Tribunal decisions

The decision

In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
JR-2024-LON-002819

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of

Ijaj Abid Redwan Hridoy

Applicant

versus

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Respondent

ORDER

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr J Metzer of counsel, instructed by Hubers Law Solicitors for the Applicant and Mr M Howarth of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the Respondent, at a hearing on 11 August 2025

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons provided in the attached judgment.

Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal

(2) The Applicant has confirmed that he does not intend to appeal the decision and no application has therefore been made for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In any event permission would be refused on the basis that there is no arguable error of law in the decision.

Costs

(3) The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s reasonable costs of these proceedings, excluding the costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and summary grounds of defence, to be assessed if not agreed, for the reasons given in the attached judgment.

Signed: S Kebede

Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Dated: 20 August 2025

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 22/08/2025

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

Case No: JR-2024-LON-002819
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

20 August 2025
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of

Ijaj Abid Redwan Hridoy
Applicant
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
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Mr J Metzer
(instructed by Hubers Law Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr M Howarth, Counsel
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 11 August 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Kebede:

1. This is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 13 July 2024 cancelling the applicant’s permission to stay in the UK. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on the papers by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on 24 April 2025.

Background

2. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh, born on 18 May 1999. On 9 August 2023 he was granted leave to enter the UK as a Skilled Worker Migrant (Health Care), with a visa valid from 9 August 2023 to 15 August 2026, sponsored by Almag Healthcare Limited (“Almag”) to work as a Health Care Worker. He entered the United Kingdom shortly after being granted his visa.

3. On 13 July 2024, an immigration enforcement visit took place at Junoon Helsby Restaurant. The applicant was encountered working there. Both he and the restaurant manager were interviewed. The applicant was considered to be in breach of the conditions of his visa and was detained and served with a notice explaining that he was liable to be removed from the UK. His visa was cancelled. He was subsequently released.

4. The decision to cancel the applicant’s permission to stay, dated 13 July 2024, was made on the following basis:
“Reasons for decision
You are liable to be removed from the UK for the following reasons:
Individual is specifically considered a person who is working in breach of his
visa conditions. Home Office records show that you was granted a SKILLED
WORKER MIGRANT HEALTH & CARE visa on 09/08/2023 with Almag
Healthcare Limited being the sponsor. A condition of this visa is that you are
only allowed to work related to Care workers and home carers.
On 13/07/2024 you were encountered by Immigration Enforcement officers
during an enforcement visit, working at JUNOON HELSBY 201 Chester Road
Helsby Frodsham WA6 0DA. He is therefore working in breach of your visa
conditions under Sec 10(1)(a) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which
is an offence under Sec 24(1)( b)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1971 as amended.
Following an interview with immigration officers I have carefully considered
the circumstances of your case and have decided it is appropriate to cancel
your permission because you have failed to comply with the conditions of
your permission to enter in line with paragraph of 9.8.8 of the Immigration
Rules.

It has been further considered whether there are any compassionate or
exceptional circumstances however none have been disclosed. The evidence
noted above has been considered when making this decision. You are
therefore working in breach of your entry conditions which is an offence under
Section 24(1)( b)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1971 as amended Your permission
to stay is cancelled with immediate effect.

All facts and circumstances have been taken into consideration and it has
been deemed that you are a person who has failed to comply with conditions
of your stay. The decision to serve this notice has been considered and it has
been decided that you will not be unfairly prejudiced by the service of this
form.

Section 10 of the IA99 (as amended) states that an individual may be removed
from the UK if a person requires leave to enter or remain but does not have it.
As such, arrangements will now be made for your removal from the UK.
Your permission to stay is cancelled from immediate effect. “

5. The applicant served a pre-action protocol letter on the respondent, dated 29 July 2024, relying upon the Home Office guidance on Skilled Workers dated 4 April 2024. The applicant asserted that the respondent had misapplied her own guidance, given that it was clear from the guidance that a skilled worker was eligible to do additional work up to 20 hours and was therefore entitled to undertake supplemental employment. It was asserted that the applicant had been working for his sponsor since coming to the UK. His P60 for April 2024 and payslips for November 2023 until May 2024 were enclosed. It was asserted further that he had started a supplemental job for up to 20 hours, doing a trial shift, the day before he was arrested, as he was entitled to do. He was intending to apply to switch his visa to a more conveniently located sponsor but had not breached the conditions of his current visa. It was asserted further that a request for full disclosure had been made to the respondent for the interview records, but none had been produced.

6. In the response to the PAP, dated 15 August 2024, the respondent maintained the decision. The respondent noted that enquiries were made of the arresting officer who had interviewed the applicant, who had advised that the applicant had admitted at the interview that he was working at Junoon Helsby as his main employment, since Almag did not give him regular work and he needed the money. Further, the applicant had stated that he could not show payments into his online bank account or evidence of work rotas for Almag, and that the payslips he had produced showed BACS payments whereas the applicant had stated that he was paid in cash. Further, the applicant had stated that he lived in London but worked in care in Nottingham, yet he was unable to provide proof of travel between the two cities and a search revealed that he lived in a caravan on site of Junoon Helsby and his passport was found in the caravan. The arresting officer was therefore satisfied that the applicant’s main employment was at Junoon Helsby and not Almag, so that he was in breach of his visa conditions and his leave was lawfully cancelled under paragraph 9.8.8 of the immigration rules.

7. In a letter dated 27 September 2024 the applicant’s solicitors were informed by the respondent, further to their subject access request, that the interview transcript of 13 July 2024 could not be located.

Judicial Review Claim and Grounds

8. The applicant then lodged a judicial review claim challenging the respondent’s decision on 14 October 2024, on four grounds:

• The respondent was wrong to suggest that the applicant was not allowed to undertake work other than as a care worker, since supplementary employment was permitted under the immigration rules, and that was what the applicant was doing;
• The decision was taken contrary to the common law duty of procedural fairness because it was taken without giving the applicant a reasonable opportunity to address her concerns and provide exculpatory evidence;
• The respondent breached her duty under Tameside;
• The decision was irrational because the evidence relied upon was inadequate to support the conclusion that the applicant had breached his visa conditions.

9. The applicant’s grounds of claim were accompanied by a bundle which included the PAP correspondence, the subject-access request response, a statement from the applicant dated 11 October 2024 together with his BRP card, his employment contract with Almag and HMRC records for 2023-2024 and 2024-2025, his payslips from Almag from November 2023 to May 2024, his P60 for Almag and his representative’s email request to Almag for information about his employment together with the response.

10. The respondent filed an Acknowledgement of Service and summary grounds of defence responding to the applicant’s grounds of challenge, raising timeliness grounds, asserting that the applicant’s claim was out of time, and asked that permission be refused in any event.

11. With the Acknowledgement of Service, the respondent produced a bundle of documents including the transcripts of the applicant’s interview and that of his employer, as well as Companies House details relating to Almag.

12. The applicant filed a response to the summary grounds of defence, accompanied by an application to do so. The timeliness issue was addressed, with a submission that the application was in time and had been made promptly. It was asserted that the respondent was impermissibly seeking to move the goalpost in the summary grounds of defence, given that the refusal decision had been made on the sole basis that the applicant was found to be working at Junoon Helsby, whereas the respondent was now stating that it was "not disputed” that the applicant was permitted to undertake supplementary work.

13. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on the papers by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville in an order issued on 24 April 2025 on the following basis:

“Reasons

(1) The application was received (just) within 3 months, rule 12 operating to extend time to 14 October 2024. Given that proper enquiries, including an SAR, were made of the respondent prior to issuing proceedings, the application can further be viewed as ‘prompt’.
(2) Given the respondent’s change in position concerning the interview notes (and, I note in passing, the surprising failure to refer the Tribunal to the operation of rule 12) I grant permission to rely on the Reply of 16 November 2024.
(3) Under Ground 1 , the respondent must be taken by omission to accept that the decision-maker was wrong to hold that the applicant was only permitted “to work related to Care workers and home carers”; why not simply admit it? This would have enabled the subsequent assertion - that the applicant admitted to no longer having the job for which he had been sponsored, so the obvious error was immaterial - to be made explicitly rather than be (perhaps somewhat generously) inferred.
(4) Considering materiality, and the ‘highly likely’ test that the same outcome would eventuate, I consider it appropriate to grant permission. The answer recorded in interview, and reproduced at para 23 of the Summary Grounds, does not conclusively establish (or rather, it is arguable that it could not rationally be taken as conclusively establishing) that he no longer continued to work at AHL. The respondent has not referred the Tribunal to any provision that would render refusal highly likely in that eventuality, such that permission should be refused notwithstanding the arguable error identified at (3) above. Each ground of judicial review may therefore be pursued for the reasons advanced by the applicant. While on final analysis the application might fail, the apparent arguability of the grounds is not dislodged by any argument presented by the respondent.”

14. The respondent filed her detailed grounds of defence, maintaining that the decision to refuse the applicant’s application was lawful and rational. The matter was listed for hearing and came before me.

Hearing and submissions

15. A trial bundle was produced for the hearing which included the original claim bundle and subsequent grounds from the parties together with a further statement from the applicant dated 12 June 2025 which sought to clarify matters arising from the interview transcripts.

16. Both parties filed skeleton arguments prior to the hearing, and both made submissions before me reflecting their skeleton arguments. The list of issues for determination, as set out in the parties’ skeleton arguments, is as follows:

Ground 1: (i) Did the decision involve a material misdirection of law regarding whether working at Junoon Helsby demonstrated breach of visa conditions? (ii) If so, is it nonetheless "highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different"?
Ground 2: (i) Was there a failure to apply fair procedure before cancellation? (ii) If so, is it nonetheless "highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different"?
Ground 3: (i) Was there a failure to take reasonable steps to obtain relevant information before the decision? (ii) If so, is it nonetheless "highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different"?
Ground 4: (i) Did the decision involve an irrational conclusion regarding breach of visa conditions? (ii) If so, is it nonetheless "highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different"?

17. I do not propose to set out the submissions in any detail at this point but shall address them in the discussion below.

Legal Framework

Immigration Rules
18. Paragraph 9.8.8 of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules provides:
“9.8.8. Permission (including permission extended under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971) may be cancelled where the person has failed to comply with the conditions of their permission.”
Paragraph SW 18.2 of Appendix SW provides:
“Conditions of grant for a Skilled Worker
SW 18.2. The grant will be subject to all the following conditions:
…(b) work is permitted only in the job the applicant is being sponsored for, subject to (c) to (e); and
(c) supplementary employment is permitted, providing the person continues to work in the job for which they are being sponsored (and where the supplementary employment takes place during the 4-month period after the end date of their certificate of sponsorship referred to in SW 18.1A the requirement to continue to work for the sponsor will not apply); …”
Paragraph 6(2)(b) of the Interpretation section of the Immigration Rules:
“Supplementary employment” means employment in a job (other than the job for which the person is being sponsored) which either:
(a) appears in Appendix Immigration Salary List; or
(b) is in the same profession and at the same professional level as the job for which the person is being sponsored; or
(c) if the person has permission as a Skilled Worker, is in an eligible SOC 2020 occupation code listed in Tables 1, 2 or 3 of Appendix Skilled Occupations;
provided in all cases that:
(i) the person remains working for the sponsor in the job for which the Certificate of Sponsorship records the person is being sponsored (except where the other employment takes place during the 4-month period referred to in SW 18.1A of Appendix Skilled Worker, where that provision applies); and
(ii) the other employment does not exceed 20 hours per week and takes place outside of the hours when the person is contracted to work for the sponsor in the job for which the person is being sponsored.”.

Discussion

19. The main focus of the applicant’s case is in the first two grounds, with the first ground being presented as determinative in itself. That ground arises from the wording in the refusal decision of 13 July 2024: “A condition of this visa is that you are only allowed to work related to Care workers and home carers. On 13/07/2024 you were encountered by Immigration Enforcement officers during an enforcement visit, working at JUNOON HELSBY 201 Chester Road Helsby Frodsham WA6 0DA. He is therefore working in breach of your visa conditions.”

20. It was Mr Metzer’s submission that the word “therefore” in the refusal decision was fatal in that it showed that the decision-maker erroneously believed that the applicant was in breach of the conditions of his visa purely because he was working in another employment aside from Almag, whereas a recent change in the immigration rules allowed for supplementary employment elsewhere. The applicant’s case, therefore, is that the decision-maker’s reasoning discloses a material misdirection of law.

21. The respondent’s case in response is that there was no misdirection in law, but rather that this is a case of substance over form and that, even if the decision letter could have been more precisely worded, the substance of the decision was legally sound, namely that the applicant was not in genuine continuing sponsored employment with the sponsoring employer.

22. I agree that the wording of the respondent’s decision has been rather clumsily expressed and that, when taken in isolation, could arguably be read as suggesting that the decision-maker believed that the applicant was only able to work for Almag. However, as Mr Howarth submitted, the decision must be read in context. It is clear from the observations at the end of the applicant’s interview (page 60 of the bundle) that the relevant provision of the immigration rules was considered and the correct issue identified, namely whether the applicant’s job at the restaurant was supplementary to his care work. The interviewer’s observation was that the restaurant job was not supplementary to the care work job and that the applicant was suspected of working illegally at the restaurant. Indeed the applicant’s own admission at his interview was that the restaurant job was his main employment. It is, furthermore, clear that the overall premise of the respondent’s decision was that the applicant was working in breach of the terms of his visa as he was working for a different employer to that for which he was originally sponsored. In the circumstances I do not accept that there was a misdirection by the respondent in the decision.

23. However, even if it is accepted that there was a misdirection/error by the decision-maker (which, for the reasons given, I do not accept), I do not consider that it was material. The outcome would have been the same without the asserted error. That is particularly when considering the basis upon which the decision was made and the evidence before the decision-maker.

24. Mr Metzer, in his submissions, emphasised the caution which had to be exercised in considering whether, absent such an error, the outcome would have been the same. It was his case that there was a high threshold to be met in concluding that the outcome would have been the same and that that threshold had not been met in this case. He relied upon the cases of R. (on the application of Plan B Earth) [2020] EWCA Civ 214, as cited in Branco-Bonfim, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 142, in that regard.

25. I have had careful regard to these principles and to the relevant test which I refer to below.

26. The relevant proposition arises from the statutory obligation in section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 which provides that relief must be refused “if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred”. In the Plan B Earth case, the Court said at [273] that:
“In particular, courts should still be cautious about straying, even subconsciously, into the forbidden territory of assessing the merits of a public decision under challenge by way of judicial review. If there has been an error of law, for example in the approach the executive has taken to its decision-making process, it will often be difficult or impossible for a court to conclude that it is “highly likely” that the outcome would not have been “substantially different” if the executive had gone about the decision-making process in accordance with the law.”

27. The “highly likely” test was more recently discussed in Branco-Bonfim, where the Court made clear at [41] that:
“ the threshold remains a high one … and courts still have to be cautious about straying into the forbidden territory of assessing the merits of a public law decision challenged in judicial review proceedings, see Plan B Earth at paragraph 273.”

28. Having duly noted the high threshold to be met, I also note that the Court, at [272] in the Plan B Earth case, said that “it does not have to be shown that the outcome would have been exactly the same; it will suffice that it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been “substantially different” for the claimant.”

29. In any event I agree with Mr Howarth that the threshold is met in this case. I agree that the respondent rationally considered that the evidence conclusively established (and it still establishes) that the applicant was not working for his sponsor at the time he was encountered working for Junnon Helsby. That was due to the total absence of evidence of employment for Almag after June 2024 both at the time of the decision and thereafter, the HMRC records confirming no income from Almag after June 2024, the applicant’s own admission at his interview that the restaurant was his main employment, and the restaurant manager’s evidence that the applicant had been working there for four to five weeks. In terms of the guidance cited, I do not consider that I am “straying into the forbidden territory of assessing the merits of a public law decision” in so concluding.

30. Mr Metzer, in asserting the contrary, maintained that the applicant had provided consistent and plausible evidence showing that he remained employed by Almag at the time he was encountered working at the restaurant. He submitted that the applicant’s evidence at his interview, that his main employment was in the restaurant at that time, was properly and plausibly explained in his supplementary witness statement at paragraphs 4 and 5, as being due to the work for Almag having recently reduced, owing to some clients’ contracts coming to an end, but that he was waiting for further work when new clients were taken on and needed the extra money to supplement the salary from Almag. Mr Metzer submitted that that was consistent with the reference in the applicant’s work contract to flexible hours of work and, under the heading “Hours of Work”, to only being paid for hours when he worked. All of that, he submitted, suggested that the applicant was still employed by Almag at the time he was encountered at the restaurant, and was simply supplementing his income, and amounted to a plausible explanation such that the “highly likely” test could not be made out.

31. Of course that explanation provided by the applicant in his supplementary statement, was not one before the respondent at the time the decision was made. However, and in any event, as Mr Howarth submitted, the explanation is contradicted by the applicant’s own evidence at [4] in his supplementary statement, that he was told that he would be paid his usual salary regardless of his working hours during the relevant period. Furthermore, despite the applicant’s claim that he needed to supplement his income since Almag did not provide regular work, the salary slips he had produced up until May 2024 stated that his hours of work had remained the same for each month, as was also reflected in the HMRC document at page 165 of the claim bundle. Accordingly, by the appellant’s own evidence, his salary would therefore have remained the same after June 2024, at least until 13 July 2024 when his permission to stay and work was cancelled. Yet the tax records in the HMRC document at page 165 show that he did not earn any income in July 2024, not even for the period up to 3 July 2024 when he claimed to have last gone to work at the care home.

32. In so far as the applicant relies upon an email from enquiries@almaghealthcare.co.uk, from “Mike”, at page 170 of the bundle, taken together with the enquiry at page 171, I agree with Mr Howarth that this cannot reasonably or rationally be regarded as evidence of ongoing employment with Almag at the time of the enforcement visit to the restaurant, given the brevity of the email, the lack of detail and information, the lack of reference to any relevant period of time, and the absence of any explanation of who is “Mike”. That is particularly so when considered against the evidence from HMRC, as already discussed, at page 165. Further, as Mr Howarth submitted, there is no explanation from the applicant as to why he has not, since the respondent’s decision, been able to produce any other evidence of his employment with Almag for July 2024, such as copies of his timesheets, evidence of his work rotas and shift patterns or communications with his sponsor regarding ongoing work assignments, or a more informative letter from his manager or other responsible person at the care home, or indeed any of the other forms of evidence referred to in the respondent’s PAP response at [5(ii)] as having been requested by the interviewing officer. Mr Metzer submitted that timesheets had to be handed in, and therefore could not be produced, but that does not explain why the applicant could not have requested copies or why he did not produce any of the other forms of evidence. In the circumstances, there is, and was, no evidence to show that the applicant was still working for Almag after June 2024 and at the time he was encountered working at the restaurant.

33. In addition to that lack of evidence, there were clearly various credibility concerns about the applicant’s overall account of his employment with Almag, including those mentioned in the PAP response at [5(iii)], namely concerns about the genuineness of the salary slips, inconsistencies in his evidence as to where he lived and worked and how he could have managed working for both Almag and the restaurant, being untruthful about the location of his passport, and inconsistencies between his own evidence and that of his manager at the restaurant as to the amount of time he had been working at the restaurant and the number of days a week he was working there. None of those concerns were properly answered by the applicant and have still not been satisfactorily addressed. As Mr Howarth submitted, it was evident from the explanations provided by the applicant in his statements, such as in relation to his place of residence and work, that he was simply trying to bend the evidence and make it fit, whereas they just gave rise to further inconsistencies. Likewise the submissions from Mr Metzer were simply speculation on an alternative explanation for the applicant’s evidence, but without any proper basis. The evidence was, as Mr Howarth submitted, unequivocal and conclusively established that the applicant was not working for his sponsor at the time he was encountered working for Junoon Helsby. There was therefore no proper scope for an alternative conclusion in the face of the available evidence.

34. Mr Metzer introduced a further challenge under the first ground in relation to the “highly likely” test, submitting that paragraph 9.8.8 of Part 9 of the immigration rules was a discretionary ground for cancellation and that, as such, it could not be said that it was “highly likely” that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the decision-maker had not acted upon a material misdirection of law. He relied upon the Home Office policy guidance ‘Cancellation and curtailment of permission’ version 5.0 dated 5 March 2024 and the Home Office policy guidance ‘Suitability previous breach of UK immigration laws’ version 6.0 dated 14th November 2023 in that regard. However, not only was this not a matter pleaded previously and thus was not considered in the grant of permission, but I do not see how the challenge adds anything to the matters already considered above. It is clear from the decision of 13 July 2024 that the decision-maker considered the discretionary nature of paragraph 9.8.8 because they went on to consider whether there were any other exceptional or compassionate circumstances that would impact the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave, observing that no such circumstances had been disclosed. Mr Metzer did not suggest any particular circumstances which could have given rise to an exercise of discretion in the applicant’s favour. For the reasons I have already given, the evidence against the applicant in relation to his employment and the breach of conditions was conclusive and, in the circumstances, there is nothing of merit in this additional submission.

35. For all those reasons the first ground has no merit and is not made out. There was no material misdirection in the respondent’s decision of 13 July 2024 and, even if relevant, the “highly likely” test was met.

36. Neither do I find any merit in the second ground, which pleads procedural unfairness in the respondent’s decision on the grounds that the applicant was not given an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him prior to the refusal decision. Mr Metzer relied upon the authorities of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Doody [1993] UKHL 8, Karagul & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3208, Campos, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 3299 and Balajigari v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673 in that respect. He referred to the fifth and sixth principles set out in Doody:

“5. Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both.
6. Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer”.

37. He also relied upon [103] in Karagul:

“(1) Where a public authority exercising an administrative power to grant or refuse an application proposes to make a decision that the applicant for some right, benefit or status may have been dishonest in their application or has otherwise acted in bad faith (or disreputably) in relation to the application, common law fairness will generally require at least the following safeguards to be observed. Either the applicant is given a chance in a form of interview to address the claimed wrongdoing, or a form of written "minded to" process, should be followed which allows representations on the specific matter to be made prior to a final decision.
(2) Further, a process of internal administrative review of an original negative decision which bars the applicant from submitting new evidence to rebut the finding of wrongdoing is highly likely to be unfair.
(3) The need for these common law protections is particularly acute where there has been a decision by the legislature to remove an appeal on the merits to an independent and impartial tribunal”.

38. It was Mr Metzer’s submission, in relying on these authorities, that the applicant should, in the interests of fairness, have been informed of the respondent’s concerns and given a chance to address them before the cancellation decision was made. The first point to note is that the authorities cited involved allegations of dishonesty and bad faith whereas the applicant’s case was one involving a breach of conditions. Although Mr Metzer sought to categorise the case as one of bad faith and acting disreputably, that was not the basis for the cancellation decision. I accept that the Court in Campos, at [104], considered that the principles of fairness set out in Doody applied in a case which was similar to the applicant’s, but I do not accept that the requirements of a ‘minded to refuse’ stage or similar, as established in Balajigari in dishonesty cases, was applicable in the applicant’s case in order to ensure procedural fairness.

39. In any event, the Court in Karagul specifically referred to an interview as being an opportunity for an applicant to address the claimed wrongdoing. In this case, the applicant was interviewed with the assistance of an interpreter and was able to provide a full explanation of his circumstances. It was Mr Metzer’s submission that the interview did not suffice, however, given that the applicant should have been, but was not asked, at the very least, whether he was still working for Almag. He submitted that the fact that such a question, as well as the concerns about his working in breach of his visa conditions, were not put to him meant that the procedure was unfair. However, it seems to me that the gist of the case against him would have been immediately apparent to him from the questions asked and the circumstances in which he was encountered by immigration officials. Further, as Mr Howarth said, the applicant was asked various questions about his work with Almag and was specifically asked when he last attended work at the care home and when he would next attend there. He was given a full opportunity at that point to explain his circumstances and to refer to evidence available to him which could be produced to show his ongoing employment at the care home, but there was no further evidence. I therefore reject the assertion that the interview was insufficient an opportunity for the applicant to address the respondent’s concerns. For the same reasons the immediate nature of the decision and the timeframe of enforcement action was, as the respondent submits, justified by the clear and unambiguous evidence of the breach and the applicant’s own clear admission about his main employment.

40. In addition, as Mr Howarth submitted, it is relevant to note that the applicant was offered an opportunity, in the cancellation decision, to provide further information and reasons prior to any attempts to remove him from the UK, should he wish to do so. Yet there is nothing in the applicant’s evidence submitted subsequently in response to the cancellation decision which addresses the respondent’s concerns or offers information that the applicant could have provided at the interview had he specifically been asked, which could have led the respondent to a different conclusion. None of the evidence has altered the factual position established during the interview.

41. In the circumstances I reject the assertion that there was a failure to apply a fair procedure prior to the decision to cancel the applicant’s permission to stay in the UK.

42. The same reasoning applies to the third ground which alleges a breach of the ‘Tameside Duty’ and makes similar arguments to those relating to procedural fairness. That duty is outlined in the case of Balajigari from [62], with the principles set out at [70], including the duty to “consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case”, in order for the Secretary of State to inform herself “so as to arrive at a rational conclusion”. In R (ASK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1239 the duty was described at [64] as “a common law duty to take reasonable steps to acquaint itself with material relevant to any decision it makes – and then properly to consider that information, with the other relevant information available to it – to enable it to make a properly informed decision.”

43. Mr Metzer’s submission was that, in carrying out that duty, the respondent should have asked the applicant if he was still working for Almag and, further, that steps should have been taken by the respondent to contact Almag to enquire about the applicant’s employment. However, as already discussed above, the respondent discharged her duty sufficiently by asking the questions that she did at the interview about the applicant’s employment. As the respondent submits, the enforcement officers considered evidence from various sources during their investigation, conducting interviews with the applicant and the restaurant manager, and reviewing evidence from the applicant and from outside sources such as HMRC. The respondent had sufficient information from the applicant’s own evidence and admission at the interview to reach a proper decision without having to consult Almag and was therefore not required, under the Tameside duty, to make further enquiries. It was, furthermore, open to the applicant to produce further evidence himself from Almag to demonstrate his employment there at the time of the interview but, as discussed above, he has not since provided anything approaching satisfactory evidence in that regard despite having had plenty of opportunity to do so. Nor has the applicant shown that, even if asked the direct question whether he was still working for Almag at the time of the interview, and even if the respondent had contacted Almag herself, any different information would have been produced other than that he provided himself at the interview and thereafter to lead to an alternative conclusion to the one reached by the respondent on 13 July 2024. In the circumstances I do not accept that there was any failure by the respondent to comply with the Tameside duty.

44. The fourth ground merely makes the same allegations as previously discussed. For the reasons already give, the respondent was not only fully and properly entitled to reach the decision that she did on the evidence available to her at the time, but that decision is reinforced by the information and evidence subsequently provided and the lack of evidence which could reasonably have been expected to have been produced. The decision was properly made on the basis of both direct and circumstantial evidence. The respondent properly concluded that the applicant had failed to comply with the conditions of his stay in line with paragraph 9.8.8 of the immigration rules, and that his stay in the UK was to be cancelled. None of the evidence reliably suggests otherwise. The decision was accordingly a lawful, rational and reasonable one.

DECISION

45. There was no material misdirection of law by the respondent and no procedural unfairness or breach of duty in the respondent’s decision-making process. There was nothing irrational, unreasonable or unlawful in the respondent’s decision to cancel the applicant’s permission to stay in the UK and to give notice of removal on the basis that she did and for the reasons given.

46. The applicant’s judicial review claim is accordingly dismissed.

Costs

47. In his decision issued on 24 April 2025 granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Neville ordered that “The respondent may not recover her costs of the Acknowledgement of Service an Summary Grounds in any event”, on the ground that “the AOS has done little more than provide documents in accordance with the duty of candour that ought to have been provided at a pre-action stage.”

48. The applicant has made submissions as to costs, referring to Upper Tribunal Judge Neville’s decision and also requesting that the Tribunal discharge him from any obligation to pay costs given that he has no financial means owing to financial difficulties as a result of being barred from undertaking work. A Halifax statement was produced at the hearing on 11 August 2025 to support his claim as to limited financial means. I do not accept one statement from Halifax as a reliable account of the applicant’s overall financial situation and, given the concerns as to his reliability and credibility arising out of the cancellation of his permission to stay, I am not prepared to accept his assertions as to his financial situation at face value. In any event, the applicant chose to pursue this claim which I have found to be without merit. The applicant is legally represented and must be taken to know when he issued the application for judicial review that he may be liable for the respondent’s costs if he were the losing party. He has been able to privately fund his own legal representatives and there is no proper reason why those assisting him to meet those costs could not assist him in meeting the respondent’s costs.

49. The respondent has not made any written submissions as to costs and has not challenged or responded to UTJ Neville’s decision. In the detailed grounds of defence the respondent simply invited the Tribunal to make an appropriate order for costs. In the circumstances I am satisfied that whilst the applicant, as the losing party, should pay the respondent’s reasonable costs of these proceedings, those costs should exclude the costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and summary grounds of defence.

50. Accordingly, the appropriate order is for the applicant to pay the respondent’s reasonable costs of these proceedings, excluding the costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and summary grounds of defence, to be assessed if not agreed.