JR-2024-LON-002763
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The decision
JR-2024-LON-002763
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Rupon Miah
Applicant
and
Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr T Yarrow of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the respondent at a hearing on 16 October 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant shall pay the respondent’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,091.50, on the indemnity basis.
(3) The applicant shall have 14 days from the date of this order to apply for permission to appeal. If no such application is made, permission to appeal shall be treated as refused on the basis that, in the absence of any grounds, the appeal would have no prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.
Signed: M R Hoffman
Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
Dated: 16th October 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 26/10/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2024-LON-002763
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
16th October 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
RUPON MIAH
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
No appearance for the applicant
Mr T Yarrow
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 16th October 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Hoffman:
1. The applicant seeks judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 21 August 2024 refusing his application for entry clearance as a visitor.
2. This claim forms part of a cohort of judicial review proceedings brought by Bangladeshi nationals challenging the refusal of visit visa applications. All of the claims were lodged by the same firm of solicitors, ZYBA Law. In a judgment handed down on 10 November 2025, the Upper Tribunal found that applicants within that cohort had relied upon fraudulent documents in support of their applications: R (on the application of Ahmed and Others) v Entry Clearance Officer (Solicitors’ duties: indication of fraud) [2026] UKUT 00273 (IAC).
3. Following that judgment, the respondent applied to re-open a number of proceedings, including the present claim, which had previously been settled by consent before the fraud came to light. The applicant did not oppose that application. By an order dated 23 September 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside the consent order that had been made in this case on 20 March 2025. As permission to apply for judicial review had been granted before the claim was settled, it was necessary for the matter to be listed for a substantive hearing.
Background
4. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh, where he resides, born on 10 October 1984. He is married and has children.
5. On 13 April 2023, the applicant applied for entry clearance as a visitor. The covering letter submitted in support of the application stated that he intended to travel alone and spend six days in London during May 2023.
6. The application was initially refused on 25 April 2023 but, following pre-action correspondence, the respondent reconsidered it and refused it again twice more on 4 September 2023 and 11 December 2023. In a decision dated 21 August 2024, the respondent refused the application for a fourth time. The respondent was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine visitor for the purposes of paragraphs V4.2(a) and (c) of Appendix V to the Immigration Rules. Although she accepted that the applicant was employed as a chef, possessed savings and received additional income from both his position as a Union Parishad member and remittances from his brother in Italy, she considered that he had underestimated the true cost of his proposed visit to the United Kingdom and had not demonstrated that he had properly researched the expenses associated with the trip. The respondent also attached significance to the fact that a substantial proportion of the funds in the applicant’s account appeared to derive from his brother overseas. Taking those matters together, she was not satisfied that the applicant had accurately declared his personal and financial circumstances, was genuinely seeking entry as a visitor, or intended to leave the United Kingdom at the end of his visit.
The judicial review proceedings
7. On 30 September 2024, ZYBA Law, acting on the applicant’s behalf, filed a claim for judicial review in the Upper Tribunal. The applicant advanced five grounds of challenge to the lawfulness of the respondent’s decision. Although the grounds were repetitive and, to a significant extent, overlapping, their essence was that the respondent had failed adequately to consider the evidence; had reached an unreasonable decision; had acted in a procedurally improper manner; and had failed properly to consider the relevant policy.
8. The respondent filed an Acknowledgment of Service resisting the claim, and permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers on 7 January 2025. The applicant renewed his application, however, and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley following an oral hearing on 12 February 2025.
9. Following the grant of permission, the respondent offered to settle the claim on the basis that she would withdraw the impugned decision and reconsider the applicant’s visit visa application within three months, absent special circumstances. The applicant agreed to withdraw the claim on terms that the respondent would also pay his reasonable costs. A consent order reflecting that agreement was sealed on 20 March 2025.
10. In March 2025, I noticed similarities between documents relied upon by applicants in two separate cases brought by ZYBA Law. The subsequent events are set out in detail in Ahmed and Others and need not be repeated here. What is relevant for present purposes is that, during the review of other cases conducted in consequence of those concerns, documents relied upon by the present applicant were also identified as bearing similarities to documents submitted in other claims. As with the other applicants whose cases had been flagged, directions issued on 12 June 2025 afforded the applicant an opportunity to make representations before the hearing that ultimately led to the judgment in Ahmed and Others. Like the other affected applicants, he failed to do so.
11. Following the handing down of the judgment in Ahmed and Others, the Upper Tribunal convened a case management hearing on 18 March 2026 to determine how the cases affected by the fraud findings should proceed. The applicant was not represented at that hearing. On the day before that hearing, the respondent applied to set aside the consent order in this case. By directions sealed on 20 March 2026, the respondent was directed to file submissions in support of her applications to set aside the consent orders in this and seven other cases by 13 May 2026. The applicant was thereafter afforded 14 days in which to file and serve a response. No response was received. A further case management hearing took place on 17 June 2026. Once again, the applicant was not represented. The Tribunal subsequently set aside the consent order on 23 September 2026. As explained above, because permission to apply for judicial review had already been granted, the consequence was that the claim had to be listed for a substantive hearing.
The hearing
12. In light of the applicant’s complete lack of engagement with these proceedings since the Tribunal first raised concerns regarding fraud within this cohort of cases in 2025, it was unsurprising that he was not represented.
13. Mr Yarrow relied upon the submissions previously advanced on behalf of the respondent at the hearing on 17 June 2026.
14. I gave my oral judgment at the end of the hearing.
Discussion
15. The respondent’s position is that the claim for judicial review should be dismissed in light of the applicant’s reliance on fraudulent documents.
16. In a witness statement dated 13 May 2026, the respondent’s solicitor, Fung Cheung of the Government Legal Department, identified a number of features of the applicant’s entry clearance application which pointed to his reliance upon fraudulent documents.
17. First, the covering letter to the applicant’s visa application contained similar wording to other letters relied upon by other members of the cohort examined in Ahmed and Others: see [44]-[49] and [66].
18. Second, it is now known that the telephone number provided by the applicant in his visa application form was not his own but instead belonged to a Bangladeshi immigration agency known as Vision Sylhet Consultancy. As explained in Ahmed and Others, it is more likely than not that this firm was responsible for the fraudulent documents relied upon by the cohort applicants: see [52], [64] and [66].
19. Third, the applicant relied upon a land valuation document, purportedly prepared by a company named Kunjo Development & Consultant, which was similar to land valuation reports relied upon by other applicants, including the same typographical errors: see Ahmed and Others at [58]-[60] and [66].
20. Fourth, the applicant relied upon a letter of support dated 9 February 2022 from a social organisation known as Multilateral Social Welfare Association, Ronshi. The wording of that letter resembles the letters of support relied upon by other cohort applicants: see Ahmed and Others at [55]-[57] and [64].
21. If the applicant has an innocent explanation for these matters, he has failed to provide it despite having been afforded the opportunity to make representations pursuant to the Tribunal’s directions of 12 June 2025 and 20 March 2026. Nor did he attend, through a representative, the hearing on 2 October 2025 at which the Tribunal considered the fraud issue, or the subsequent case management hearings held on 18 March 2026 and 17 June 2026. Indeed, he was unrepresented at the substantive hearing of his judicial review claim.
22. For the reasons given in Ahmed and Others, I am satisfied that the applicant relied upon fraudulent documents in support of his entry clearance application and, by extension, these judicial review proceedings. It is therefore unnecessary to engage with the merits of his five grounds of challenge. Fraud unravels all: see Bokqiu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 191 at [28]. Moreover, judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and it may be appropriate to refuse relief where proceedings have been brought in a manner that amounts to an abuse of process: see R (Mount Cook Land Limited) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 at [46]. As I explained in my order of 23 September 2026 setting aside the consent order, the submission of false documents in support of judicial review proceedings constitutes a serious procedural irregularity: see Abbasi (rule 43; para 322(5): accountants’ evidence) [2020] UKUT 00027 (IAC) at [51]-[52]. In those circumstances, granting relief would not accord with the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly. The applicant’s fraud is a powerful reason for refusing any form of relief.
Conclusion
23. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Costs
24. I am satisfied that the respondent should be entitled to her costs on the indemnity basis. That is because the applicant’s conduct in advancing his claim based on fraud has been unreasonable to a degree that takes his case out of the norm. His conduct demonstrates a lack of moral probity and warrants condemnation. Accordingly, it is appropriate that he should pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis: see R (Butt) v SSHD (Indemnity costs) [2022] UKUT 00069 (IAC); Esure Services Ltd v Quarco [2009] EWCA Civ 595.
25. I have considered the respondent’s statement of costs. I have reduced the amount claimed slightly, as I am not satisfied that items 2 to 4, 8, 16, 28 and 30 in the schedule of work undertaken are properly recoverable. I have, however, added £62.50 to the total claimed in respect of Mr Yarrow’s fee for attending the hearing.
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In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Rupon Miah
Applicant
and
Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr T Yarrow of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the respondent at a hearing on 16 October 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant shall pay the respondent’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,091.50, on the indemnity basis.
(3) The applicant shall have 14 days from the date of this order to apply for permission to appeal. If no such application is made, permission to appeal shall be treated as refused on the basis that, in the absence of any grounds, the appeal would have no prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.
Signed: M R Hoffman
Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman
Dated: 16th October 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 26/10/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2024-LON-002763
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
16th October 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
RUPON MIAH
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
No appearance for the applicant
Mr T Yarrow
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 16th October 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Hoffman:
1. The applicant seeks judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 21 August 2024 refusing his application for entry clearance as a visitor.
2. This claim forms part of a cohort of judicial review proceedings brought by Bangladeshi nationals challenging the refusal of visit visa applications. All of the claims were lodged by the same firm of solicitors, ZYBA Law. In a judgment handed down on 10 November 2025, the Upper Tribunal found that applicants within that cohort had relied upon fraudulent documents in support of their applications: R (on the application of Ahmed and Others) v Entry Clearance Officer (Solicitors’ duties: indication of fraud) [2026] UKUT 00273 (IAC).
3. Following that judgment, the respondent applied to re-open a number of proceedings, including the present claim, which had previously been settled by consent before the fraud came to light. The applicant did not oppose that application. By an order dated 23 September 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside the consent order that had been made in this case on 20 March 2025. As permission to apply for judicial review had been granted before the claim was settled, it was necessary for the matter to be listed for a substantive hearing.
Background
4. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh, where he resides, born on 10 October 1984. He is married and has children.
5. On 13 April 2023, the applicant applied for entry clearance as a visitor. The covering letter submitted in support of the application stated that he intended to travel alone and spend six days in London during May 2023.
6. The application was initially refused on 25 April 2023 but, following pre-action correspondence, the respondent reconsidered it and refused it again twice more on 4 September 2023 and 11 December 2023. In a decision dated 21 August 2024, the respondent refused the application for a fourth time. The respondent was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine visitor for the purposes of paragraphs V4.2(a) and (c) of Appendix V to the Immigration Rules. Although she accepted that the applicant was employed as a chef, possessed savings and received additional income from both his position as a Union Parishad member and remittances from his brother in Italy, she considered that he had underestimated the true cost of his proposed visit to the United Kingdom and had not demonstrated that he had properly researched the expenses associated with the trip. The respondent also attached significance to the fact that a substantial proportion of the funds in the applicant’s account appeared to derive from his brother overseas. Taking those matters together, she was not satisfied that the applicant had accurately declared his personal and financial circumstances, was genuinely seeking entry as a visitor, or intended to leave the United Kingdom at the end of his visit.
The judicial review proceedings
7. On 30 September 2024, ZYBA Law, acting on the applicant’s behalf, filed a claim for judicial review in the Upper Tribunal. The applicant advanced five grounds of challenge to the lawfulness of the respondent’s decision. Although the grounds were repetitive and, to a significant extent, overlapping, their essence was that the respondent had failed adequately to consider the evidence; had reached an unreasonable decision; had acted in a procedurally improper manner; and had failed properly to consider the relevant policy.
8. The respondent filed an Acknowledgment of Service resisting the claim, and permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers on 7 January 2025. The applicant renewed his application, however, and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley following an oral hearing on 12 February 2025.
9. Following the grant of permission, the respondent offered to settle the claim on the basis that she would withdraw the impugned decision and reconsider the applicant’s visit visa application within three months, absent special circumstances. The applicant agreed to withdraw the claim on terms that the respondent would also pay his reasonable costs. A consent order reflecting that agreement was sealed on 20 March 2025.
10. In March 2025, I noticed similarities between documents relied upon by applicants in two separate cases brought by ZYBA Law. The subsequent events are set out in detail in Ahmed and Others and need not be repeated here. What is relevant for present purposes is that, during the review of other cases conducted in consequence of those concerns, documents relied upon by the present applicant were also identified as bearing similarities to documents submitted in other claims. As with the other applicants whose cases had been flagged, directions issued on 12 June 2025 afforded the applicant an opportunity to make representations before the hearing that ultimately led to the judgment in Ahmed and Others. Like the other affected applicants, he failed to do so.
11. Following the handing down of the judgment in Ahmed and Others, the Upper Tribunal convened a case management hearing on 18 March 2026 to determine how the cases affected by the fraud findings should proceed. The applicant was not represented at that hearing. On the day before that hearing, the respondent applied to set aside the consent order in this case. By directions sealed on 20 March 2026, the respondent was directed to file submissions in support of her applications to set aside the consent orders in this and seven other cases by 13 May 2026. The applicant was thereafter afforded 14 days in which to file and serve a response. No response was received. A further case management hearing took place on 17 June 2026. Once again, the applicant was not represented. The Tribunal subsequently set aside the consent order on 23 September 2026. As explained above, because permission to apply for judicial review had already been granted, the consequence was that the claim had to be listed for a substantive hearing.
The hearing
12. In light of the applicant’s complete lack of engagement with these proceedings since the Tribunal first raised concerns regarding fraud within this cohort of cases in 2025, it was unsurprising that he was not represented.
13. Mr Yarrow relied upon the submissions previously advanced on behalf of the respondent at the hearing on 17 June 2026.
14. I gave my oral judgment at the end of the hearing.
Discussion
15. The respondent’s position is that the claim for judicial review should be dismissed in light of the applicant’s reliance on fraudulent documents.
16. In a witness statement dated 13 May 2026, the respondent’s solicitor, Fung Cheung of the Government Legal Department, identified a number of features of the applicant’s entry clearance application which pointed to his reliance upon fraudulent documents.
17. First, the covering letter to the applicant’s visa application contained similar wording to other letters relied upon by other members of the cohort examined in Ahmed and Others: see [44]-[49] and [66].
18. Second, it is now known that the telephone number provided by the applicant in his visa application form was not his own but instead belonged to a Bangladeshi immigration agency known as Vision Sylhet Consultancy. As explained in Ahmed and Others, it is more likely than not that this firm was responsible for the fraudulent documents relied upon by the cohort applicants: see [52], [64] and [66].
19. Third, the applicant relied upon a land valuation document, purportedly prepared by a company named Kunjo Development & Consultant, which was similar to land valuation reports relied upon by other applicants, including the same typographical errors: see Ahmed and Others at [58]-[60] and [66].
20. Fourth, the applicant relied upon a letter of support dated 9 February 2022 from a social organisation known as Multilateral Social Welfare Association, Ronshi. The wording of that letter resembles the letters of support relied upon by other cohort applicants: see Ahmed and Others at [55]-[57] and [64].
21. If the applicant has an innocent explanation for these matters, he has failed to provide it despite having been afforded the opportunity to make representations pursuant to the Tribunal’s directions of 12 June 2025 and 20 March 2026. Nor did he attend, through a representative, the hearing on 2 October 2025 at which the Tribunal considered the fraud issue, or the subsequent case management hearings held on 18 March 2026 and 17 June 2026. Indeed, he was unrepresented at the substantive hearing of his judicial review claim.
22. For the reasons given in Ahmed and Others, I am satisfied that the applicant relied upon fraudulent documents in support of his entry clearance application and, by extension, these judicial review proceedings. It is therefore unnecessary to engage with the merits of his five grounds of challenge. Fraud unravels all: see Bokqiu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 191 at [28]. Moreover, judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and it may be appropriate to refuse relief where proceedings have been brought in a manner that amounts to an abuse of process: see R (Mount Cook Land Limited) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 at [46]. As I explained in my order of 23 September 2026 setting aside the consent order, the submission of false documents in support of judicial review proceedings constitutes a serious procedural irregularity: see Abbasi (rule 43; para 322(5): accountants’ evidence) [2020] UKUT 00027 (IAC) at [51]-[52]. In those circumstances, granting relief would not accord with the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly. The applicant’s fraud is a powerful reason for refusing any form of relief.
Conclusion
23. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Costs
24. I am satisfied that the respondent should be entitled to her costs on the indemnity basis. That is because the applicant’s conduct in advancing his claim based on fraud has been unreasonable to a degree that takes his case out of the norm. His conduct demonstrates a lack of moral probity and warrants condemnation. Accordingly, it is appropriate that he should pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis: see R (Butt) v SSHD (Indemnity costs) [2022] UKUT 00069 (IAC); Esure Services Ltd v Quarco [2009] EWCA Civ 595.
25. I have considered the respondent’s statement of costs. I have reduced the amount claimed slightly, as I am not satisfied that items 2 to 4, 8, 16, 28 and 30 in the schedule of work undertaken are properly recoverable. I have, however, added £62.50 to the total claimed in respect of Mr Yarrow’s fee for attending the hearing.
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