solicitor to put forward a case that the client knows to be untrue. As we have already explained, a solicitor may act for someone who has been dishonest provided that they do not act in any way that furthers a dishonest purpose. The question is whether the iniquity puts the conduct outside of the normal scope of professional conduct or is an abuse of the relationship which falls within the ordinary scope of such engagements: see Al Sadeq.
97. Therefore, where information is brought to a solicitor’s attention, either by the Tribunal, the respondent or a third party, that, on the balance of probabilities, raises a prima facie case of iniquity on the part of their client, there is in our view a duty on the solicitor to assist the Tribunal in the furtherance of its inherent jurisdiction to ensure that its time and resources are not being abused in furtherance of a fraud. That duty arises from (a) rule 2 of the Procedural Rules; (b) the duty of candour; and (c) a solicitor’s professional obligations under (i) the SRA Principles to act in a way that upholds the public trust and confidence in the solicitor’s profession and the duties to act with honesty and integrity; and (ii) the Solicitors Code of Conduct, including the duty to maintain trust and act fairly and the duty not to waste the court’s time. A failure to comply with those duties may result in the Tribunal taking action against the solicitor under its Hamid jurisdiction.
Part III: Application to the facts of the present cases

98. Having made the findings above, we now consider whether ZYBA Law have complied with their duties as solicitors to the Tribunal.

99. We would first make it clear that ZYBA Law deny having any links to Vision Sylhet Consultancy. They also deny using any agents in Bangladesh. The respondent has not sought to cast doubt on those assertions and neither do we. On the limited information available to us, we are unable to make any findings on why so many Bangladeshi nationals relying on similar documents in support of their visit visa applications have decided to use ZYBA Law, seemingly exclusively, to bring their judicial review claims and it would be inappropriate for us to speculate.

100. At various stages we have issued directions to ZYBA Law for them to assist the Tribunal by answering our questions and providing information. The order of 28 March 2025 required Mr Hussain to explain whether he was aware of any similarities between the documents relied upon by Mr Uddin and Mr Akbor in support of their visit visa applications before filing their judicial review claims and, if not, why not. Mr Hussain responded on the following basis in his letter of 19 May 2025:

“It is, with respect, not the function of a solicitor, who is given documents and instructions by one client, to then seek to compare those documents and instructions with those given by another client, in order to ascertain any similarities and/or to embark on further inquiry. This was not a matter that was in Mr Hussain’s mind when he was instructed in these cases.

Indeed, it is quite common in the immigration law jurisdiction for unconnected clients to rely on the same kind of information and documents in support of their applications. It would be unworkable for a solicitor to embark on such a comparison every time they receive instructions from a client. Further, it raises issues of confidentiality. It is simply not possible for a solicitor, who is instructed by one client, to say to them upon receipt of instructions that they have another client who has provided similar instructions and documents. That would compromise client confidentiality.

In these cases, no issue — none whatsoever — was taken by the Respondent as to the probity of the relevant documents. Given that this was not even an issue between the parties, Mr Hussain was naturally not thinking about the probity of the relevant documents. It is not the function of a solicitor to start challenging a client, upon receipt of instructions and documents, as to the probity of those instructions and documents in circumstances where that is not an issue in the case.”

101. Mr Hussain was also asked whether he was aware of any other judicial review claims brought by his firm where the applicant has relied on documents that were similar or identical to those identified by the Tribunal. Again, we set out Mr Hussain’s response in full:

“The Upper Tribunal, on its own motion, has identified nine cases in which the applicant relied on similar or identical documents. ZYBA Law holds approximately 300 judicial review files. Unless directed to do so, it is not our intention to conduct an audit of those files to ascertain whether other applicants relied on similar or identical documents.

Moreover, conducting such an audit and providing the resulting information to the Respondent (who is the opposing party) would breach our duty of confidentiality. If the Respondent suspects that any applicant has submitted false documents, she is at liberty to investigate and to take whatever action she considers appropriate. However, there is no obligation on us — i.e. on ZYBA Law and Mr Zakir Hussain — to assist the Respondent in this regard. This is unlike obligations which may arise in relation to money laundering or terrorism.

Furthermore, anything we provide to the Upper Tribunal and the Respondent in relation to these claims must also be disclosed to the applicants in these claims. They have a right to see such information, documents, and details. We cannot possibly provide documents or details relating to other clients to these applicants without risking a breach of the principle of confidentiality.”

102. We address below the four main points that we have identified in Mr Hussain’s letter.

103. First, is Mr Hussain’s suggestion that it not the function of a solicitor to seek to compare the documents relied upon by one client with those of another in order to ascertain whether there are any similarities. In the normal course of events, we would accept that is correct. In a medium or large law firm where cases are spread across several different solicitors or over a protracted period of time it likely will be more difficult to identify patterns that may indicate fraud. For example, given the dozens of lawyers working in GLD’s immigration litigation teams, it is perhaps unsurprising that no one there picked up on the suspect documents. But there may be cases where the documents arise so frequently that it would be unusual not to notice a pattern emerging. In the instant case, ZYBA Law is a small firm and, so far as we are aware, conduct of all the cases have been shared between just two solicitors: Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid. Furthermore, many of the applications for judicial review were filed within a short period of time. For example, Mr Akbor, Mr Uddin, Mr Arafat, Mr MD Nozir Ali and Mr Uddin MD Amin’s cases were all filed with the Tribunal between 22 August 2024 and 15 November 2024. Mr Akbor and Mr Arafat’s claims were filed just three days apart. Given that all of these applicants’ judicial review bundles were prepared to a template index, in our view it is reasonable to have expected the solicitor reviewing the papers and compiling the bundles to have noticed the similarities in the documents relied upon by the applicants. Indeed, I needed to see only two of the cases over the course of a month before I noticed the similarities in the evidence. Yet, according to Mr Hussain, he failed to notice the similarities despite his firm being responsible for all of these applications.

104. On 27 March 2025, the Tribunal had brought to ZYBA Law’s attention numerous red flags that raised a prima facie case of fraud. Mr Hussain was therefore required to take reasonable steps to satisfy himself that his firm was not being used by his clients in furtherance of that fraud. However, there is no evidence before us to suggest that he did that. To the contrary, Mr Hussain’s correspondence indicates that his view was that he was entitled to carry on as before because the respondent had not herself raised the concerns.

105. Second, is Mr Hussain’s claim that it would not be possible for a solicitor to tell one client that they have another client who has provided similar instructions and documents or share information with the respondent because that would compromise client confidentiality. It is unclear from Mr Hussain’s letter whether he is referring to legal professional privilege or some other duty of confidentiality, for instance under the UK GDPR. In any case, we reject his proposition:

a. It is difficult to see how a solicitor comparing documents relied upon by different clients would breach confidentiality requirements.
b. There is no obvious need for a solicitor to share the documents between different clients let alone in a form in which personal details are disclosed. It is also open to a solicitor to ask for a client’s permission to share documents as may be necessary.
c. In any event, unless, for example, reporting restrictions have been made or a confidentiality ring is in place, once documents have been filed with the Tribunal they form part of public legal proceedings.
d. Similarly, given that ZYBA Law will already have served the judicial review bundles on the respondent, it is difficult to see how, by confirming with the Tribunal and the respondent which of those cases include the documents of concern ZYBA Law could be said to have breached their duty of confidentiality.
e. Legal privilege does not arise where there is a prima facie case of fraud.

106. Third, are Mr Hussain’s assertions that given that the respondent had not questioned the probity of the documents relied upon by his clients he was not thinking about their genuineness; that it “is not the function of a solicitor to start challenging a client…as to the probity of those instructions and documents in circumstances where it is not an issue in the case”; and that “there is no obligation on us – ZYBA Law and Mr Zakir Hussain – to assist the Respondent in this regard.” However, as the cases of Houlgate and Zulfiqar Ali demonstrate, where a solicitor becomes aware that their client may be committing a fraud, it is professional misconduct to continue to act without first satisfying themselves that their client is not acting dishonestly. This applies equally where fraud or misrepresentation is not an issue in the proceedings.

107. Fourth, is Mr Hussain’s refusal to carry out, unless directed to do so, an audit of his cases to help the Tribunal identify those where the applicants had relied on the documents of concern. His refusal to assist had two consequences: the Tribunal had to stay all of ZYBA Law’s visit visa judicial review claims; and the Tribunal had to try and identify the cases itself. This inevitably delayed the administration of justice for those cases where the applicant did not rely on the documents of concern and, furthermore, it took up valuable Tribunal time and resources in reviewing ZYBA Law’s cases itself.

108. We are therefore satisfied that Mr Hussain has not acted in accordance with his duty under rule 2 of the Procedure Rules to assist the Tribunal in furthering the overriding objective and he arguably has acted in breach of his duties as a solicitor to act in a way that upholds the public trust and confidence in the solicitor’s profession, to act with integrity and not to waste the court’s time.

Mrs Jhuma’s application for judicial review

109. ZYBA Law’s handling of the case of Mrs Jhuma gives us serious cause for concern.

110. Mrs Jhuma’s application for judicial review was filed on 17 June 2025. That was almost three months after I had first raised concerns about Mr Akbor’s and Mr Uddin’s cases at the permission hearing on 27 March 2025 and six days after the case management hearing at which Judge Lindsley and I decided to stay ZYBA Law’s visit visa cases pending a decision on whether the applicants were seeking to rely on fraudulent documents. Mr Tauhid would therefore have been well aware of the Tribunal’s concerns.

111. Even if Mr Tauhid is correct and the three documents were not directly relevant to Mrs Jhuma’s challenge to the respondent’s decision of 6 May 2025, they were clearly relevant in the wider context because this amounted to evidence of yet another applicant relying on the same or similar material. It was also of direct relevance to Mrs Jhuma’s application to exempt herself from the general stay on ZYBA Law’s visit visa cases. It is therefore astonishing that a decision was taken not to disclose material submitted by Mrs Jhuma with her visit visa application that fell squarely within the cohort of documents identified by the Tribunal. It is even more concerning that ZYBA Law would then make an application for Mrs Jhuma’s case to be exempt from the general stay on the express basis that “this JR Claim is not one that shares any of the above similarities” with the other cases. That application was accompanied by a statement of truth signed by Mr Tauhid on 17 June 2025. In doing so, he ticked a box confirming that the “the facts and matters stated in this application are true and complete.”

112. As we now know, Mrs Jhuma had in fact relied upon three of the five documents that Mr Tauhid had expressly claimed were not in issue in her case. We take into account Mr Tauhid’s explanation that he did not include the documents because he believed them to be irrelevant to the judicial review proceedings as a result of Mrs Jhuma purportedly varying her visit visa application to a human rights claim on 14 April 2025. In his witness statement, Mr Tauhid asserts that the human rights claim was made before the stay on ZYBA Law’s visit visa claims was made on 12 June 2025 and therefore it could not have been intended to circumvent that stay. However, while it is correct that the human rights claim pre-dates the general stay, it post-dates the 27 March 2025 hearing and the subsequent directions order in which ZYBA Law were notified of the Tribunal’s concerns arising from the visit visa claims.

113. Mr Tauhid’s repeated suggestion in his reply to the summary grounds of defence and his witness statement that Mrs Jhuma was not challenging the refusal of a visit visa application but the refusal of her human rights claim also rings hollow. It is clear from reading the 6 May 2025 decision that it was concerned only with a refusal of a visit visa application. It was not a refusal of a human rights claim. That Mrs Jhuma’s third ground of claim argued that the respondent had unlawfully failed to consider her human rights claim only serves to show that it was wrong to characterise the decision as a refusal of a human rights claim.3

114. We have reviewed the bundles produced by ZYBA Law in respect of Mrs Jhuma’s previous two judicial review claims4 and we note that the letter regarding the repayment of a loan and the letters from the cultural associations were not provided with them either. However, the covering letter to the British High Commission was disclosed as part of those applications. While we acknowledge Mr Tauhid’s claim that he had not seen the letter regarding the repayment of the loan and the letters from the cultural association before, he undoubtedly had seen the covering letter and, as he acknowledges at paragraph 12 of his witness statement, he was aware that the other documents were listed within it as having been provided to the respondent with the visit visa application.

115. Therefore, when preparing Mrs Jhuma’s application for permission to apply for judicial review, Mr Tauhid:

a. knew that the Tribunal had already raised concerns about specified documents relied upon by some of ZYBA Law’s clients;
b. knew that the Tribunal had stayed all of ZYBA Law’s visit visa cases while the question of fraud was investigated;
c. knew that Mrs Jhuma had applied for a visit visa;
d. knew that Mrs Jhuma had been expressly accused by the respondent of having relied upon a fraudulent document (her marriage certificate); and
e. was aware from material available to him that Mrs Jhuma had relied on three of the documents of concern to the Tribunal as part of her visit visa application.

116. When preparing Mrs Jhuma’s judicial review claim, including her application to exempt herself from the stay, Mr Tauhid should have recognised that the duty of candour required him to disclose to the Tribunal the documents that accompanied Mrs Jhuma’s visit visa application and to set out all the relevant facts of the case in the statement of facts and grounds, yet he failed to do either. Equally concerning is that the judicial review claim form then unequivocally claimed that Mrs Jhuma had not sought to rely on any of the documents of concern when applying for her case to be exempt from the general stay. He then double-downed on his position at paragraph 7 of the reply to the summary grounds. We find these breaches of the duty of candour, and arguably Mr Tauhid’s professional duty to act with integrity, to be significant.

117. For the reasons given above, we intend to make Show Cause notices against both Mr Hussain and Mr Tauhid under the Hamid jurisdiction.

Disposal

118. At the hearing, Ms Broadfoot argued that if the Tribunal was to find that there is evidence that the applicants have relied on fraudulent documents, their cases should be dismissed and the applicants ordered to pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis. The respondent has also reserved her right to apply to reopen cases that she has settled by consent.

119. In the light of our decision to withhold consent to the withdrawal of the applicants’ claims, we consider it both fair and in the interests of justice to convene a joint hearing encompassing all cases currently subject to the general stay. This will afford the applicants an opportunity to renew their applications to withdraw or to make submissions as to why their claims should nonetheless be permitted to proceed in view of the Tribunal’s findings on fraud, and to respond to the respondent’s application for indemnity costs. Directions will be issued accordingly.

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Annex: Table of cases relevant to this judgment

Case Reference Applicant's Name
1. JR-2023-LON-000938 A Saleh Numan
2. JR-2023-LON-002929 MD Bilal Ahmed
3. JR-2024-LON-001463 (CA-2024-002884) Minhajur Rahman Polash
4. JR-2024-LON-001679 Mofijur Rahman
5. JR-2024-LON-002177 MD Ripon Mia
6. JR-2024-LON-002276 MD Nozir Ali
7. JR-2024-LON-002488 Mizanur Rahman
8. JR-2024-LON-002623 Uddin MD Amin
9. JR-2024-LON-002724 Ali Akbor
10. JR-2024-LON-002763 R Miah
11. JR-2024-LON-002829 Mohammed Amir Ali
12. JR-2024-LON-002988 Mohammad M Hussain
13. JR-2024-LON-003112 Kagim Uddin
14. JR-2024-LON-003146 Yasir Arafat
15. JR-2024-LON-003155 Sagar Bapari
16. JR-2024-LON-003167 MD Imamul Islam
17. JR-2025-LON-000934 Salamun Ahmed
18. JR-2025-LON-000552 Enam Uddin
19. JR-2025-LON-000585 Saif Uddin
20. JR-2025-LON-000657 MD Fahad Miah
21. JR-2025-LON-000764 MD Shimul Ahmed & Others
22. JR-2025-LON-000784 M.T. Howlader
23. JR-2025-LON-000827 M.S. Howlader
24. JR-2025-LON-000864 M A A A Chowdhury
25. JR-2025-LON-001964 Taslim Akter Jhuma

NB. The cases in bold are those formally joined for the purposes of the hearing on 2 October 2025.

The other cases are those identified as being relevant in the spreadsheet circulated to the parties by the Tribunal on 1 May 2025 and in the witness statement of Mr Bennett dated 4 June 2025.