JR-2024-LON-001256
- Case title:
- Appellant name:
- Status of case: Unreported
- Hearing date:
- Promulgation date:
- Publication date:
- Last updated on:
- Country:
- Judges:
The decision
JR-2024-LON-001256
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Mohammad Faroque Hossain Baparee
Applicant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
UPON the matter being remitted by the Court of Appeal for consideration of the arguability of Applicant’s application for judicial review along with his application to extend time for bringing the claim therein;
AND UPON hearing oral evidence;
AND UPON hearing submissions from Mr Lee of counsel for the Applicant and Mr Yarrow of counsel for the Respondent;
It is ORDERED that:
1. The application for judicial review is not admitted;
2. The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s reasonable costs of proceedings in the Upper Tribunal to be assessed if not agreed;
3. The parties are to file written submissions on the issue of the basis and scope of the costs assessment referred to in paragraph 2, by 4pm on 25 March 2026, for determination by Judge Hoffman on the papers. Such submissions to be limited to 2 sides of A4;
4. Permission to appeal is refused because no application has been made on the Applicant’s behalf and, in any event, I am satisfied that the Upper Tribunal did not commit any arguable error of law in refusing to admit his claim, nor is there any other compelling reason to grant permission.
Signed: M R Hoffman
Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
Dated: 18th March 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 18/03/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2024-LON-001256
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
18th March 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
MOHAMMAD FAROQUE HOSSAIN BAPAREE
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr G Lee
(instructed by PSA McKenzie Solicitors), for the applicant
Mr T Yarrow
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 26th February 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Hoffman:
1. This decision concerns two matters. The first is whether the applicant should be granted an extension of time to file his judicial review claim. The second is, if an extension of time is granted, whether the claim discloses arguable grounds for judicial review such that permission should be granted.
2. By way of his application for judicial review, the applicant seeks permission to challenge the respondent’s decision dated 3 January 2023 treating his application for leave to remain as a dependent of a representative of an overseas business as invalid.
Background
3. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh born on 1 December 1978. He was granted a two-year multiple entry visit visa on 22 July 2020. On 3 September 2020, he entered the UK along with his wife and son. According to the applicant, they intended to return to Bangladesh on 25 December 2020. They did not, however, leave the country. According to the applicant, this was due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
4. On 6 March 2021, the applicant applied for an exceptional assurance under the Covid Visa Concession policy. This was granted on 9 March 2021, permitting him to remain in the United Kingdom until 30 April 2021. On 6 May 2021, he sought a further extension of that assurance, which was granted on 10 May 2021, extending his permission to 30 June 2021. A subsequent extension was then granted, allowing him to remain until 1 October 2021.
5. Meanwhile, on 7 May 2021, the applicant’s wife applied for leave as an overseas business representative, with their son as her dependent, under Appendix Representative of an Overseas Business of the Immigration Rules (“Appendix ROB”). On 16 August 2021, the applicant’s wife and son were granted three years’ leave to remain.
6. On 31 August 2021, the applicant applied for leave to remain as a dependent spouse. That application was refused on 29 March 2022. However, following an administrative review, the respondent withdrew her decision but, following a reconsideration on 3 January 2023, the application was rejected as invalid on the basis that as a person who had last been granted permission as a visitor, the applicant did not meet the validity requirements set out under paragraph ROB 20.4 of Appendix ROB.
7. On 10 February 2023 the applicant sent a pre-action letter to the Home Office, although the respondent says that this was not received until 21 February 2023. The respondent replied to that letter on 6 March 2023, maintaining her decision. What happened next is a matter of dispute between the parties.
The timing of the application for judicial review
8. According to the applicant, on Sunday 26 March 2023, he sent his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal from the post office at the Royal Hospital Chelsea (RHC). However, no such application was ever received by the Tribunal.
9. On 22 April 2024, Mr Pasoon Sadozai, a solicitor working for PSA McKenzie Solicitors, emailed the Upper Tribunal to say that his firm had been instructed by the applicant. Mr Sadozai explained that the applicant “has submitted a judicial review application on 26/03/2023 however they have not had any response since.” The Upper Tribunal replied on 24 April 2024 to explain that it had no record of the applicant having filed an application for judicial review.
10. Consequently, on 26 April 2024, the applicant’s solicitors filed an application for judicial review with the Upper Tribunal. The date of the grounds of claim is 26 March 2023. Section 8 of the claim form included the following:
“Although the application seemed to be filed on time (please refer to the attached proof of posting) [sic]. However, in the recent email from the Tribunal, it was suggested to apply for out of time application [sic].
It is submitted that the applicant submitted his application on 10.02.2023 [sic], but the Tribunal did not receive the same. We would therefore request the Tribunal to accept this application valid [sic] and grant him permission to lodge this application.”
11. Accompanying the application were the following documents:
a. A Certificate of Posting, naming the Upper Tribunal as the recipient, with an RHC Post Office stamp dated 26 March 2023.
b. An image of an envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal with RHC Post Office stamps dated 26 March 2023 over the postage stamps.
c. A photograph of an envelope addressed to the (Home Office’s) Litigation Operations Allocation Hub with stamps from the Abbotts Langley Post Office dated 10 February 2023 over the postage stamps (this was said to contain the pre-action letter).
The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
12. In an order sealed on 4 September 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor refused to admit the application for judicial review on the basis that it was out of time. The applicant then renewed his application to an oral hearing that took place on 9 October 2024 where it was heard by a panel (Upper Tribunal Judges Perkins and Ruddick). They too refused to admit the application. However, that decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal and the matter remitted to the Upper Tribunal for rehearing: see [2025] EWCA Civ 1464.
Legal framework
13. Rule 28(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 sets out the deadline for bringing applications for permission to bring judicial review proceedings in the Upper Tribunal:
“…an application under paragraph (1) must be made promptly and, unless any other enactment specifies a shorter time limit, must be sent or delivered to the Upper Tribunal so that it is received no later than 3 months after the date of decision, action or omission to which the application relates.”
14. However, under its case management powers, the Upper Tribunal may “extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction”: see rule 5(3)(a).
15. In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the Tribunal will apply the well‑known three‑stage test set out in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, namely: (i) it will consider whether the delay is serious and significant; (ii) if so, it will consider why the failure occurred; and (iii) it will evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal with the application justly.
The hearing
16. The Upper Tribunal directed four individuals to give oral evidence: the applicant and his witness, Mr Manish Patel; and, on behalf of the respondent, Ms Fatima Fares of the Government Legal Department (GLD) and Mr Mark Taylor of the RHC. Mr Patel did not attend the hearing. The applicant, Ms Fares, and Mr Taylor all appeared and were cross‑examined. Their oral evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings.
17. The electronic hearing bundle prepared by the applicant’s solicitors left much to be desired. The index did not clearly set out all its contents; no hyperlinks or bookmarks were included; it was not fully text‑searchable; and it did not contain all the evidence upon which the parties sought to rely. I therefore had to work from several different documents:
a. The hearing bundle (HB).
b. The exhibits to Ms Fares’s statement, which had been omitted from the hearing bundle.
c. The applicant’s original judicial review bundle, filed on 26 April 2024.
d. An image of the envelope purportedly sent to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023, which had been uploaded to the case management system on 26 April 2024.
e. The applicant’s amended judicial review bundle, filed on 5 July 2024 (AJRB).
f. The respondent’s Acknowledgment of Service and summary grounds of defence, filed on 22 July 2024.
g. The parties’ skeleton arguments filed for the hearing.
18. I heard submissions from both parties and, at the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
A. Whether the applicant posted his claim form to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023
19. In support of his claim that he posted his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023, the applicant relies on the following evidence:
a. The documents referred to at [11] above.
b. Copies of the UTIAC1 form and grounds of claim that he purports to have posted to the Upper Tribunal.
c. Evidence from Mr Manish Bharatkumar Patel, who works at the RHC Post Office, including a letter dated 30 April 2025 addressed to the Court of Appeal and two witness statements, dated 23 October 2025 and 31 October 2025. Mr Patel’s evidence is that, until October 2024, the RHC Post Office was open seven days a week from 9 am to 5 pm.
20. The applicant has also prepared two witness statements.
21. The first statement (which is unsigned and undated) records that the applicant “signed and submitted” his application for judicial review on 26 March 2023 (paragraph 13). He states that he was advised by his OISC representatives that he should then wait, and that he was unaware that he was required to notify the respondent of his application or expect an Acknowledgment of Service. At paragraph 14, he explains that, in April 2024, his immigration advisers put him in contact with his present solicitors, who informed him of the judicial review process. He instructed them to make enquiries with the Upper Tribunal, at which point he discovered that the Tribunal had no record of his application.
22. The second statement (dated 24 October 2025) was prepared for the Court of Appeal hearing, although the Court of Appeal refused to admit it. It is accompanied by screenshots taken from the applicant’s son’s mobile phone. The applicant explains that the metadata for those screenshots shows that they were taken during the hearing before Judges Perkins and Ruddick on 9 October 2024. The screenshots include an image of the RHC Post Office’s opening times on Google, which states that it is open between 9 am and 5 pm on Sundays (Exhibit FB1).
23. The applicant states that on 30 April 2025 he visited the RHC Post Office to obtain further evidence. He says that he met with Mr Patel, who worked at the post office, and showed him the Certificate of Posting. Following this, Mr Patel “kindly issued a written confirmation on the same day confirming the receipt had indeed been issued by their post office.” The written confirmation referred to is Exhibit PSJR2 to Mr Sadozai’s second witness statement. It is a typed letter addressed to the Court of Appeal, dated 30 April 2025, in which Mr Patel states as follows:
“I am writing on behalf of Chelsea Post office [sic], that until October 2024, we were open 7 days a week from 9:00am-17:00pm.
We Confirm [sic] that the stamp shown on the envelope dated 26/03/2023, was from this post office.
We also allow customers to take photographs of their envelopes as proof of posting.
We have now shifted to a new address.
Please feel free to contact us if you have any question [sic] or require further assistance regarding the matter.”
The letter is not on headed paper. It features a mobile phone number written in manuscript as well as an RHC Post Office stamp at the bottom. Written at the bottom in manuscript is “Attn – the new name of the above Post Office is Royal Hospital Chelsea.” It is unclear why this is said to be the “new name” given that there appears to have been no such change.
24. Mr Patel has also prepared two witness statements.
25. The first statement (dated 23 October 2025) records that he “commenced employment” at the RHC Post Office in September 2021 and that he now works as a locum. He goes on to state that the Certificate of Posting was issued by the RHC Post Office and that it bears the official seal; and that he issued the letter dated 30 April 2025 at the applicant’s request, the contents of which he says are accurate.
26. Mr Patel’s second statement (dated 31 October 2025) seeks to correct two errors in his first statement – namely, that it erroneously gave his first name as Manishkumar rather than Manish, and recorded his date of birth as 1 May 1985 instead of 31 October 1983. Quite how Mr Patel managed to make such fundamental biographical errors when preparing his first statement is left unexplained.
27. As the respondent argues that the applicant’s evidence in support of his claim to have posted his application for judicial review is fraudulent, the burden is on her to prove this to the civil standard: see DK & RK (ETS: SSHD evidence; proof) India [2022] UKUT 00112 (IAC).
Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of fraud
The evidence of the Post Office’s opening hours
28. In support of her allegation, the respondent relies on the following evidence that she says proves that the RHC Post Office was closed on Sunday 26 March 2023.
29. Two witness statements have been prepared by Ms Fares, which are dated 3 September 2025 and 26 January 2026. Ms Fares asserts that her enquiries, as evidenced in the accompanying exhibits, show that the RHC Post Office was not open on 26 March 2023. I deal with the exhibits below.
30. A witness statement has also been provided Mr Mark Taylor, dated 22 January 2026. In his witness statement, Mr Taylor says the following:
a. He has held the role of human resources director at the RHC since July 2018.
b. He says at paragraph 5 that he has made checks with current and former staff of the RHC, including the former post office manager, who held that post for 13 years between February 2011 and February 2024. Mr Taylor says that the former post office manager “told me unequivocally that the Post Office counter never opened on a Sunday for that whole period of time. Such accords with my own understanding.”
c. He says that when the post office moved site, its opening hours remained the same (paragraph 7).
d. With respect to the evidence of Mr Patel, Mr Taylor says at paragraphs 12 to 17 that:
i. He believes Mr Patel’s evidence regarding the opening times of the Post Office and the authenticity of the Certificate of Posting is wrong.
ii. It is Mr Taylor’s belief that the Certificate of Posting is inauthentic and must have been produced on a date which is not 26 March 2023 because the Post Office was not open that day.
iii. Mr Patel is the current sub-postmaster (in oral evidence, Mr Taylor said that this means that Mr Patel works on a locum basis). Mr Patel comes to the RHC Post Office periodically as part of his role. In doing so, he has access to the post office keys and, therefore, the date stamp.
iv. Mr Taylor has made enquiries with the RHC’s finance department. They have told him that Mr Patel was not contracted by RHC to provide any services in March 2023. Mr Patel was contracted up until 24 January 2020 and then not again until 29 February 2024. The former post office manager also confirmed that only three workers provided post office services between March 2020 and January 2024.
v. If Mr Patel did stamp the Certificate of Posting, he must have done so after February 2024 and “for whatever reason edited the stamp so as to backdate it to show 26 March 2023.”
vi. Regarding the letter Mr Patel sent to the Court of Appeal, dated 30 April 2025, he had no authority to do so on behalf of the RHC Post Office. Mr Taylor is “deeply concerned that the information provided [within that letter] was inaccurate. I do not know what reason he might have had to send it.”
31. Mr Lee submitted that little weight should be attached to Mr Taylor’s evidence because it was hearsay – or even double hearsay – and unsupported by first‑hand statements from the finance department or the former post office manager. However, I am satisfied that weight can be attached to Mr Taylor’s evidence. He has held a senior position, that of human resources director, at RHC since July 2018. He relayed information communicated to him directly, and there is no reason to doubt the competence or honesty of those who provided it, or to think Mr Taylor misreported what he had been told. Although it would have been optimal for the respondent to provide witness statements from the finance department and the former post office manager, Mr Alan Simpson, I accept Mr Taylor’s explanation that it was agreed with the GLD that requiring multiple witnesses for a permission hearing would be disproportionate, and that it was more practical to collate all relevant information within a single statement.
32. Mr Taylor’s evidence is that RHC’s finance department had confirmed to him that Mr Patel did not work at the RHC Post Office between 24 January 2020 and 29 February 2024, and therefore he could not have been working there on 26 March 2023 (paragraph 15). While the applicant said that he could not recall whether it was Mr Patel who served him, I bear in mind that the Certificate of Posting is initialled “MP” and that, according to Mr Taylor, the former post office manager recalled Mr Patel as being the only worker with those initials (paragraph 13). The former post office manager also told Mr Taylor “unequivocally” that the post office counter never opened on a Sunday throughout his tenure between February 2011 and February 2024.
33. Exhibit FF/08 to Ms Fares’ first witness statement gives further reason to doubt what is said in Mr Patel’s letter of 30 April 2025. The exhibit contains an email sent to Ms Fares by Ms Ester Fenyves, who is the retail manager for the gift shop and post office, on 23 July 2025. In that email, she states:
“I have been told by Manish Patel that the certificate of posting attached it [sic] has been discontinue [sic] a while ago [in] 2016/2017 give or take, since the Post Office introduced the electronical certificate of posting since then [sic].
He confirmed the documents attached [i.e. the Certificate of Posting and Mr Patel’s letter to the Court of Appeal] was never written or signed by Manish. He confirmed that the Post Office at the Royal Chelsea Hospital was opened only Monday to Friday, so no transaction was made over the weekend mentioned in the attached documentation.”
34. At paragraph 5(d) of his first witness statement, Mr Patel accepts that “Ms Ester” had asked him about this matter. However, he asserts that he “at no time” stated, texted, or emailed her denying authorship of the letter dated 30 April 2025 and maintains that the signature on that letter is his. He attributes the contradictory account to “some miscommunication” between “Ms Ester, the Respondent, and myself.” However, I find that the contents of Ms Fenyves’ email are clear and unequivocal. Taking all the evidence in the round – including Mr Patel’s failure to attend the hearing to have his evidence tested – I place greater weight on the information provided by Ms Fenyves to the GLD than Mr Patel’s account.
35. That the post office was not open on the date in question – nor, indeed, on weekends up until October 2024, as Mr Patel claims – is further supported by contemporaneous website evidence. A snapshot of the RHC website captured by the Wayback Machine on 21 March 2023 records that the post office was, at that time, closed on weekends (Exhibit FF/05). The RHC’s Digital Product Manager, Mr Gawain Cox, also emailed Mr Taylor on 15 January 2026 with a link to an archived version of the RHC Post Office webpage taken from 4 August 2024, likewise stored by the Wayback Machine, which again indicated that it was closed on weekends [HB/224]. In addition, the respondent relies upon an undated Post Office branch relocation notice concerning the RHC Post Office, museum, and gift shop. It states that the branch is scheduled to close on Thursday 29 August 2024 and reopen on Tuesday 3 September 2024, with the opening hours at the new location being 09:00–16:30 Monday to Friday, and closed on Saturday and Sunday (Exhibit FF/06).
36. While Mr Lee submitted that the Wayback Machine should be treated with caution because it contains a disclaimer that the Internet Archive “makes no warranty or representation regarding the accuracy, currency, completeness, reliability, or usefulness” of archived content, the respondent relies on System Products UK Ltd v Truscott Terrace Holdings LLC [2019] RPC 15, in which the court expressly recognised the utility of the Wayback Machine in intellectual property cases (see [15], [61], [69], [71]–[72]). In any event, the archived snapshots do not stand alone but must be assessed alongside the other evidence – particularly the information provided to Mr Taylor by the former post office manager and the 2024 relocation letter. When considered cumulatively, this material strongly supports the conclusion that the post office was closed on the relevant Sunday.
37. Leaving aside Mr Patel’s evidence and the applicant’s own account, the only remaining external evidence the applicant relies upon is the Google screenshot said to have been taken by his son during the earlier permission hearing [HB/259]. This says that the “Post Office & Gift Shop” were open seven days a week between 9 am and 5 pm. Mr Taylor accepts at paragraph 8 of his witness statement that, in October 2024, Google Maps stated that the post office was open on Sundays. However, he says that information was incorrect and explains that this was the result of the relocation of the post office and gift shop to a new part of the estate. He says:
“For a short time, we only had one listing for both the Gift Shop and Post Office, and as the Gift Shop was open on Saturday & Sundays, and the Post Office is located within the gift shop, the listing showed that we were open at the weekend for both. However, this was incorrect: only the gift shop was open and the Post Office was, and always has been, closed on a Saturday & Sunday at the Royal Hospital.”
38. Mr Taylor goes on to say that once Mr Cox was made aware of this error, he split the Post Office and the gift shop into two separate Google listings, despite them having the same geographical location. This is supported by the disclosure of email communications between Ms Fenyves and Mr Cox [HB/222-223]. On 19 October 2024, Ms Fenyves emailed Mr Cox on the following basis:
“I have noticed that a few customers today were asking about the PO service mentioning online in Google is advertising [sic] the PO and gift shop are opened 7 days a week from 9-5pm.
Would it be possible to rename the advert mentioning only the Souvenir shop? Maybe in the notes we could add the PO opening time which are M-F 9-4.30.”
Mr Cox replied on 21 October 2024 to say:
“I’ve removed the Gift Shop from our existing listing and changed the times to reflect the Post Office only. I’ve also created a new profile for the Gift Shop with the correct times and showing it [is] open 7 days a week. This keeps the two separate, which is the only way of having separate opening times.”
39. I find this to be compelling evidence that the Google screenshot relied upon by the applicant is unreliable.
40. Having considered Mr Patel’s evidence in light of the convincing material adduced by the respondent, I find that I can attach little, if any, weight to it. In reaching that conclusion, I have also taken into account that although Mr Patel was directed to attend the hearing for cross‑examination, he failed to do so. Mr Lee informed me that Mr Patel no longer wished to be involved in the case. His refusal to attend and have his evidence tested significantly diminishes the weight that can properly be placed on his written statements.
The “original” UTIAC1 form and grounds of claim
41. I have considered the applicant’s production of what he says are copies of the UTIAC1 form and accompanying grounds of claim, which he asserts were posted to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023. In cross‑examination, however, the applicant initially stated that he had not kept a copy of the form he said he posted. When asked by Mr Yarrow how, in that case, a copy came to be included in his amended judicial review bundle [AJRB/1], he replied that he could not remember which documents he had copied and that, if it was disclosed, he must at some point have made a copy. Mr Yarrow invited the Tribunal to note that the top left-hand corner of the purported “original” UTIAC1 form includes a typed entry “26.03.2023” in the box marked “For Upper Tribunal use only”. In oral evidence, the applicant accepted that he might have inserted that date, but could not recall doing so. Given that the form was never received by the Upper Tribunal, it must have been the applicant who typed the date into a box clearly designated for Tribunal use only. The question, therefore, is why he did so. While one explanation might be that he was acting in person and made an innocent error, taking all the evidence in the round, I find it more likely than not that this was done at some point in 2024 in an effort to reinforce the appearance that the form had been posted on 26 March 2023.
42. That conclusion is strengthened by the applicant’s vague and internally inconsistent evidence under cross‑examination about why his grounds of claim were dated 26 March 2023. He said he had worked on the document over several days and in several locations, including the Yes Immigration office and his brother‑in‑law’s home, due to not having internet access at his own home. He accepted that he must have typed the date himself because it appears on the printed document. He further stated that he printed the form at his brother‑in‑law’s house, most likely on 25 March 2023, as he said he posted it the following day. He was therefore asked why he did not date the grounds 25 March 2023. The applicant explained that, in Bangladesh, it is customary before printing a document to “put the latest date” on it, “afterwards, immediate, something like this”. Yet he also claimed that at the time of printing he did not know on which date he would actually post the form. He could not recall when he prepared the address label for the envelope.
43. While he denied any backdating or fabrication of the date, taken together, his evidence was confused and internally contradictory, and it does not provide a credible explanation for the dating of the grounds of claim. I find that the dates on the UTIAC1 form and the grounds of claim could have been added after 26 March 2023 and, considered in the round, I attach little weight to them.
The Certificate of Posting and the stamped envelope
44. I therefore turn to the Certificate of Posting and the image of the envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal. Both bear the RHC Post Office date stamp showing the date 26 March 2023. However, as Mr Taylor explains at paragraph 10 of his witness statement, the date on the stamp can be manually altered backwards or forwards; and, as he states at paragraph 14, Mr Patel would have had access to that stamp after he resumed working for the RHC Post Office in February 2024.
45. Furthermore, as set out at paragraph 9 of Mr Taylor’s statement, the Certificate of Posting was no longer in general use in March 2023, having been superseded by an electronic system, save where members of the public had retained old copies for use – which is not what the applicant claims occurred. Mr Taylor’s evidence that the Certificate of Posting was no longer issued by the Post Office by 2023 is supported by Ms Fenyves email to Ms Fares dated 23 July 2025, where she writes “I have been told by Manish Patel that the certificate of posting attached it has been discontinue [sic] a while ago 2016/2017 give or take, since the Post Office introduced the electronical certificate of posting” (Exhibit FF/08).
46. I also take into account that the Certificate of Posting records the initials of the member of staff who completed it as “MP”, and that, according to Mr Taylor at paragraph 13 of his witness statement, the former post office manager could recall no member of staff with those initials other than Mr Patel, who, as already explained, was not contracted on the relevant date.
47. A further issue arising in respect of the image of the stamped envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal concerns its provenance. The image was not included in the amended judicial review bundle or in the hearing bundle, and it was a document that Mr Yarrow had not seen prior to the hearing. It was uploaded to the Tribunal’s case management system on 26 April 2024. The applicant’s evidence is that it was a photograph taken on his phone at the RHC Post Office on 26 March 2023 because he wanted proof of posting and was unaware that recorded delivery was an option. In light of this, Mr Yarrow asked whether the applicant could show the Tribunal the original photograph on his phone, as the metadata would reveal where and when it was taken and might therefore be dispositive of the issue in dispute. I accordingly granted a short adjournment for Mr Lee to take instructions. On his return, Mr Lee stated that his instructions were that the applicant’s phone, on which the photograph had been stored, had since broken, and the image could no longer be retrieved.
48. In cross‑examination, the applicant was asked how he had provided his solicitor with the photograph of the envelope. He stated that he had printed a copy of the image and handed the hard copy to his solicitor, and that he had printed it at home. Mr Yarrow submitted that it was astonishing that the applicant would not simply have emailed the photograph to his solicitor. Given that the applicant appears to have sent electronic copies of the UTIAC1 form and his grounds of claim to his solicitor, I agree that it is surprising that he would nonetheless choose to print the photograph of the envelope and provide it only in hard copy form.
49. The applicant’s explanation was that he did not have Wi‑Fi or internet access at home and was seeking to reduce his costs, so he decided to give his solicitor a hard copy. However, he also said that he printed the photograph at home using his son’s phone as a hotspot. Mr Yarrow therefore asked why he did not use that same hotspot to email the image to his solicitor; the applicant responded that “I thought it would be important for him to have a hard copy.” Mr Yarrow put it to the applicant that he was not telling the truth and that the photograph had in fact been taken some time in 2024, around a year after he claimed to have posted the envelope. Although the applicant denied this, I find his explanation for printing the photograph rather than emailing it to his solicitor unconvincing.
50. Mr Yarrow submitted that the real reason the applicant was unable to show the Tribunal the original photograph on his phone was because, almost certainly, the metadata would show that it was taken in 2024. Having considered the matter, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the photograph of the envelope is a fabrication that post‑dates 26 March 2023.
51. Considered in the round with the other evidence, I find that little weight can be attached to the Certificate of Posting or the image of the envelope.
Conclusion
52. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the respondent has raised a prima facie case of fraud.
Whether there is an innocent explanation
53. There was no substantive explanation from the applicant for the evidence presented by the respondent. Instead, he simply maintained that the RHC Post Office was open on 26 March 2023 and that he did post his judicial review application to the Upper Tribunal on that date.
54. Mr Lee did submit that it was possible that Mr Patel might, of his own volition, have decided to open the post office at weekends. While Mr Taylor has not produced any documentary evidence from RHC’s finance department, I nonetheless attach weight to his evidence that he was told that Mr Patel, who worked on a locum basis, was not contracted between 24 January 2020 and 29 February 2024. I note that the date on which Mr Patel is said to have resumed working at the RHC Post Office corresponds with the date of the post office manager’s retirement, which lends further support to the fact that Mr Patel only returned to the RHC at that point in time when a new member of staff was required. Furthermore, nowhere in his written evidence does Mr Patel claim that he ever opened the post office at weekends, notwithstanding the fact that it was officially closed; nor does that seem a plausible course of action, given that, as Mr Taylor confirmed, Mr Patel was paid a day rate. On balance, I find it unlikely that Mr Patel would have unilaterally decided to open the post office at weekends, particularly if he was not being paid for doing so, as the finance department’s records indicate.
55. Given the overwhelming evidence that the post office was closed on that day, and in light of the concerns regarding the reliability of the applicant’s own evidence, I am not satisfied that his repetition of the claim amounts to an explanation meeting even the minimum threshold of plausibility.
Conclusion on fraud
56. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the RHC Post Office has never been open on weekends, and that the applicant could not have posted his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal on Sunday 26 March 2023. I am therefore satisfied that the respondent has discharged her burden of proving, to the civil standard, that the applicant – likely with the connivance of Mr Patel – fabricated evidence purporting to show that he posted his claim form on that date, in a dishonest attempt to secure an extension of time for his judicial review claim.
B. Whether the ground of claim raises an arguable public law error
57. I consider this matter in advance of determining whether to grant an extension of time because Mr Lee submitted that, even if I were to find that the applicant had not posted his claim form on 26 March 2023, the strength of his underlying claim was a factor that could, in itself, justify admitting it.
58. The applicant advances a single ground of claim. In his written grounds, he contends that the respondent’s decision to refuse his application on a discretionary rather than mandatory basis was irrational and unfair because she failed to take into account exceptional circumstances arising from the pandemic. At the hearing before me, Mr Lee reformulated the argument more clearly. In summary, he submitted that the decision to treat the applicant’s application as invalid, solely on the basis that he was not entitled to switch leave having last entered the United Kingdom as a visitor, was inconsistent with the terms of the pandemic-era exceptional assurance policy [HB/140]. According to Mr Lee, that policy provided that a person was “able to apply for permission to stay in the UK if [they] have been issued with an ‘exceptional assurance’”.
59. Mr Yarrow submitted that, at the time the applicant’s wife and child applied for leave under Appendix ROB, the policy did indeed allow visitors to switch in‑country [HB/122]. However, he argued that, properly construed, the policy in force when the applicant submitted his own application for leave to remain in late August 2021 did not entitle a person present in the United Kingdom under an exceptional assurance to apply for a route for which they would not otherwise qualify.
60. Having considered the matter, I am satisfied that the applicant’s ground of claim is not arguable. On a plain reading of the policy in force at the time of his application, it clearly provided that a person was entitled to make an application for further leave only if they “hold permission in a route that would normally allow them to do so”, which, as the policy goes on to explain, does not mean that they may “apply for a route for which there is no provision in the Immigration Rules for making an in‑country application”. It is not suggested by the applicant that, but for the exceptional assurance, he could have switched in‑country from being a visitor to a dependent of an overseas business representative. It would make little sense for a visitor benefitting from an exceptional assurance to be placed in a more advantageous position than a person who continued to hold extant leave and was subject to prohibitions on switching. I am satisfied that the provision that the applicant relies upon is unarguably intended to prevent those stranded in the United Kingdom during the pandemic from being refused leave to remain, where they would otherwise qualify for it, based on their overstaying.
61. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the decision in Seerangan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] 4 WLR 60 at [22], where the Court of Appeal (per Underhill LJ, with Dingemans and Falk LJJ agreeing) considered the very passage of the policy relied upon by the applicant. The Court held that, for those subject to an exceptional assurance,
“it means that [when applying for leave to remain] their current overstaying is to be disregarded as long as the entire period since the expiry of their visa is covered by an EA granted under the Policy: the disregard would be outside of the Rules, but the Secretary of State has power to waive compliance.”
It follows that the passage relied upon by the applicant did not exempt him from the prohibition in the Rules against switching in‑country from a visit visa; rather, it simply meant that any period of overstaying would be disregarded. Accordingly, I would have refused permission in any event.
C. The application for an extension of time
The seriousness of the delay
62. In accordance with rule 28(2) of the Procedure Rules, the claim form should have been filed promptly and, in any event, no later than three months after the date of the decision challenged, which, in this case, would have been 3 April 2023. As the claim form was not filed until 26 April 2024, I am satisfied that the delay of over 12 months is both serious and significant.
Is there a good explanation for the delay?
63. For the reasons already explained in this decision, I have found that, rather than providing a good explanation for the delay in filing the claim, the applicant has instead manufactured a fraudulent one.
Considering all the circumstances of the case, should an extension be granted?
64. There are various factors to be taken into account. These include the need to ensure procedural rigour and compliance with the Procedure Rules, the prejudice to the respondent, and the public interest in the finality of administrative decision‑making when asked to litigate a decision of 3 January 2023 after such a lengthy delay.
65. More importantly, the fact that the applicant has sought to deceive the Upper Tribunal in order to obtain an extension of time weighs very heavily against granting one. Fraud unravels all: see, for example, Bokqiu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 191 at [28]. Therefore, even if I had concluded that the applicant’s ground of claim was arguable, contrary to what Mr Lee submitted, his conduct would nonetheless have made an extension of time inappropriate.
66. Accordingly, I refuse to extend time, and the application for judicial review is not admitted.
67. The parties are invited to agree an order disposing of this matter, including the issue of costs.
~~~~0~~~~
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Mohammad Faroque Hossain Baparee
Applicant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
UPON the matter being remitted by the Court of Appeal for consideration of the arguability of Applicant’s application for judicial review along with his application to extend time for bringing the claim therein;
AND UPON hearing oral evidence;
AND UPON hearing submissions from Mr Lee of counsel for the Applicant and Mr Yarrow of counsel for the Respondent;
It is ORDERED that:
1. The application for judicial review is not admitted;
2. The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s reasonable costs of proceedings in the Upper Tribunal to be assessed if not agreed;
3. The parties are to file written submissions on the issue of the basis and scope of the costs assessment referred to in paragraph 2, by 4pm on 25 March 2026, for determination by Judge Hoffman on the papers. Such submissions to be limited to 2 sides of A4;
4. Permission to appeal is refused because no application has been made on the Applicant’s behalf and, in any event, I am satisfied that the Upper Tribunal did not commit any arguable error of law in refusing to admit his claim, nor is there any other compelling reason to grant permission.
Signed: M R Hoffman
Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
Dated: 18th March 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 18/03/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2024-LON-001256
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
18th March 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
MOHAMMAD FAROQUE HOSSAIN BAPAREE
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr G Lee
(instructed by PSA McKenzie Solicitors), for the applicant
Mr T Yarrow
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 26th February 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Hoffman:
1. This decision concerns two matters. The first is whether the applicant should be granted an extension of time to file his judicial review claim. The second is, if an extension of time is granted, whether the claim discloses arguable grounds for judicial review such that permission should be granted.
2. By way of his application for judicial review, the applicant seeks permission to challenge the respondent’s decision dated 3 January 2023 treating his application for leave to remain as a dependent of a representative of an overseas business as invalid.
Background
3. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh born on 1 December 1978. He was granted a two-year multiple entry visit visa on 22 July 2020. On 3 September 2020, he entered the UK along with his wife and son. According to the applicant, they intended to return to Bangladesh on 25 December 2020. They did not, however, leave the country. According to the applicant, this was due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
4. On 6 March 2021, the applicant applied for an exceptional assurance under the Covid Visa Concession policy. This was granted on 9 March 2021, permitting him to remain in the United Kingdom until 30 April 2021. On 6 May 2021, he sought a further extension of that assurance, which was granted on 10 May 2021, extending his permission to 30 June 2021. A subsequent extension was then granted, allowing him to remain until 1 October 2021.
5. Meanwhile, on 7 May 2021, the applicant’s wife applied for leave as an overseas business representative, with their son as her dependent, under Appendix Representative of an Overseas Business of the Immigration Rules (“Appendix ROB”). On 16 August 2021, the applicant’s wife and son were granted three years’ leave to remain.
6. On 31 August 2021, the applicant applied for leave to remain as a dependent spouse. That application was refused on 29 March 2022. However, following an administrative review, the respondent withdrew her decision but, following a reconsideration on 3 January 2023, the application was rejected as invalid on the basis that as a person who had last been granted permission as a visitor, the applicant did not meet the validity requirements set out under paragraph ROB 20.4 of Appendix ROB.
7. On 10 February 2023 the applicant sent a pre-action letter to the Home Office, although the respondent says that this was not received until 21 February 2023. The respondent replied to that letter on 6 March 2023, maintaining her decision. What happened next is a matter of dispute between the parties.
The timing of the application for judicial review
8. According to the applicant, on Sunday 26 March 2023, he sent his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal from the post office at the Royal Hospital Chelsea (RHC). However, no such application was ever received by the Tribunal.
9. On 22 April 2024, Mr Pasoon Sadozai, a solicitor working for PSA McKenzie Solicitors, emailed the Upper Tribunal to say that his firm had been instructed by the applicant. Mr Sadozai explained that the applicant “has submitted a judicial review application on 26/03/2023 however they have not had any response since.” The Upper Tribunal replied on 24 April 2024 to explain that it had no record of the applicant having filed an application for judicial review.
10. Consequently, on 26 April 2024, the applicant’s solicitors filed an application for judicial review with the Upper Tribunal. The date of the grounds of claim is 26 March 2023. Section 8 of the claim form included the following:
“Although the application seemed to be filed on time (please refer to the attached proof of posting) [sic]. However, in the recent email from the Tribunal, it was suggested to apply for out of time application [sic].
It is submitted that the applicant submitted his application on 10.02.2023 [sic], but the Tribunal did not receive the same. We would therefore request the Tribunal to accept this application valid [sic] and grant him permission to lodge this application.”
11. Accompanying the application were the following documents:
a. A Certificate of Posting, naming the Upper Tribunal as the recipient, with an RHC Post Office stamp dated 26 March 2023.
b. An image of an envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal with RHC Post Office stamps dated 26 March 2023 over the postage stamps.
c. A photograph of an envelope addressed to the (Home Office’s) Litigation Operations Allocation Hub with stamps from the Abbotts Langley Post Office dated 10 February 2023 over the postage stamps (this was said to contain the pre-action letter).
The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
12. In an order sealed on 4 September 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor refused to admit the application for judicial review on the basis that it was out of time. The applicant then renewed his application to an oral hearing that took place on 9 October 2024 where it was heard by a panel (Upper Tribunal Judges Perkins and Ruddick). They too refused to admit the application. However, that decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal and the matter remitted to the Upper Tribunal for rehearing: see [2025] EWCA Civ 1464.
Legal framework
13. Rule 28(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 sets out the deadline for bringing applications for permission to bring judicial review proceedings in the Upper Tribunal:
“…an application under paragraph (1) must be made promptly and, unless any other enactment specifies a shorter time limit, must be sent or delivered to the Upper Tribunal so that it is received no later than 3 months after the date of decision, action or omission to which the application relates.”
14. However, under its case management powers, the Upper Tribunal may “extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction”: see rule 5(3)(a).
15. In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the Tribunal will apply the well‑known three‑stage test set out in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, namely: (i) it will consider whether the delay is serious and significant; (ii) if so, it will consider why the failure occurred; and (iii) it will evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal with the application justly.
The hearing
16. The Upper Tribunal directed four individuals to give oral evidence: the applicant and his witness, Mr Manish Patel; and, on behalf of the respondent, Ms Fatima Fares of the Government Legal Department (GLD) and Mr Mark Taylor of the RHC. Mr Patel did not attend the hearing. The applicant, Ms Fares, and Mr Taylor all appeared and were cross‑examined. Their oral evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings.
17. The electronic hearing bundle prepared by the applicant’s solicitors left much to be desired. The index did not clearly set out all its contents; no hyperlinks or bookmarks were included; it was not fully text‑searchable; and it did not contain all the evidence upon which the parties sought to rely. I therefore had to work from several different documents:
a. The hearing bundle (HB).
b. The exhibits to Ms Fares’s statement, which had been omitted from the hearing bundle.
c. The applicant’s original judicial review bundle, filed on 26 April 2024.
d. An image of the envelope purportedly sent to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023, which had been uploaded to the case management system on 26 April 2024.
e. The applicant’s amended judicial review bundle, filed on 5 July 2024 (AJRB).
f. The respondent’s Acknowledgment of Service and summary grounds of defence, filed on 22 July 2024.
g. The parties’ skeleton arguments filed for the hearing.
18. I heard submissions from both parties and, at the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
A. Whether the applicant posted his claim form to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023
19. In support of his claim that he posted his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023, the applicant relies on the following evidence:
a. The documents referred to at [11] above.
b. Copies of the UTIAC1 form and grounds of claim that he purports to have posted to the Upper Tribunal.
c. Evidence from Mr Manish Bharatkumar Patel, who works at the RHC Post Office, including a letter dated 30 April 2025 addressed to the Court of Appeal and two witness statements, dated 23 October 2025 and 31 October 2025. Mr Patel’s evidence is that, until October 2024, the RHC Post Office was open seven days a week from 9 am to 5 pm.
20. The applicant has also prepared two witness statements.
21. The first statement (which is unsigned and undated) records that the applicant “signed and submitted” his application for judicial review on 26 March 2023 (paragraph 13). He states that he was advised by his OISC representatives that he should then wait, and that he was unaware that he was required to notify the respondent of his application or expect an Acknowledgment of Service. At paragraph 14, he explains that, in April 2024, his immigration advisers put him in contact with his present solicitors, who informed him of the judicial review process. He instructed them to make enquiries with the Upper Tribunal, at which point he discovered that the Tribunal had no record of his application.
22. The second statement (dated 24 October 2025) was prepared for the Court of Appeal hearing, although the Court of Appeal refused to admit it. It is accompanied by screenshots taken from the applicant’s son’s mobile phone. The applicant explains that the metadata for those screenshots shows that they were taken during the hearing before Judges Perkins and Ruddick on 9 October 2024. The screenshots include an image of the RHC Post Office’s opening times on Google, which states that it is open between 9 am and 5 pm on Sundays (Exhibit FB1).
23. The applicant states that on 30 April 2025 he visited the RHC Post Office to obtain further evidence. He says that he met with Mr Patel, who worked at the post office, and showed him the Certificate of Posting. Following this, Mr Patel “kindly issued a written confirmation on the same day confirming the receipt had indeed been issued by their post office.” The written confirmation referred to is Exhibit PSJR2 to Mr Sadozai’s second witness statement. It is a typed letter addressed to the Court of Appeal, dated 30 April 2025, in which Mr Patel states as follows:
“I am writing on behalf of Chelsea Post office [sic], that until October 2024, we were open 7 days a week from 9:00am-17:00pm.
We Confirm [sic] that the stamp shown on the envelope dated 26/03/2023, was from this post office.
We also allow customers to take photographs of their envelopes as proof of posting.
We have now shifted to a new address.
Please feel free to contact us if you have any question [sic] or require further assistance regarding the matter.”
The letter is not on headed paper. It features a mobile phone number written in manuscript as well as an RHC Post Office stamp at the bottom. Written at the bottom in manuscript is “Attn – the new name of the above Post Office is Royal Hospital Chelsea.” It is unclear why this is said to be the “new name” given that there appears to have been no such change.
24. Mr Patel has also prepared two witness statements.
25. The first statement (dated 23 October 2025) records that he “commenced employment” at the RHC Post Office in September 2021 and that he now works as a locum. He goes on to state that the Certificate of Posting was issued by the RHC Post Office and that it bears the official seal; and that he issued the letter dated 30 April 2025 at the applicant’s request, the contents of which he says are accurate.
26. Mr Patel’s second statement (dated 31 October 2025) seeks to correct two errors in his first statement – namely, that it erroneously gave his first name as Manishkumar rather than Manish, and recorded his date of birth as 1 May 1985 instead of 31 October 1983. Quite how Mr Patel managed to make such fundamental biographical errors when preparing his first statement is left unexplained.
27. As the respondent argues that the applicant’s evidence in support of his claim to have posted his application for judicial review is fraudulent, the burden is on her to prove this to the civil standard: see DK & RK (ETS: SSHD evidence; proof) India [2022] UKUT 00112 (IAC).
Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of fraud
The evidence of the Post Office’s opening hours
28. In support of her allegation, the respondent relies on the following evidence that she says proves that the RHC Post Office was closed on Sunday 26 March 2023.
29. Two witness statements have been prepared by Ms Fares, which are dated 3 September 2025 and 26 January 2026. Ms Fares asserts that her enquiries, as evidenced in the accompanying exhibits, show that the RHC Post Office was not open on 26 March 2023. I deal with the exhibits below.
30. A witness statement has also been provided Mr Mark Taylor, dated 22 January 2026. In his witness statement, Mr Taylor says the following:
a. He has held the role of human resources director at the RHC since July 2018.
b. He says at paragraph 5 that he has made checks with current and former staff of the RHC, including the former post office manager, who held that post for 13 years between February 2011 and February 2024. Mr Taylor says that the former post office manager “told me unequivocally that the Post Office counter never opened on a Sunday for that whole period of time. Such accords with my own understanding.”
c. He says that when the post office moved site, its opening hours remained the same (paragraph 7).
d. With respect to the evidence of Mr Patel, Mr Taylor says at paragraphs 12 to 17 that:
i. He believes Mr Patel’s evidence regarding the opening times of the Post Office and the authenticity of the Certificate of Posting is wrong.
ii. It is Mr Taylor’s belief that the Certificate of Posting is inauthentic and must have been produced on a date which is not 26 March 2023 because the Post Office was not open that day.
iii. Mr Patel is the current sub-postmaster (in oral evidence, Mr Taylor said that this means that Mr Patel works on a locum basis). Mr Patel comes to the RHC Post Office periodically as part of his role. In doing so, he has access to the post office keys and, therefore, the date stamp.
iv. Mr Taylor has made enquiries with the RHC’s finance department. They have told him that Mr Patel was not contracted by RHC to provide any services in March 2023. Mr Patel was contracted up until 24 January 2020 and then not again until 29 February 2024. The former post office manager also confirmed that only three workers provided post office services between March 2020 and January 2024.
v. If Mr Patel did stamp the Certificate of Posting, he must have done so after February 2024 and “for whatever reason edited the stamp so as to backdate it to show 26 March 2023.”
vi. Regarding the letter Mr Patel sent to the Court of Appeal, dated 30 April 2025, he had no authority to do so on behalf of the RHC Post Office. Mr Taylor is “deeply concerned that the information provided [within that letter] was inaccurate. I do not know what reason he might have had to send it.”
31. Mr Lee submitted that little weight should be attached to Mr Taylor’s evidence because it was hearsay – or even double hearsay – and unsupported by first‑hand statements from the finance department or the former post office manager. However, I am satisfied that weight can be attached to Mr Taylor’s evidence. He has held a senior position, that of human resources director, at RHC since July 2018. He relayed information communicated to him directly, and there is no reason to doubt the competence or honesty of those who provided it, or to think Mr Taylor misreported what he had been told. Although it would have been optimal for the respondent to provide witness statements from the finance department and the former post office manager, Mr Alan Simpson, I accept Mr Taylor’s explanation that it was agreed with the GLD that requiring multiple witnesses for a permission hearing would be disproportionate, and that it was more practical to collate all relevant information within a single statement.
32. Mr Taylor’s evidence is that RHC’s finance department had confirmed to him that Mr Patel did not work at the RHC Post Office between 24 January 2020 and 29 February 2024, and therefore he could not have been working there on 26 March 2023 (paragraph 15). While the applicant said that he could not recall whether it was Mr Patel who served him, I bear in mind that the Certificate of Posting is initialled “MP” and that, according to Mr Taylor, the former post office manager recalled Mr Patel as being the only worker with those initials (paragraph 13). The former post office manager also told Mr Taylor “unequivocally” that the post office counter never opened on a Sunday throughout his tenure between February 2011 and February 2024.
33. Exhibit FF/08 to Ms Fares’ first witness statement gives further reason to doubt what is said in Mr Patel’s letter of 30 April 2025. The exhibit contains an email sent to Ms Fares by Ms Ester Fenyves, who is the retail manager for the gift shop and post office, on 23 July 2025. In that email, she states:
“I have been told by Manish Patel that the certificate of posting attached it [sic] has been discontinue [sic] a while ago [in] 2016/2017 give or take, since the Post Office introduced the electronical certificate of posting since then [sic].
He confirmed the documents attached [i.e. the Certificate of Posting and Mr Patel’s letter to the Court of Appeal] was never written or signed by Manish. He confirmed that the Post Office at the Royal Chelsea Hospital was opened only Monday to Friday, so no transaction was made over the weekend mentioned in the attached documentation.”
34. At paragraph 5(d) of his first witness statement, Mr Patel accepts that “Ms Ester” had asked him about this matter. However, he asserts that he “at no time” stated, texted, or emailed her denying authorship of the letter dated 30 April 2025 and maintains that the signature on that letter is his. He attributes the contradictory account to “some miscommunication” between “Ms Ester, the Respondent, and myself.” However, I find that the contents of Ms Fenyves’ email are clear and unequivocal. Taking all the evidence in the round – including Mr Patel’s failure to attend the hearing to have his evidence tested – I place greater weight on the information provided by Ms Fenyves to the GLD than Mr Patel’s account.
35. That the post office was not open on the date in question – nor, indeed, on weekends up until October 2024, as Mr Patel claims – is further supported by contemporaneous website evidence. A snapshot of the RHC website captured by the Wayback Machine on 21 March 2023 records that the post office was, at that time, closed on weekends (Exhibit FF/05). The RHC’s Digital Product Manager, Mr Gawain Cox, also emailed Mr Taylor on 15 January 2026 with a link to an archived version of the RHC Post Office webpage taken from 4 August 2024, likewise stored by the Wayback Machine, which again indicated that it was closed on weekends [HB/224]. In addition, the respondent relies upon an undated Post Office branch relocation notice concerning the RHC Post Office, museum, and gift shop. It states that the branch is scheduled to close on Thursday 29 August 2024 and reopen on Tuesday 3 September 2024, with the opening hours at the new location being 09:00–16:30 Monday to Friday, and closed on Saturday and Sunday (Exhibit FF/06).
36. While Mr Lee submitted that the Wayback Machine should be treated with caution because it contains a disclaimer that the Internet Archive “makes no warranty or representation regarding the accuracy, currency, completeness, reliability, or usefulness” of archived content, the respondent relies on System Products UK Ltd v Truscott Terrace Holdings LLC [2019] RPC 15, in which the court expressly recognised the utility of the Wayback Machine in intellectual property cases (see [15], [61], [69], [71]–[72]). In any event, the archived snapshots do not stand alone but must be assessed alongside the other evidence – particularly the information provided to Mr Taylor by the former post office manager and the 2024 relocation letter. When considered cumulatively, this material strongly supports the conclusion that the post office was closed on the relevant Sunday.
37. Leaving aside Mr Patel’s evidence and the applicant’s own account, the only remaining external evidence the applicant relies upon is the Google screenshot said to have been taken by his son during the earlier permission hearing [HB/259]. This says that the “Post Office & Gift Shop” were open seven days a week between 9 am and 5 pm. Mr Taylor accepts at paragraph 8 of his witness statement that, in October 2024, Google Maps stated that the post office was open on Sundays. However, he says that information was incorrect and explains that this was the result of the relocation of the post office and gift shop to a new part of the estate. He says:
“For a short time, we only had one listing for both the Gift Shop and Post Office, and as the Gift Shop was open on Saturday & Sundays, and the Post Office is located within the gift shop, the listing showed that we were open at the weekend for both. However, this was incorrect: only the gift shop was open and the Post Office was, and always has been, closed on a Saturday & Sunday at the Royal Hospital.”
38. Mr Taylor goes on to say that once Mr Cox was made aware of this error, he split the Post Office and the gift shop into two separate Google listings, despite them having the same geographical location. This is supported by the disclosure of email communications between Ms Fenyves and Mr Cox [HB/222-223]. On 19 October 2024, Ms Fenyves emailed Mr Cox on the following basis:
“I have noticed that a few customers today were asking about the PO service mentioning online in Google is advertising [sic] the PO and gift shop are opened 7 days a week from 9-5pm.
Would it be possible to rename the advert mentioning only the Souvenir shop? Maybe in the notes we could add the PO opening time which are M-F 9-4.30.”
Mr Cox replied on 21 October 2024 to say:
“I’ve removed the Gift Shop from our existing listing and changed the times to reflect the Post Office only. I’ve also created a new profile for the Gift Shop with the correct times and showing it [is] open 7 days a week. This keeps the two separate, which is the only way of having separate opening times.”
39. I find this to be compelling evidence that the Google screenshot relied upon by the applicant is unreliable.
40. Having considered Mr Patel’s evidence in light of the convincing material adduced by the respondent, I find that I can attach little, if any, weight to it. In reaching that conclusion, I have also taken into account that although Mr Patel was directed to attend the hearing for cross‑examination, he failed to do so. Mr Lee informed me that Mr Patel no longer wished to be involved in the case. His refusal to attend and have his evidence tested significantly diminishes the weight that can properly be placed on his written statements.
The “original” UTIAC1 form and grounds of claim
41. I have considered the applicant’s production of what he says are copies of the UTIAC1 form and accompanying grounds of claim, which he asserts were posted to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2023. In cross‑examination, however, the applicant initially stated that he had not kept a copy of the form he said he posted. When asked by Mr Yarrow how, in that case, a copy came to be included in his amended judicial review bundle [AJRB/1], he replied that he could not remember which documents he had copied and that, if it was disclosed, he must at some point have made a copy. Mr Yarrow invited the Tribunal to note that the top left-hand corner of the purported “original” UTIAC1 form includes a typed entry “26.03.2023” in the box marked “For Upper Tribunal use only”. In oral evidence, the applicant accepted that he might have inserted that date, but could not recall doing so. Given that the form was never received by the Upper Tribunal, it must have been the applicant who typed the date into a box clearly designated for Tribunal use only. The question, therefore, is why he did so. While one explanation might be that he was acting in person and made an innocent error, taking all the evidence in the round, I find it more likely than not that this was done at some point in 2024 in an effort to reinforce the appearance that the form had been posted on 26 March 2023.
42. That conclusion is strengthened by the applicant’s vague and internally inconsistent evidence under cross‑examination about why his grounds of claim were dated 26 March 2023. He said he had worked on the document over several days and in several locations, including the Yes Immigration office and his brother‑in‑law’s home, due to not having internet access at his own home. He accepted that he must have typed the date himself because it appears on the printed document. He further stated that he printed the form at his brother‑in‑law’s house, most likely on 25 March 2023, as he said he posted it the following day. He was therefore asked why he did not date the grounds 25 March 2023. The applicant explained that, in Bangladesh, it is customary before printing a document to “put the latest date” on it, “afterwards, immediate, something like this”. Yet he also claimed that at the time of printing he did not know on which date he would actually post the form. He could not recall when he prepared the address label for the envelope.
43. While he denied any backdating or fabrication of the date, taken together, his evidence was confused and internally contradictory, and it does not provide a credible explanation for the dating of the grounds of claim. I find that the dates on the UTIAC1 form and the grounds of claim could have been added after 26 March 2023 and, considered in the round, I attach little weight to them.
The Certificate of Posting and the stamped envelope
44. I therefore turn to the Certificate of Posting and the image of the envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal. Both bear the RHC Post Office date stamp showing the date 26 March 2023. However, as Mr Taylor explains at paragraph 10 of his witness statement, the date on the stamp can be manually altered backwards or forwards; and, as he states at paragraph 14, Mr Patel would have had access to that stamp after he resumed working for the RHC Post Office in February 2024.
45. Furthermore, as set out at paragraph 9 of Mr Taylor’s statement, the Certificate of Posting was no longer in general use in March 2023, having been superseded by an electronic system, save where members of the public had retained old copies for use – which is not what the applicant claims occurred. Mr Taylor’s evidence that the Certificate of Posting was no longer issued by the Post Office by 2023 is supported by Ms Fenyves email to Ms Fares dated 23 July 2025, where she writes “I have been told by Manish Patel that the certificate of posting attached it has been discontinue [sic] a while ago 2016/2017 give or take, since the Post Office introduced the electronical certificate of posting” (Exhibit FF/08).
46. I also take into account that the Certificate of Posting records the initials of the member of staff who completed it as “MP”, and that, according to Mr Taylor at paragraph 13 of his witness statement, the former post office manager could recall no member of staff with those initials other than Mr Patel, who, as already explained, was not contracted on the relevant date.
47. A further issue arising in respect of the image of the stamped envelope addressed to the Upper Tribunal concerns its provenance. The image was not included in the amended judicial review bundle or in the hearing bundle, and it was a document that Mr Yarrow had not seen prior to the hearing. It was uploaded to the Tribunal’s case management system on 26 April 2024. The applicant’s evidence is that it was a photograph taken on his phone at the RHC Post Office on 26 March 2023 because he wanted proof of posting and was unaware that recorded delivery was an option. In light of this, Mr Yarrow asked whether the applicant could show the Tribunal the original photograph on his phone, as the metadata would reveal where and when it was taken and might therefore be dispositive of the issue in dispute. I accordingly granted a short adjournment for Mr Lee to take instructions. On his return, Mr Lee stated that his instructions were that the applicant’s phone, on which the photograph had been stored, had since broken, and the image could no longer be retrieved.
48. In cross‑examination, the applicant was asked how he had provided his solicitor with the photograph of the envelope. He stated that he had printed a copy of the image and handed the hard copy to his solicitor, and that he had printed it at home. Mr Yarrow submitted that it was astonishing that the applicant would not simply have emailed the photograph to his solicitor. Given that the applicant appears to have sent electronic copies of the UTIAC1 form and his grounds of claim to his solicitor, I agree that it is surprising that he would nonetheless choose to print the photograph of the envelope and provide it only in hard copy form.
49. The applicant’s explanation was that he did not have Wi‑Fi or internet access at home and was seeking to reduce his costs, so he decided to give his solicitor a hard copy. However, he also said that he printed the photograph at home using his son’s phone as a hotspot. Mr Yarrow therefore asked why he did not use that same hotspot to email the image to his solicitor; the applicant responded that “I thought it would be important for him to have a hard copy.” Mr Yarrow put it to the applicant that he was not telling the truth and that the photograph had in fact been taken some time in 2024, around a year after he claimed to have posted the envelope. Although the applicant denied this, I find his explanation for printing the photograph rather than emailing it to his solicitor unconvincing.
50. Mr Yarrow submitted that the real reason the applicant was unable to show the Tribunal the original photograph on his phone was because, almost certainly, the metadata would show that it was taken in 2024. Having considered the matter, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the photograph of the envelope is a fabrication that post‑dates 26 March 2023.
51. Considered in the round with the other evidence, I find that little weight can be attached to the Certificate of Posting or the image of the envelope.
Conclusion
52. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the respondent has raised a prima facie case of fraud.
Whether there is an innocent explanation
53. There was no substantive explanation from the applicant for the evidence presented by the respondent. Instead, he simply maintained that the RHC Post Office was open on 26 March 2023 and that he did post his judicial review application to the Upper Tribunal on that date.
54. Mr Lee did submit that it was possible that Mr Patel might, of his own volition, have decided to open the post office at weekends. While Mr Taylor has not produced any documentary evidence from RHC’s finance department, I nonetheless attach weight to his evidence that he was told that Mr Patel, who worked on a locum basis, was not contracted between 24 January 2020 and 29 February 2024. I note that the date on which Mr Patel is said to have resumed working at the RHC Post Office corresponds with the date of the post office manager’s retirement, which lends further support to the fact that Mr Patel only returned to the RHC at that point in time when a new member of staff was required. Furthermore, nowhere in his written evidence does Mr Patel claim that he ever opened the post office at weekends, notwithstanding the fact that it was officially closed; nor does that seem a plausible course of action, given that, as Mr Taylor confirmed, Mr Patel was paid a day rate. On balance, I find it unlikely that Mr Patel would have unilaterally decided to open the post office at weekends, particularly if he was not being paid for doing so, as the finance department’s records indicate.
55. Given the overwhelming evidence that the post office was closed on that day, and in light of the concerns regarding the reliability of the applicant’s own evidence, I am not satisfied that his repetition of the claim amounts to an explanation meeting even the minimum threshold of plausibility.
Conclusion on fraud
56. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the RHC Post Office has never been open on weekends, and that the applicant could not have posted his application for judicial review to the Upper Tribunal on Sunday 26 March 2023. I am therefore satisfied that the respondent has discharged her burden of proving, to the civil standard, that the applicant – likely with the connivance of Mr Patel – fabricated evidence purporting to show that he posted his claim form on that date, in a dishonest attempt to secure an extension of time for his judicial review claim.
B. Whether the ground of claim raises an arguable public law error
57. I consider this matter in advance of determining whether to grant an extension of time because Mr Lee submitted that, even if I were to find that the applicant had not posted his claim form on 26 March 2023, the strength of his underlying claim was a factor that could, in itself, justify admitting it.
58. The applicant advances a single ground of claim. In his written grounds, he contends that the respondent’s decision to refuse his application on a discretionary rather than mandatory basis was irrational and unfair because she failed to take into account exceptional circumstances arising from the pandemic. At the hearing before me, Mr Lee reformulated the argument more clearly. In summary, he submitted that the decision to treat the applicant’s application as invalid, solely on the basis that he was not entitled to switch leave having last entered the United Kingdom as a visitor, was inconsistent with the terms of the pandemic-era exceptional assurance policy [HB/140]. According to Mr Lee, that policy provided that a person was “able to apply for permission to stay in the UK if [they] have been issued with an ‘exceptional assurance’”.
59. Mr Yarrow submitted that, at the time the applicant’s wife and child applied for leave under Appendix ROB, the policy did indeed allow visitors to switch in‑country [HB/122]. However, he argued that, properly construed, the policy in force when the applicant submitted his own application for leave to remain in late August 2021 did not entitle a person present in the United Kingdom under an exceptional assurance to apply for a route for which they would not otherwise qualify.
60. Having considered the matter, I am satisfied that the applicant’s ground of claim is not arguable. On a plain reading of the policy in force at the time of his application, it clearly provided that a person was entitled to make an application for further leave only if they “hold permission in a route that would normally allow them to do so”, which, as the policy goes on to explain, does not mean that they may “apply for a route for which there is no provision in the Immigration Rules for making an in‑country application”. It is not suggested by the applicant that, but for the exceptional assurance, he could have switched in‑country from being a visitor to a dependent of an overseas business representative. It would make little sense for a visitor benefitting from an exceptional assurance to be placed in a more advantageous position than a person who continued to hold extant leave and was subject to prohibitions on switching. I am satisfied that the provision that the applicant relies upon is unarguably intended to prevent those stranded in the United Kingdom during the pandemic from being refused leave to remain, where they would otherwise qualify for it, based on their overstaying.
61. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the decision in Seerangan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] 4 WLR 60 at [22], where the Court of Appeal (per Underhill LJ, with Dingemans and Falk LJJ agreeing) considered the very passage of the policy relied upon by the applicant. The Court held that, for those subject to an exceptional assurance,
“it means that [when applying for leave to remain] their current overstaying is to be disregarded as long as the entire period since the expiry of their visa is covered by an EA granted under the Policy: the disregard would be outside of the Rules, but the Secretary of State has power to waive compliance.”
It follows that the passage relied upon by the applicant did not exempt him from the prohibition in the Rules against switching in‑country from a visit visa; rather, it simply meant that any period of overstaying would be disregarded. Accordingly, I would have refused permission in any event.
C. The application for an extension of time
The seriousness of the delay
62. In accordance with rule 28(2) of the Procedure Rules, the claim form should have been filed promptly and, in any event, no later than three months after the date of the decision challenged, which, in this case, would have been 3 April 2023. As the claim form was not filed until 26 April 2024, I am satisfied that the delay of over 12 months is both serious and significant.
Is there a good explanation for the delay?
63. For the reasons already explained in this decision, I have found that, rather than providing a good explanation for the delay in filing the claim, the applicant has instead manufactured a fraudulent one.
Considering all the circumstances of the case, should an extension be granted?
64. There are various factors to be taken into account. These include the need to ensure procedural rigour and compliance with the Procedure Rules, the prejudice to the respondent, and the public interest in the finality of administrative decision‑making when asked to litigate a decision of 3 January 2023 after such a lengthy delay.
65. More importantly, the fact that the applicant has sought to deceive the Upper Tribunal in order to obtain an extension of time weighs very heavily against granting one. Fraud unravels all: see, for example, Bokqiu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 191 at [28]. Therefore, even if I had concluded that the applicant’s ground of claim was arguable, contrary to what Mr Lee submitted, his conduct would nonetheless have made an extension of time inappropriate.
66. Accordingly, I refuse to extend time, and the application for judicial review is not admitted.
67. The parties are invited to agree an order disposing of this matter, including the issue of costs.
~~~~0~~~~