Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2024-LON-001654
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
(1) Muhammad Atteq
(2) Amtul Sabooh
(3) Toseeq Ahmed
(4) Mounes Ahmed
(5) Aneeq Ahmed
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal granting the applicants permission to apply for judicial review by an order dated 13 December 2024

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 17 February 2025 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 6 April 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 17 February 2025 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2024-LON-003161
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
(1) Attia Tul Habib
(2) Shafia Tanveer Ahmad
(3) Faris Ahmad
(4) Mabroor Ahmad
Applicants
and

The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the Interested Party, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal directing a rolled-up hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 8 June 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The applicants’ application to withdraw the claim is refused.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2024-LON-003186
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
(1) Zahid Ahmad
(2) Hasher Ahmed
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 5 December 2024 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 24 September 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 5 December 2024 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000004
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
(1) Shumaila Ahsan
(2) Muqadus Noor
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 30 January 2025 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the applicants’ sponsor, Mrs Aneela Khan, attending the hearing on 19 August 2025 along with her husband, Mr Abdullah Khan, and both giving oral evidence

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 8 June 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 30 January 2025 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000097
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
(1) Zakra Mansoor
(2) Shafia Mansoor
(3) Shayan Ahmed
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal having granted the applicants permission to apply for judicial review by an order dated 9 May 2025

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 13 December 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

2. No order as to costs

3. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000251
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
Rehana Shakil
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicant not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal directing a rolled-up hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicant is not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as she would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in her entry clearance application submitted on 6 December 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

2. No order as to costs

3. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000441
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
(1) Abida Ishaq
(2) Malaika Ishaq
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 1 April 2025 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the applicants’ “sponsor”, Mrs Aneela Khan, attending the hearing on 19 August 2025 along with her husband, Mr Abdullah Khan, and both giving oral evidence

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 7 June 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 1 April 2025 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000568
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
Wasima Suleman
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicant not attending the hearing

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 12 March 2025 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicant is not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as she would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in her entry clearance application submitted on 9 January 2025

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 12 March 2025 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000609
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for set aside

The King
on the application of
(1) Samaira Mushtaq
(2) Nadeem Ahmad
(3) Najeeb Ahmad
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the respondent applying for the approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 8 May 2025 to be set aside

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 9 January 2025

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 8 May 2025 is set aside.

2. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

3. No order as to costs

4. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-000681
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
(1) Zahid Ahmad
(2) Hasher Ahmed
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal directing a rolled-up hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 24 September 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

2. No order as to costs

3. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-001030
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
(1) Zahid Ahmad
(2) Hasher Ahmed
Applicants
and

The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the Interested Party, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal directing a rolled-up hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 24 September 2024

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

2. No order as to costs

3. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 13/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

JR-2025-LON-001382
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
(1) Basharat Ahmad
(2) Shagufta Nasrin
(3) Najia Basharat
(4) Naghma Huma
Applicants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley and Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Hannah Burton, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 19 August 2025 and with the applicants not attending the hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal giving the parties notice that it would consider the use of false evidence in this application encompassing intentionally created false or manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts

UPON the Upper Tribunal directing a rolled-up hearing

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that a third party has been actively engaged in deception on this Tribunal

UPON the Upper Tribunal finding that the applicants are not personally aware of these proceedings and would not have brought the proceedings in any event as they would not wish for judicial scrutiny of the false evidence relied upon in their entry clearance application submitted on 21 February 2025

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

2. No order as to costs

3. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 14/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

Case Nos: JR-2024-LON-001654, JR-2024-LON-003161, JR-2024-LON-003186,
JR-2025-LON-000004, JR-2025-LON-000097; JR-2025-LON-000251,
JR-2025-LON-000441, JR-2025-LON-000568, JR-2025-LON-000609,
JR-2025-LON-000681, JR-2025-LON-001030, JR-2025-LON-001382

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)

Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

7 May 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

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RE IN THE MATTER OF TWENTY-SEVEN ENTRY CLEARANCE APPLICATIONS FROM PAKISTAN

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No attendance on behalf of the applicants

Ms H Burton, Counsel
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 19 August 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge O’Callaghan:

Index Paragraph No.

A. Introduction 1 - 10
B. Summary 11 - 13
C. The claims 16 - 21
D. Chronology 22 - 130
E. Proceedings before the Upper Tribunal 131 - 142
F. Applications to set aside Orders of the Upper Tribunal 143 - 144
G. The hearing 145 - 161
H. Post-hearing directions 162 - 163
I. The law 164 - 196
J. Analysis 197
(1) Death certificates 198
(2) Sponsors 199 - 247
(3) Solicitor witnesses to documents 248 - 253
(4) External management of claims/ false documents 254
(a) Visa fee payment 255
(b) Grounds of claim 256 - 263
(c) Misspelling 264 - 265
(d) False documents 266 - 306
(e) Handwriting 307 - 310
(5) Individual cases 311 - 382
K. Help with fees 383 - 412
L. Third-party controllers of applications and JR claims 413 - 478
M. Decision 479 - 518
N. Additional observations 519
(6) Draft Consent Orders 520 - 525
(7) Relevant documents 526 - 530
(8) Help with Fees scheme 531 - 534
(9) False / manipulated documents 535 - 540
(10) Contact details entered on VAF 541
(11) Practice Directions / Practice Statement 542
(12) Victims of identity theft 543
(13) False documents 544 - 546
(14) Controlled email addresses 547
(15) Controlled telephone numbers 548 - 550
(16) Immigration Advice Authority 551
O. Disposal 552 - 583

A. Introduction

1. The Upper Tribunal is required to consider the exercise of deception using false evidence encompassing both intentionally created false documents and manipulated documents, as well as the provision of false personal information and the concealment of relevant facts in entry clearance applications and judicial review proceedings.

2. It is also required to consider the exercise of fraud in Help with Fees applications concerned with fee remission.

3. Before this panel there are twelve judicial review claims brought by twenty-seven applicants who reside in Pakistan. In Zahid Ahmad, a father and son have filed three of the twelve claims. The remaining applicants each have only one individual claim before this Tribunal. Ten claims challenge decisions made by entry clearance officers. Two challenge decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). All twelve claims are advanced on public law grounds. One claim additionally raises a contempt of court ground.

4. We refer to the twenty-seven people as ‘applicants’ for ease in this judgment, but we find on balance that none of them were aware at the outset that these proceedings were filed in their name, and they would not have decided themselves to subject the extent of falsity in their entry clearance applications to judicial scrutiny by bringing a public law claim. We conclude that the applicants’ identities are being used as a tool in these proceedings by a third party.

5. Six of the claims were settled by consent upon the respondent having agreed to reconsider her challenged decision. The Upper Tribunal approved draft consent orders filed by agreement between the parties, quashed the decisions and granted the applicants leave to withdraw their claims. In each of these six cases, the respondent has since filed set aside applications.

6. Permission to apply for judicial review has been granted in one case. Applicants in two cases renewed their applications for permission to apply for judicial review following the refusal of their applications by a paper consideration. Permission has not been considered in three claims to date.

7. The Upper Tribunal notified the applicants as to the hearing on 19 August 2025 via the contact email addresses previously provided by them. They were informed that the Tribunal would proceed to consider their respective case at the hearing.

8. An undisputed fact in these proceedings is that nine people died in the United Kingdom between March 2024 and February 2025. A death certificate was officially issued on each occasion. Between them, these certificates are the foundation for each applicant seeking entry clearance to this country, purportedly to visit family members at a time of bereavement. The various entry clearance applications before us were made within three and twenty-three days of a deceased’s death.

9. At the outset we offer our sympathies to the families of each of the deceased for their loss. We are aware of the personal anguish suffered by family members who have contacted the Upper Tribunal in respect of these proceedings, and we appreciate the distress that others may suffer upon becoming aware that the death of a loved one has resulted in efforts by persons unknown to seek to circumvent immigration control by the use of their family member’s identity and reference to their death.

10. We find on balance that several members of the deceased families, including spouses, have or may have been victims of identity theft for financial gain.

B. Summary

11. We declare:

i. The proceedings in each case are a nullity.

12. Though judicial review is fundamentally a supervisory jurisdiction concerned with the legality of decision-making processes, we are required by necessity to exceptionally determine factual dispute as the respondent asserts that false and manipulated documents have been used in each case such as to undermine the integrity of the proceedings. In undertaking this task we apply the civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities, with the burden placed upon the respondent. We draw proper inferences from the available materials.

13. We find, inter alia:

i. The entry clearance applications all bear striking similarities though the applicants live across Pakistan.

ii. In all cases deception has been exercised using false evidence encompassing intentionally created false documents and/or manipulated documents as well as the provision of false personal information, the use of documents belonging to others under the guise that they belong to an applicant, and the concealment of relevant facts that undermine the veracity of each entry clearance application.

iii. The applicants were not aware at the outset that judicial review proceedings were filed in their name. To date, twenty-five applicants remain unaware of these proceedings. The applicants in Ahsan are now aware but do not support the claim brought in their name because they are belatedly alert to false evidence accompanying their entry clearance applications along with false personal information.

14. As to the applicants’ visa consultants, Globe Path Immigration Consultant, Office 2, Block 4, Bahria Square Commercial Lane 2, Bahria Phase 7, Rawalpindi we find that its directors, representatives, agents and/or servants have, inter alia:

i. Deliberately engaged in deception in the entry clearance applications submitted in all cases, and in eleven cases with agreement from applicants, using false evidence encompassing intentionally created false documents and/or manipulated documents as well the provision of false personal information, the use of documents belonging to others under the guise that they belong to an applicant, and the concealment of relevant facts such as home addresses.

ii. Filed judicial review claims on behalf of the applicants without their knowledge and authority.

iii. Filed judicial review claims solely for their own financial benefit.

iv. Controlled proceedings in each of the judicial review cases in the guise of the applicants.

v. Placed false contact email addresses and telephone numbers on visa application forms (‘VAFs’) and UTIAC1s permitting directors, representatives, agents and servants of the firm to adopt the identity of the applicants if the respondent sought to make further enquiries by using these means of contact.

vi. Placed false signatures on various UTIAC forms filed in these proceedings with the intention to deceive.

vii. Sought costs in these proceedings from the respondent for work not undertaken.

viii. Provided false information in respect of fee remission applications under the Help with Fees scheme.

15. We observe:

Procedure

i. The Upper Tribunal can expect an initial decision maker considering entry clearance applications to interrogate documents relied upon, and to be alert to false and manipulated documents.

Statement of truth

ii. The importance of the mandatory requirement that a statement of truth be signed on a UTIAC form cannot be underestimated: it is no empty formality as is evident from the fact that a false statement can give rise to liability for contempt of court. The requirement for a signed statement of truth serves an important purpose; it eliminates claims where the party has no honest belief in the case. The essence of a public law challenge ultimately rests upon such confirmation being genuinely held by the applicant.

iii. Justice depends upon openness, transparency and above all upon honesty. It is seriously damaged by untruthful claims that place a burden of analysis upon a tribunal. As this form of contempt of court undermines the administration of justice, it is always serious, even if the falsity of the relevant statement is identified at an early stage and does not in the end affect the outcome of the litigation.

Draft consent order

iv. There is an expectation by the Upper Tribunal that a respondent to a judicial review claim will interrogate an applicant’s case and documents relied upon before agreeing that its own decision be quashed or that it be subject to a mandatory order. This should be a considered decision made by the respondent being mindful that it is requesting the Tribunal to make a prerogative order with its attendant consequences and should not be founded solely upon convenience or related factors.

v. Where a conclusion is reached in an entry clearance decision that deception or fraud has been exercised, the respondent should consider whether the Upper Tribunal may be assisted by an agreed draft consent order being accompanied by a statement of reasons informing the Tribunal as to the public law reasoning why a decision of a public authority should be quashed. The reasoning, though it may be short, needs to be clear, correct and adequate. When undertaking such consideration, the respondent should be alert to the fact that the Tribunal will scrutinise a draft consent order as to its appropriateness.

Filing of documents

vi. In judicial review proceedings challenging an entry clearance decision, an applicant must file the VAF and, if served, any accompanying written representations. Additionally, they should file the biographical data page of their current passport as the document is beneficial to the Upper Tribunal in its task. If there is a failure to do so, these documents should be filed by the respondent when filing her acknowledgment of service.

Applications under the Help with Fees scheme

vii. These cases evidence that inconsistencies between declarations made in Help with Fees applications and financial documents previously submitted in entry clearance applications are not being picked up in the present process adopted under the scheme. We recommend that applications should be accompanied by up-to-date evidence relating to income and savings for the applicant and any partner in addition to all financial evidence submitted with the entry clearance application.

viii. A judge concerned about fraud under the scheme may issue directions and request clarification of an applicant’s financial status. This step provides adequate notice and permits an opportunity for explanation. The issue of whether there has been a fraudulent application under the scheme can be dealt with at any stage of judicial review proceedings.

C. The claims

16. The public law claims before us:

i. JR-2024-LON-001654 (‘Atteq’): (1) Muhammad Atteq, (2) Amtul Sabooh, (3) Toseeq Ahmed, (4) Mounes Ahmed and (5) Aneeq Ahmed (a minor).

ii. JR-2024-LON-003161 (‘Habib’): (1) Attia Tul Habib, (2) Shafia Tanveer Ahmad (a minor), (3) Faris Ahmad (a minor) and (4) Mabroor Ahmad (a minor).

iii. JR-2024-LON-003186, JR-2025-LON-000681 and JR-2025-LON-001030 (‘Zahid Ahmad’): (1) Zahid Ahmad and (2) Hasher Ahmed (a minor).

iv. JR-2025-LON-000004 (‘Ahsan’): (1) Shumaila Ahsan and (2) Muqadus Noor (a minor).

v. JR-2025-LON-000097 (‘Mansoor’): (1) Zakra Mansoor, (2) Shafia Mansoor and (3) Shayan Ahmed (a minor).

vi. JR-2025-LON-000251 (‘Shakil’): Rehana Shakil.

vii. JR-2025-LON-000441 (‘Ishaq’): (1) Abida Ishaq and (2) Malaika Ishaq (a minor).

viii. JR-2025-LON-000568 (‘Suleman’): (1) Wasima Suleman.

ix. JR-2025-LON-000609 (‘Mushtaq’): (1) Sumaira Mushtaq, (2) Nadeem Ahmad and (3) Najeeb Ahmad.

x. JR-2025-LON-001382 (‘Basharat Ahmad’): (1) Basharat Ahmad, (2) Shagufta Nasrin, (3) Najia Basharat and (4) Naghma Huma.

17. The various claims were filed with the Upper Tribunal between 6 April 2024 and 21 February 2025, a period of ten months.

18. The twenty-seven applicants are nationals of Pakistan. Having made online applications for entry clearance, they presented their Pakistani passports when attending a visa application centre where they provided their biometrics and so their identities are not challenged by the respondent. Eight applicants are presently minors. All the applicants present as litigants in person who are conducting their own cases through their lead applicant from whom this Tribunal has purportedly received email communication relating to their individual proceedings.

19. According to the information provided by the applicants in their VAFs they live in various cities and provinces of Pakistan. The applicants in Mushtaq and Suleman reside in Islamabad. The applicants in Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan and Atteq state that they reside in Sindh. The remaining applicants are said to reside in Punjab and primarily in the city of Chenab Nagar. The distance between the applicants residing furthest south in Pakistan, Zahid Ahmad in Kotri, and those living furthest north, Habib in Gujrat, is approximately 680 miles.

20. As addressed below, the Upper Tribunal is uncertain as to where many of the applicants truly reside, though we accept that they all reside in Pakistan. The lack of certainty is consequent to the use of deception and the provision of false documents. In several cases there is inconsistency as to the home address identified in documents relied upon by individual applicants with the home address recorded by them in their VAFs and claim forms.

21. We proceed on the basis that the applicants do not know each other outside of their own family group. For reasons detailed below, this includes the applicants in Ahsan and Ishaq who, by their applications, are identified as being related.

D. Chronology

22. For ease, we reference UTIAC judicial review forms by their form numbers. A UTIAC1 form must be used for making an application for judicial review in this Chamber. A UTIAC4 is filed when applying for urgent consideration or interim relief at the same time as filing a UTIAC1. A UTIAC5 is filed when applying for urgent consideration or interim relief when a UTIAC1 has previously been filed. A UTIAC6 is an application notice without consent. A UTIAC10 is a notice of withdrawal of all or part of a party’s case. If an applicant is refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers and they want it to be reconsidered at an oral hearing, they must file a UTIAC11. A UTIAC13 is filed following a grant of permission to apply for judicial review at an oral reconsideration hearing; it permits the case to continue to a substantive hearing upon an application fee being paid.

23. Save for UTIAC4 and UTIAC10, the application forms referenced above must be accompanied by an application fee. Relevant to these proceedings are various Court and Tribunal Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Orders, amending fees in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (Judicial Review) (England and Wales) Fees Order 2011.

24. Following decisions to refuse entry clearance, or on two occasions the subsequent refusal by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) to accept an appeal, the applicants filed UTIAC1 applications to commence their public law claims. We address the claims in the order they were filed with this Tribunal.

a) Atteq

25. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

26. On 25 March 2024, Mr Muhammad Malik died at the City Hospital, Birmingham. He was a retired foundry worker and aged eighty-nine. His death was registered on 2 April 2024 by his niece, Mrs Razia Bashir.

27. On 6 April 2024, four days after the registration of Mr Malik’s death, Mr Muhammad Atteq along with his wife, Mrs Amtul Sabooh, and their children, then aged twenty-one, twenty, and fifteen respectively, applied to visit the United Kingdom for fourteen days.

28. Mr Atteq confirmed by his VAF the intention of the applicants’ visit was to provide emotional and personal support to close family members in this country. He stated that Mrs Sabooh was Mr Malik’s daughter. Mr Atteq recorded his contact email address as muhammadatteq37@gmail.com.

29. The respondent was informed that the applicants’ sponsor was Mrs Sabooh’s brother, Mr Muhammad Irfan, residing in Yardley, Birmingham. His contact email address was said to be muhammadatteq37@gmail.com, the same email address provided by Mr Atteq, and his United Kingdom telephone number ended 00689. That the sponsor had the same personal email address as Mr Atteq did not concern the respondent. The respondent adopted this approach in several other claims, despite it being a possible indicator that contact with a sponsor is being controlled by an applicant or a third party.

30. The family reside in Karachi, Sindh. Mr Atteq confirmed his contact telephone number as ending 25506. He detailed that he was employed in Karachi by Shezan International Ltd, a Pakistani beverage manufacturer. The telephone number provided for Mr Atteq’s employer ends 44722. This number is confirmed on the employer’s website as belonging to its Karachi office, where Mr Atteq states that he works. It is the only telephone number provided by an applicant or sponsor in the cases before us that we have confidence is not controlled by a third party.

31. On 6 May 2024, the respondent individually refused the applications under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Immigration Rules (‘the Rules’).

32. A judicial review claim was lodged by the applicants by means of a UTIAC1 on 19 June 2024. Mr Atteq again confirmed his contact email address to be muhammadatteq37@gmail.com. The Upper Tribunal has since received correspondence from this email address. The Tribunal fee of £169.00 was paid by ‘Muhammad Munir’ using a Lloyds Bank account.

33. The UTIAC1 and accompanying grounds were completed in English. Section 11 of the form includes a clear and important warning:

‘I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.’

34. Underneath this warning, Mr Atteq signed and confirmed that he believed the facts and matters stated in the application were true and complete.

35. The respondent filed her acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence opposing the application on 2 August 2024. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused by a paper decision sent to the parties on 4 November 2024. Having considered the grounds of claim and documents filed the Judge concluded, inter alia, that it was unarguably open to the respondent to consider the applicants’ level of income and to consider whether the costs of such a short trip were disproportionate. The Judge proceeded on the basis that the financial documentation filed in the case was genuine.

36. On 11 November 2024, the applicants renewed the application by filing a UTIAC11, with an attendant form EX160 Help with Fees (‘form EX160’) applying for an application fee remission in the sum of £424. The statement of truth on both forms was signed by Mr Atteq. The application fee was remitted.

37. The applicants were granted permission to apply for judicial review at an oral reconsideration hearing held on 13 December 2024. In granting permission, the Judge relied, in part, on documentary evidence said to have been provided by the sponsor. Accompanying the order were case management directions.

38. A UTIAC13 was subsequently filed following the grant of permission accompanied by a form EX160, in which the statement of truth section was signed by Mr Atteq. The fee of £385 was remitted.

39. A request was sent from muhammadatteq37@gmail.com to the Upper Tribunal on 31 January 2025 that the final hearing be expedited because the applicants’ sponsor, Mr Irfan, had sustained severe burns to his body following a gas explosion at his home on 30 January 2025. Accompanying the request was a letter issued by Chelsea & Westminster Hospital. Mr Atteq was advised by the Upper Tribunal that the request was to be made on notice using a UTIAC5 which would be placed before a judge.

40. On 4 February 2025, the Upper Tribunal received a request from muhammadatteq37@gmail.com seeking information as to what UTIAC form should be used for default judgment if the respondent failed to comply with relevant case management directions.

41. On the same day the Upper Tribunal received a second request from the same email address. It was stated that consequent to the respondent failing to file detailed grounds of defence within the directed thirty-five days, the respondent “has essentially conceded the case” and is “essentially saying they have no legal arguments to refute the applicant’s claim about the visa refusal being unlawful”. The Upper Tribunal was asked to issue an order granting the remedies sought without a substantive hearing and for the respondent to pay the applicants’ costs.

42. The Upper Tribunal received a draft consent order signed by the parties on 14 February 2025. It was approved by a Senior Legal Officer, pursuant to delegated judicial powers, on 17 February 2025 and sealed on the same day.

43. On 11 March 2025, the Upper Tribunal wrote to the applicants via muhammadatteq37@gmail.com observing the correspondence of 31 January 2025 and noting that a very similar hospital letter had since been received in separate judicial review proceedings, namely Habib. Mr Atteq was informed that further to enquiries made with Chelsea & Westminster Hospital, the Upper Tribunal was concerned that the two hospital letters were not genuine. Mr Atteq was further informed that his matter and the application in Habib would be listed together to permit the Upper Tribunal to further consider the hospital letters filed in both cases. No explanation as to the origin of the hospital letter has been received to date from Mr Atteq or any other member of his family.

44. On 13 May 2025, the respondent applied to set aside the approved consent order of 17 February 2025. She observed a pattern of conduct and the use of fraudulent documentation in multiple immigration matters as being highly indicative of a calculated and persistent attempt to deceive her and the Upper Tribunal.

b) Habib

45. The respondent is the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).

46. Mrs Inayat Bibi died at the Bradford Royal Infirmary on 3 June 2024. She was a widow aged seventy-six. Her son, Mr Mohammed Idrees, registered her death the next day.

47. On 8 June 2024, four days after the registration of death, Mrs Attia Tul Habib submitted entry clearance applications for visit visas on behalf of herself and her three children, who were then aged eleven, eight and six. Mrs Habib stated that Mrs Bibi was her mother, and both she and her children wished to participate in death prayers. Additionally, they wished to attend Mrs Bibi’s grave. Her contact email address was recorded as attiatulh42@gmail.com and her phone number ending 76450. The applicants reside in Gujrat, Punjab.

48. The sponsor, Mr Muhammad Irfan, was said to Mrs Habib’s brother who resided at the same address in Bradford, West Yorkshire, as Mr Idrees, the son of the deceased. Mr Irfan’s phone number was provided, ending 28684. His contact email address was also recorded as attiatulh42@gmail.com.

49. By decisions dated 13 August 2024, the applications for entry clearance were refused by the respondent under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules.

50. Mrs Habib and her children filed an appeal with the First-tier Tribunal. On 14 October 2024, the First-tier Tribunal refused to accept the appeal by a notice served under rule 22 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan reasoned that the decision by an entry clearance officer to refuse a visit entry clearance application was not an appealable decision under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the terms of the decisions in this case clearly established that the decision-maker had not considered, and therefore not refused, a human rights claim.

51. On 12 November 2024, a UTIAC1 and accompanying grounds of claim completed in English were filed with the Upper Tribunal. The document was signed by Mrs Habib who confirmed that she believed the facts and matters stated in the application were true and complete. Her contact email address was recorded as attiatulh42@gmail.com and subsequent communication with the Upper Tribunal was conducted via this address. The accompanying Tribunal fee of £169 was paid by ‘M Munir’ from a NatWest Bank account ending ‘592’.

52. The respondent filed an acknowledgment of service on 9 December 2024. She observed that she was not a party to proceedings, though she had been served with a sealed copy of the application. She requested that the application be refused. The First-tier Tribunal did not file an acknowledgment of service. We observe the typical approach adopted by the First-tier Tribunal when defending in judicial review proceedings is to indicate in its acknowledgment that it will take no part in proceedings and is content to rely on the submissions of other parties, such as the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

53. The Upper Tribunal was contacted by attiatulh42@gmail.com on 5 February 2025. Attached to the email was a typed document detailing that as neither the respondent nor the Secretary of State for the Home Department as an interested party “have provided no substantive legal arguments or authorities against this claim ... the court (sic) is likely to grant the permission to the Claimant’s (sic) application as the Defendant (sic) has essentially conceded the case by not defending themselves”. The reference to “has essentially conceded the case” is also to be found in Mr Atteq’s email sent to the Upper Tribunal the previous day when requesting default judgment. We observe that the applicants in Habib and Atteq live in different provinces of Pakistan and do not know each other.

54. A UTIAC5 was filed by Mrs Habib on 28 February 2025 requesting urgent consideration of her claim “as my UK sponsor is in a critical condition due to gas explosion and burnt badly, kindly see the attached hospital letter in this regard”. The application was accompanied by a letter from Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, dated 27 February 2025, in which the gas explosion was said to have occurred on 25 February 2025. Accompanying the application was a completed form EX160. The statement of truth sections of both forms were signed by Mrs Habib. The application fee of £281 was remitted.

55. By an Order sealed on 28 February 2025 the Upper Tribunal refused the application for urgent consideration and the attendant application for permission to apply for judicial review.

56. On the same day, a UTIAC11 was filed requesting a reconsideration hearing, accompanied by a signed form EX160. The statement of truth on both forms was signed by Mrs Habib. The application fee of £425 was remitted.

57. A second UTIAC5 urgent application was filed on 7 March 2025, again relying upon the sponsor, Mr Irfan, being in a critical condition. The application was accompanied by a letter from Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, dated 27 February 2025. A form EX160 was filed and the statement of truth sections of both forms were signed by Mrs Habib. The application fee of £281 was remitted.

58. On 7 March 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan directed that the hearing of the oral renewed permission hearing be listed on 2 April 2025. The Upper Tribunal confirmed by its order that it would contact Chelsea and Westminster Hospital to ascertain the present health condition of Mr Irfan. The order was sent to attiatulh42@gmail.com on the same day.

59. At 14.47 on 10 March 2025, the Upper Tribunal sent an email to attiatulh42@gmail.com informing the applicants that the hearing listed on 2 April 2025 was vacated and would be listed on a different date. At 14.49 the Upper Tribunal received an email from attiatulh42@gmail.com asking why the hearing had been vacated. The Upper Tribunal responded at 14.57 that a Judge had made the decision. At 16.06 an email was received from attiatulh42@gmail.com attached to which was a letter from Mrs Habib detailing that Mr Irfan had died on the day of his hospital admission, now said to be the 7 February 2025, and had been buried two days later. Consequently, she was withdrawing the urgent application because “the urgent purpose of the application consideration has been ceased, useless and ineffective ...”. We observe that the date of the hospital admission does not tally with that referenced in the Chelsea and Westminster letter relied upon by Mrs Habib and the identified date of death was twenty-one days before the filing of the UTIAC5.

60. Chelsea and Westminster Hospital wrote to the Upper Tribunal on 11 March 2025 confirming that the letter relied upon by Mrs Habib was not genuine and “no similar letter has been issued in respect of the patient”.

61. On 12 March 2025, the Upper Tribunal was informed by means of a letter attached to an email sent from attiatulh42@gmail.com that Mrs Habib wanted to withdraw her judicial review claim. The following day the Upper Tribunal informed the parties that the oral reconsideration hearing would be listed with the case of Atteq on 14 May 2025.

62. By a one sentence email sent from attiatulh42@gmail.com on 16 April 2025 the Upper Tribunal was again informed that Mrs Habib wished to withdraw her judicial review claim. Judge O’Callaghan refused the application by a decision sent to the parties on 24 April 2025 reasoning that withdrawal required the Upper Tribunal’s consent under rule 17(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and as no paid application had been filed there was no valid application before the Upper Tribunal to consider exercising its discretion.

63. Mrs Habib filed a UTIAC10 on 30 April 2025 seeking permission to withdraw proceedings. She signed the statement of truth. No attendant fee was required for this application. The Upper Tribunal was informed by Mrs Habib that she had secured Australian permanent residence and so did not require a United Kingdom visit visa at this time. She signed the statement of truth section of the form. The respondent has since informed the Upper Tribunal that having liaised with the Australian authorities there is no record of Mrs Habib having been granted permanent residence, or any visa, permitting her to lawfully enter and remain in Australia.

c) Zahid Ahmad

64. The respondent in JR-2024-LON-003186 and JR-2025-LON-000681 is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

65. The respondent in JR-2025-LON-001030 is the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).

66. Mr Nazakat Ali died in Wakefield on 22 September 2024, aged forty-six. He was a taxi driver. His death was registered on the same day by his cousin, Mr Shamraze Abbas Ali.

67. Two days later, on 24 September 2024, Mr Zahid Ahmad and his son, Hasher Ahmed, then aged sixteen, applied for entry clearance as visitors on compassionate circumstances. Mr Zahid Ahmad confirmed in his VAF that Mr Ali was his brother and stated that father and son wished to visit the United Kingdom on compassionate grounds. Mr Zahid Ahmad recorded his email address as zahidahmadpak3@gmail.com and his contact phone number ending 02870. Mr Zahid Ahmad confirmed that he had been employed as a foreman at Meko Denim Mills (PVT) Ltd since 2010. It has not been possible to verify as genuine the company telephone number provided which ends 76900.

68. Mr Zahid Ahmad confirmed his sponsor to be his deceased brother’s wife, Mrs Sarah Saddiq, residing in West Yorkshire. Her email address was said to be munir2013@gmail.com and her telephone number ending 89376.

69. The respondent initially refused the applications under the Rules by separate decisions dated 31 October 2024. Reliance was placed upon paragraphs V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules.

70. A UTIAC1 in JR-2024-LON-003186 was filed with the Upper Tribunal on 20 November 2024. The form and accompanying grounds are in English. Mr Zahid Ahmad signed the statement of truth section. His contact email address was again detailed to be zahidahmadpak3@gmail.com and this address was reconfirmed in the two subsequent UTIAC1 claim forms filed with this Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal has since received communication from this email address. A form EX160 was filed, and the accompanying statement of truth was signed by Mr Zahid Ahmad. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

71. The respondent filed a draft consent order signed by both parties on 5 December 2024. She agreed to reconsider her decisions of 31 October 2024 within three months of the sealing of the order, absent special circumstances. The draft consent order was approved by a Senior Legal Officer, pursuant to delegated judicial powers, on 5 December 2024 and sealed the next day.

72. The applications for entry clearance were again refused under paragraph V.4.2 (a) and (c) of the Rules by individual decisions dated 25 February 2025. The applicants filed a UTIAC1 on 3 March 2025 (JR-2025-LON-000681). The form and the grounds were completed in English, and the statement of truth section was signed by Mr Zahid Ahmad. The grounds additionally request the Upper Tribunal to exercise its contempt powers:

“There is not a shred of fresh evidence before the Respondent. The Respondent,s position remains exactly as it was before the initial refusal. There is no fair basis for the Respondent to have refused this application on the same basis and with no new evidence. There is no basis to depart from the previous decision. On that basis this JR Consent Order was signed by both parties, as it shows a disregard for the judicial process, is a waste of public funds and gives the impression of a lack of respect for judicial decisions. It is also inherently unfair to do so.

Kindly allow this application for the contempt of court proceedings in the interests of justice.”

73. The claim bundle filed in this case is in the poorest state of preparation of those before this panel. It contains a UTIAC1 claim form, the sealed Order in JR-2024-LON-003186, the challenged decision and the earlier decision subject to challenge in previous proceedings. No documents relating to the entry clearance application were filed. Mr Zahid Ahmad filed a form EX160 and signed the statement of truth. The application fee of £169 was remitted. The respondent filed and served an acknowledgment of service defending the claim on 25 April 2025.

74. In the meantime, the applicants filed an appeal against the decisions of 25 February 2025 with the First-tier Tribunal. By a notice under rule 22 of the 2014 Procedure Rules, dated 27 March 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Bibi did not accept the appeal. This decision is challenged by a judicial review claim filed on 3 April 2025 (JR-2025-LON-001030). A UTIAC1 and grounds of claim were completed in English. Again, Mr Zahid Ahmad completed a form EX160 and signed the statement of truth section of both forms. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

75. On 15 August 2025, the respondent filed and served a paid application to set aside the approved consent order in JR-2024-LON-003186.

d) Ahsan

76. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

77. Mr Shakoor Amed, a food delivery driver, died in Preston, Lancashire on 2 June 2024. His death was registered two days later by his brother, Mr Akeel Ahmed.

78. On 8 June 2024, four days after the registration of death, Mrs Shumaila Ahsan and her daughter, Muqadus, then aged thirteen, applied for visit visas on compassionate grounds. Mrs Ahsan stated that Mr Amed was her brother. Mother and daughter reside in Thatta, Sindh.

79. When completing her VAF, Mrs Ahsan confirmed her email address as ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com and her contact telephone number ending 63128. Her sponsor is her sister, Mrs Aneela Khan, who resides in the United Kingdom with her husband. Mr Abdullah Khan. Mrs Khan’s email address was also said to be ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com and her United Kingdom phone number ends 54907.

80. By decisions dated 18 December 2024, the entry clearance applications were refused under paragraph V4.2 (a) and (c) of the Rules.

81. The applicants filed a UTIAC1 with the Upper Tribunal on 2 January 2025, accompanied by a form EX160. The documents and grounds of claim are in English. The statement of truth sections in both forms was signed by Mrs Ahsan. The application fee of £169 was remitted. Mrs Ahsan’s contact email address was again identified as ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com. The Upper Tribunal has since received communication from this email address.

82. The respondent filed her acknowledgment of service on 24 January 2025 and indicated her agreement to reconsider the decisions within three months of the sealing of a consent order. A draft consent order signed by the parties was received by the Upper Tribunal on 27 January 2025. It was approved by a Senior Legal Officer pursuant to delegated judicial powers on 29 January 2025 and sealed on 30 January 2025.

83. On 1 August 2025, the respondent applied to set aside the order of 30 January 2025.

e) Mansoor

84. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

85. Mr Muhammad Shahzad died at St Bart’s Hospital, London on 5 December 2024. He was aged fifty-two and was employed as a security officer. His wife, Mrs Jurate Barauskiene, registered his death the following day. Mrs Barauskiene is a Lithuanian national lawfully residing in the United Kingdom.

86. On 13 December 2024, seven days after the registration of death, Mrs Zakra Mansoor applied for entry clearance with her children for a family visit on compassionate grounds following the death of her brother, Mr Shahzad. Her children were then aged eighteen and eight. The purpose of the trip was for Mrs Mansoor to visit the grave of her brother in this country. In her VAF Mrs Mansoor gave her email address as waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com and her phone number ending 63119.

87. Mrs Mansoor confirmed her sponsor as her deceased brother’s wife, Mrs Barauskiene, whose contact email address was also said to be waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com and her phone number ending 13394.

88. The applications for entry clearance were refused under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules by decisions dated 9 January 2025.

89. A UTIAC1 was filed on 13 January 2025. Both the form and the grounds are in English. The statement of truth section was signed by Mrs Mansoor. A new contact address was provided by Mrs Mansoor, namely munir2013@gmail.com, and she subsequently communicated with the Upper Tribunal using this address. This email address is the same as that attributed to Mrs Saddiq, the sponsor in Zahid Ahmad, and is very similar to that of Mrs Shakil which is recorded in her UTIAC1 as munirj2013@gmail.com. Mrs Mansoor applied for fee remittance through completing a EX160 form. The application fee of £169 was remitted

90. Permission to apply for judicial review was initially refused following a paper consideration. A UTIAC11 was filed along with a form EX160. The statements of truths were signed by Mrs Mansoor and the application fee of £424 was remitted. Permission was subsequently granted by the Upper Tribunal at an oral reconsideration hearing held at Field House on 9 May 2025. The Judge expressly relied in their reasoning on Mrs Mansoor’s documentary evidence as to her financial situation, as well as the “extensive and unchallenged official identity documents submitted, particularly ... the brother’s birth certificate ...”

91. Mrs Mansoor did not attend the hearing remotely and was not represented. We observe a request sent by email from munir2013@gmail.com on 9 May 2025:

“Here in Pakistan there is a big problem with the internet these days due to the war between India and Pakistan, therefore the main applicant might be unable to attend the CVP hearing of this case on 09-05-2025.”

92. On 15 May 2025, a UTIAC13 was filed to continue the case after the grant of permission. Also filed was a form EX160 with the statement of truth section signed by Mrs Mansoor. The application fee of £436 was remitted.

f) Shakil

93. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

94. Mrs Mohammed Bibi died in Smethwick on 3 December 2024. She was a widow and aged ninety. Her death was registered on the same day by her nephew, Mr Jawed Hussain, whose address in Birmingham is recorded on the death certificate.

95. Three days later, on 6 December 2024, Mrs Rehana Shakil applied for entry clearance as a visitor on compassionate grounds following the death of her mother. Mrs Shakil provided her contact email address as afaqahamd703@gmail.com and her phone number ending 87295. She resides in Chenab Nagar, Punjab. Her sponsor was confirmed as her sister, Mrs Amina Hussain, the wife of Mr Jawed Hussain. Mrs Hussain’s email address was identified as munirj2013@gmail.com and her phone number ending 98659.

96. On 23 January 2025, the application was refused by the respondent under paragraph V4.2 (a) and (c) of the Rules.

97. Mrs Shakil filed her claim for judicial review on 27 January 2025. The UTIAC1 form and grounds are in English. She provided a new contact email address identified as shakilrehana740@gmail.com. This email address has since been used to communicate with the Upper Tribunal. She filed a form EX160 and signed the statement of truth sections in both the UTIAC1 and form EX160. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

98. She also applied for urgent consideration on the same day by filing a UTIAC4. No application fee was required. The application for urgent consideration was refused by a decision of the Upper Tribunal sent to the parties on 31 January 2025.

99. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused following a paper consideration on 12 May 2025. Mrs Shakil renewed her application by a UTIAC11 form on 19 May 2025 and filed a form EX160 on the same day. She signed the statement of truth sections on both forms. The application fee of £438 was remitted.

g) Ishaq

100. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

101. Mr Shakoor Amed’s death certificate has been used in a second entry clearance application, again with Mrs Aneela Khan confirmed as the sponsor.

102. On 7 June 2024, a day before the applicants in Ahsan made their entry clearance application, Mrs Abida Ishaq and her three-year-old daughter, Malaika, applied for visit visas. Mrs Ishaq states that Mr Amed was her brother. Mother and daughter reside in Chenab Nagar, Punjab.

103. In her VAF, Mrs Ishaq detailed her contact email address as abidaishaq27@gmail.com and provided her telephone number ending 63119. Mrs Khan’s home address was provided, and was the same as provided by the applicants in Ahsan, but though she has the same telephone number as provided in Ahsan, ending 54907, her contact email address was now identified as abidaishaq27@gmail.com.

104. Having withdrawn a previous refusal decision following service of a pre-action protocol letter, the respondent refused the applications under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules by decisions dated 8 February 2025.

105. A UTIAC1 was filed with the Upper Tribunal on 11 February 2025. The UTIAC1 and grounds were completed in English, and the statement of truth section was signed by Mrs Ishaq. She recorded her email address as abidaishaq27@gmail.com and communicated with the Upper Tribunal using this email address. A form EX160 was filed along with the UTIAC1, and its statement of truth section was signed by Mrs Ishaq. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

106. By her acknowledgment of service filed on 8 March 2025 the respondent invited the applicants to withdraw the proceedings upon her agreeing to reconsider the entry clearance officer’s decision within three months of an order being sealed, absent special conditions. A draft consent order was filed by the parties with the Upper Tribunal on 27 March 2025. It was approved by a Legal Officer pursuant to delegated judicial powers and sealed on 1 April 2025.

107. On 1 August 2025 the respondent filed and served an application to set aside the approved consent order sealed on 1 April 2025.

h) Suleman

108. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

109. Mrs Arzo Gul died at the Royal Stoke University Hospital on 3 January 2025. She was aged nineteen. Her death was registered the same day by her cousin, Mr Sadaqat Maqsoom.

110. Six days later, on 9 January 2025, Mrs Suleman applied for a visit visa on compassionate grounds following the death of her sister. In her VAF, she gave her contact email address as sulemanwasima@gmail.com and her phone number ending 87290. Mrs Suleman resides in Rawalpindi, Punjab.

111. Her sponsor is Mr Sufyan Iftikhar, the husband of Mrs Gul. He resides in Stoke-on-Trent. His contact email address is the same as Mrs Suleman and his phone number ends 82696.

112. On 20 February 2025, the entry clearance application was refused under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules.

113. Mrs Suleman filed a UTIAC1 on 21 February 2025. Both the UTIAC1 and the grounds of claim are written in English. She confirmed her contact email address as sulemanwasima@gmail.com and this address was subsequently used to communicate with the Upper Tribunal. The application was accompanied by a form EX160. The statement of truth section was signed by Mrs Suleman on both forms. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

114. A draft consent order was agreed between the parties and filed with the Upper Tribunal on 11 March 2025. It was approved by a Legal Officer pursuant to delegated judicial powers on 11 March 2025 and sealed the next day.

115. On 1 August 2025 the respondent filed and served her application to set aside the approved consent order sealed on 12 March 2025.

i) Mushtaq

116. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

117. Mr Munir Ahmed died in Sheffield, West Yorkshire, on 1 January 2025. He was aged fifty-seven. He worked as a sales assistant and was a foster carer. His death was registered the next day by his daughter, Mrs Aleeshah Ahmed.

118. On 9 January 2025, eight days after Mr Ahmed’s death, Mrs Mushtaq and her children, then aged thirteen and seven, applied for a visit visa. In her VAF, Mrs Mushtaq confirmed Mr Ahmed to be her deceased brother. She recorded her contact email address as hanifahmadali1981@gmail.com and her phone number ending 87330. Mrs Mushtaq resides in Islamabad.

119. Her sponsor is the deceased’s wife, Mrs Shahnaz Akhtar Hussain, who resides in South Yorkshire. Her contact email address is recorded as being the same as Mrs Mushtaq’s and her phone number ends 82695.

120. The applications were refused under paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) of the Rules by decisions dated 23 February 2025.

121. A UTIAC1 was filed with the Upper Tribunal on 26 February 2025. Both the UTIAC1 and the grounds are completed in English. On this form Mrs Mushtaq detailed her contact email address as hanifahmadali198@gmail.com. The claim form was accompanied by a form EX160 with the statement of truth section signed on both forms by Mrs Mushtaq. On the form EX160, Mrs Mushtaq’s contact email address was identified with an additional digit, hanifahmadali1981@gmail.com. The second email address is consistent with that referenced on the VAF and is the email address subsequently used in correspondence with the Upper Tribunal. The application fee of £169 was remitted.

122. By her acknowledgment of service filed on 28 April 2025 the respondent agreed to reconsider her decision. A draft consent order was filed with the Upper Tribunal on 29 April 2025. It was approved by a Legal Officer pursuant to delegated judicial powers on 2 May 2025 and sealed on 8 May 2025.

123. On 1 August 2025 the respondent filed an application to set aside the approved consent order sealed on 8 May 2025.

j) Basharat Ahmad

124. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

125. Mr Mohammad Akram died in Bury on 16 February 2025. He was aged seventy-three and was a retired textile operative. His death was registered three days later by Mr Umer Rashid, his nephew.

126. On 21 February 2025, two days after Mr Akram’s death was registered, Mr Basharat Ahmad, his wife Mrs Shagufta Nasrin and two of their children, then aged forty-four and thirty-three, applied for entry clearance as visitors to visit family. Mrs Nasrin is said to be the deceased’s sister. An adult son, Asif Ahmad, did not join his family in making an entry clearance application.

127. In his VAF, Mr Basharat Ahmad recorded his contact email address as ba1881239@gmail.com and his phone number ending 11413. The family reside in Rabwa, Punjab. The applicants’ sponsor is Mr Mohammed Akram, said to be Mr Basharat Ahmad’s nephew, residing in Rochdale, Greater Manchester. His contact email address is the same as Mr Basharat Ahmad and his phone number ends 52485.

128. The applications were refused under paragraph V.4.2 (a) and (c) by decisions dated 25 March 2025.

129. A UTIAC 1 was filed with this Tribunal on 1 May 2025. Both the UTIAC1 and the grounds of claim were completed in English. Mr Basharat Ahmad confirmed his contact email address as ba1881239@gmail.com and this was the address used to communicate with the Upper Tribunal. Accompanying the claim form was a form EX160. The statement of truth sections in both forms was signed by Mr Basharat Ahmad. The application fee of £174 was remitted.

130. The respondent filed and served her acknowledgment of service defending the claim on 27 May 2025.

E. Proceedings before the Upper Tribunal

131. On 13 March 2025, the Upper Tribunal notified the parties in Atteq and Habib that the cases would be listed together at an oral hearing as it was concerned as to fraud on the tribunal being exercised by the applicants in both cases through use of false documents in applications for expedition.

132. The applicants in Atteq and Habib did not attend before this panel at the hearing on 14 May 2025. The hearing was adjourned on the day, in part because Mr Atteq confirmed when filing a UTIAC6 two days prior to the hearing that he was seeking to instruct a solicitor. The respondent also sought an adjournment as she wished to make further enquiries. This panel issued case management directions. We observe the statement of truth section of the form EX160 that accompanied the UTIAC6 was signed by Mr Atteq and the application fee of £290 was remitted.

133. The other ten cases were later joined by the Upper Tribunal to be heard with the cases of Atteq and Habib. Bespoke directions in respect of each individual case were served on the parties via the email addresses held by the Upper Tribunal. Similarities between the cases were noted, as were concerns to the veracity of information and documents provided with the entry clearance applications. The parties were permitted to file and serve any further submissions and evidence they wished to rely upon within twenty-one days of their respective order being sent. The Tribunal confirmed that a hearing link would be sent on request to the applicants to enable their attendance at the oral hearing. A copy of the directions was also sent by registered post to each United Kingdom-based sponsor at the home address identified in the relevant VAF.

134. In readiness for the hearing, the respondent filed and served written submissions dated 16 August 2025 and further submissions dated 29 August 2025. She additionally filed and served a witness statement from Ms Ally Keeting, a lawyer at the Government Legal Department, dated 17 August 2025, annexed to which were 238 pages of exhibited documents.

135. The only communication with the Upper Tribunal from the applicants prior to the August 2025 hearing were emails sent in the case of Zahid Ahmad. The first was sent on 14 August 2025 from zahidahmadpak3@gmail.com requesting an adjournment of the hearing. The email, purportedly sent by Mr Zahid Ahmad, detailed, inter alia:

“After receiving the court letter I am much worried about the concerns raised in the letter.

I have submitted a complaint to the police and relevant Pakistan Investigation Authority against the consultant / persons who actually filed my application for a visa in Pakistan.

Kindly adjourned this Hearing dated 19-08-2025 for a short period of time because a conclusion of this enquiry by Police will be received very soon.”

136. On 16 August 2025, a further email from the same email address informed the Upper Tribunal:

“I am also victim of this person who has exposed by The Telegraph.co.uk there are several other innocent people are victim of this agent, after few next days he is giving to victim people their email addresses and passwords, so if this hearing of 19.08.2025 is once postponed the several innocent people will contact you ...”

137. This email referenced a Telegraph article published in the United Kingdom on 21 July 2025 titled, ‘Revealed: Pakistani migrants tricking way into Britain with fake £50k visa documents. Paperwork approved by Home Office despite being littered with grammatical errors.’ The author of the article was Sophia Yan, a Senior Foreign Correspondent at the newspaper, and the focus of the article was directed to an undercover investigation of a Pakistani national, Mr Syed Haider. The article detailed, inter alia:

“Pakistani migrants are paying up to £50,000 for visa applications, which the Home Office is waving through despite being littered with errors and falsehoods.

One application obtained by The Telegraph includes a job reference from a fake hospital that said staff would “recommend her for any position she may to seeking. We wish her all the best in future”.

The Telegraph also posed as a migrant seeking a UK visa from the consultant who had drawn up these fake documents. He boasted of a 98 per cent chance of successful entry into the UK within three months.

Syed Kamran Haider, the chief executive of Mirpur Visa Consultant (MVC) in the Pakistan-administered region of Kashmir, was found to be operating openly online, where he advertises loopholes in the UK asylum system, which experts described as “easy to manipulate”.

...

Mr Haider’s MVC firm, identified by The Telegraph, is charging thousands of pounds to falsify their clients’ documents, including fake CVs and bank statements, to use in their visa applications.

The Telegraph obtained falsified paperwork – a fake CV and letter attesting to employment history – that it understands was produced by MVC and submitted in a UK work visa application that was ultimately successful.

A fake letter supporting the migrant’s application purported to be from “Riaz International Hospital” in Mirpur. It “certified” that the Pakistani individual had worked from March 1, 2019, to May 5, 2020, as a nursing care assistant in the hospital.

The letter had grammatical errors, including a line that read: “During this period, her services were found to be satisfactory in caring out the job duties.’

One of the responsibilities stated was nonsensical: “Responsible to take and record of vital signs in takes outputs empty drains.”

The Telegraph found that “Riaz International Hospital” existed only for two years from 2012 to 2014, serving as a temporary location when the original Riaz Hospital Mirpur was undergoing renovations.

Dr Riaz Ahmed, the chief executive of the real Riaz Hospital Mirpur since it opened in 1978, said that the letter The Telegraph reviewed was a “bogus certificate”, as it lacked an official hospital seal and a legitimate signature.”

138. The email provided a link to the referenced Telegraph article as well as a link to the Telegraph’s X (formerly Twitter) post of 21 July 2025:

“Investigation: Pakistani migrants using £50k fake visa documents to scam way into Britain.

Syed Haider [SH] – who advertises loopholes in the UK asylum system – boasted of his success rate to a Telegraph reporter [T] posing as a potential client.

Work visa: Transcript of phone call between Telegraph reporter posing as a client and Syed Kamran Haider

SH All right, if you say so, I’ll get a work permit for Bulgaria. It’ll cost 35 lakh rupees, with 10 lakh upfront and the rest later.

T Is there work in Bulgaria? In the UK, we have relatives there. They said that if any of our family reaches the UK, they will help us manage everything.

SH. There will be work in Bulgaria. It is cheap.

T So does this mean that without spending that amount, it is not possible to get a visa for the UK?

SH. Yes, for the UK, the minimum is 40 or 45 lakh rupees.

T. How much time will the process take?

SH. Two, three months.

T. Is the payment on the condition that everything is done?

SH. No, no, this won’t be a done deal. We’ll have to pay the fees. God forbid, if the visa doesn’t get approved, the bank statement, visa fee and my fees are non-refundable, rest of the fee will be refundable.”

139. At the relevant time in July 2025, 35 lakh Pakistani rupees (PKR 35,00,000) equated to approximately £9,400 and the upfront request of 10 lakhs equated to approximately £2,680. The minimum cost for a United Kingdom visa was £10,300 (PKR 40,00,000).

140. The contention as to Mr Haider’s involvement in Mr Zahid Ahmad’s case was repeated in an email sent from the same address and received by the Upper Tribunal on 13 September 2025:

“I have confirmed to you on 16th August that all my application and other processes were done by the Mirpur Visa Consultant ....”

141. No more was heard by the Upper Tribunal from Mr Zahid Ahmed on this issue. No police report was filed, nor was evidence received as to Mr Haider’s ‘victims’ receiving their email addresses and passwords.

142. Ms Keeting filed a supplementary witness statement, dated 19 August 2025, in which she addressed a Facebook business page belonging to ‘Globe Path Immigration Consultant’ (‘Globe Path’) written in English. The firm is based in Pakistan. Placed on the page were images of the sealed approved consent orders in Ishaq and Mushtaq with a United Kingdom telephone number (ending 74913) overlaid on the images. The firm publicly confirmed its involvement on behalf of the applicants in these two judicial review claims before the Upper Tribunal. We address the role of Globe Path later in our judgment.

F. Applications to set aside Orders of the Upper Tribunal

143. On various dates the respondent filed paid applications requesting the Upper Tribunal to set aside the approved consent orders in Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186), Ahsan, Atteq, Ishaq, Mushtaq, and Suleman. The application fees for these applications together amounted to £1,740.

144. By written submissions filed with each UTIAC6 application the respondent explained that she undertook an internal investigation following the adjourned hearing on 14 May 2025. The investigation identified there was a wider cohort of cases that shared numerous similarities with the cases of Atteq and Habib, including the death of a relative in England. The respondent observed that though the applicants in these cases are supposedly litigants in person, the manner in which documentation is drafted is so strikingly similar that it is inconsistent with each claim having been prepared separately by each individual applicant. Upon examining the cases together, the respondent noted the striking similarities between the individual cases and the cases of Atteq and Habib, with false documents filed, and she submitted that this gave rise to real concerns that the integrity of these proceedings was critically undermined. She explained these circumstances were not known to her when giving her consent to bring an end to proceedings. She contended that applying the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60, [2016] AC 871, her recent discovery of fraud on the Tribunal and the use of false documents vitiated the good faith basis of the agreement. She contended that it was in the interests of justice for the Upper Tribunal to set aside the approved consent orders under rule 43(1)(a) of the 2008 Procedure Rules.

G. The hearing

145. The following applications are before the panel:

i. To withdraw the claim for judicial review:

• Habib

ii. Permission to apply for judicial review:

• Basharat Ahmad
• Zahid Ahmad (JR-2025-LON-000681 & JR-2025-LON-001030)
• Shakil

iii. Applications to set aside an approved consent order:

• Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186)
• Ahsan
• Atteq
• Ishaq
• Mushtaq
• Suleman

146. The panel is also asked to set aside the grant of permission to apply for judicial review in Mansoor.

147. No representative attended for the applicants, nor did the applicants attend. Prior to the hearing, the Upper Tribunal sent links to the email addresses of the applicants and sponsors held on its record so as to enable remote attendance. As confirmed above, the applicants in each case had previously communicated with the Upper Tribunal via the contact email addresses held by the Tribunal, and such communication was in English. We are satisfied that to the best of the Tribunal’s ability each applicant was properly informed of the hearing via the personal email address recorded on their UTIAC1 and via this email address a link was sent enabling them to attend.

148. Ms Burton attended the hearing on behalf of the respondent in all cases and made submissions to the panel.

Oral evidence

149. Mrs Aneela Khan and Mr Abdullah Khan are a married couple resident in the United Kingdom. Mrs Khan is a British citizen, and Mr Khan is a national of Pakistan lawfully residing in this country. Mrs Khan is the recorded sponsor in Ahsan and Ishaq. Both applicants provided personal documents belonging to Mr and Mrs Khan in their entry clearance applications. The couple attended the hearing remotely and answered questions posed by the Tribunal.

150. Mr and Mrs Khan wrote to the Upper Tribunal by email on 7 August 2025 following receipt of the Upper Tribunal’s directions sent in Ahsan and Ishaq and having been invited, if they so wished, to address issues arising by 12 noon on Friday 15 August 2025. Mr and Mrs Khan explained by their email:

“We write jointly in response to the Order of the Upper Tribunal, in which we have been invited to clarify our position in relation to the sponsorship undertaking dated 12 June 2024, ahead of the hearing scheduled for 19 August 2025.

We confirm that we did not complete or sign the sponsorship undertaking dated 12 June 2024. Furthermore, we do not know Abida Ishaq or Malaika Ishaq and have never had any involvement with them or their immigration matters. We are unaware of who completed or signed the document in question and request that the Tribunal examine any such document carefully if it is said to bear our names or signatures.

We remain available to provide further information if required, and we respectfully ask the Tribunal to consider this statement in its assessment of the matter.”

151. Mrs Khan wrote again to the Tribunal on 10 August 2025:

“Mr. Khan has never held any account with NatWest.

In June 2024, my elder sister, Shumaila Ahsan, and her daughter, Muqadas Noor, applied for a UK visit visa, as referenced in case JR-2025-LON-000004. At my sister’s request, we provided certain personal documents to support their visa application.

Due to limited familiarity with the visa process, my sister and her husband engaged a visa consultant/lawyer to handle the application on their behalf. These documents were handed over to the visa consultant solely to assist with the visa application.

We have since become aware that this individual used our documents in connection with other clients, without our knowledge, consent, or authorization — and without the awareness of my sister or her family.

We also wish to confirm that we do not own any property in the United Kingdom or in any other country.

Furthermore, we wish to make it clear that we do not know, and have no association with, Abida Ishaq or Malaika Ishaq.”

152. In her oral evidence before the panel Mrs Khan confirmed in respect of Ahsan that the purpose of the visit was to permit her son, aged eleven, and Mrs Ahsan’s daughter, Muqadas, to meet as cousins and see London together. The intention was for the visit to be over two weeks. Mother and daughter would travel together because Muqadas is too young to travel on her own. Mrs Ahsan’s husband would remain in Pakistan because he was engaged with his two businesses, growing crops and supplying charcoal.

153. Mrs Khan explained that neither she nor her sister understood how to make a visa application as a visitor, and so they contacted a visa consultant who was recommended to Mrs Ahsan’s husband by a friend. The consultant was named ‘Firooze’ and he was based in Chenab Nagar. Because of his actions in this case, we conclude that ‘Firooze’ is a false name. The family were charged PKR 5,00,000 (then approximately £1,440). This was a conditional fee, only to be paid if the application was successful. Otherwise, the only payment would be the cost of the application fee, PKR 42,365 (then approximately £120).

154. Neither Mrs Ahsan nor her husband met the consultant in person with all contact being conducted over the phone using WhatsApp, a messaging and calling app. Mrs Ahsan resides in Sindh, which is in the south of Pakistan, and the consultant was based in Punjab, which is situated in the north of the country.

155. ‘Firooze’ informed Mrs Ahsan that her sponsors, Mr and Mrs Khan, were required to provide copies of the biographical data page of their passports, their Pakistani identity cards, P60s, Mrs Khan’s Family Registration certificate, and bank statements. The couple sent copies of these documents by WhatsApp to Mrs Ahsan who forwarded them to her consultant by the same means.

156. The panel was informed that Mrs Ahsan may have learning difficulties as she suffered a seizure during childhood. Mrs Khan explained that after talking to her sister for “twenty-five minutes” it is apparent that “she is younger than her age”. Neither Mrs Ahsan nor her husband are educated. Mrs Ahsan can receive and send messages on WhatsApp and use it for telephone calls.

157. Mrs Ahsan and her husband rent agricultural land, and they own two houses. They reside with Mr Ahsan’s father. They have borrowed money from Mr Khan to buy seed.

158. Mrs Khan confirmed that she does not have a brother. She was shocked when contacted by the Upper Tribunal and asked about her ‘brother’, Shakoor Amed. She contacted Mrs Ahsan who explained that she too had no idea who Mr Amed was, or why it was being said that he was their brother. Mrs Khan explained that the consultant was only approached to facilitate an application for Mrs Ahsan and her daughter to visit Mr and Mrs Khan in London. There was no family bereavement in this country. Neither woman has any understanding as to how Mr and Mrs Khan’s documents came to be used by the applicants in Ishaq, but she has a real concern that ‘Firooze’ used their documents to earn money by providing them to others to make applications to travel to the United Kingdom. Mrs Khan explained that she had thought the conditional fee agreement entered into by her sister with ‘Firooze’ was “too little money for the work” but explained that she now understands the financial value both her and her husband’s British issued documents have to an unscrupulous consultant. Mrs Khan confirmed that there was no intention on her part, or on Mrs Ahsan’s, to mislead the British authorities.

159. Since becoming aware of the false basis of her entry clearance application, Mrs Ahsan has sought to contact ‘Firooze’, but he has not picked up his phone.

160. Neither Mrs Khan nor Mrs Ahsan were aware that a judicial review claim had been filed in the Upper Tribunal. Mrs Ahsan has informed Mrs Khan that she had no conversation with ‘Firooze’ as to initiating any challenge to a negative entry clearance decision. Neither Mrs Khan nor Mrs Ahsan were aware that the respondent had refused Mrs Ahsan and her daughter’s entry clearance applications on 18 December 2024, over nine months before the panel hearing.

161. Mr Khan informed the panel that he would be very grateful if the Upper Tribunal could stop criminals from using his and his wife’s documents. The panel informed Mr Khan that it is open for him to report the matter to the police both in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan.

H. Post-hearing directions

162. On 26 August 2025, the respondent filed and served a supplementary witness statement from Ms Keeting, dated the same day, exhibiting thirteen pages of documents. Ms Keeting confirmed that she served her earlier witness statement upon the applicants via their email addresses at 02.25am on 19 August 2025. She attended the hearing before the panel later that day and at 10.45am she checked the Globe Path Facebook page and became aware that she could no longer access it. The time difference between service and her becoming aware that the page was closed to non-group members was a little over eight hours.

163. The Upper Tribunal issued further directions to the applicants permitting them to respond to the further evidence by 16.00 (United Kingdom time) on 16 September 2025. There were responses in all cases which we detail and address below.

I. The law

Upper Tribunal

164. By virtue of section 3(5) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the Upper Tribunal is a superior court of record.

165. It is a creature of statute, and its procedure derives from two sources: the 2007 Act and the 2008 Procedure Rules made pursuant to that Act.

166. It has inherent jurisdiction to govern its own procedure. Part of that jurisdiction is to guard against fraud in cases before it. If the Tribunal has such concerns, it possesses the power under rules 5(3) and 15(1) of the 2008 Procedure Rules to hold a hearing to consider any matter, issue directions, require evidence or submissions, and make rulings as may be appropriate in the circumstances.

Immigration Rules

167. Appendix V: Visitor of the Immigration Rules relates to those persons who require a visa to visit the United Kingdom. It presently establishes three visitor routes: standard visitor, marriage and civil partnership, and transit visitor.

168. A “visa national” is defined in paragraph 6 of the Rules as “persons specified in Appendix Visitor: Visa National List as needing a visa, or entry clearance, for the UK for a visit or for any other purposes where seeking entry for 6 months or less”. Nationals of Pakistan are placed on the List. Consequently, all the applicants in the cases before us require visas to enter the United Kingdom for six months or less as visitors. To secure leave to enter, they sought entry clearance, a procedure used by Entry Clearance Officers to check that applicants qualify under the Rules for entry to this country.

169. An application as a standard visitor under Appendix V is made overseas and online by persons who require a visa to visit the United Kingdom. The application must be accompanied by a passport or other documentation which satisfactorily establishes their identity and nationality. The VAF has various sections that must be completed and at its conclusion there is a declaration section where the applicant is to positively confirm that “the information relating to the application” and “the supporting evidence” is correct to the best of their knowledge and belief. They so confirm by signing the document. An applicant is warned that “if false information is given, the application can be refused” and that they may be banned from the United Kingdom and additionally may be prosecuted.

170. Under Appendix V a visitor must satisfy the decision maker that they are a genuine visitor, meaning that they will leave the United Kingdom at the end of their visit. The respondent’s ‘Visit: caseworker guidance’ states, both at the time of the various applications as well as presently, that a decision maker must consider a person’s financial circumstances as well as their family, social and economic background and their personal and economic ties to their country of residence. The need to have sufficient funds to cover all reasonable costs in relation to the proposed visit without working or accessing public funds is included as an element going to the genuineness of the visit.

171. Relevant to these cases, paragraph V4.2(a) and (c) requires:

“V 4.2. The applicant must satisfy the decision maker that they are a genuine visitor, which means the applicant:

(a) will leave the UK at the end of their visit; and

...

(c) is genuinely seeking entry or stay for a purpose that is permitted under the Visitor route as set out in Appendix Visitor: Permitted Activities and at V 13.3; ...”

172. At the time the entry clearance applications in these cases were submitted mandatory grounds of refusal under Part 9 of the Rules included by means of paragraph 9.7.1:

“An application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay may be refused where, in relation to the application, or in order to obtain documents from the Secretary of State or a third party provided in support of the application:

(a) false representations are made, or false documents or false information submitted (whether or not relevant to the application, and whether or not to the applicant’s knowledge); or

(b) relevant facts are not disclosed.”

173. Paragraph 9.7.2:

“An application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay must be refused where the decision maker can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.”

174. These paragraphs were replaced by Part Suitability to the Rules on 11 November 2025. This date is after the relevant entry clearance decisions were issued.

175. Rights of appeal against a visit refusal have varied over time but from 25 June 2013 the refusal of an application for any visitor’s visa does not enjoy a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). A right of appeal against a refusal now exists only if it constitutes a refusal of a human rights claim: section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act.

Judicial Review

176. A claim for judicial review may be a claim to review the lawfulness of a decision made under various Immigration Acts. These claims are heard in this Chamber of the Upper Tribunal under section 15 of the 2007 Act.

177. Part 4 of the 2008 Procedure Rules is concerned with judicial review proceedings in the Upper Tribunal. Rule 28(1) establishes that a person seeking permission to bring judicial review proceedings before the Upper Tribunal under section 16 of the 2007 Act must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal for such permission. A claim is initiated by filing a UTIAC1, providing grounds of claim and documents, including the challenged decision, and paying the required application fee.

178. Fee remission can be sought through the Help with Fees scheme by filing form EX160 if the applicant is in receipt of benefits, has low savings and if they have a low gross monthly income. Reduced fees may be payable depending on the party’s disposable income. A partner’s income is treated as being the party’s income for the purpose of determining liability for fees.

Duty of candour

179. It is well established in both the Upper Tribunal and the Administrative Court that the general rules relating to disclosure in litigation do not apply to judicial review proceedings. Disclosure is not required in this Chamber unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. Accordingly, there is a special duty that applies to parties to judicial review, namely the duty of candour which requires the parties to ensure that all relevant information and facts are put before the Upper Tribunal. This requires the parties to disclose any relevant information or material fact which either supports or undermines their case: R (BG) v Hackney LBC [2022] UKUT 00338 (IAC), [2023] Imm AR 183. It is a mandatory requirement and applies equally to both sides.

180. A duty is imposed not to mislead a court or tribunal in judicial review proceedings by the non-disclosure of a material fact. Observing the cases before us, in Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286, at 294G, Lord Bridge affirmed the need for ‘frank disclosure of all relevant facts’ on the part of applicants in public law cases.

Contempt powers

181. The applicants in Zahid Ahmad have requested the Upper Tribunal use its contempt powers in JR-2025-LON-000681.

182. A Presidential panel confirmed in YSA (Committal for contempt by media) [2023] UKUT 00075 (IAC) that the Upper Tribunal has the contempt powers of the High Court derived from section 25(1) of the 2007 Act. The panel noted the operation of Civil Procedure Rules (‘CPR’) Part 81 concerned with applications and proceedings in relation to contempt of court and observed that the CPR do not apply directly to proceedings in the Upper Tribunal. Nevertheless, it was considered unrealistic to treat section 25(1) as conferring on the Tribunal the jurisdiction of the High Court unaffected by that Court’s practice and procedure. To the extent where the Tribunal’s power derives from section 25, its procedures should be closely modelled on those operating in the relevant court in the relevant part of the United Kingdom, save where Tribunal Procedure Rules provide otherwise. In the absence of specific procedures laid down by Tribunal Procedure Rules, the Tribunal requires applications to commit for contempt to adopt, so far as possible, the same practices and safeguards as are found in CPR Part 81, so as to ensure fairness to the respondent, and economy of resources.

Approved consent orders

183. The Upper Tribunal may make a consent order without a hearing in judicial review proceedings if it is satisfied that the order should be made. However, though both parties are required to agree to a draft consent order filed with the Tribunal, they cannot determine for themselves what order should be made. A draft consent order cannot be endorsed automatically by the Tribunal as judicial approval is necessary.

184. Under powers derived from Schedule 5 of the 2007 Act, which allows authorised staff to exercise certain tribunal functions, and are conferred by a Practice Statement of the Senior President of Tribunals and authorised by the Chamber President, a UTIAC Legal Officer may approve a consent order under delegated judicial case management powers. The operative power is found in Rule 39 of the 2008 Procedure Rules, which permits the Tribunal to approve agreed disposals of proceedings; a consent order is treated as such. Accordingly, Legal Officers can approve consent orders where the matter is agreed and suitable for determination without a Judge.

Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007

185. Section 15 of the 2007 Act establishes the Upper Tribunal’s judicial review jurisdiction.

186. The 2007 Act provides for supplementary powers for the Upper Tribunal at section 25:

(1) In relation to the matters mentioned in subsection (2), the Upper Tribunal—

(a) has, in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland, the same powers, rights, privileges and authority as the High Court, and

(b) has, in Scotland, the same powers, rights, privileges and authority as the Court of Session.

(2) The matters are—

(a) the attendance and examination of witnesses,

(b) the production and inspection of documents, and

(c) all other matters incidental to the Upper Tribunal's functions.

(3) Subsection (1) shall not be taken—

(a) to limit any power to make Tribunal Procedure Rules;

(b) to be limited by anything in Tribunal Procedure Rules other than an express limitation.

(4) A power, right, privilege or authority conferred in a territory by subsection (1) is available for purposes of proceedings in the Upper Tribunal that take place outside that territory (as well as for purposes of proceedings in the tribunal that take place within that territory).

187. Paragraph 15 of Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the 2007 Act provides for the correction of errors and setting-aside of decisions on procedural grounds

(1) Rules may make provision for the correction of accidental errors in a decision or record of a decision.

(2) Rules may make provision for the setting aside of a decision in proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal—

(a) where a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to, or was not received at an appropriate time by, a party to the proceedings or a party's representative,

(b) where a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal at an appropriate time,

(c) where a party to the proceedings, or a party's representative, was not present at a hearing related to the proceedings, or

(d) where there has been any other procedural irregularity in the proceedings.

(3) Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be taken to prejudice, or to be prejudiced by, any power to correct errors or set aside decisions that is exercisable apart from rules made by virtue of those sub-paragraphs.

The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Overriding objective

188. As established by rule 2, the overriding objective of the 2008 Procedure Rules is to enable the Upper Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. This includes dealing with a case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case and the complexity of the issues. The parties are obliged to the help the Upper Tribunal to further the overriding objective and to co-operate with the Tribunal generally.

Case management powers

189. Rule 5 of the 2008 Procedure Rules establishes the Upper Tribunal’s case management powers. Relevant to these proceedings:

(2) The Upper Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal or proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside and earlier direction.

(3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Upper Tribunal may -

...
(k) transfer proceedings to another court or tribunal if that other court or tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings, and -
(i) because of a change of circumstances since the proceedings were started, the Upper Tribunal no longer has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings; ...
Striking out a party’s case

190. Tribunals are statutory bodies whose powers are exclusively conferred and regulated by statute. They have no inherent jurisdiction and so, unlike courts, they have no inherent power to strike out. The power is conferred by rule 8 of the 2008 Procedure Rules:

(1) The proceedings, or the appropriate part of them, will automatically be struck out—
(a) if the appellant or applicant has failed to comply with a direction that stated that failure by the appellant or applicant to comply with the direction would lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them; or
(b) in immigration judicial review proceedings, when a fee has not been paid, as required, in respect of an application under rule 30(4) or upon the grant of permission.
(1A) Except for paragraph (2), this rule does not apply to an asylum case or an immigration case.

(2) The Upper Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Upper Tribunal—
(a) does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and
(b) does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.
(3) The Upper Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if -
(a) the appellant or applicant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the appellant or applicant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them;
(b) the appellant or applicant has failed to co-operate with the Upper Tribunal to such an extent that the Upper Tribunal cannot deal with the proceedings fairly and justly; or
(c) in proceedings which are not an appeal from the decision of another tribunal or judicial review proceedings, the Upper Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant's or the applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding.
(4) The Upper Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraph (2) or (3)(b) or (c) without first giving the appellant or applicant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out.
191. The Upper Tribunal reviewed its power to strike out an application in R (SN) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 227 (IAC), [2015] Imm AR 905. The exclusion established by rule 8(1A) results in the discretion under rule 8(3) not applying to immigration or asylum appeals, but it does not extend to immigration or asylum judicial reviews.

192. Where there is no reasonable prospect of success, the Upper Tribunal possesses the power in judicial review proceedings to certify a claim as totally without merit under rule 30(4A) of the 2008 Procedure Rules, though such power exists only at the paper consideration stage.

Withdrawal of a claim

193. Rule 17(2) of the 2008 Procedure Rules requires the Upper Tribunal to consent to the withdrawal by a party of its case or any part of it. Ordinarily the Tribunal will have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it should consent to the withdrawal where there is nothing to be gained by the case proceeding when notice of withdrawal of the case or any part of it is given. That might be described as the ‘default position’. However, as confirmed in R (EK and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rule 17 Withdrawal) [2025] UKUT 00089 (IAC), [2025] 1 WLR 2939, it is not inconsistent with the Rules and their purpose for the Tribunal to refuse consent if it considers it appropriate in all the circumstances. An abuse of the tribunal’s process is a powerful factor for refusing consent to withdraw but given the breadth of the discretion in the Rules it would be wrong to treat abuse of process as either a necessary or an exclusive criterion.

Set aside

194. Rule 43 of the 2008 Procedure Rules provides for the setting aside of a decision which disposes of proceedings:

(1) The Upper Tribunal may on the application of a party or on its own initiative, set aside a decision which disposes of proceedings, or part of such a decision, and re-make the decision or the relevant part of it, if -

(a) the Upper Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so; and

(b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (2) are satisfied.

(2) The conditions are -

(a) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to, or was not received at an appropriate time by, a party or a party's representative;

(b) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to the Upper Tribunal at an appropriate time;

(c) a party, or a party's representative, was not present at a hearing related to the proceedings; or

(d) there has been some other procedural irregularity in the proceedings.’

195. The Upper Tribunal therefore has discretion, on the application of a party or on its own initiative, to set aside a decision which disposes of proceedings, or part of such a decision and re-make the decision or the relevant parts of it. A ‘decision’ includes a sealed order in judicial review proceedings. An identified condition must be met, for example there has been some other procedural irregularity in the proceedings. In judicial review proceedings a party applying for a decision, or part of a decision, to be set aside, must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal so that it is received no later than one month after the date on which the Upper Tribunal sent notice of its decision to the party: rule 43(3). Rule 5(3) of the same Rules permits the Upper Tribunal to regulate its own behaviour, including ‘extend or shorten the time for complying with any rules, practice direction or direction’: rule 5(3)(a). Consequently, the Upper Tribunal may extend time for the application to be received.

196. The requirement that the decision be one that ‘disposes of proceedings’ is core. In judicial review proceedings the court or tribunal’s final order is the final determination of the claim though appeal time limits run from the date of judgment. This order may follow a substantive hearing or be by consent with the agreement of the Upper Tribunal. The fact that an appeal could be made to the Court of Appeal against a final decision of the Upper Tribunal, with permission granted either by the Upper Tribunal or that court, in no way affects a final decision of this Tribunal being one that disposes of proceedings for the purpose of rule 43 of the 2008 Procedure Rules.

J. Analysis

197. The burden rests upon the respondent to prove to the civil standard that documents relied upon by the applicants are fraudulent: DK & RK (ETS: SSHD evidence, proof) India [2022] UKUT 00112 (IAC).

(1) Death certificates

198. The respondent has confirmed that the death certificates filed with the Upper Tribunal in these proceedings have been genuinely issued by the General Register Office.

(2) Sponsors

199. The Upper Tribunal sent its case management directions issued in each case to the named sponsor by registered post, observing that as it would be considering the potential use of false documents the sponsors may, if they so wished, file and serve by email a signed letter or witness statement addressing issues arising. The Upper Tribunal confirmed that it would be aided by the sponsors confirming whether they completed and signed sponsorship undertakings relied upon by the applicants and if they did not, they were asked to confirm who completed and signed these documents on their behalf.

200. No registered letters were returned to the Upper Tribunal. We conclude that all letters were delivered to the addresses identified by the applicants as being the home of their sponsor, all which were located in England.

a) Atteq
b) Habib

201. On the face of the papers before this Tribunal, Mr Muhammad Irfan has homes in Bradford, Worcestershire and Yardley. According to the applicants in Atteq his home in Yardley is local authority owned. The applicants in Habib contend differently; he bought his home in Bradford in June 2017. In Atteq he is willing to pay £2000 towards his sister and her family’s visit to the United Kingdom. The costs of travel in Habib are being met by his brother-in-law, Mrs Habib’s husband. To date the Upper Tribunal has had no response from Mr Irfan. Observing that the documents filed in these two cases identify on their face that Mr Irfan lives in a town in Worcestershire, and not Bradford or Yardley, the lack of response may not be considered a surprise.

202. Are Mrs Sabooh and Mrs Habib sisters? Is Mr Irfan their brother? The applicants in both cases have filed documents to positively answer the second question. The first question is one the applicants have not willingly wanted this panel to consider. We consider the papers in the cases together. A Birth Registration Certificate issued by the Government of Punjab to Mrs Sabooh on 13 October 2020 confirms her parents to be Mr Muhammad Malik and Mrs Hamida Begum. Her parentage is recorded as such on the presented National Database & Registration Authority (‘NADRA’) Family Registration Certificate issued on 21 February 2021. Mrs Habib’s evidence differs. Her NADRA Family Registration Certificate records her parents as Mr Mirza Abdul Wahid and Mrs Inyat Bibi. Mr Wahid is listed as Mrs Bibi’s husband on her death certificate. Mrs Sabooh wishes to visit this country following the bereavement of her father, Mr Malik. Mrs Habib contends that her visit follows the death of her mother, Mrs Bibi. It is abundantly clear to us that the first question is properly to be answered negatively.

203. As to the second question, we conclude that neither applicant is truthful. In both cases the applicants rely upon the same copies of Mr Irfan’s United Kingdom driving licence, expiring in 2027 and a United Kingdom car registration certificate, both of which identify a home address in Worcestershire. The same copy of Mr Irfan’s Pakistan National Identity Card, expiring in 2031, was also relied upon by both applicants.

204. The applicant in Atteq filed Barclays Bank statements said to relate to Mr Irfan’s account, though his name is not identified on the documents. The statements have the same account number as statements relied upon in Habib. In both cases they run from 18 January 2024 to 17 April 2024. They have the same credit payments and funds transfer. A second statement for the account, from 24 March 2024 to 24 June 2024 is filed in Habib. We observe that the statements identify Mr Irfan making three unrelated payments to HM Courts and Tribunals Service. A statement from Wise Payments Ltd has been filed in both cases. This document was generated on 14 February 2024 and covers the period from 14 October 2023 to 14 February 2024. Mr Irfan’s address is identified as being a town in Worcestershire, and most of the transactions over this period were conducted in the same town.

205. The applicant in Atteq relies upon a copy of a title register summary for a property in Yardley; the applicant in Habib relies upon the same but for a property in Bradford. For reasons given below when addressing title register summaries filed in these cases, we find both documents are false.

206. We consider the evidence as clearly establishing that Mr Irfan does not reside in either Yardley or Bradford. It is probable that he resides in Worcestershire. We conclude to the civil standard that he is not aware of these proceedings and is not and has never agreed to be a sponsor of the applicants in either Atteq or Habib. We further conclude that it is more likely than not that he provided his documents in relation to a visa application for another person, and they have been recycled in these cases without his consent. We find that it is probable that Mr Irfan is the victim of identity theft.

207. We have carefully considered the two sponsorship undertakings said to have been prepared by Mr Irfan in respect of the entry clearance applications submitted in Atteq on 6 April 2024 and in Habib on 8 June 2024. Consequent to striking similarities in handwriting we conclude that they were written by the same person, but probably not by Mr Irfan.

208. We find that Mr Irfan’s purported email addresses are under the control of a third party, as are his purported United Kingdom telephone numbers ending 00689 and 28684. Such control permits a third party engaged in deception the opportunity to adopt the identify of Mr Irfan if the respondent seeks to make further enquires through these identified means of contact.

209. We observe, with concern, that the fact the documents provided on behalf of Mr Irfan clearly establish him as residing in Worcestershire, and not Bradford or Yardley, was not addressed by the respondent in the challenged entry clearance decisions. The only reference to Mr Irfan in the decision refusing Mr Atteq’s application is:

“You have said that your sponsor will help you with this visit by providing you with accommodation whilst you are in the United Kingdom and I am satisfied that they are in a position to do so based on documents provided.”

210. It has proven difficult for this panel to understand how this conclusion was reached if adequate assessment was undertaken in light of the clear internal inconsistency as to where Mr Irfan resided on the face of the documents presented in Atteq.

211. We are also concerned that there is no express reference to Mr Irfan in Mrs Habib’s decision.

c) Zahid Ahmad

212. No response was received from Mrs Sarah Saddiq, the sponsor in this case, to the Upper Tribunal’s directions sent by registered post. Mrs Saddiq’s home address is detailed on her deceased husband’s death certificate, and it is this address that is recorded on the VAF. The respondent has been unable to locate through her enquiries a passport record for Mrs Saddiq with the date of birth and address provided by the applicants.

213. Mrs Saddiq’s contact email address was recorded in Mr Zahid Ahmad’s VAF as munir2013@gmail.com. This is the same email address said by Mrs Mansoor to belong to her in the UTIAC1 filed in her case.

214. For the reasons addressed below we conclude that the Ffrees statement said to have been issued to Mrs Saddiq is a false document as are the title register summary relied upon and the certification of a sponsorship undertaking by a lawyer practising in England.

215. We conclude to the civil standard that Mrs Saddiq is not aware of these proceedings and has not agreed to be the sponsor of the applicants in this case. We find that it is probable that Mrs Saddiq is the victim of identity theft in circumstances arising from the death of her husband.

216. Mrs Saddiq’s purported email address munir2013@gmail.com and the United Kingdom telephone number ending 89376 are under the control of a third party.

d) Ahsan

217. Mrs Khan confirmed in writing and then in her oral evidence that Mrs Ahsan is her sister. We accept Mrs Khan’s evidence as to basis of the entry clearance application her sister intended to make when engaging her visa consultant, ‘Firooze’. We find that the visa application actually made on her behalf, based upon a non-existent deceased sibling, was not requested or agreed to by Mrs Ahsan. We observe that the email address used by Mrs Khan to correspond with this Tribunal is not the one attributed to her in the VAF. Mrs Khan has communicated with the Upper Tribunal using her personal email address. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the email address ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com said to belong to her, as well as the United Kingdom telephone number ending 54907, are in the control of a third party.

218. We accept Mrs Khan’s evidence that Mrs Ahsan was not aware of the content of the VAFs submitted on behalf of her daughter and herself. We also accept Mrs Ahsan did not know that judicial review proceedings had been commenced in her name, that this Tribunal has been provided with false contact details through the UTIAC1 and that a fraudulent application for fee remission has been made on her behalf. We find that Mrs Ahsan was unaware that the proceedings had settled in her favour. Indeed, until her sister received the Tribunal’s directions, she was unaware that a negative decision had been made on both her and her daughter’s visa application.

e) Mansoor

219. Mrs Barauskiene wrote to the Upper Tribunal on 18 August 2025 using a different email address to that accorded to her in Mrs Mansoor’s VAF. She stated she was not personally aware of Mrs Mansoor nor as to her having been identified as a sponsor in Mrs Mansoor’s visit visa application. She considered her personal details to have been fraudulently obtained and used in this case.

220. She wrote again to the Upper Tribunal on 3 September 2025 addressing the marriage certificate relied upon by Mrs Mansoor that records her marriage to Mr Shahzad as taking place in Pakistan on 15 September 2012 and recording her father’s name as “John Barauskiene”:

“I categorically deny this information.

My wedding date above mentioned is not correct. That date I was married with completely different person. I was not in Pakistan and didn’t even know my deceased Pakistani husband on above mentioned date. My father name mentioned is not correct.

I state again that I do not know these individuals and did not sponsored anyone in Pakistan for visit visa or any immigration matter.”

221. The marriage certificate relied upon by Mrs Mansoor is a false document.

222. We find that Mr Shahzad is not Mrs Mansoor’s recently deceased brother. Mrs Barauskiene is not Mrs Mansoor’s sister-in-law and has not agreed to be her sponsor in respect of an entry clearance application. Mrs Barauskiene is the victim of identity theft.

223. We conclude that the email address waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com and the United Kingdom telephone number ending 13394 are not controlled by Mrs Barauskiene. They are controlled by a third party.

f) Shakil

224. A letter was sent to the sponsor, Mrs Amina Hussain, at her home address in Birmingham. Mrs Shakil states that her brother-in-law, Mr Jawed Hussain, is Mrs Hussain’s husband and is paying for her trip to the United Kingdom. Mr Hussain is recorded on Mrs Bibi’s death certificate as having informed the authorities as to her death. The address provided for Mr and Mrs Hussain in the VAF differs to that on the death certificate; the house number is transposed. The Upper Tribunal wrote to the address recorded on the death certificate.

225. Mr Hussain contacted the Upper Tribunal by email on 6 August 2025 and confirmed:

“I received attached letter today at me home address.

I do not know anything about any sponsorship under my name for any applicants.

Also, Mrs Amina Hussain does not live at my address, and my wife's name is Mrs Rizwana Hussain.

Someone has false put me name and address to an application under false documents.

Therefore, can you raise this further as someone putting a false sponsorship with me details.”

226. The email address used by Mr Hussain is different to the one attributed to him by Mrs Shakil in her VAF. We conclude the United Kingdom telephone number ending 98659 is under the control of a third party.

227. The respondent has made enquiries and confirms that Mrs Hussain was issued with a British passport in 2022, but she is recorded as residing at a different address to that asserted by the applicants.

228. Mrs Hussain’s email address is recorded by the applicants as munirj2013@gmail.com. This address is similar to the email address attributed to Mrs Saddiq, the sponsor in Zahid Ahmad. It is also detailed on the Ffrees statements said to belong to the sponsors in Basharat Ahmad, Mansoor and Suleman. As addressed below, it is also the contact email address used in a visitor visa application made by Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua in 2024. We consider Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua’s role in these cases later in our judgment.

229. We find that the sponsor, Mrs Hussain, does not reside with Mr Hussain in Birmingham. They are not married. Consequently, the Ffrees statement said to belong to both is a false document.

230. We conclude therefore that Mrs Hussain is probably the victim of identity theft and unaware that she is a sponsor in these proceedings. We conclude it probable that a copy of the biographical data page of her United Kingdom passport was used in Mrs Shakil’s application because it was in the possession of a third party, more likely than not in respect of an unrelated entry clearance application, and the name “Hussain” could plausibly connect her to the known family of Mrs Bibi.

231. The email address munirj2013@gmail.com and the United Kingdom phone number ending 98659 said to belong to Mrs Hussain are under the control of a third party.

g) Ishaq

232. Mrs Khan has confirmed that she does not personally know Mrs Ishaq or her daughter and they are not members of her family.

233. We find that the documents provided by Mrs Ahsan to ‘Firooze’ in good faith were used within days to support Mrs Ishaq’s visa application. Such was the duplicitous nature of this arrangement that it was contrived by a third party that Mrs Ishaq’s false entry clearance application was submitted before Mrs Ahsan’s.

234. We accept Mrs Khan’s evidence as to neither her nor Mrs Ahsan knowing the applicants in Ishaq. Mrs Khan is the victim of identity theft. The email address abidaishaq27@gmail.com and the United Kingdom telephone number ending 54907 attributed to Mrs Khan are under the control of a third party.

h) Suleman

235. No response to the Upper Tribunal’s letter was received from Mr Sufyan Iftikhar, the sponsor in this case. As Mr Iftikhar’s date of birth is illegible on the sponsorship undertaking form, and no official identity documents relating to him have been filed by Mrs Suleman, the respondent has been unable to locate Mr Iftikhar’s passport records.

236. In her application, Mrs Suleman provided minimal evidence from her sponsor. The handwriting on the sponsorship undertaking is similar to that identified on other documents. For the reasons detailed below, the Ffrees statement and the title register summary are false documents. These are the extent of the sponsor’s ‘documents’ before us.

237. We conclude therefore that Mr Iftikhar is probably the victim of identity theft and unaware that he is a sponsor in these proceedings. We find that his identity was used in this application because he is named on his wife’s death certificate. The absence of any genuine documents provided by Mr Iftikhar filed in this entry clearance application flows from him having no knowledge of Ms Suleman and not having engaged with her application. Consequently, we find that the email address sulemanwasima@gmail.com and the United Kingdom phone number ending 82696 said to belong to Mr Iftikhar are under the control of a third party.

i) Mushtaq

238. The sponsor, Mrs Shahnaz Hussain, is a British citizen. On the deceased’s death certificate, she is named as Mr Ahmed’s wife, and their home address is recorded. Mrs Hussain contacted the Upper Tribunal on 13 August 2025 and stated:

“It is with deep distress that my late husband, Munir Ahmed, and I have been used in this case to gain entry into the United Kingdom.

I am categorically confirming I have not sponsored the named person(s) in the correspondence attached. I do not know of, or have spoken to, these individuals who are making this fraudulent application. Therefore, this application should be revoked and an investigation should take place.

I have contacted South Yorkshire Police and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. The reference number is as follows [ ].

Furthermore, I am extremely concerned that this is the first correspondence I have had regarding this matter and I will be contacting the Home Office to inform them of the situation.”

239. The email address used by Mrs Hussain to contact the Upper Tribunal is not the one recorded for her by Mrs Mushtaq in her VAF.

240. We find that Mrs Hussain is a victim of identity theft.

241. We conclude that the contact email address hanifahmadali1981@gmail.com and the United Kingdom telephone number ending 82695 are in the control of a third party.

j) Basharat Ahmad

242. No response to the Upper Tribunal’s letter was received from Mr Mohammed Akram, the sponsor in this case. As he is presently unaware of these proceedings, we do not detail Mr Akram’s full name to avoid jigsaw identification from information detailed below.

243. The respondent located records of a live British passport for Mr Akram, consistent with the biographical data page filed in these proceedings by the applicants and issued in 2022. However, his recorded address when applying for the British passport is approximately two hundred miles away from the address asserted to be his home by the applicants. His address recorded by HM Passport Agency is in the town of his birth.

244. The respondent undertook further research of Mr Akram at Companies House and established that he is a director of a company in the town of his birth. The company address is the same as the address provided when applying for his passport. Additional research undertaken by the respondent confirmed that no other person with Mr Akram’s full name was born in this country in the month of his birth.

245. For the reasons detailed below, the Ffrees statement and title register summary purportedly provided to the applicants by Mr Akram are false documents.

246. We conclude that Mr Akram is probably the victim of identity theft and unaware that he is a sponsor in these proceedings. We find it more likely than not that he provided his documents to an agent in relation to a separate entry clearance application, and they have been recycled by a third party on behalf of the applicants in this matter without Mr Akram’s consent.

247. In conclusion, save for Mrs Khan in respect of her sister, Mrs Ahsan, we find that every purported ‘sponsor’ is, or probably is, the victim of identity theft, with their identity and personal documents being used by others to secure the benefit of entry clearance as a visitor. We have identified probable identity theft for fraudulent gain by applying the civil standard in those cases where the sponsors have not contacted this Tribunal via an email address that is not controlled by a third party.

(3) Solicitor witnesses to documents

248. In Zahid Ahmad a sponsorship undertaking was certified by Mr Zaheer Ahmad Hashmi, Morden Solicitors LLP, 37 London Road, Morden SM4 5HT. The certification is undated. It states that the document “is an undertaking given in pursuance of the Immigration Rules within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971 as amended by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999”. We observe that the sponsor, Mrs Saddiq, resides in West Yorkshire and Mr Hashmi’s office is approximately 220 miles away from her home. It is a significant distance to travel for the purpose of certifying a document.

249. Mr Hashmi wrote to the Upper Tribunal on two occasions in August 2025, confirming that he found no record of the sponsorship undertaking being attested by him, though his signature and stamp appear genuine as presented on the document. He subsequently informed us that the attestation is not in the usual style as he “would have attested under signature”.

250. We conclude that a third party has lifted Mr Hashmi’s signature and stamp from another document and placed it on this false document.

251. The same ‘terms of certification’ accompanies the sponsorship undertaking provided in Shakil. Again, the certification is undated. The named solicitor, Mrs Naheed Akhtar, is recorded at the time of certification in 2024 as being employed at Aventus Law Solicitors, Davidson House, Forbury Square, Reading. The distance between the sponsor’s home and the office recorded on the certification stamp is approximately 100 miles.

252. Mrs Akhtar contacted the Upper Tribunal in August 2025 and provided a witness statement confirming that she would never witness a sponsorship undertaking. She informed us that Aventus Law Solicitors closed in May 2023, and she joined Batley Law Solicitors, 26 Wellington Street, Batley, West Yorkshire, in the same month.

253. We conclude that a third party has lifted Mrs Akhtar’s signature and stamp from another document and placed it on this false document.

(4) Observations as to external management of claims and use of false documents

254. Before addressing each claim individually, we make general observations as to external management of these claims by a third party, and the use of false documents.

(a) Visa fee payment

255. The respondent’s records confirm that the same Lloyds Bank payment card ending 1811 was used to pay the visa application fees in Basharat Ahmad, Ahsan and Shakil. We observe that the applicants in Basharat Ahmad and Shakil reside in Chenab Nagar, Punjab and the applicants in Ahsan reside in Thatta, Sind. The cities are over 600 miles apart. The visa applications were made on 8 June 2024, 6 December 2024 and 21 February 2025 and so cover a period of eight months. We conclude that there is no cogent basis as to why these three cohorts of applicants would use the same British issued payment card to pay their application fees. We find it probable that someone active with a third party resides in this country and is engaged in facilitating the process of visa application fees through their British bank account.

(b) Grounds of claim

256. In Ahsan, Ishaq, Mansoor and Suleman the grounds of claim are drafted in such similar style that we find they exhibit the use of a template with the addition of information relevant to the individual applicants.

257. The applicants are persons residing in Pakistan, none of whom are lawyers. They have proven capable of citing domestic precedent. In nine of the ten cases challenging an entry clearance decision there is reliance in the grounds of claim upon Abbasi and another (visits - bereavement - Article 8) [2015] UKUT 00463 (IAC): Basharat Ahmad, Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Ishaq, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil and Suleman.

258. In Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Habib, Ishaq and Suleman there is reliance upon the reported decision of MY (refusal of human rights claim) Pakistan [2020] UKUT 00089, [2020] Imm AR 906, and the Court of Appeal judgment in MY (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 1500, [2022] 1 WLR 238. We observe the misspelling of IAC as “IAg” in each document save for the grounds filed in Suleman.

259. In Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Habib and Ishaq the reported decision in Baihinga (r. 22; human rights appeal: requirements) [2018] UKUT 00090 (IAC), [2018] Imm AR 930, was relied upon.

260. There is a recurring formatting anomaly in the grounds of claim with a comma consistently used in place of an apostrophe. Though regularly repeated, we identify one instance per applicant:

“The purpose of the visit is to visit the ... second applicant,s real brother ...”

Basharat Ahmad

“The Respondent,s position remains exactly as it was before the initial refusal.”

Zahid Ahmad (JR-2025-LON-000681)

“... as well as her marriage certificate, where her father,s name is also matched with her birth certificate ...”

Ahsan

“The purpose of the visit is to visit the first applicant,s brother ...”

Ishaq

“The purpose of the visit is to visit the first applicant,s brother ...”

Mansoor

“It is arguable that the refusal of the applicant,s application ...”

Mushtaq

“... as attached again in this bundle for the Tribunal,s consideration.”

Shakil

“The purpose of the visit is to attend the Applicant’s beloved sister,s death prayers ...”

Suleman

261. The same anomaly is identifiable in various pre-action protocol letters, for example in Atteq:

“The purpose of the visit is to visit the first Applicant’s father in law, second applicant,s father ...”

262. It is repeated in various emails sent to the Upper Tribunal, for example the email accompanying the UTIAC6 filed in Atteq on 12 May 2025:

“I,ll be much obliged to you in this regard.”

263. The anomaly is therefore identifiable in each of the cases.

(c) Misspelling

264. There are instances of consistent misspelling identifiable within documents across the cases. An example is the word “humanitarian” which is misspelt as “humaintarian” in the grounds of claim filed in Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Ishaq and Mansoor. In Shakil it is misspelt as “humaintarin”. Humanitarian is also misspelt as “humaintarian” in all bar one of the VAFs, which are drafted in broadly similar terms to:

“A family visit on compassionate reason that my [relative] suddenly passed away due [medical reason] and buried in the UK as well, kindly see [his/her] UK death certificate in this regard, in these circumstances I am much worried, so please grant me visit visa on humaintarian basis [for identified time].”

265. The sole exception is Mushtaq where the relevant passage is:

“A family visit on the death of [relative] on compassionate circumstances kindly see [his/her] UK death certificate inside this bundle.”

(d) False documents

(i) Property valuation reports

266. In eight cases, a property valuation report issued by the Department of Land and Revenue, Pakistan, attested by Mr Ghulam Mustafa Anjum accompanied the entry clearance application: Basharat Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil and Suleman.

267. The report in Ahsan is dated 19 June 2024. It confirms that the family reside at a property in Thatta with the value of PKR 23.4 million (then £66,000). They own a plot of 500 yards in Thatta with a value of PKR 21.8 million (then £61,000) and inherited land with a value of PKR 97.5 million in Sindh (then £275,000).

268. In a report dated 24 June 2024, the family in Habib reside in a property with a value of PKR 23.4 million (then £66,000) as well as a plot of 500 yards in Kharian with a value of PKR 21.8 million (then £61,000) and inherited land with a value of PKR 97.5 million in Sindh (then £275,000).

269. The report in Shakil is dated 11 December 2024 and confirms the family residing at a family home with a value of PKR 23.4 million (then £66,000) as well as a plot of 500 yards in Kharian with a value of PKR 21.8 million (then £61,000) and inherited land with a value of PKR 97.5 million in Sindh (then £275,000).

270. In Mansoor the report of 19 December 2024 details the family to be living at a property in Chenab Nagar with the value of PKR 23.4 million (then £66,000) as well as a plot of 500 yards in Kharian with a value of PKR 21.8 million (then £61,000) and inherited land with a value of PKR 97.5 million in Sindh (then £275,000).

271. Though the cities vary within the individual reports, the property and land values are replicated in the reports of Ahsan, Habib, Mansoor and Shakil as well as the inherited land being in Sindh.

272. The valuation differs in the report filed in Suleman, dated 8 January 2025. The family reside at a property in Rawalpindi with a value of PKR 16.3 million (then £46,000). They have a residential plot of 250 yards in Chiniot with a value of PKR 10.4 million (then £29,000) and inherited land in Sindh with a value of PKR 66.7 million (then £192,000).

273. The applicants in Mushtaq provided two property valuation reports. The first was issued by the Department of Land and Revenue and again attested by Ghulam Mustafa Anjum. It is dated 9 January 2025, a day after the report in Suleman. It confirms the value of the family home in ‘Lahore’ as PKR 61 million (then £171,000). We observe that by her VAF, dated the same day, namely 9 January 2025, Mrs Mushtaq states that she resides in ‘Islamabad’. Additionally, the report confirms the family have a residential plot of 250 yards in Chiniot with a value of PKR 16.4 million (then £46,000) and inherited land in Punjab with a value of PKR 66.7 million (then £192,000). We note the similarity with Suleman in respect of the residential plot being in Chiniot, a city in Punjab, and the valuation of the inherited land.

274. The report in Basharat Ahmad is dated 7 March 2025. The present market value of the residential villa in which the family reside is PKR 61.2 million (then £169,800). Additionally, the family have a residential plot of 500 yards in Chiniot with a value of PKR 36.4 million (then £101,000) and inherited land in Rabwah with a value of PKR 18.1 million (then £50,000). We observe the similarity with Suleman and Mushtaq as to the family having a residential plot in Chiniot.

275. The oldest report is provided in Atteq. It is dated 17 April 2024 and details the market value of the flat in which the family reside as PKR 23.4 million (then £67,000). Additionally, the family have a plot of land in Karachi with a value of PKR 19.9 million (then £57,000) and inherited land in Sindh with a value of PKR 37.5 million (then £107,000).

276. We note that in Basharat Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil and Suleman the applicants reside at a property, own a plot of land elsewhere and also own inherited land.

277. The “Department of Land and Revenue Pakistan” letterhead is noticeably askew at the top of each document. Some tilt to the left, others to the right. Each letterhead tilts at a different angle to the others. None are straight, which can properly be expected from a genuine letterhead.

278. We conclude that the property valuation reports purportedly attested by Ghulam Mustafa Anjum are false documents, not only consequent to the consistency in references and the nature of the letterhead, but also because when examined together the six stamps on each document are in exactly the same place on each of the eight documents, purportedly individually attested over a period of eleven months. We find on balance that the stamps have been lifted from a genuine document and applied to these false documents.

279. The second report in Mushtaq is said to have been prepared by Ghulam Mustafa Associates, Architect Engineers, Lahore and is dated 27 May 2023. The property is situated in Bhakkar, Punjab. It relates to a different property to that identified in the Department of Land and Revenue report, which is said to be in Lahore. The two cities are almost 250 miles apart. The market value of the property is PKR 61 million (then £171,000). This property is not referenced in the Department of Land and Revenue report. In her VAF, Mrs Mushtaq confirms that she resides in Islamabad and this address is referenced in the Department of Land and Revenue report. We conclude that the second report is a false document not only because it is inconsistent with Mrs Mushtaq’s assertion as to the city in which she resides with her family, but we do not consider it likely that an architect firm in Lahore would undertake a valuation by an architect engineer and a survey inspector of a property in Bhakkar. We find on balance that the stamps have been lifted from a genuine document and applied to these false documents.

280. A property valuation report was prepared in Ishaq by Jammu Associates & Real Estates, Chenab Nagar. The document was attested by Hafiz Atif Reza, Lahore. It values a five-bedroom house in Chenab Nagar as PKR 5,11,30,000 (then £144,000). We address this document below.

281. No property valuation report was provided in Zahid Ahmad.

(ii) Ffrees statements

282. Ffrees statements were provided in six entry clearance applications: Basharat Ahmad, Zahid Ahmad, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil and Suleman.

283. Ffrees was a United Kingdom based financial technology company operated by Contis Financial Services, which entered administration on 30 January 2025. Ms Keeting confirms in her statement dated 17 August 2025 that the appointed administrators have informed the respondent that, as of the date of administration, all Ffrees accounts were frozen and rendered inoperative.

284. Sort codes are allocated by pay.uk to payment service providers offering accounts in the United Kingdom, subject to certain criteria. The administrators for Contis Financial Services have informed the respondent that the only sort codes attributed to Ffrees accounts were 60-83-70, 60-83-88 and 62-30-53. We accept this to be the case. All six statements relied upon in these proceedings record the individual accounts as having the sort code 62-31-65, which was not attributed to Ffrees. At the present time, no payment service provider has been allocated this sort code.

285. Further, the administrators have confirmed that genuine statements issued by Ffrees did not display email addresses alongside account names as occurs in each of the documents before us.

286. The statements in all six cases reference one direct debit receipt from “ALDI 59 772” in the sum of £1 and one payment by bank giro credit from PIP in the sum of £22.88.

287. We observe additional marked similarities in the statements relied upon in Zahid Ahmad, Mansoor and Shakil. In Zahid Ahmad, the account is said to be held by the sponsor, Mrs Saddiq, and runs from 1 September 2024 to 30 September 2024. In Mansoor, it is the account of Mrs Barauskiene and runs from 10 November 2024 to 10 December 2024. In Shakil, it is the account of Mrs Amina Hussain and Mr Jawed Hussain and also runs from 10 November 2024 to 10 December 2024. The closing balance on all three statements is £18,109.09. On all three documents the account number is the same, ending 3118. We observe that the same account number is referenced in the statements provided in Suleman and Basharat Ahmad. The account name on all three statements is identified as munirj2013@gmail.com which is not a genuine display according to the administrators. This email address was additionally referenced in an entry clearance application by Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua which we address below.

288. There are similarities in the statements relied upon in the remaining three applications. The statement in Mushtaq relates to the account of Mrs Shahnaz Hussain. It alone of the six statements has an account number ending 4229. It runs from 8 December 2024 to 8 January 2025. It has the account name sah7866@gmail.com. In Suleman the account belongs to Mr Iftikhar and Ms Gul and runs from 11 December 2024 to 2 January 2025. It has the account name sufya2013@gmail.com. The account in Basharat Ahmad belongs to Mr Akram. It purports to run from 6 February 2025 to 6 March 2025, a time when accounts had been rendered inoperative. The account name is kronline2020@outlook.com. The closing balance on all three accounts is £18,354.97.

289. Additionally, we observe that the statement relied upon in Zahid Ahmad records the month of “September” as “Septmber”.

290. We have no hesitation in finding that each of these crude documents are false.

(iii) Title register summaries

291. In each case the applicants rely upon title register summaries issued by HM Land Registry which are said to establish their sponsor’s residence in the United Kingdom.

292. HM Land Registry registers the ownership of property in England and Wales, as well as noting other interests in registered land. It maintains two key documents for registered land in England and Wales: the title register and the title plan. These documents collectively provide essential information about a property’s legal ownership, boundaries, and associated rights or restrictions.

293. The title register is divided into three parts: (1) Property Register, (2) Proprietorship Register, and (3) Charges Register. It is accessible to the public for a nominal fee through the HM Land Registry’s online services. The payment of the fee permits the downloading of a digital summary of the title register providing ownership details, covenants, mortgages, etc and a title plan (map) for immediate use. We observe that it may take HM Land Registry time to update the title.

294. Ms Keeting conducted a check of each title register summary filed in these cases with the official HM Land Registry website and explained the nature of her checks in a witness statement. We are satisfied as to the accuracy of these checks.

295. In Atteq the title register summary does not correspond with the sponsor’s address in Birmingham. It is a general title covering a large estate with several roads. The address identified as the sponsor’s is recorded as freehold on the HM Land Registry website and would normally have its own standalone title number. Ms Keeting has confirmed in her statement that HM Land Registry records show the sponsor’s property was sold in February 2024, whereas the document in the bundle is dated April 2024 and does not show any sale. We accept that there may be delay in recording a sale of property on the title register summary. However, we have concluded that the sponsor, Mr Irfan, is probably the victim of identity theft and so would not have provided this document to the applicants.

296. The document presented in Habib relates to a different property situated on the same road as the purported sponsor.

297. In Mansoor, the document linked to Ms Barauskiene’s property has a postcode relating to a different road, and the title number corresponds to a property situated on a third road. There is approximately seven miles between Ms Barauskiene’s home and the property to which the title number belongs.

298. The postcode recorded on the title register summary relied upon in Mushtaq does not exist. We observe that the erroneous postcode is referenced in the VAF and the sponsorship undertaking as well as the title register summary. Additionally, the title number relates to a property situated two miles from the purported sponsor’s home address in Sheffield.

299. The postcode on the title register summary filed in Suleman does not exist and the title number corresponds to a property situated approximately twelve miles away in Stoke-on-Trent.

300. We conclude on balance that the title register summaries relied upon in Basharat Ahmad, Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Mushtaq, and Suleman are false documents.

301. The title number of the summary filed in Basharat Ahmad corresponds with the purported sponsor’s address as do the summaries filed in Zahid Ahmad and Shakil. We observe that the sponsor’s address in all three cases is recorded on the relevant death certificate as either the home of the deceased or of the informant.

302. In respect of Ahsan and Ishaq, Mrs Khan confirmed that she provided her genuine title register summary for the use of her sister, Mrs Ahsan, in her entry clearance application.

(iv) Medical letters

303. In Atteq, the applicants wrote to the Upper Tribunal on 31 January 2025 requesting that the listing of the substantive hearing be expedited as their sponsor, Mr Irfan, had sustained “massive burns” in a gas explosion at his home on 30 January 2025 leaving him a critical condition in hospital. Accompanying the request was a letter from Mr Naresh Joshi, Consultant Oculoplastic Surgeon, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, dated 31 January 2025. The letter names Mr Irfan and gives his address in Yardley. It provides an NHS number and a hospital number. We recite the letter in full:

“I can confirm that the above named patient has sustained massive burns to the whole body following a gas explosion at home on 30/01/2025, this patient who suffered 65% TBSA burns including 35% facial burns, concerned about the degree of microstomia, and the upper lip shortening in particular, that is contributing to this, he required a full thickness skin graft to release the upper lip with a small graft, possibly with a Z-plasty to the lower lip to improve his oral opening and decrease the tension on the nasal apertures causing nasal stenosis. I advised a major surgery to do this for his in the next few days.

This patient will remain in the Hospital’s Burns Unit, until he fully improves. I hope you are able to allow his immediate family members from Pakistan to visit him, as he is unable to travel and his family would like to come and visit given his condition.

Should you require further information, please do not hesitate to contact me”

304. On 28 February 2025 an application was made in Habib for the matter to be considered expeditiously as their sponsor, Mr Irfan, was in a critical condition with burns. Accompanying the request was a letter from Mr Naresh Joshi, Consultant Oculoplastic Surgeon, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, dated 27 February 2025. The letter names Mr Irfan and provides his address in Bradford. Otherwise, the contents are the same as the letter filed in the matter of Atteq, including the NHS number and the hospital number, save that the date of the gas explosion was identified as 25 February 2025 and it was also confirmed that Mr Irfan would remain in the “Chelsea and Westminster Hospital Burns Unit” rather than the “Hospital’s Burns Unit”. We observe that the formatting of the letter is different to that in Atteq, with events and prognosis provided in one paragraph and not two.

305. Ms Isabel Jones, Consultant Burns and Plastic Surgery, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, wrote to the Upper Tribunal by letter dated 11 March 2025 confirming that the two letters relied upon in Atteq and Habib had been investigated:

“Following our enquiries, I can confirm that neither of the two letters in question are genuine and no similar letter has been issued in respect of the patient.”

306. To date the applicants in Atteq and Habib have not responded to directions issued by the Upper Tribunal to provide an account of the individual letter they rely on. We find that both letters are false.

(e) Handwriting

307. We observe that the applicants contend that the sponsorship undertaking forms they rely upon were completed by their sponsors resident in the United Kingdom. We note consistency in handwriting in the various forms filed with the Upper Tribunal.

308. Though this Tribunal is not expert in handwriting, we consider that there is sufficient consistency before us to be satisfied to the requisite standard that stylistically when inspecting the words “Pakistani”, “employed”, and “employer” the forms were completed by one of two people:

Person 1: Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Ishaq, Mansoor, Shakil and Suleman

Person 2: Basharat Ahmad and Mushtaq

309. Observing that Mrs Khan is the sponsor in Ishaq as well as for her sister in Ahsan, we note that none of the sponsors in Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan/ Ishaq, Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Shakil and Suleman are said to know each other. They reside respectively in West Yorkshire, Surrey, Yardley, Bradford, London, Birmingham and Stoke-on-Trent. That they have the same handwriting is not plausible. We find the signatures to be false. When reaching our conclusion, we are fortified by Mrs Khan’s confirmation that she did not sign any undertaking. We find the same in respect of Basharat Ahmad and Mushtaq where the sponsors are said to reside in Rochdale and Sheffield.

310. We again note our finding that the applicants reside throughout Pakistan and do not know each other outside of their own family group. Observing that the applications in Basharat Ahmad and Mushtaq share strong connections with the other claims, for example, through the false property valuation reports, the Ffrees statements, consistency in misspelling and the grounds of claim, we conclude that the general similarity in handwriting supports our finding that a third-party has been engaged in preparing all of the entry clearance applications.

(5) Individual cases

311. We turn to the documents filed in the individual cases. The entry clearance applications before us were submitted between 6 April 2024 and 21 February 2025, a period of ten months. Three applications were made within a period of two days in June 2024: Ishaq, Habib and Ahsan.

312. The burden rests upon the respondent to prove fraud or dishonesty and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. She contends that there is a prima facie case that the applicants have relied upon fraudulent and dishonest material, including false documents. Having carried out a holistic assessment of the documents filed in all twelve claims, including examination of signatures on passports and information provided in VAFs, we agree for the reasons detailed below.

a) Atteq

313. We have found that the evidence before us establishes that the sponsor, Mr Mohammad Irfan, is probably the victim of identity theft. The real Mr Irfan does not reside in Yardley, Birmingham. It is probable that he resides in Worcestershire. We find that he does not know the applicants, has never agreed to be their sponsor and is probably not aware of these proceedings.

314. The sponsorship undertaking purportedly signed by Mr Irfan on 15 April 2024 is a false document as is the title register summary for the sponsor’s ‘property’ in Yardley and the property valuation report issued in respect of the applicants’ family home in Karachi. We find that copies of Mr Irfan’s genuine documents, such as his Pakistan identity card, his United Kingdom driving licence and several bank and payment statements have been recycled on behalf of the applicants by a third-party to whom Mr Irfan had previously provided his documents, most probably in relation to an entry clearance application for another person, and they have been used in this case and also in Habib without his consent.

315. Consequently, the entry clearance applications in Atteq are founded upon false information and deception. We find that neither Mrs Sabooh nor any of the applicants are related to the deceased, Mr Malik. We find that Mrs Sabooh’s Birth Registration Certificate, ‘issued’ on 12 October 2020 is a false document. It has been created to falsely establish Mr Malik to be Ms Sabooh’s father. The Family Registration Certificate ‘issued’ by NADRA on 21 February 2021, which also records Mr Malik as Mrs Sabooh’s father, is also a false document.

316. The home address for the applicants identified on the VAF application dated 6 April 2024 differs to the home address for Mr Atteq detailed on his Bank AL Habib Limited bank statement, dated 15 April 2024, and the same bank’s account maintenance certificate dated the same day. We conclude that the Bank AL Habib Limited documents are false.

317. Mr Atteq asserts in his VAF that he has travelled to the United Arab Emirates on two occasions, to Malaysia and to Qatar in the previous five years. Copies of passport entry and exit stamps were provided but no biographical data page. Embossed on the copied pages is a passport number beginning F369 which does not match Mr Atteq’s presently issued passport. Without the relevant biographical data page, we do not accept that these stamps relate to journeys undertaken by Mr Atteq.

318. Mr Atteq details in his VAF that he operates machinery as an employee of Shezan International Ltd. In his pre-action protocol letter, dated 17 April 2024, he states he has been employed with the company since 2006. We find that evidence filed as to his employment is genuine. In reaching this conclusion, we observe that the recording of his employer’s contact telephone number on the VAF is the one telephone number we have confidence is not controlled by a third party. When the VAF was completed, the author would therefore have been confident that a call from an entry clearance officer to the employer would have resulted in positive confirmation of Mr Atteq’s employment.

319. The Return of Income form issued by the Federal Board of Revenue confirms Mr Atteq’s annual income up to 30 June 2023 as PKR 9,20,875 (then £2,500). Consequent to our finding as to the genuineness of Mr Atteq’s identified employment, we also accept this document to be genuine. Having found the bank statements to be false documents, we conclude that the third-party has adopted the approach of blending false documents with genuine ones to aid the visa application. In this matter, bank statements identifying the applicant as has having PKR 35,17,640.05 (then £10,040) constitutes a crude attempt to inflate the Mr Atteq’s financial circumstances.

320. We have found the letter ‘from’ Chelsea and Westminster Hospital to be a false document.

321. Mr Atteq’s ‘signature’ has been placed on several documents filed with this Tribunal. All the signatures are in English script. We observe that a copy of Mr Atteq’s biographical data and signature page of his passport has not been filed with the Upper Tribunal and so we cannot compare the signatures with that on his passport. The signatures on the two form EX160s that accompanied the application to renew following refusal of permission on the papers and then accompanied the application to renew following a grant of permission are very similar, as is the signature on the UTIAC11 reconsideration form. They differ noticeably to the signature on the UTIAC1. The signature on the draft consent order bears no correlation with any of Mr Atteq’s other signatures. The signature on the bill of costs also bears no similarity with the other signatures, nor does the signature on the UTIAC6 seeking an adjournment of the hearing on 14 May 2025. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mr Atteq’s signature in these proceedings.

322. We find a third party controls Mr Irfan’s purported email account as well as the email account said to belong to Mr Atteq. Such control is a means of endeavouring to hide the false nature of the entry clearance and judicial review applications from this Tribunal. We are also satisfied that the United Kingdom telephone number detailed as belonging to Mr Irfan in the VAFs and the personal telephone number provided by Mr Atteq in his VAF are controlled by a third party for the same reason.

b) Habib

323. Mrs Habib is the sole adult applicant in this case. We have found that Mr Irfan is not aware of these proceedings. He is probably a victim of identity fraud and has not agreed to sponsor the applicants in this case. Mr Irfan’s personal documents have been relied upon by the applicants without his knowledge. The sponsorship undertaking is a false document as is the title register summary.

324. We find that the applicants are not related to Mrs Bibi. Consequently, the Family Registration Certificate ‘issued’ by NADRA on 24 June 2018 is a false document created to establish Mrs Habib’s link to Mrs Bibi. The property valuation report is false.

325. We observe that the bank statement issued by United Bank Limited identifies the joint account holders as ‘Tanveer Ahmed and Sajida Parveen’, not Mrs Habib. The same names are recorded on a letter from United Bank Limited certifying the account holders, dated 24 June 2024. Mrs Habib asserts that the account belongs to her husband, Mr Tanveer Ahmed. We note that the home address on the bank statement is the same as Mrs Habib’s home address recorded in her VAF. The computerised national identity card number (‘CNIC’) numbers recorded as belonging to ‘Tanveer Ahmed and Sajida Parveen’ on the bank statement are different to the CNIC numbers recorded for Mrs Habib and her husband on the false Family Registration Certificate. On balance, we accept that the United Bank Limited statement and the ‘To Whom It May Concern’ letter issued by the same bank on 24 June 2024 are genuine, but they belong to someone else and not to Mrs Habib. We find that Mr Tanveer Ahmed and Mrs Sajida Parveen are not known to Mrs Habib. We further find that the ’home address’ provided by Mrs Habib on her VAF and UTIAC1 is not hers; it belongs to Mr Ahmed and Mrs Parveen.

326. A third party has sought to bolster an application by using false documents alongside genuine documents in its control belonging to others. We find the affidavit said to have been sworn by Mrs Habib’s husband on 24 June 2024 asserting that the United Bank Limited account is his bank account is a false document.

327. The entry clearance applications in Habib and Ishaq are linked by their husbands’ purported employment. Taxpayer Registration Certificates issued by the Federal Board of Revenue record the employer of both men as Hameed Sons, Flat No 11, 2nd Floor, Adyala Tower, Main Adyala Road, Rawalpindi. The applicants in Habib reside in Gujrat, approximately 80 miles from Rawalpindi, and those in Ishaq reside approximately 160 miles away in Chenab Nagar. We understand Hameed Sons is a general supplier of machinery, spare parts and test equipment. It has one office in Rawalpindi.

328. The applicants in Habib and Ishaq have filed the same documents relating to Hameed Sons:

i. Contract No 13-1105-00-C between Hameed Sons and Government of Pakistan General Headquarters Directorate General Procurement (Army) Rawalpindi, dated 7 March 2022.

ii. Contract Conditions / Clauses for Contract No 13-1105-00-C, dated 7 March 2022.

iii. Schedule of stores to be supplied on Contract No 13-1105-00-C, dated 7 March 2022.

iv. A covering letter issued by General Headquarters, LS Branch, DGP (A), Rawalpindi accompanying the cheque detailed at v below.

v. A United Bank Limited cheque drawn on the account of DGP (Army) General Fund paid to Hameed Sons, dated 26 March 2024.

vi. A bank statement issued by Askari Bank on an account of Hameed Sons from 1 November 2023 to 7 May 2024.

vii. An Askari Bank deposit slip for Hameed Sons, date stamped 26 March 2024.

viii. Hameed Sons’ membership certificate, the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, issues on 30 January 2024.

329. None of these documents reference the husbands of the applicants in Habib and Ishaq.

330. We consider the Hammed Sons documents to be genuine but find that they have no relation to the husbands.

331. We observe that the Taxpayer Registration Certificate issued to Mr Tanveer Ahmed, said by Mrs Habib to be her husband, and the accompanying Federal Board of Revenue Active Taxpayer List (Income Tax) printout have a registration number ending 35795. Under Income Tax Ordinance 2001 (as amended) and Income Tax Rules 2002 (as amended), individuals registering for income tax are provided with a National Tax Number, which are the thirteen numbers of their CNIC. On the Family Registration Certificate, Mr Ahmed’s CNIC ends 71551 and on the United Bank Limited statement it is recorded as ending 76927. We find that the documents purportedly issued by the Federal Board of Revenue are false.

332. Mrs Habib relies upon documentary evidence relating to her children. A document issued by Maryam Girls Higher Secondary School, Rabwar certifies that Faris, a male aged eight, is in Class 2, and Shafia, a girl aged eleven, is in Class 7. We take judicial note that within the Pakistan education system, years one to five (ages six to eleven) are primary level, years six to eight are middle level where students work towards their Secondary School Certificate, and years eleven and twelve are intermediate level where studies are directed to a Higher Secondary School Certificate. Observing the age of the children said to be attending a Higher Secondary School, coupled with Faris being certified as studying at a girls’ school, and irregular typesetting in both documents we do not accept them as genuine.

333. The Chelsea and Westminster Hospital letter is not genuine, nor is the assertion advanced on her behalf that Mrs Habib has secured permanent residence in Australia.

334. Ultimately, no documents save for Mrs Habib’s passport is genuine. Even her ‘home’ address as recorded in her VAF and UTIAC1 is not hers.

335. The biographical data and signature pages of Mrs Habib’s passport evidence her signature, which has also been placed on several documents filed with this Tribunal. We have considered the signatures placed on the UTIAC1 application form, the UTIAC2 statement of truth page and the UTIAC5 application form filed in relation to the request for urgent consideration made in February 2025. Whilst the first two are similar, the third shares no consistency with the others. We further observe that the two signatures on the form EX160 differ from each other. None compare with the signature in Mrs Habib’s passport. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Habib’s signature.

c) Zahid Ahmad

336. The sponsor, Mrs Saddiq, has not responded to the Upper Tribunal’s request for information. Her home address is recorded on her deceased husband’s death certificate and has been replicated in false documents. We observe that save for a sponsorship undertaking the only personal documentation relating to Mrs Saddiq filed by the applicants was a false Ffrees statement. We have found that Mr Hashmi’s signature and stamp have been lifted from another document and placed onto the sponsorship undertaking. Turning to the title registry summary, though it relates to Mrs Saddiq’s property, we conclude on balance that it is not genuine in light of the other false documents relied upon.

337. Considering this evidence in the round, and applying the required standard of proof, we find on balance that Mrs Saddiq is probably the victim of identity theft. Her identity has been used to link the applicants to her deceased husband and so facilitate visitor’s visa applications founded upon his bereavement. We find that Mrs Saddiq is probably not aware of these proceedings.

338. A limited number of documents were filed by the applicants. Various documents record Mr Zahid Ahmad’s CNIC as ending in “5271”. The respondent has filed evidence from the Federal Board of Revenue, Pakistan, that this CNIC number belongs to someone else, namely Mr Mohammad Zahid. We also observe a spelling mistake in the terms and conditions on the reverse of a submitted health insurance card; it reads “exeeding” instead of “exceeding”.

339. A bank statement belonging to the account of ‘Shagufta w/o [wife of] Zahid Ahmed’ was filed with the entry clearance application. The closing date of the statement is 30 September 2024. The entry clearance application was made less than a week before, and these documents were submitted to the entry clearance officer soon afterwards. The VAF confirms Mr Zahid Ahmad’s wife as ‘Shagufta Shagufta’. We acknowledge that some Pakistani citizens have a mononym and their single given name is used for all legal documentation including passports and CNIC. The name may have to be duplicated for a British visa application form. A different home address is given for Mrs Shagufta on her bank account to that detailed on the VAF. The bank statement identifies Mrs Shagufta as living in Mirpus Khas, Sindh, which is situated approximately 55 miles from Kotri. We note that Mr Zahid Ahmad’s place of birth on the VAF is recorded as Mirpus Khas. For reasons given below there is reference in the statement to a person who we find to be engaged as a third party in these matters. Consequently, we accept this bank statement to be a genuine document, and accordingly Mr Zahid Ahmad and his wife reside in Mirpus Khas and not Kotri. Consequently, the ’home' address recorded in the VAF and UTIAC1 is false.

d) Ahsan

340. We accept that Mr and Mrs Khan are the genuine sponsors of the applicants in this matter, who are mother and daughter. Mrs Khan’s evidence is that the intention was for Mrs Ahsan to visit the United Kingdom so that their children could meet. Mrs Ahsan engaged a visa consultant called ‘Firooze’ who was based in Chenab Nagar. Mr and Mrs Khan provided genuine documents as requested, which were initially conveyed to Mrs Ahsan by WhatsApp and then forwarded by the same messaging app to the visa consultant. We find genuine British identity, financial and accommodation documents hold a financial value for a disreputable third party engaged in entry clearance applications to this country. We observe the several instances in the cases before us where genuine documents issued in this country have been blended into entry clearance applications without the knowledge of the documents’ owners. We conclude that ‘Firooze’ was such a disreputable third party. Consequently, there was a significant financial value for ‘Firooze’ in either selling on to another third party or recycling for one of his own clients the United Kingdom documents provided by Mr and Mrs Khan. They would not have been reported as stolen, and on inspection would be properly assessed as genuine. We consider that what Mrs Khan considered a generous offer by the visa consultant to work for a conditional fee was underpinned by the expected profit to be made by the unscrupulous selling of the United Kingdom documents onwards to another person expeditiously.

341. In this matter, we observe that Mr and Mrs Khan’s documents were used by the applicants in Ishaq, whose entry clearance application was made before that of the applicants in this case. We note that to protect itself, a third party controlled the email address and telephone number recorded on the VAF as belonging to Mrs Khan despite her being a genuine sponsor to her sister and niece. The control exhibited by the third party in this matter was self-serving; it was not in Mrs Ahsan’s best interests but to protect the interests of a third party who was advancing the application in a manner contrary to Mrs Ahsan’s wishes. Mrs Ahsan’s best interests were never relevant to the third party, and she is now at risk of a ten-year bar in making an application to visit her sister in this country.

342. Mrs Ahsan’s husband, Mr Ghulam Murtaza provided bank statements relating to his account with the United Bank Ltd from December 2023 to June 2024. The account held up to PKR 64,56,000 (then £18,414) during this time and its closing balance was PKR 47,42,529.44 (then £13,500). We observe that there is a payment to Mrs Ahsan on 23 January 2024 in the sum of PKR 50,000. We conclude that this statement is a genuine document as are Mr Murtaza’s Federal Board of Revenue documents. We note that the home address on the bank statements is the same address provided by Mrs Ahsan in her VAF and recorded in the UTIAC1.

343. We conclude that genuine documents were blended with false ones when the visa application was made. Whether this is because a third party was concerned as to the overall strength of the underlying application, an important consideration if a conditional fee agreement exists, or had become accustomed to using false documents is not a matter for us to reach a finding on. It is sufficient that a third party decided to rely upon the false ‘death certificate’ visitors application used in other cases, and false documents were added to the application to establish a familial tie between Mr Amed and Mrs Ahsan. We accept Mrs Khan’s evidence that her sister was not aware that the reasons for visiting the United Kingdom were distorted without her permission at the time the application was made. However, a third party was working on her sister’s behalf, and the application was made on the false basis that Mrs Ahsan is the sister of Mr Amed and wished to travel to this country following his death. Mrs Khan was clear as to Mr Amed not being a brother of either woman. We conclude that the Government of Punjab Birth Registration Certificates recording Mrs Ahsan and Mr Amed to be siblings is a false document as is the property valuation report, which fails to identify the two houses the family own which are located close to each other.

344. We accept that neither Mrs Ahsan, nor Mr and Mrs Khan, sought to deceive the respondent. We find that the decision to do so was unilaterally undertaken by a third party and not on Mrs Ahsan’s instructions. We are concerned by Mrs Khan’s evidence that neither Mrs Ahsan nor her sister were aware that the entry clearance application had been refused. We accept that the existence, and conclusion, of judicial review proceedings has been a surprise to both.

345. Mrs Ahsan has purportedly signed several documents. Though signed a day apart, the signatures on the claim form and the form EX160 are in Urdu and differ. The signature on the consent order is consistent with the signature of Mrs Ahsan’s Pakistani passport. However, we have found that Mrs Ahsan had no knowledge of these proceedings at that time. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Ahsan’s signature and at least one of them had access to a copy of Mrs Ahsan’s passport which she sent to her visa consultant, ‘Firooze’. We accept Mrs Khan’s evidence that Mrs Ahsan has not signed any of the documents. She simply used WhatsApp to communicate with ‘Firooze’ and to send him documents in respect of her and her daughter’s entry clearance application.

e) Mansoor

346. There are two adult applicants, including Shafia Mansoor who was aged eighteen at the date of the entry clearance application, and one minor child. We have found that Mrs Barauskiene is a victim of identity theft. Until being contacted by the Upper Tribunal, she was unaware of these proceedings. She has confirmed that she does not know the applicants and that her ‘marriage certificate’ filed by the applicants is not a genuine document. The applicants are not related to the deceased, Mr Shahzad. Accordingly, the Government of Punjab Birth Registration Certificate ‘issued’ in respect of Mr Shahzad and identifying him as having the same father as Mrs Mansoor is a false document. The NADRA Family Registration Certificate details different dates of birth for Mrs Mansoor’s husband, Mansoor Ahmed, and their children to that recorded on the VAF. This document is false.

347. The applicants rely upon a one-page United Bank Limited joint account statement dated 18 December 2024. The joint account holders are ‘Mansoor Ahmad Kokab and Mubarika’. This may well be a genuine document, but Mrs Mansoor is not the account holder. We find that she is not married to Mr Mansoor Ahmad Kokab; Mubarika is. The address on the bank statement is not the home address provided by Mrs Mansoor in her VAF or UTIAC1.

348. A letter from United Bank Ltd, certifying Mr Ahmad’s account, dated 19 December 2024, details his CNIC as ending 26811. We note that the NADRA family registration certificate issued on 15 January 2024 records his CNIC as ending 29775. We further observe that this document does not identify ‘Mubarika’ as a joint account holder. This document is false.

349. The sponsorship undertaking, the Ffrees statement and the property valuation documents are false. We have found the title register summary to be a false document. As to that document, we observe that in a document said to be issued by HM Land Registry the words ‘proprietor’ and ‘the’ are misspelt as ‘proprieter’ and ‘teh’. Such mistakes are not to be expected from documents issued by HM Land Registry and establishes that a third party is manufacturing false title register summaries.

350. We note that the ‘home’ addresses provided in the VAF and UTIAC1 differ, though the visa application was made on 13 December 2024 and the UTIAC1 was filed with this Tribunal one month later, on 13 January 2025. We conclude that the applicants have not provided their true home address in this case.

351. Mrs Mansoor’s signatures are consistent on her claim form and her first form EX160. Her signature differs on the second form EX160. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Mansoor’s signature.

f) Shakil

352. The sole applicant is Mrs Shakil. We have found that the identity of her purported sponsor, Mrs Amina Hussain, has probably been stolen. We find that Mrs Hussain is probably unaware of these proceedings. Mrs Shakil is not related to the deceased. Mrs Bibi, as confirmed by Mr Hussain. We observe that the names of Mrs Shakil’s parents recorded on her NADRA Family Registration Certificate are a different font size to the rest of the entries. There has been a crude effort to identify Mrs Bibi as her mother. This is a false document.

353. Limited evidence was provided on behalf of the sponsor. An enhanced biographical data page from Mrs Hussain’s passport is suggestive that it is a scanned document, which being mindful of the evidence of Mrs Khan is strongly suggestive that it was sent by Mrs Hussain to a third party by a messaging app in respect of an unrelated entry clearance application and subsequently used in this matter without her consent. Otherwise, Mrs Shakil relies upon a sponsorship undertaking and a Ffrees statement that are false documents. We have found that Mrs Akhtar’s signature and stamp have been lifted from another document and placed on the sponsorship undertaking.

354. We note that the registry title summary relied upon corresponds with Ms Hussain’s purported home address, but we have found that she does not reside at the property. Noting the significant use of false evidence in this case, observing that the address is recorded on Mrs Bibi’s death certificate and having found that the sponsor does not reside at her ‘home’ address, we find that this is a false document.

355. As to Mrs Shakil’s personal documents, we have found that the property valuation report is a false document.

356. Mrs Shakil relies upon documents said to relate to her children. Her son, Nabil, aged eleven at the time of application, is identified on a school identity card as attending the Nusrat Jahan Academy Girls School, a secondary school for girls in Chenab Nagar. We find this identity card is false. A second document certifies that he is in Class 6 at Nusrat Jahan Academy Boys School in the same city. The inconsistency in evidence as to where Nabil is studying is noted. On balance we do not consider the second document to be genuine.

357. Two school documents have been filed in the name of ‘Hiba Tul Musawar’, a daughter of Mrs Shakil. This daughter, said to be in Class 10 of her school, is not named on the NADRA Family Registration Certificate, nor referenced in Mrs Shakil’s VAF.

358. Evidence accompanied the entry clearance application relating to Mrs Shakil’s husband, Mr Shakil Anjum, includes an identity card issued by the Government of Punjab Education Department, several pay slips, MCB Bank Limited statements documents issued by the Federal Board of Revenue. Mr Anjum earns approximately PKR 71,000 (£185) net per month. His bank statements record his salary payments and between May and November 2024 he has approximately PKR 1,500 (then £4) and 333,456 (then £860) in the account. To the requisite standard we find these documents to be genuine. We reach the same conclusion for Mrs Shakil’s statements from the same bank. Whilst the account closes with PKR 33,50,417.72 (then £8,700), the credits are identified as remittances. The home address on these documents corresponds with the home address recorded in the VAF and UTIAC1.

359. Mrs Shakil’s passport has been filed with this Tribunal. The signature differs from those on the claim form and the two form EX160 application. All four signatures differ from each other. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Shakil’s signature.

360. This is a matter where we conclude that Mrs Shakil has submitted some genuine documents, but a third party has sought to blend them with false documents.

g) Ishaq

361. We find that Mrs Khan is not the sister of Mrs Abida Ishaq and the aunt of Malaika. We conclude that Mrs Abida Ishaq used deception in her application by purporting to be the sister of both the deceased, Mr Amed, and Mrs Khan, a British citizen. Accordingly, the various Government of Punjab birth registration certificates linking Mr Amed to Mrs Ishaq are false documents, as is the Government of Sindh birth certificate said to belong to Mr Amed and Mrs Ishaq’s father. The sponsorship undertaking is a false document.

362. The employment documents provided on behalf of the applicant’s husband, Mr Muhammad Ishaq Majoka are not genuine. Consequent to the same Hameed Sons documents also being used in Habib we find that Federal Board of Revenue documents detailing Mr Majoka’s employment with Hameed Sons are false.

363. The applicant has provided one page of a Bank AL Habib Limited statement relating to a savings account said to belong to her husband. The statement runs from 23 February 2024 to 10 June 2024 and has a closing balance of PKR 3.023.836.59 (then £7,800). An accompanying account maintenance certificate states that the account was opened on 12 February 2024. With the account having been opened eleven days previously, and there being only a small number of credits and debits, there is no cogent explanation as to why the statement does not commence on 12 February 2024. Observing the significant use of false documents in this case, on balance, we find the bank statement a false document.

364. A property valuation report was prepared by Jammu Associates & Real Estates, Chenab Nagar. The document was attested by Hafiz Atif Reza, an advocate in Lahore. We observe that the cities of Lahore and Chenab Nagar are approximately 110 miles apart. Being mindful of the significant use of false documents in this case we find, on balance, that this is not a genuine document.

365. Mrs Ishaq relies upon having travelled to Thailand, Malaysia and Sri Lanka as a tourist. Whilst we do not have the biographical data page for the relevant passport, and so do not have clarity as to whether they are in her present passport, we accept to the requisite standard that the visas and entry/exit stamps are genuine. Mrs Ishaq’s name is typed in the machine-readable zone on both the Thai and Malaysian e-Visa vignette issued in 2015. Additionally, her photograph has been placed in the Malaysian e-Visa vignette. However, these trips were undertaken in 2015 and 2016 and do not evidence her financial circumstances when the entry clearance application was made in June 2024.

366. Mrs Ishaq’s Urdu script signature has been placed on her form EX160, and the UTIAC1. Visually, the signatures differ. Mrs Ishaq’s signature on the consent order is in English script. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Ishaq’s signature.

h) Suleman

367. Mrs Suleman is the sole applicant. We have received no response from her sponsor, Mr Sufyan Iftikhar. We have found that he is probably a victim of identity theft. To establish his sponsorship, Mrs Suleman relies upon a title register summary for a postcode that does not exist and the title number corresponds to a property situated approximately twelve miles away. The Ffrees statement has the multiple failings previously identified. No other documents were provided. It is clear to us that Mrs Suleman has no connection to Mr Iftikhar and is not the sister of Mrs Gul. She has sought to rely upon a death certificate to fabricate family membership with the deceased and her widower. The Government of Punjab Birth Registration Certificate ‘issued’ to Mrs Gul is a false document as is the NADRA Family Registration Certificate which seeks to link Mrs Suleman to Mrs Gul through their ‘parents’.

368. We observe as to her husband that Mr Muhammad Suleman Ahmed’s CNIC referenced on the certificate of account issued by United Bank Limited ends 66059. His CNIC is recorded as ending 59491 on the NADRA Family Registration Certificate. The same CNIC is recorded on a conveyance document placed in the bundle. Consequent to the inconsistency, we find the bank statement and conveyance document are not genuine. Additionally, the property valuation report is a false document. We do not find any document relied upon to be genuine.

369. We find that Mrs Suleman has not provided her true ‘home’ address. Two different addresses were detailed in the VAF and the UTIAC1. The second address was used in a separate VAF by someone connected to a third party, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, which we consider below. We conclude that Mrs Suleman has not provided the correct details of her home address at any time in these proceedings.

370. Mrs Suleman signed the UTIAC1 and EX160 in Urdu script. They are dissimilar. Neither signature bears a resemblance to the Urdu script signature on the consent order. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Suleman’s signature.

i) Mushtaq

371. Mrs Mushtaq is the sole adult applicant. She is not the sister of the deceased, Mr Ahmed. We have found that her ‘sponsor’, Mrs Hussain, is the victim of identity theft. Until contacted by the Upper Tribunal, Mrs Hussain was unaware of these proceedings. The sponsorship undertaking is a false document as are the sponsor’s Ffrees statement and title summary entry.

372. A school card issued to Nadeem Ahmad references him as “D/O Hanif Ahmad” [daughter of] and not “S/O” [son of]. This is a false document.

373. The respondent has filed a Documentation Verification Report produced by the visa section of the British Embassy, Abu Dhabi, in relation to a United Bank Ltd account statement provided in the name of Mr Hanif Ahmad, who Mrs Mushtaq states is her husband. The report is dated 20 February 2023. We accept that this is a typographical error and should read 2025 to be consistent with the report’s contents. The report confirms that a scanned copy of the statement was sent to a contact at the Bank who confirmed that it was a genuine document. However, Mr Ahmad’s CNIC did not match the CNIC of the true account holder, who was subsequently contacted and confirmed that he had not applied for a United Kingdom visa, nor had he provided his statement for any visa purpose. The bank statement is a false document in that Mr Ahmad’s name has been transposed onto a genuine statement belonging to another person.

374. According to her VAF submitted in January 2025 Mrs Mushtaq was residing in Islamabad. The same month, one of her property valuation reports had her living in Lahore. A second property valuation report had her home in Bhakkar in May 2023. We have found that both property valuation reports are false documents. It is clear to us that the ultimate intention was to present Mrs Mushtaq as residing at one address that is not hers, but through ineptness a third party failed to be consistent as to the address to be used. We conclude that none of the addresses are the true family home of Mrs Mushtaq. This is a matter where the applicant has sought, with the aid of a third party, to hide her true address in Pakistan.

375. This is one of five instances where we find that home addresses entered on to VAFs are not the genuine home addresses of the applicants. The others are Zahid Ahmad, Habib, Mansoor, and Suleman. We are satisfied that these evidence a deliberate intention to hide the true home addresses of these applicants from firstly the respondent and then the Upper Tribunal.

376. We find that no document relied upon in this case is genuine.

377. Mrs Mushtaq’s Urdu script signatures on her claim form and form EX160 differ. The signature on the draft consent order is in English script. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mrs Mushtaq’s signature.

j) Basharat Ahmad

378. The four applicants are adults. We have found that the ‘sponsor’, Mr Akram is probably the victim of identity theft. We conclude that he probably does not know about these proceedings. His identity was used consequent to his having the same surname as the deceased. The respondent accepts that the title registry summary corresponds with the address provided by the applicants for the sponsor, but we have found that Mr Akram lives a considerable distance away from this address. The sponsorship undertaking is a false document as is the Ffrees statement. Additionally, the Government of Punjab Birth Registration Certificate for the deceased, issued to Mrs Nasrin as the deceased’s ‘sister’ on 3 December 2020, is a false document.

379. The fourth applicant, Mrs Naghma Huma, is confirmed to be a Pakistani national in her VAF. She details her husband to be a Pakistani national. The birth registration certificate of her son filed with this claim was issued in January 2025 and records her as a Romanian national. We find that the birth registration certificate is false.

380. We have considered copies of various visa vignettes placed in passports and related entry and exit stamps. Mrs Nasrin’s name is identifiable on a Dutch visa issued in 1988. None of the visas or stamps post-date 1998. Though no biographical page accompanies the stamps, we consider, on balance, that they are genuine as the respondent has not identified the three separate visas issued for entry to the United Kingdom in 1987, 1993 and 1995 as false.

381. We have examined the bank statements and pension details provided by Mr Basharat Ahmad and accept them to be genuine. We considered this to be a blended application, where genuine documents have been placed with false documents to raise the chances of securing entry clearance as a visitor.

382. Mr Basharat Ahmad signed the UTIAC1 and EX160 in English script. The signatures are dissimilar. We conclude that more than one person has ‘signed’ Mr Basharat Ahmad’s signature.

K. Help with Fees

383. In 2013 the Help with Fees scheme was introduced by the Ministry of Justice in England and Wales to protect universal access to justice by providing those on low income and little to no savings with financial help towards the cost of court and tribunal fees. It is a system for fee remission. An individual may make an application to a court or tribunal for confirmation that they are not required to pay the relevant fee or, alternatively, make an application for a refund of a fee that they have already paid, but could not afford to pay at that time.

384. A Help with Fees application is made in the Upper Tribunal by a form EX160 with the present version having been introduced for applications made or fees paid on or after 27 November 2023. This form was in use at the time all the applications for fee remissions in the cases before us were made. An online application can be made at https://www.gov.uk/get-help-with-court-fees.

385. A foreign national residing overseas can apply for fee remission under the scheme if their case in being conducted in a court or tribunal in England or Wales.

386. Form EX160 states on page 1:

“The information you provide needs to be accurate as it will act as evidence for your application and will allow us to check the information with other government departments.”

387. At section 14 of the form applicants and litigation friends are required to declare and state as true:

“I am the applicant or litigation friend completing this form.

I believe that my/the applicant’s current financial circumstances mean that that I/the applicant may be entitled to help with fees. I declare that the information I have given on this form is correct and complete. I understand that if I have given false information, criminal or civil proceedings may be brought against me. I understand that if I have given false information or I do not provide evidence of the information given in this form if requested, my/this application may be rejected and the full fee will be payable.”

388. We observe that as the applicants all reside outside the United Kingdom and have no domestic National Insurance number it is not possible for the Ministry of Justice to liaise with other government departments. The system relating to overseas applicants is therefore reliant on them making truthful self-declarations.

389. A full fee remission can be secured if an applicant has a small amount of savings and meets the income criteria. If a tribunal fee is up to £1,420, an applicant must have less than £4,250 in savings and investments to be eligible for Help with Fees. Savings over this sum results in ineligibility.

390. Where an applicant crosses the savings threshold, they are required to meet the income criteria. If the applicant is single, they must have a monthly income less than £1,420 plus £425 for each child aged up to 13, and £710 for each child aged 14 or older. If they have a partner, they must have a monthly income less than £2,130 plus £425 for each child you have aged up to 13, and £710 for each child you have aged 14 or older.

391. If income is not the same every month, an applicant may use their income from the previous month or their average income for the last three months, whichever is lower.

392. An applicant must sign and date the declaration and statement of truth to confirm their belief that they may be entitled to Help with Fees, and that all the information given is true. If an applicant is found to have been deliberately untruthful or dishonest, criminal proceedings for fraud can be brought.

393. In this cohort of cases, the initial UTIAC1 fees were paid by “Muhammad Munir” in Atteq and by ‘M Munir’ in Habib on 19 June 2024 and 12 November 2024 respectively. Thereafter, fee remission was sought in all cases from the filing of a UTIAC1 in Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186) on 20 November 2024 onwards. There have been nineteen successful applications for fee remission in these cases.

a) Atteq

394. When applying for entry clearance on 6 April 2024, Mr Atteq asserted that he had savings in the region of £11,400 and was earning £192 per month

395. Following the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review following a paper consideration the applicants renewed the application by UTIAC11 on 11 November 2024, with an accompanying form EX160 applying for fee remission for the renewal fee of £425. The self-declaration at section 8 of the form that he and his wife had less than £4,250 in savings and investments and that his average earnings for the previous three months was £620.11. Fee remission was granted as was the application fee for filing the UTIAC13 following the grant of permission. Mr Atteq benefitted to the sum of £809.

b) Habib

396. Mrs Habib produced documentary evidence of her husband having savings of over £125,000 when applying for entry clearance on 8 June 2024. Her application fee to initiate proceedings was paid.

397. When renewing her application and requesting a reconsideration hearing by filing a UTIAC11 on 28 February 2025, Mrs Habib self-declared her savings with her husband to be less than £4,250 and her husband’s average earnings over the previous three months by her form EX160 to be £574. The application fee of £425 was remitted

398. When filing her first UTIAC5 seeking urgent consideration on 28 February 2025 and her second UTIAC5 on 7 March 2025, the self-declaration was repeated. Mrs Habib benefitted from the three applications for fee remission to the sum of £987.

c) Zahid Ahmad

399. In his entry clearance application of 24 September 2024, Mr Zahid Ahmad declared monthly earnings of PKR 74,420 (then £200) and stated that he had savings of PKR 2,672.995 (then £7,203).

400. By his form EX160 accompanying his UTIAC1 filed in JR-2024-LON-003186 less than two months later, on 20 November 2024, Mr Zahid Ahmad self-declared that he had less than £4,250 savings and had earned an average of £625.11 over the previous three months. In section 12 of his UTIAC1 claim form, dated the previous day, Mr Ahmad declared that his monthly wage was £204 Consequent to the self-declaration the Tribunal fee of £169 was remitted.

401. Mr Zahid Ahmad again sought fee remission in JR-2025-LON-000681 and in JR-2025-LON-001030. He self-declared that he had less than £4,250 savings and earned an average of £611 over the previous three months. Consequent to the self-declaration the fee of £169 was waived in both claims. Mr Zahid Ahmad benefitted from fee remissions to the sum of £507.

d) Ahsan

402. In her form EX160 accompanying her UTIAC1 filed on 2 January 2025, Mrs Ahsan self-declared that she had less than £4,250 savings and had earned an average of £372 over the previous three months. A fee of £169 was remitted consequent to the self-declaration. In her entry clearance application submitted six months previously, Mrs Ahsan provided her husband’s bank statements with a closing balance of PKR 47,42,529 (then £12,780).

403. We have found above that the judicial review proceedings were entirely controlled by a third party without Mrs Ahsan’s knowledge.

e) Mansoor

404. When filing her UTIAC1 on 13 January 2025 and later her UTIAC13 on 15 May 2025, Mrs Mansoor filed form EX160 self-declaring at section 8 that she and her husband had less than £4,250 in savings and investments. On both occasions she stated that her husband’s average earnings for the previous three months were £521. In her entry clearance application, Mrs Mansoor stated that her husband had a high-profile business in Pakistan and provided his bank statements establishing that he has PKR 82,00,000 (then £23,400) in his bank account. Mrs Mansoor benefitted from fee remission to the sum of £605.

f) Shakil

405. In her initial form EX160 accompanying her UTIAC1 on 27 January 2025, Mrs Shakil self-declared that she had less than £4,250 savings and her husband earned an average of £578 over the previous three months. A fee of £169 was remitted. A second form EX160 filed with the UTIAC6 confirmed the same save that her husband earned an average of £541 over the previous three months. We observe that Mrs Shakil stated in her entry clearance application submitted in December 2024 that with her husband she had the equivalent of £9383 in savings and her husband earned PKR 6,96,000 per annum (then £2000). Mrs Shakil benefitted from fee remission to the sum of £605.

g) Ishaq

406. Mrs Ishaq filed a form EX160 when commencing her claim on 11 February 2025. She self-declared at section 8 of the form that she and her husband had less than £4,250 in savings and investments and that her husband’s average earnings for the previous three months was £578. A fee of £169 was remitted. We observe that by her entry clearance application submitted eight months previously, Mrs Ishaq provided what she said to be her husband’s bank statements establishing that he had PKR 30,23,836 (then £8,600) in his account and in a three-month period had deposited PKR 7,26,792 (then £2,000).

h) Suleman

407. In her form EX160 accompanying her UTIAC 1 filed on 21 February 2025, Mrs Suleman self-declared that she and her husband had less than £4,250 savings and that her husband earned an average of £578 over the previous three months. A fee of £169 was remitted. In her entry clearance application submitted a month earlier, she provided bank statements establishing that her husband had funds of PKR 23,89,474 (then £6,826.70).

i) Mushtaq

408. Mrs Mushtaq filed a form EX160 with her UTIAC1 on 26 February 2025. It contained a self-declaration that she and her husband had less than £4,250 in savings and investments and that her husband’s average earnings for the previous three months was £587. A fee of £169 was remitted. The previous month, Mrs Mushtaq provided documentary evidence in her visa application that her husband had PKR 21,38,876.02 (then £6,110) in his bank account.

j) Basharat Ahmad

409. A form EX160 accompanied the UTIAC1 filed on 1 May 2025. Consequent to the self-declaration the fee of £174 was remitted. In the entry clearance application submitted less than three months previously, Mr Basharat Ahmad declared savings equivalent to £20,600.

410. On their face, the self-declarations by the lead applicants in all the claims were entirely inconsistent with the financial circumstances advanced by them in their entry clearance application. The amount of savings said to exist in support of securing visitors’ visas far exceed the savings threshold under Help with Fees.

411. We have found above that all the applications for entry clearance involved the use of deception. We further find that fraud is likely to have been exercised in respect of the Help with Fees applications by those who completed the forms. We address below whether the perpetrators were the applicants or a third party.

412. The nineteen Help with Fees applications made in the cases before us resulted in fee remissions amounting to £5,079. There have been additional costs to the public purse through the engagement of the Government Legal Department on behalf of the respondents and the several Judges who have been required to consider the claims, whether at the paper consideration stage or at oral hearings. We consider these costs to be very significantly greater than the sum of the fee remissions.

L. Third-party controllers of entry clearance applications and judicial review claims

413. A person seeking entry clearance can properly call upon the assistance of a suitably experienced agent or consultant to aid them navigate the application process. We are required in these cases to consider whether a third party has engaged in fraud, supplied false documents and sought to conduct litigation in this Tribunal.

414. We observe the following links between these cases where, as observed at the outset of our judgment, the families are unknown to each other and portray themselves to this Tribunal as litigants in person:

i. The cases are all linked by the understanding of, and references to, domestic case law in their grounds of claim.

ii. The cases are all linked by the formatting anomaly of a comma being consistently used in place of an apostrophe in grounds of claim and other correspondence.

iii. The cases are all linked by the applications for fee remission under the Help with Fees scheme when the applicant’s individual case is that they have sufficient savings to meet the relevant visitor requirements and the identified sums are greater than the maximum permitted under the scheme.

iv. The applicants in Atteq and Habib are linked by their reliance upon letters purportedly issued by Mr Naresh Joshi, Consultant Oculoplastic Surgeon, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital.

v. The applicants in Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Ishaq, Mansoor, and Shakil are linked by the word ‘humanitarian’ being misspelt in their VAFs.

vi. The applicants in Basharat Ahmad, Mushtaq, and Suleman are linked by similarity when detailing in their VAFs the main purpose of their visit to the United Kingdom.

vii. The applicants in Zahid Ahmad and Shakil are linked by the false certification of their sponsorship undertakings.

viii. The applicants in Basharat Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil, and Suleman are linked by their reliance upon a property valuation report issued by the Department of Land and Revenue, Pakistan, and attested by Ghulam Mustafa Anjum.

ix. The applicants in Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, Habib, Ishaq, Mansoor, Shakil, and Suleman are linked by the handwriting on the sponsorship undertakings filed in their cases.

x. The applicants in Basharat Ahmad and Mushtaq are linked by the handwriting on the sponsorship undertakings filed in their cases.

xi. The applicants in Basharat Ahmad, Zahid Ahmad, Mansoor, Mushtaq, Shakil and Suleman are linked by their reliance upon Ffrees statements purportedly belonging to their sponsors.

xii. The applicants in Atteq, Habib, Mansoor, Mushtaq, and Suleman are linked by their reliance upon title register summaries that did not correspond with the home address identified as belonging to their sponsor.

xiii. All the applicants save for the mother and daughter in Ahsan are linked by their sponsors being the victims, or probable victims, of identity theft.

415. We have found that in each of these cases, the applicants were aided by a third party who was adept at recycling genuine documents belonging to others, manufacturing false documents and manipulating documents as well as controlling email addresses and telephone numbers to advance the deception that the applicants were related to the deceased and their sponsor when seeking to visit this country. The organisation of a third party was such that it could provide the applicants in Basharat Ahmad with a copy of a United Kingdom passport matching the surname of a person whose death was registered in this country two days before they made their entry clearance application. We consider this a clear indication of a third party linked to organised immigration crime being behind these fraudulent applications. We accept that in Ahsan the applicants were unaware that their trust in ‘Firooze’ was misplaced.

416. The respondent has filed evidence in relation to the applicants’ engagement with a third party. We have considered this evidence with care.

417. Following the draft consent order being approved by the Upper Tribunal in Atteq, the applicants sought their costs. On 24 February 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an email via muhammadatteq37@gmail.com requesting that Mr Atteq be provided with “the bill of costs accordingly”. An undated bill of costs was subsequently served on the respondent stating that the applicants sought their costs for instructing a barrister with fourteen years’ experience. The barrister was unnamed and remains so to this day. We find that there was no barrister instructed to aid the applicants. The applicants, or a third party, were seeking legal costs for instructing a barrister that were never incurred. The costs sought were identified as follows:

‘1-Preparing the pre-action protocol draft grounds and correspondence with the SSHD, sum of cost GBP-£600.

2-File the Judicial Review application in the Upper Tribunal, sum of costs GBP-£1000.

3-Court fee regarding Judicial Review application – GBP-169.00

4-Permission was refused on papers and applied for the Oral Hearing – sum of costs GBP-1400 & paid a court fee of GBP-424.00 as well.

5-After permission was granted a further court fee was paid for substantive hearing GBP-385.00

6-Final Settlement correspondence with the Government Legal Department, and the submission application for a default hearing correspondence with the Upper Tribunal, sum of costs GBP-2000.00.

Total amount “GBP 5978”’

418. In respect of the claim cited above, we observe that though the original application fee of £169 was paid when filing the UTIAC1, the application fee for filing the UTIAC11 was remitted following submission of a form EX160.

419. On 15 May 2025, Ms Keeting wrote to muhammadatteq37@gmail.com seeking clarity as to who Mr Atteq’s legal representative was. A response was received that day from the same email address:

“No I would not be able to provide invoices from the legal representative as it was privately hired, you can just proceed to pay the JR application fees of £978 to the account that I provided in a previous email.:

420. We note the primary focus of this correspondence was to secure repayment of the application fees.

421. On the same day, a communication from muhammadatteq37@gmail.com provided an account number and sort code for a Monzo bank account held in the name of ‘Muhammad Farhan Munir’ and requested that the payment of the application fees be reimbursed to that account. The account was held in the United Kingdom.

422. Ms Keeting queried via email correspondence why the sought-for costs were to be paid to this account. She was advised by a further email that it was held in the name of Mr Atteq’s ‘nephew’. On the same day, Ms Keeting was contacted by Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir via the email account munirfarhan67@gmail.com. Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir provided a United Kingdom telephone number ending 22166. Ms Keeting requested that Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir confirm his identity. In reply, Ms Keeting received a copy of Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s passport issued by the Pakistan authorities. The passport number ends 0454. On the biographical data page, he is recorded as having been born in Rawalpindi. His father is recorded as ‘Muhammad Munir Janjua’. Also provided was a Council Tax account document issued by Basingstoke and Deane local authority on 4 December 2024 for a property in the name of ‘Mr Muhammad Munir’ located in Basingstoke.

423. A search was undertaken by the respondent and historic VAFs were located for both Muhammad Farhan Munir and Muhammad Munir Janjua.

424. Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s VAF is dated 14 September 2024 and was made in relation to an application in respect of a European Union Family Permit. His email address is recorded on the VAF as munirfarhan67@gmail.com and he provided a Pakistan telephone number ending 78970. His passport number ends 0454. Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua and Mrs Noreen Fatima are recorded as his parents. His partner was identified as a Romanian national and her contact email address is recorded as naeemshoukat821@gmail.com. We observe that ‘Naeem Shoukat” is not her name. Her United Kingdom contact telephone number ends 74913. We have no evidence before us that this Romanian national is engaged in the activities of a third party in these proceedings, or indeed whether she was, or is, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s partner.

425. Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s home address is recorded as being in Islamabad. The same address is recorded in her UTIAC1 by the applicant in Suleman as her home address. We note that Mrs Suleman provided a different home address in her VAF, which was identified as being situated in Rawalpindi.

426. Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua’s VAF was submitted on 9 February 2018 and concerned an application for a multiple visit visa. He confirmed seven visits to the United Kingdom during the previous decade. The form details the same date of birth as identified in his son’s VAF and Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua records his place of birth as Rawalpindi. His email address is recorded as babarmunirj@gmail.com and his Pakistan telephone number ends 06673. His wife is named as Mrs Noreen Fatima, and her date of birth is the same as recorded by Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir on his VAF. Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua names five children on his VAF including Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, with the same date of birth as recorded in Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s passport. He also named Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir and Mr Muhammad Badar Munir as his sons.

427. We observe that in Zahid Ahmad a Bank AL Habib Limited bank statement in the name of Mr Zahid Ahmad was filed, with a ‘rental payment’ on 2 April 2024 in the sum of PKR 1,00,000 (then £285) to a joint account in the name of ‘Muhammad Munir Janjua and Nore’. No further ‘rental payment’ is made over the next five months. We observe that ‘Nore’ is at the end of the reference line with no further space available to enter any additional letters or numbers. On balance, we find that the payment was to an account held by Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua and Mrs Noreen Fatima.

428. In a VAF submitted for a visitor’s visa on 28 October 2022, Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua details his email address as munirj2013@gmail.com and his contact number ending 78970. This email address is attributed to the sponsors in Zahid Ahmad and Shakil as well as being the email address recorded for Mrs Barasukiene on her Ffrees statement in the case of Mansoor.

429. The same telephone number ending 78970 was provided by Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir in his VAF dated 14 September 2024.

430. The respondent has filed records with this Tribunal concerned with a previous internal finding of misrepresentation involving Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua, recorded by the Visa Section in Abu Dhabi in March 2018. The record shows that Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua submitted documents in support of an application that were inconsistent and misleading. Concerns included the sponsor’s signature on a sponsorship undertaking not matching the signature on their United Kingdom passport, that the sponsor resided at an address in a different town to that recorded on the sponsorship undertaking, that phone calls to the sponsor’s telephone to undertake a sponsor interview went unanswered, and that the purported relationship with the sponsor did not exist upon further investigation. The Visa Section concluded in writing:

“Based on all of the above, I conclude that misrepresentations have been made in support of this visa application (and this has been confirmed to a higher degree of probability by the appropriate source).”

431. The application fee in Atteq was paid by Lloyds Bank transfer from an account in the name of ‘Muhammad Munir’. The respondent’s records confirm that Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir and Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua were not present in the United Kingdom at the relevant time. Another son, Mr Muhammad Badar Munir, was in this country, having previously entered the United Kingdom on a student visa and later securing status under the EU Settlement Scheme until 2027 consequent to a relationship with a Romanian national. The respondent has filed Mr Muhammad Badar Munir’s VAF seeking entry clearance as a student submitted on 26 July 2021 where he names his parents as Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua and Mrs Noreen Fatima.

432. A photograph of the family home was filed in Mushtaq. Visible in the photograph is the label ‘mfaizanmunir@gmail.com’ and the sender of the photograph is identified as ‘Faizan’. We consider it more probable than not that the photograph was sent by Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir.

433. The respondent has filed an English language Facebook business page managed by Globe Path. The business is advertised as being based in Rawalpindi. In August 2025, the respondent printed a copy of this Facebook business page, by which time it had 5,200 followers. It reads:

“Our mission is to simplify your journey, providing expert guidance and personalised support every step of the way.

Our service:

Student Visa Application
Visa Refusal Case Analysis
Judicial Review
English Test Preparation
Documents Preparation
Visa Application Assistance”

434. We observe the reference to ‘Judicial Review’ as a service offered by the firm. It being placed on an English language business page is more likely to mean that Globe Path will engage for a fee in judicial review proceedings brought in this country.

435. The firm’s address is Office 2, Block 4, Bahria Square Commercial Lane 2, Bahria Phase 7, Rawalpindi and details a United Kingdom telephone number ending 74913.

436. Placed on the page were images of the sealed Orders in Ishaq and Mushtaq with a telephone number overlaid corresponding with the telephone number ending 74913. This is the number provided by Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir as belonging to his Romanian partner in his VAF submitted in September 2024.

437. The approved consent order in Ishaq was uploaded onto its Facebook business page by Globe Path on 4 April 2025, accompanied by a comment:

“Exciting news from Chiniot

Success Story Alert

One of our valued clients faced a UK visit visa refusal but didn’t give up hope. They reached out to us at GlobePath Immigration Consultants Islamabad, and our expert legal team guided them. After thorough analysis and a strategic Judicial Review application, we’re thrilled to announce that the Home Office has now withdrawn its refusal in favour of a reconsideration and it’s a Big success for our legal team !!!

This success story proves that with the right support and expertise, challenges can turn into triumphs!

Don’t miss out – let us help you achieve your immigration goals too.

Call us

[...] 74913.”

438. We observe both the identification of a second office operated by Globe Path in Islamabad and the repeated reference to the United Kingdom telephone number ending 74913.

439. On 18 May 2025, Globe Path uploaded the approved consent order in Mushtaq on its Facebook page, again with a comment:

“Another Milestone Achieved

A Second Chance for Sumaira

Sumaira Mushtaq has fought long and hard for her future in the UK. Represented by GlobePath Immigration Consultants, she challenged a decision by the Home Department through a judicial review.

On 2 May 2025, a pivotal moment arrived. Legal Officer Krupa Gupta from the Upper Tribunal Immigration & Asylum Chamber signed a Consent Order, marking a turning point. The Home Department agreed to reconsider their decision made on 23 February 2025 – an unexpected win for Sumaira.

Results

With the government’s legal team acknowledging the need for review, Sumaira withdrew her claim. No legal costs were imposed.

It wasn’t a courtroom battle won – but a door reopened. For Sumaira, it meant hope. And for many like her, a reminder that justice sometimes begins with persistence and the right allies.

GlobePath had delivered more than legal help – they delivered a lifeline.”

440. We observe our finding that the applications advanced in Ishaq and Mushtaq were wholly founded upon false documents, with Mr and Mrs Khan’s documents being used in Ishaq.

441. Having noted the respondent’s stated concern as to the activity of Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir and Mr Muhammad Badar Munir, the Upper Tribunal issued directions on 11 September 2025 permitting these four men to write to it, if they wished, and explain whether they have been involved in some or all of these applications and proceedings before the Tribunal. The email was sent to the known email addresses of the applicants and sponsors.

442. By the preamble to its directions, the Tribunal identified concern that acts may have been undertaken in respect of some or all of the cases that constituted criminal offences under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to the United Kingdom) and/or conspiracy in respect of section 25 of the 1971 Act and/or section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 (fraud) and/or section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (conspiracy to commit fraud).

443. Additionally, the Upper Tribunal noted its concern that various email accounts said to belong to the applicants may be controlled jointly or severally by Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir and Mr Muhammad Badar Munir. These persons were also informed that the Tribunal would consider in these proceedings whether Globe Path is controlled by them jointly or severally.

444. There was no response any of the four men by the directed time of 16.00 (United Kingdom time) on 16 September 2025. No response has been received to date.

445. In respect of these directions, concerned with members of the Munir family, the Upper Tribunal received responses from applicants in all ten cohorts.

446. In an email sent from sulemanwasima@gmail.com on 13 September 2025 Mrs Suleman stated:

“I don’t know this organisation or the stated people.”

447. On the same day, an email sent from zahidahmadpak3@gmail.com provided Mr Zahid Ahmad’s view:

“I have confirmed to you on 16th August that all my application and other processes were done by the Mirpur Visa Consultant, as you stated the other few names now which I have no direct or indirect contact with these people, I have never heard about this firm or the person names before.’

448. The following day, by an email sent from ba1881239@gmail.com the Upper Tribunal was informed by Mr Basharat Ahmad:

“I have no link with this consultant or the persons at all.”

449. On 15 September 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an email from abidaishaq27@gmail.com attached to which was an affidavit of Mrs Ishaq dated the same day and ‘identified’ by Muhammad Akhtar, Advocate High Court, General Secretary Bar Association (Rabwah) Chenab Nagar. Mrs Ishaq confirmed, “That I do not know the names and I am also not a client of the firm as mentioned”. As observed above, the Facebook business page of Globe Path confirmed on 4 April 2025 that the applicants in Ishaq are clients of the firm, and a copy of the approved consent order was exhibited. We conclude that the affidavit is a false document, as is the lawyer’s signature and the stamp purporting to have been applied by a lawyer. The email is a crude and ineffective effort to deflect away from Globe Path’s own stated position.

450. The Upper Tribunal received an email from muhammadatteq37@gmail.com on 15 September 2025, in which Mr Atteq stated:

“I am living far away from this city so this firm or the stated people are not handling my application anyway and I am not associated with them.”

451. On 15 September 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an unsigned email from waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com:

“This firm or the personalities, I do not recognise them.”

452. On 16 September 2025, an email was received from attiatulh42@gmail.com.com in which Mrs Habib confirmed:

“Neither this firm nor these names, Noman Bhatti of 5 star consultants Lahore is handling my all case.”

453. On the same day, Mrs Ahsan confirmed via ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com:

“My Uk sponsors also attended the court, our case is dealing a different person, these Firm or names are not known by us.”

454. The person(s) controlling the email address ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com were unaware, having not attended the hearing, that Mrs Khan informed the panel that her sister communicates by WhatsApp and not by email.

455. An email was received from hanifahmadali1981@gmail.com on 16 September 2025. This is said to be Mrs Mushtaq’s email address. The display name on the email is “Hanif Ahmad”. The email simply states:

“Thank you for your email.”

456. Attached to the email is a letter signed by Mrs Mushtaq. We observe that the English signature is the same as that placed on the draft consent order, but Mrs Mushtaq’s passport signature is in Urdu script. The letter states:

“It is stated that I received an email from the tribunal in which there was a firm mentioned with name Globepath Immigration Consultants and address is also mentioned. The Honourable Judge has also mentioned few names as well. I want to clarify the honourable Judge that I don’t know the firm mentioned above and I don’t know the anyone of the persons mentioned. I am handling my email myself. I hope this identification will be considered by the honourable Judge. If you need any further information, kindly do not hestitate to contact me.”

457. The English language Facebook page of Globe Path confirms that the applicants in Mushtaq are clients of the firm.

458. Returning to the email sent from waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com. This was the only response the Upper Tribunal received from an email address purportedly belonging to a sponsor. We note the display name for this email address is “Waqas Ahmad”, a name unrelated to anyone involved in Mansoor. This email address was recorded in Mrs Mansoor’s VAF as belonging to both the sponsor, Mrs Barauskiene, and herself. Mrs Barauskiene has since been in email communication with the Upper Tribunal using a different email address and denies knowing Mrs Mansoor and her family. We observe that in her UTIAC1 a different email address was provided by Mrs Mansoor, namely munir2013@gmail.com. We conclude that the probable intention of a third party was for all the ‘applicants’ to deny knowledge of Globe Path, and the optics in responding by an email incorporating the name ‘Munir’ was noted. We are satisfied to the requisite standard that a third party sought to portray the email from waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com as being sent by Mrs Mansoor, though using her purported sponsor’s email address.

459. We observe that each lead applicant sent a response seeking to distance both Globe Path as well as identified members of the Munir family from these proceedings, whilst save for applicants in Atteq and Zahid Ahmad seeking adjournments, none had engaged in seeking to establish the genuineness of their own cases when requested to do so by this Tribunal.

460. When considering whether the respondent has identified a third party controlling the claims before us, we apply the civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities.

461. Globe Path has publicly confirmed that it conducted judicial review litigation in Ishaq and Mushtaq. The United Kingdom phone number placed over the sealed approved consent orders on the firm’s Facebook business page is that attributed by Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir to his Romanian partner on a previously submitted VAF. We have identified the significant links between all these cases in the body of our decision. We conclude that each case was, and remains, controlled by Globe Path.

462. The applicants’ engagement in these proceedings was significantly heightened when the Upper Tribunal requested Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir, Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir and Mr Muhammad Badar Munir to engage and explain both their and Globe Path’s involvement in these proceedings. We observe the speed with which the applicants denied the involvement of various members of the Munir family. We also note the content of the email sent by Mr Zahid Ahmad on 16 August 2025 where he referenced victims would be given “their email addresses and passwords” in the next few days. Up until that time, the respondent had not raised the issue of emails being controlled by persons other than the applicants. We consider it significant that at this time, effort was undertaken in Zahid Ahmad to identify the true third party as Mr Syed Kamran Haider, chief executive of Mirpur Visa Consultant, who was said to be using similar means to secure entry to the United Kingdom such as falsifying documents and providing false documents. Since then, effort has been made to bring Mr Noman Bhatti of 5 Star Consultants, Lahore, under this panel’s scrutiny.

463. Considering the evidence in the round, we find that members of the Munir family have significant interest in Globe Path. We find it probable that it is a firm run by members of the Munir family as directors. It is striking that when Ms Keeting served evidence on behalf of the respondent identifying two sealed Orders on the firm’s Facebook business page, the page was shut down in a matter of hours. This is strong evidence of Globe Path, a firm assisting in visa applications and offering services in judicial review, being in third party control of the email addresses said to belong to all the lead applicants, upon whom the evidence was served. We find that the firm does control these email addresses. We also note that Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir engaged directly with Ms Keeting when seeking costs in Attaq, providing his own bank details.

464. We observe the similarity of information recorded on different documents, such as Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir’s home address in Islamabad also being recorded as Mrs Suleman’s home address on her UTIAC1 and one of Mr Muhamad Munir Janjua’s email address being the same as two sponsors in cases before us. Mr Muhamad Munir Janjua’s bank details are recorded in Mr Zahid Ahmad’s bank statement. We note Mr Muhamad Munir Janjua’s previous history of misrepresentation where he adopted similar tactics to those identified in these cases.

465. The respondent has confirmed that Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua, Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir and Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir were not recorded as being in this country at the times when UTIAC application fees were paid. The pay references identify the payee as ‘Mohammad Munir’ and ‘M Munir’. Two separate bank accounts were used, neither being a Monzo account. The respondent has confirmed from her records that Mr Muhammad Badar Munir was present in this country at the relevant time. We find on the evidence before us that Mr Muhammad Badar Munir is the son of Mr Muhamad Munir Janjua and the older brother of Mr Muhammad Farhan Munir. We conclude it probable that he paid these fees from his account and he worked for the family firm on these cases whilst present in the United Kingdom.

466. Mr Muhammad Faizan Munir’s visible presence is more limited. However, he is named in a false document before us. We find it probable that he too is engaged in working with the family firm.

467. We find that Globe Path is the third party controlling these claims. We further find that the use of identity theft, deception, providing false documents, falsifying paperwork and manipulating genuine documents belonging to others so as to dishonestly benefit applicants has been undertaken by the firm.

468. We have identified five separate models operated by Globe Path in these cases which relate to visa applications to enter the United Kingdom, though we acknowledge there may be others:

i. The “sell on” or “conditional fee agreement” model – a genuine client provides genuine United Kingdom-issued documents. A reduced conditional fee agreement attracts the client, and upon receiving the documents they are sold on to someone else wishing to make an application. Genuine United Kingdom documents have a high worth in immigration matters where someone is intent on using deception to secure entry clearance, particularly where the documents have been provided elsewhere in good faith and not recorded as stolen.

This model is identified in Ahsan.

ii. The “genuine overseas document(s)” model – a client will pay a significant fee for a third party to provide them with genuine foreign documents belonging to others that raise the likelihood of a visa application succeeding.

Identified in Ishaq.

iii. The “blended” model - a client will pay for either genuine documents belonging to another Pakistani national or false documents produced by a third party to be added to their own genuine documents to increase the chances of a visa application succeeding.

Identified in Basharat Ahmad, Zahid Ahmad, and Atteq.

iv. The “false personal circumstances” model - a client will pay for assistance in making a visa application combining genuine documents belonging to another Pakistani national who has the personal circumstances suitable for a successful entry clearance application coupled with false documents produced by a third party.

Identified in Habib, Mansoor, and Shakil.

v. The “entirely false documents” model - a client will pay for assistance in making a visa application entirely based upon false documents produced by a third party.

Identified in Mushtaq and Suleman.

469. We find it is more likely than not that Globe Path has adopted a similar business approach to that expressed by Mr Syed Kamran Haider to an undercover journalist as it is unlikely that Mr Haider would adopt a more generous approach than his competitors. If a visa application is unsuccessful, the charged, and inflated, fee will be refunded save for the application fee, the likely significant cost of securing false documents or genuine documents from others and previously identified agreed fees. We also observe that success likely encourages approaches from new clients and note that ‘Firooze’ was recommended to Mrs Ahsan’s husband. Consequently, there is a financial incentive for Globe Path to successfully secure a visa for their client.

470. The identified models are themselves subject to capricious decisions made by Globe Path. As we have noted in Ahsan, an applicant may wish to make a visa application on a genuine basis, but a decision was made by the firm in that matter to convert it without authority into a false “bereaved relative” application. We find that in order to try to make money from both sides of the transaction, and having sold on Mr and Mrs Khan’s genuine documents, false documents were added to Mrs Ahsan’s visa application in the hope that it would be successful and a conditional fee of PKR 5,00,000 (then £1,440) be secured rather than simply the cost of the application fee. It is clear that genuine clients using Globe Path may find themselves unknowingly relying upon deception and/or false documents that fall foul of Part Suitability to the Rules, particularly paragraphs SUI 9.1 and SUI 10.1, and consequently they may face a ten-year bar on future applications for entry clearance to the United Kingdom.

471. Mrs Khan’s evidence provides an insight into Globe Path’s working practices. We find that ‘Firooze’, who engaged with Mrs Ahsan, works with the firm. ‘Firooze’ may be an independent agent selling on documents of value, or he may be an employee of the firm. He may be a member of the Munir family. It is sufficient for our consideration that he works with the firm. He, and others he works with, may never meet their clients in person as the working practice is for discussion to be undertaken by telephone or video call apps and valuable documents are sent by messaging app, such as WhatsApp. By this means, Globe Path can have clients residing anywhere in Pakistan, as well as advertise to potential clients in the United Kingdom, for example to those who may be willing to fund entry clearance applications for family members.

472. We consider this fraudulent business machine to be well-oiled. Death certificates are secured within days for use in entry clearance applications. On balance we consider this to probably involve someone present in the United Kingdom with connections to Mosques where death announcements are made after prayers, and the Salat al-Janazah performed. Whilst the deaths may become known sometime later in Pakistan, we consider the speed of securing death certificates to more likely than not establish someone as being active in this country and using the General Register Office priority service to secure a genuine death certificate which can then be forwarded to Pakistan by messaging app. Such steps permitted the applications in Basharat Ahmad and Zahid Ahmad to be made two days after the registration of Mr Akram’s and Mr Ali’s deaths, and for the applications in Ishaq and Shakil to be made three days after the deaths of Mr Amad and Mrs Bibi.

473. The costs incurred by clients are likely to be significant. The visa application fee itself was at the relevant time in the region of £120. We take judicial note that in 2025 the average Pakistan monthly wage was in the region of PKR 39,000 (then approximately £100) according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics Labour Force Survey 2025. Mrs Khan considered the conditional fee sum of PKR 5,00,000 (then £1,440) agreed with her sister to be “too little money for the work”, though the real value to a third party in Mrs Ahsan’s matter was in the financial value of the documents Mrs Khan sent to them. The Telegraph investigation into Mr Syed Kamran Haider identified £10,300 as being the minimum sum required to secure a United Kingdom visa. The business models identified above will likely have sliding scales of charges. We consider that there is potential for considerable profit to be made by unscrupulous persons.

474. We have observed a nuanced change to the approach adopted by Globe Path. UTIAC1s initially filed in Atteq and Habib were accompanied by the payment of an application fee. We have found that the fees were paid by Mr Muhammad Badar Munir on behalf of the firm. These fees have not to date been repaid. Consequently, it became understood by the firm that application fees would likely be a drain on profit even if a consent order was secured and approved by the Upper Tribunal. After filing the UTIAC1 in Habib, the firm progressed to making fraudulent fee remission applications under the Help with Fees schemes, declaring a lack of savings wholly inconsistent with the applicant’s case at the visa application stage. We have no doubt that the adoption of this approach was to avoid the significant outlay judicial review proceedings require in Pakistani financial terms.

475. The constant search by the firm for additional profit, akin to squeezing the pips of a lemon, is exemplified by the seeking of costs in the sum of £5,978 in Atteq. Save for the application fee of £169, none of the rest of the costs sought was genuinely incurred.

476. We have found that as a third party, Globe Path, exercises significant control over applications and subsequent judicial review claims. Their control is such that over time no true contact details are provided for the applicants and sponsor save for the applicants’ passports and biometric details which must be provided with the entry clearance application. We have found that false home addresses have been provided in several cases. Whether this is because from the outset the applicants want to overstay in the United Kingdom if they are successful in securing entry clearance and do not wish for the authorities to know where they hail from in Pakistan, or there is another reason, is not a matter for us to decide in these proceedings.

477. The use of false documents is, we conclude, predicated upon the respondent only intensively checking documents in a small number of applications. We observe that Mr Muhammad Munir Janjua may well have learnt the benefit of controlling the narrative when an earlier visa application made by him was refused as the respondent could not contact his sponsor by phone for an interview.

478. Globe Path openly confirms by comment on its Facebook business page that it had conduct of the judicial review proceedings in the United Kingdom in the cases of Ishaq and Mushtaq. Rule 11(5A) of the 2008 Procedure Rules requires that a representative in judicial review proceedings in the Upper Tribunal must be authorised under the Legal Services Act 2007 to conduct litigation in the High Court of England and Wales. Globe Path is not authorised under the Act.

M. Decision

479. We firstly address two important findings of fact and related law relevant to all twelve cases.

i. UTIAC1: Statement of Truth

480. The multiplicity of ‘applicant’ signatures signed by people other than the applicant in each case, as well as Mrs Khan’s evidence that her sister, Mrs Ahsan, was entirely unaware that public law proceedings had been brought in her name, lead us to conclusively find that none of the statements of truth completed in the various UTIAC forms were signed by the applicants. They are forged signatures, falsely imitating what is purported to be the applicant’s signature.

481. It is a mandatory requirement that a UTIAC1 be verified by a statement of truth, and the statement of truth must be signed by the party or litigation friend, or the legal representative on behalf of the party or litigation friend. The importance of the mandatory requirement that a statement of truth be signed on a UTIAC1 cannot be underestimated: it is no empty formality as is evident from the fact that a false statement can give rise to liability for contempt of court.

482. The requirement for a signed statement of truth serves an important purpose; it eliminates claims where the party has no honest belief in the case. It is underpinned by possible criminal sanction. Making a false statement may be considered an attempt to interfere with the course of justice, which is a public wrong and is punishable by a prison sentence of up to two years under section 14(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The deliberate or reckless making of a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth, to which the criminal standard is applied, will usually be so inherently serious that nothing other than an order for committal to prison would be sufficient: George Eliot Hospital NHS Trust v Elder [2019] EWHC 1813 (QB), at paragraph 47.

483. If a party is required to certify their belief in the accuracy and truth of the matters put forward, the statement of case is less likely to include assertions that are speculative and fanciful. It discourages claims that are not supported by evidence, and which are brought in the hope that some evidence may be forthcoming through disclosure. Additionally, it aids this Tribunal by its effect of tying a party to the facts they have pleaded and so encourages them to set out their definitive case from the outset.

484. Underpinning these reasons is the confirmation that the matters put forward are accurate and true. The essence of the public law challenge ultimately rests upon such confirmation being genuinely held by the applicant.

485. Case management powers permit potential ways around the absence of a signed statement of truth accompanying a claim form, which is not valid until signed, such as an application for relief from sanctions.

486. A forged signature represents a more serious situation than a simple omission. It constitutes an interference, or an attempted interference, with the administration of justice.

487. We emphasise the gravity of making false statements verified by statements of truth. Justice depends upon openness, transparency and above all upon honesty. It is seriously damaged by untruthful claims that place a burden of analysis upon a court or tribunal. We are clear that because this form of contempt of court undermines the administration of justice, it is always serious, even if the falsity of the relevant statement is identified at an early stage and does not, in the end, affect the outcome of the litigation.

488. We find that the forged signatures on all twelve UTIAC1 in these matters are an abuse of process. They advance a contention of fact by persons who are not the applicants, nor legal representatives permitted to undertake public law litigation in this Chamber, that is known by the person or persons signing the form to be false.

ii. Are the applicants aware of their public law proceedings in this Tribunal?

489. It is inherent in public law proceedings that an applicant wishes to undertake a review of the lawfulness of a decision or act of a public body. Those applicants who lack capacity will have a litigation friend to conduct proceedings on their behalf: see R (JS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKUT 64 (IAC), [2019] Imm AR 618.

490. It is inimical for an applicant to have no interest in proceedings.

491. Where proceedings have been brought purportedly on a person’s behalf but without their authority or knowledge, and without being communicated to them, orders in those proceedings should not be enforceable against that person. This principle reflects the fundamental requirement that a party or their litigation friend must have authorised litigation to be bound by it.

492. We have considered with care whether all twenty-seven applicants were aware of these proceedings at the outset. We have already found that Mrs Ahsan was not as we have accepted Mrs Khan’s evidence on this point. Mrs Ahsan only became aware when the Upper Tribunal contacted her sister, and she has taken no step to rely upon the claim advanced in her name. We note the evidence filed establishing the approved consent orders in Ishaq and Mushtaq having been uploaded on Globe Path’s Facebook business page. This may suggest that the applicants in Ishaq and Mushtaq are aware of their public law claims in this Chamber. However, the Facebook business page is in English, and a United Kingdom contact telephone number is provided. We consider that the business page is much more likely than not to be an internet marketing device primarily designed to attract new clients from the United Kingdom who have relatives in Pakistan considering making an entry clearance application. We were not provided with a copy of the entire business page, and so are unaware as to whether the approved consent orders in the cases of Zahid Ahmad, Ahsan, Atteq, and Suleman have been uploaded on it. We will not speculate either way. There is no evidence before us as to which, if any, of the applicants speak English and so we accept, on balance, that the applicants in Ishaq and Mushtaq are unaware that the orders in their cases have been placed on the business page. We have found that all the claims are being conducted by a third party, the home addresses for several applicants are false, and each case evidences the use of false documents and/or the use of documents belonging to others.

493. On balance, and being mindful of Mrs Khan’s evidence, we conclude that all the applicants were unaware as to public law challenges being filed in their name with this Chamber, and that all but the applicants in Ahsan remain unaware. In reaching this conclusion we observe the level of control Globe Path have exercised in these proceedings, which is such that in all bar one instance no true telephone number or email address has been provided. Any effort to check documents and information through these contact details would be met by a director, representative, agent or servant of Globe Path. Having refined its modus operandi since filing the claims in Atteq and Habib, particularly by fraudulent use of the Help with Fees scheme, the abusive use of judicial review proceedings without the need to pay attendant Tribunal fees has resulted in Globe Path enjoying a second roll of the dice with minimal additional costs that are primarily limited to those incurred in completing forms and filling in template grounds of claim. Globe Path has acted in such manner for financial benefit as it seeks ultimately to secure its full fee. It has deliberately not informed the applicants because it does not wish its clients to know that their entry clearance application has been refused, as established in Ahsan. We are fortified in our conclusion by the fact that if the applicants were genuinely engaged in these proceedings, there would be consistency in signatures on the various UTIAC forms and draft consent orders filed in each case. There is not. For completeness, we note that Mrs Ishaq’s ‘signature’ on her UTIAC1 significantly differs from that on the approved consent order. The same is also observed in respect of Mrs Mushtaq. In each case we conclude that more than one person has signed the documents.

494. This panel is therefore faced with twenty-five applicants who are not only unaware that there was a hearing before us but are entirely unaware of these proceedings. The remaining two applicants have not sought to rely on ‘their’ proceedings; they expressly deny core factual contentions advanced in their claim. We find that there have been deliberate, regular and long-running efforts by Globe Path to undermine the administration of justice.

Nullity

495. Judicial review is highly pragmatic because of the two-stage process incorporating the requirement of the permission stage, which safeguards public authorities by deterring or eliminating clearly ill-founded claims without the need for a full hearing, and provides a mechanism for the efficient management of the Upper Tribunal's judicial review caseload. Defects such as an unintentional failure to sign a statement of truth may be remedied by application. In practical terms, procedural rigour can be exercised by refusing permission to deal with defective proceedings or, where appropriate, exercising strike out.

496. A question arises as to whether in these exceptional circumstances the proceedings before this Tribunal are a nullity, being fundamentally invalid from the outset. Whilst the concept of nullity is well-established in relation to decisions challenged through judicial review, its application to the proceedings themselves is far more restricted, arising where there are fundamental defects affecting jurisdiction or, relevant in these matters, compliance with essential procedural requirements.

497. Lord Bingham said as to nullity in Seal v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2007] UKHL 31, [2007] 1 WLR 1910, at paragraph 7:

“7. The important question is whether, in requiring a particular condition to be satisfied before proceedings are brought, Parliament intended to confer a substantial protection on the putative defendant, such as to invalidate proceedings brought without meeting the condition, or to impose a procedural requirement giving rights to the defendant if a claimant should fail to comply with the requirement, but not nullifying the proceedings: see R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340, para 23. To answer this question a broader inquiry is called for.”

498. When considering the consequence of non-compliance with a procedural requirement, we assess the language of the relevant Rule against the factual circumstances.

499. Rule 28(1) of the 2008 Procedure Rules establishes that “a person” who seeks permission to bring judicial review proceedings “must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal for such permission”. Whilst “a person” is not defined in rule 2, we observe that the same rule defines “applicant” as “a person who applies for permission to bring, or does bring, judicial review proceedings before the Upper Tribunal”.

500. We have found that save for mother and daughter in Ahsan the applicants have no knowledge of these proceedings. Without knowledge of proceedings, a party cannot meaningfully exercise their right to participate in the legal process and present their case. Knowledge is essential for meaningful participation. The requirement serves both to protect individual rights and to ensure the legitimacy and fairness of judicial decisions. Where a person is personally unaware that they are an applicant in judicial review proceedings, this is likely to constitute something more fundamental than a mere procedural defect. However, it does not automatically constitute the required jurisdictional error for nullity in the narrow sense, because the defect may be cured by the party’s retrospective authorisation and if such step is not taken proceedings can be struck out.

501. The very unusual circumstances arising in these cases amount to more than an abuse of the process of the tribunal, as may arise in respect of solicitors issuing proceedings in the name of a person who has not given them authority to do so: see Adams v Ford [2012] 1 WLR 3211, per Toulson LJ at [39]. A striking factor in these proceedings is that the identity of each applicant was used by a third party, Globe Path, solely for the aim of quashing decisions so as to permit entry clearance applications built upon deception a further and unwarranted chance of success before new decision makers unaware of the substance and nature of falsity. In doing so, we have found that Globe Path deliberately did not inform the applicants of the proceedings. We conclude on balance that underpinning the approach adopted by Globe Path is a drive to ensure it does not lose its full fee if the entry clearance application is ultimately unsuccessful. Save for the applicants’ identity, they were irrelevant to Globe Path’s primary considerations when filing the judicial review claims.

502. We find that Globe Path has a financial interest in bringing these proceedings. We acknowledge that the applicants may ultimately benefit if the challenged decisions are quashed and observe that, bar the applicants in Ahsan, they engaged with a third party with the express intention that deception be used to aid them. However, we consider it more likely than not that the applicants would not themselves wish for their entry clearance applications to be subject to judicial scrutiny. They wish to enter this country, and do not desire the use of deception to be identified. We observe that the applicants in Ahsan have not sought to retrospectively authorise the claim brought in their name as the entry clearance application was not in the terms they requested when securing the services of their consultant.

503. We consider that the applicants having no wish to bring proceedings, even if aware they were commenced, to be of significance and goes to the heart of validity. The claim form is an essential procedural requirement by which a person commences seeking permission to apply for judicial review. Knowledge by a party of their own proceedings is a fundamental requirement in judicial review. Whilst a lack of knowledge may be cured by subsequent application, the lack of authority in these claims is fundamental. The applicants were not aware of, and if they were would not support, the claim brought in their name. They did not, and would not even now, request that permission to proceed be granted at the outset. These claims were effectively brought by a third party whose legal rights were not directly and adversely affected by a public body’s conduct. The claims were brought solely for the financial benefit of a third party, Globe Path.

504. If the proceedings were valid, this Tribunal could consider its power to strike out. However, we consider that these claims fall to be considered as very rare cases where proceedings were invalid from the outset. It is a fundamental requirement that an applicant wish to bring judicial review proceedings, whether by themselves or through a litigation friend. There must be a genuine request for permission to proceed. It is absent in these cases. The jurisdictional requirement of ‘a person’ is not met for the purpose of rule 28(1).

505. We conclude that all twelve cases are a nullity, being invalid from the outset.

506. In any event, it is not just and convenient that the machinery of the Tribunal be made available to a third party with no standing to seek a quashing order and consequently the enforcement of such order against the respondent.

507. Turning to the approved consent orders they remain at this time effective in law despite the proceedings being a nullity and following R (A) v Harrow Crown Court [2003] EWHC 2020 (Admin) they must be obeyed unless and until set aside.

508. We exercise our case management powers under rule 5(3)(a) of the 2008 Procedure Rules and extend time for the respondent to apply to set aside the approved consent orders. We accept that the true extent and nature of the deception used in the six cases was not known to her at the various dates she agreed to the terms of the draft consent order.

509. In Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186) we are mindful that consequent to the quashing of the original decision a new entry clearance decision was made. If we set aside the approved consent order, there will be two existing decisions relating to both father and son. The second decision can be considered to have replaced the first, rendering the initial public law proceedings to be academic. We consider that the finding of nullity goes to the core of the claim which is to be treated as never having validly existed, and consequently relevant practice as to finality of proceedings is not applicable. Consequent to nullity, the order is properly to be set aside.

510. We set aside the approved consent orders in Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186), Ahsan, Atteq, Ishaq, Mushtaq and Suleman as nullity amounts to a procedural irregularity for the purposes of rule 43(2)(d) of the 2008 Procedure Rules and it is in the interests of justice to set aside the orders.

511. If we are in error in concluding that we can set aside under rule 43(2)(d), which we do not consider we are, the Upper Tribunal’s supplementary powers under section 25 of the 2007 Act and in particular section 25(2)(c), establishes that this Tribunal has, dependent on where it is sitting, the same powers, rights, privileges and authority as the High Court in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland, or the Court of Session in Scotland, in relation to all other matters incidental to the Upper Tribunal’s functions. We observe Lane J’s confirmation in R (Watson) (s.94B process; s. 25 powers) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKUT 00156 (IAC) that the only requirement for the application of section 25 is that there must be a free standing function of the Upper Tribunal to which the matter in question is “incidental”. Section 15 of the same Act establishes the Upper Tribunal’s judicial review jurisdiction and so in considering set aside, this Tribunal is exercising a function under the 2007 Act. It is engaged in the process of setting aside a decision made consequent to fraud on the tribunal, and to proceed under section 15 to re-make the permission decision. We therefore enjoy the same power as the High Court to set aside an order effective in law despite proceedings being a nullity.

512. Having set aside the approved consent orders the six cases revert to their previous status in the two-stage process. Permission was granted to the applicants in Atteq. This is a separate order to the approved consent order, and we conclude that it remains in place. It is not a decision that disposes of proceedings, as required by the narrow scope of rule 43(1) of the 2008 Procedural Rules. We consider the incidental power possessed by the Upper Tribunal under section 25 of the 2007 Act. Though the 2008 Procedure Rules do not contain the specific bar preventing defendants from applying to set aside a grant of permission in judicial review proceedings established in the High Court by CPR 54.13, we observe that the Tribunal’s incidental power cannot be greater than the powers enjoyed by the High Court and Court of Session. The statutory provision is clear that the “same powers” are possessed. The CPR has placed a clear restriction which we accept must apply to this Tribunal when exercising its supplementary powers under section 25. This panel does not possess the power to set aside the grant of permission. As the hearing directions confirmed that this panel would proceed consequent to our findings as to deception, this claim is substantively before us.

513. Zahid Ahmad (JR-2024-LON-003186), Ahsan, Ishaq, Mushtaq and Suleman revert to paper considerations. Observing the importance of an expeditious final decision following our findings we convert them into rolled-up hearings.

514. Following the grant of permission, the case of Mansoor is before us substantively. The cases of Habib and Shakil are at the oral permission stage. We convert the remaining two cases brought by the applicants in Zahid Ahmed and the case of Basharat Ahmad into rolled up hearings as to date the applications for permission have not been considered.

515. We refuse the applicants in Habib permission to withdraw the claim consequent to our finding that the proceedings are a nullity. There is no claim to withdraw.

516. We declare that proceedings in all twelve cases before us are a nullity. They have never properly come into existence because of a fundamental defect in an essential procedural requirement.

Costs

517. Any costs order we make in favour of the respondent would be unenforceable as we have found that no applicant is aware that they are parties to these proceedings or having been subsequently informed in Ahsan the applicants have not sought to cure the defect.

518. We make no order as to costs in each case.

N. Additional observations

519. We consider it appropriate to make additional observations that arise from our consideration of these cases.

(1) Draft consent orders

520. Parties are obliged to help the Upper Tribunal to further the overriding objective and to cooperate with the Tribunal generally.

521. If the parties agree about the final order they consider should appropriately be made in the proceedings, this Tribunal may make the order without a hearing if it is satisfied that the order should be made. The parties cannot determine for themselves what order should be made, and this Tribunal will not make an order if it is not in the public interest to do so being mindful of its supervisory function. Party consent therefore does not bind the Tribunal, and the duty of candour extends to the presentation of consent orders.

522. A respondent to proceedings is properly to be mindful when signing a draft consent order that it is indicating agreement that a decision of a public authority should be quashed. This should be a considered decision made by the respondent being mindful that it is requesting the Tribunal to make a prerogative order with its attendant consequences and should not be founded solely upon convenience or related factors.

523. The Tribunal must independently assess whether the proposed order is appropriate and will not simply approve a consent order without scrutiny. However, when undertaking scrutiny, the Tribunal will not have been aided by a forensic examination of the papers at a hearing. It is, therefore, reliant upon parties being confident when filing an agreed draft consent order that the public interest is served by the claim being settled on the proposed terms. Consequently, there is an expectation that a respondent will interrogate an applicant’s case and documents relied upon before agreeing that its own decision be quashed or that it be subject to a mandatory order.

524. In several of the cases before us where an approved consent order was made, the applicant’s bundle is missing core documents filed in the entry clearance application. It may be that the respondent has not discharged the obligations described above. There are obvious concerns, identified in our judgment, as to documents, for example several bank statements filed having different account holder names to an applicant. We consider Mushtaq a good example of this panel’s concern. The entry clearance officer relied upon a Documentation Verification Report confirming that a bank statement relied upon by Mrs Mushtaq was a genuine document, but the account holder was not her husband as asserted. The entry clearance decision of 23 February 2025 expressly relied upon the provision by Mrs Mushtaq of a non-genuine document. The challenge advanced in the grounds of claim is simply detailed as “[t]he respondent’s assertion in this regard is totally baseless and without foundation as the document is genuine.” It is difficult for this panel to understand how the respondent concluded in the face of the limited challenge advanced that the decision should be quashed by consent.

525. Where a conclusion has been reached in a challenged decision that deception or fraud has been exercised, for example by means of false or manipulated documents, and being mindful of the scrutiny to be exercised by the Tribunal, the respondent should consider whether the Tribunal may be assisted by an agreed draft consent order being accompanied by a statement of reasons informing the Tribunal as to the public law reasoning why a decision of a public authority should be quashed. The reasoning, though it may be short, needs to be clear, correct and adequate. When undertaking such consideration, the respondent should be alert to the fact that the Tribunal will scrutinise a draft consent order as to its appropriateness.

(2) Relevant documents

526. This Tribunal has not been aided by incomplete VAFs and the absence of passport biographical data pages being filed in several cases.

527. Rule 28(6)(b) of the 2008 Procedure Rules is mandatory in requiring an applicant to send with the UTIAC1 application “copies of any other documents in the applicant’s possession or control on which the applicant intends to rely.”

528. We consider in a public law entry clearance challenge that a VAF, and if served any accompanying written representations, fall into the category of “documents” identified by rule 28(6)(b). It is the form which commences the underlying application and attendant representations will provide further detail as to its substance. These are documents upon which the applicant must intend to rely in proceedings to evidence both the scope and nature of the application as well as establishing when and how it was submitted. An applicant must file a complete copy of the relevant VAF and accompanying written submissions. If a litigant in person fails to complete this step or only files a partial copy, these documents should be filed by the respondent along with her acknowledgment of service. It is essential that this Tribunal understands how the application for entry clearance was advanced by an applicant.

529. An applicant should file their passport biographical data page in judicial review proceedings challenging entry clearance decisions because it is beneficial to the Upper Tribunal not only as a genuine document establishing identity but it is also a means for a judge to ensure that a person attending an oral hearing conducted remotely is actually the applicant and not a third party. If this page is not filed by a litigant in person, it should be filed by the respondent when filing her acknowledgement of service as she will have been provided with it at an early stage of the entry clearance application.

530. Additionally, if an applicant relied upon passport endorsements in an entry clearance application, an applicant should file the relevant passport biographical data page. If the page is not filed at the outset of proceedings by a litigant in person, it should be provided by the respondent when filing her acknowledgment of service.

(3) Help with Fees scheme

531. We are concerned that inconsistencies between declarations made in Help with Fees applications and financial documents previously submitted in entry clearance applications are not being picked up in the present process adopted for applications under the scheme.

532. We recommend that applications for Help with Fees brought in relation to judicial review proceedings challenging entry clearance applications should be accompanied by up-to-date evidence relating to income and savings for the applicant and any partner in addition to all financial evidence submitted with the entry clearance application. Such requirement permits confidence that fraud is not being conducted in respect of the scheme, and so on the Tribunal.

533. A judge concerned about fraud under the scheme may issue directions and request clarification of an applicant’s financial status. This step provides adequate notice and permits an opportunity for explanation. The issue of whether there has been a fraudulent application under the scheme can be dealt with at any stage of judicial review proceedings.

534. This judgment will be sent to the centre manager at Field House with a request that our concerns as to identified abuse of the Help with Fees Scheme in these proceedings be raised with the HMCTS counter-fraud team.

(4) False / manipulated documents

535. These proceedings are a prime example of increasing use of false and manipulated documents in this Chamber. However, it does not fall upon this Tribunal to examine the bona fides of documents in public law proceedings. Its role is to review not fact find.

536. This Tribunal can properly expect an initial decision maker to interrogate documents relied upon. In entry clearance applications, where there are suspicions as to financial documents, such as bank statements, decision makers can submit a documentation verification request to financial institutions. As established in these proceedings, HM Passport Agency can be contacted to confirm the genuineness of a British passport, and to provide relevant personal details such as the home address of the British passport holder at the time of the passport application. As proved beneficial in our consideration, checks can be made in respect of HM Land Registry documents.

537. Decision makers should properly be alert to the manipulation of digital documents including those from institutions such as banks, financial institutions, employers, local and central government, etc. Manipulation can be undertaken in several ways, including re-writing after downloading or editing photographs of documents. The false HM Land Registry documents filed in these cases are suggestive of the inappropriate use of artificial intelligence.

538. It is open to the respondent to request an original version or download of a document and to examine the information / properties tab which will have details of who created it and when. For example, if the document is a direct download from a banking institution, the institution should show in the properties as the creator or the document. The metadata should show whether the document has been edited and when. If the document was printed, photocopied, scanned to PDF and then emailed by an applicant or a third party before editing, the metadata will show the document as being created by the applicant or a third party, or by whomever the software being used is registered, and importantly detail the date of creation.

539. Additionally, where suspicion arises, a decision maker can scrutinise documents carefully for discrepancies and anomalies which can then properly be placed into the overall assessment when a decision is made.

540. It has taken examination by this panel of documents filed in ten entry clearance applications to identify the substance and nature of deception exercised by a third party. We consider that the respondent is now to be taken as aware that at least one third party, Globe Path, and likely others are being financially rewarded to actively engage in the preparation and use of false and manipulated documents in visitor visa applications and possibly other entry clearance applications.

(5) Contact details entered onto VAF

541. We are concerned that abusive entry clearance applications are using contact email addresses under the control of persons engaged in deception and fraud. The respondent should properly be alert as the extent of control established in these proceedings. We consider that the cases before us are strongly suggestive that the request for an email address and telephone number are increasingly redundant as a means of confidently engaging with a sponsor in respect of an application.

(6) Practice Directions and Practice Statement

542. We conclude that matters arising in these cases and their impact on proceedings in this Chamber may require consideration to be given to amending the Practice Directions as well as the Practice Statement: Immigration Judicial Reviews in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal on or after 1 November 2013 (1 November 2013). If guidance is to be given about the documents to be included with an application, it will probably have to feature in relevant Tribunal forms.

(7) Victims of identity theft

543. We find the following to be, or likely to be, victims of identity theft:

Mr Mohammed Akram
Mrs Jurate Barasukiene
Ms Amina Hussain
Mrs Shahnaz Hussain
Mr Sufyan Iftikhar
Mr Muhammad Irfan
Mr Abdullah Khan
Mrs Aneela Khan
Mrs Sarah Saddiq

(8) False documents

544. Documents have been found to be false, either by creation or manipulation. These include documents issued by governmental entities:

Federal Board of Revenue Active Taxpayer List
Federal Board of Revenue Taxpayer Registration Certificate
Federal Board of Revenue 116(3) Revised Wealth Statement
Government of Punjab Birth Registration Certificate
Government of Punjab Marriage Registration Certificate
Government of Sind Birth Certificate
NADRA Family Registration Certificate

545. Documents purportedly issued by the banks below have been found to be false, either by creation or manipulation:

Bank AL Habib Limited
United Bank Limited

546. Documents purportedly issued by HM Land Registry.

(9) Controlled email addresses

547. We find that the following email addresses are in the control of a third party:

abidaishaq27@gmail.com
afaqahamd703@gmail.com
ahsanshumaila8@gmail.com
attiatulh42@gmail.com
ba1881239@gmail.com
babarmunirj@gmail.com
hanifahmadali1981@gmail.com
kronline2020@outlook.com
muhammadatteq37@gmail.com
munirfarhan67@gmail.com
munirj2013@gmail.com
naeemshoukat821@gmail.com
sah7866@gmail.com
shakilrehana740@gmail.com
sufya2013@gmail.com
sulemanwasima@gmail.com
waqasahmadpak876@gmail.com
zahidahmadpak3@gmail.com

(10) Controlled telephone numbers

548. We find that the following United Kingdom telephone numbers, known to the respondent, are in the control of a third party:

Ending
00689
13394
22166
28684
52485
54907
74913
82695
82696
89376
98659

549. We do not cite the numbers in full, as the service provider may reallocate the number to manage limited supply.

550. In addition, we find that several Pakistan telephone numbers are in the control of a third party:

Ending
02870
06673
11413
25506
63119
63128
74913
76450
78970
87290
87295
87330

(11) Immigration Advice Authority

551. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Immigration Advice Authority.

O. Disposal

552. For the reasons provided we dispose of the proceedings as follows.

JR-2024-LON-001654 (Atteq)

553. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 17 February 2025 is set aside.

554. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

555. No order as to costs.

JR- 2024-LON-003161 (Habib)

556. The application to withdraw the claim is refused.

557. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

558. No order as to costs.

JR-2024-LON-003186 (Zahid Ahmad)

559. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 6 December 2024 is set aside.

560. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

561. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000004 (Ahsan)

562. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 30 January 2025 is set aside.

563. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

564. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000097 (Mansoor)

565. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

566. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000251 (Shakil)

567. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

568. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000441 (Ishaq)

569. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 28 March 2025 is set aside.

570. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

571. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000568 (Suleman)

572. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 11 March 2025 is set aside.

573. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

574. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000609 (Mushtaq)

575. The approved consent order sealed by the Upper Tribunal on 8 May 2025 is set aside.

576. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

577. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-000681 (Zahid Ahmad)

578. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

579. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-001030 (Zahid Ahmad)

580. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

581. No order as to costs.

JR-2025-LON-001382 (Basharat Ahmad)

582. The proceedings are declared to be a nullity.

583. No order as to costs.

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