Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2024-LON-002876

In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of

MSK

Applicant

and

EAST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL

Respondent

ORDER

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam and Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman

HAVING CONSIDERED all the documents lodged and having heard Mr Shattock for the Applicant and Mr Hoar for the Respondent at a hearing held on 6 and 7 May 2025,
IT IS DECLARED THAT:
1. The Applicant’s date of birth is 15 October 2006, such that he was 15 years of age when he arrived in the UK on 10 October 2022 and aged 18 at the date of this order.
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The Applicant shall not be identified either directly or indirectly.
2. The order for interim relief made on 27 September 2024 is discharged on the basis that the Applicant is a former relevant child who is entitled to leaving care support from the Respondent under the Children Act 1989.
3. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant’s costs of the claim, to be assessed if not agreed.
4. There shall be a detailed assessment of the Applicant’s publicly funded costs.
5. Pursuant to Rule 10(10) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent shall make a payment on account of costs within 28 days of being served with the Applicant’s bill of costs, and being the sum of 60% of the amount claimed in the Applicant’s bill of costs.

Signed: M R Hoffman

Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman

Dated: 24th June 2025

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 25/06/2025

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

Case No: JR-2024-LON-002876
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

24th June 2025
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
MSK
Applicant
- and -

EAST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL
Respondent
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Mr A Shattock
(instructed by Lawstop Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr F Hoar
(instructed by East Sussex County Council), for the respondent

Hearing date: 6th and 7th May 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Hoffman:

Introduction

1. The applicant, who is a national of Afghanistan, seeks to challenge the respondent’s decision dated 14 November 2023 which concluded that he was older than his claimed age. The applicant maintains that his date of birth is 1 January 2007; however, the respondent has assessed his date of birth to be 1 January 2004, which would make him 21 rather than 18 years old at the date of the hearing.

2. The purpose of these proceedings is to determine the age and date of birth of the applicant. For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, he was born on 15 October 2006.

3. References in square brackets to “[HB/X]” are to the pages in the hearing bundle.

Background

4. The applicant was born in Afghanistan. According to him, he grew up in a small village an hour and a half’s drive from Jalalabad where he lived with his parents and younger siblings. He claims to have left Afghanistan in or around August 2021. He travelled through various countries including Iran, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland and France. Following three unsuccessful attempts to enter the UK, he arrived here by small boat on 10 October 2022. In an interview with the Home Office shortly after his arrival, he explained that he had come to the UK “for a better future, for better opportunities”, that he would “return to my country after I complete my studies in the UK” and that he had come here “to support my family financially” [HB/230-231]. The applicant’s date of birth was recorded by the Home Office as “1 January 2007” [HB/228]. However, it appears that the applicant provided only his year of birth and the Home Office therefore recorded the day and month as 1 January in the absence of any more precise information. As a consequence, the applicant has adopted 1 January 2007 as his date of birth.

5. The applicant claimed asylum on 17 October 2022. While we do not have documents relating to his asylum claim before us, the applicant’s representatives have confirmed that his claim was refused on 11 April 2024 and that he has a pending appeal before the First-tier Tribunal.

6. On 26 October 2022, the applicant was transferred to the care of the respondent who placed him with a foster carer. He was also allocated social workers. Evidently, there was some doubt as to whether the applicant was as young as he claimed to be and, consequently, he was referred for an age assessment. He was interviewed by two social workers, Ms Verity Avery and Mr Jerry Okoh (“the assessors”), on 16 and 19 October 2023. A third meeting took place with the applicant on 7 November 2023 at which the social workers informed him of the reasons why they minded to believe him to be older than he claimed and gave him the opportunity to respond (the “minded to” meeting). A fourth and final meeting took place on 14 November 2023 at which the applicant was informed of the outcome of the assessment. This was confirmed in the age assessment report that is challenged by the applicant in these proceedings [HB/367]. The assessors decided that the applicant had been born on 1 January 2004 which would have made him 18 years old when he arrived in the UK.

The application for judicial review

7. The applicant initiated these proceedings on 24 June 2024. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Bright J in an order sealed on 27 September 2024 and the case was transferred to the Upper Tribunal to hear the substantive hearing.

8. The applicant raises two grounds of claim:

• Ground 1: The age assessment process was procedurally unfair because (i) no appropriate adult was provided to support the applicant at the interview that took place on 16 October 2023; and (ii) the applicant was not given a fair and proper opportunity to respond to adverse points taken against him during the “minded to” meeting.

• Ground 2: The respondent came to the wrong factual conclusion in finding that the applicant is older than his claimed age.

The law

9. The parties were agreed on the legal principles applicable to age assessment cases.
10. In R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court decided that “there is a right or a wrong answer” to the question whether an individual is or is not a child and that it was for the court to determine it. A person’s age is a fact precedent to a local authority exercising any of its powers under the Children Act 1989. The role of this Tribunal therefore is to determine, in its inquisitorial role and on the balance of probabilities, whether the applicant is a child. Neither party is required to prove the precedent fact and neither party bears the burden of proof (R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590). It is open to the Tribunal, having carried out a holistic assessment of all material evidence, to reach a conclusion that is different from both the claimed age and the assessed age.
11. The assessment of age is not subject to statute. Procedures have been developed, primarily through case law. The judgment in R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin), [2003] 4 All ER 280 laid down guidance in judicial review proceedings on appropriate processes to be adopted when a local authority is assessing a young person’s age in borderline cases. Assessments which comply with those guidelines are said to be “Merton compliant”. In VS v The Home Office [2014] EWHC 2483 (QB) and (AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 the court set out a list of core principles as they derive from the case law. In R (HAM) v London Borough of Brent [2022] EWHC 1924 (Admin), Swift J held that “it would be wrong to regard each item on the list as a requirement of fairness in every case” as although “each list contains a collection of some matters that will very likely be a requirement of fairness in all cases” there are “other matters that are unlikely ever to rise above general guidance or good practice”.
12. We summarise the main points made:
“(1) The purpose of an age assessment is to establish the chronological age of a young person.
(2) The decision makers cannot determine age solely on the basis of the appearance of the applicant, except in clear cases.
(3) Demeanour can be notoriously unreliable and by itself constituted only ‘somewhat fragile material’: NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) per Blake J at [28]. Demeanour will generally need to be viewed together with other things.
(4) There should be ‘no predisposition, divorced from the information and evidence available to the local authority, to assume that an applicant is an adult, or conversely that he is a child’: see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [37-38]. The decision, therefore, needs to be based on particular facts concerning the particular person.
(5) There is no burden of proof imposed on the applicant to prove his or her age in the course of the assessment: see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [38], confirmed by R (CJ) v Cardiff CC [2011] EWCA Civ 1590.
(6) Benefit of any doubt is always given to the unaccompanied asylum-seeking child since it is recognised that age assessment is not a scientific process: A and WK v London Borough of Croydon & Others [2009] EWHC 939 (Admin) per Collins J at [40]; see also [21] of A (AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 (Admin).
(7) The two social workers who carry out the age assessment should be properly trained and experienced: A and WK per Collins J at [38].
(8) The applicant should have an appropriate adult, and should be informed of the right to have one, with the purpose of having an appropriate adult also being explained to him or her.
(9) The applicant should be told the purpose of the assessment.
(10) The decision ‘must be based on firm grounds and reasons’ [and] ‘must be fully set out and explained to the applicant’: A and WK per Collins J at [12].
(11) The approach of the assessors must involve trying to establish a rapport with the applicant and any questioning, while recognising the possibility of coaching, should be by means of ‘open-ended and not leading questions’.
(12) It is ‘equally important for the assessors to be aware of the customs and practices and any particular difficulties faced by the applicant in his home society’: A and WK per Collins J at [13].
(13) It is ‘axiomatic that an applicant should be given a fair and proper opportunity, at a stage when a possible adverse decision is no more than provisional, to deal with important points adverse to his age case which may weigh against him’: R (FZ) v Croydon LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 59, [21].
(14) It is not sufficient that the interviewing social workers withdraw to consider their decision, and then return to present the applicant ‘with their conclusions without first giving him the opportunity to deal with the adverse points’. In R (HAM) at [32] the court stated ‘a fair interview will permit the person who is being assessed a genuine opportunity to explain his position to answer questions that may be put to him and to respond to matters adverse to their case’.
(15) Assessments devoid of detail and/or reasons for the conclusion are not compliant with Merton guidelines; and the conclusions must be ‘expressed with sufficient detail to explain all the main adverse points which the fuller document showed had influenced the decision’ (FZ, at [22]).”
13. In R (AM) v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] UKUT 000118 (IAC) the Vice President of the Upper Tribunal stated, at [15];
“In the present case the evidence is wide-ranging. It may therefore be appropriate to make some general observations about the impact of evidence of various sorts and from various sources in this type of case. First, we think that almost all evidence of physical characteristics is likely to be of very limited value. That is because, as pointed out by Kenneth Parker J in R (R) v Croydon [2011] EWHC 1473 (Admin) there is no clear relationship between chronological age and physical maturity in respect of most measurable aspects of such maturity.”
14. The guidance given in Merton was approved by the Supreme Court in R (A) v London Borough of Croydon [2009] UKSC 8 where the following was stated:
“The decision maker cannot determine age solely on the basis of the appearance of the applicant. In general, the decision maker must seek to elicit the general background of the applicant, including his family circumstances and history, his educational background, and his activities during the previous few years. Ethnic and cultural information may also be important. If there is reason to doubt the applicant’s statement as to his age, the decision maker will have to make an assessment of credibility and he will have to ask questions designed to test his credibility.”
15. The observations made by the Upper Tribunal in R (AM) were endorsed by the Administrative Court in GE Eritrea), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) (at [74]). In the earlier decision of NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) Blake J indicated, at [27], that physical appearance alone was a notoriously unreliable basis for assessment of chronological age. This was endorsed in VS (at [78]). In R (AM) the following was also stated:
“There may be value to be obtained from observations of demeanour and interaction with others made over a long period of time by those who have opportunity to observe an individual going about his ordinary life. … It [is] difficult to see that any useful observations of demeanour or social interaction or maturity can be made in the course of a short interview between an individual and a strange adult.”
16. The Upper Tribunal considered that the view of a person who could point to consistent attitudes and a number of supporting instances over a considerable period of time was likely to carry weight that observations made in the artificial surroundings of an interview could not carry. The Tribunal also noted that the evidence of interaction between an age-disputed individual and other young people may well assist in making an Age Assessment. The approach in R (AM) was endorsed in R (GE) v Secretary of State and Bedford Borough Council [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) where the Administrative Court noted that people can behave in a formal interview in a way that is very different from their normal behaviour as a result of nervousness, fear, feeling of intimidation, or because they simply want the experience to end.
17. In MVN v LB Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 the Administrative Court observed that the primary focus will be on the credibility of the person’s evidence concerning their age, but it is permissible to have regard to credibility more generally, as long as the primary focus is not forgotten. Any assessment of credibility must be made “in the round” and in light of all relevant evidence, including background country evidence and expert reports (Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367, Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11), and allowance should be given to the fact that asylum seekers may have problems giving coherent accounts of their history: R (N) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 1952 (Admin).
18. When assessing the plausibility of the applicant’s account, the Tribunal must additionally remind itself that reliance on inherent improbability may be dangerous or inappropriate where the conduct in question has taken place in a society whose conduct and customs are very different from those in the United Kingdom (HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, at [29]; Araghi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 973, at [7]).
19. Finally, in cases such as this one where the applicant seeks to challenge the age assessment both on the merits and on procedural grounds, the procedural challenge should not be considered in isolation from the decision on the merits unless there is a good reason to do (SB v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 924, at [86]). Elisabeth Laing LJ (with whom Falk LJ and Sir Launcelot Henderson agreed) gave two linked reasons for this at [85]: (i) the outcome on the merits may well make an independent decision on any procedural challenge unnecessary; and (ii) it may well be artificial and unhelpful to consider a procedural unfairness challenge without also confronting the decision on the merits without which it is impossible to make an accurate assessment of the significance of the procedural challenge, which a decision on the merits may well supersede.
The evidence

20. On the first day of the hearing, the Tribunal heard oral evidence from the applicant who adopted his witness statements dated 19 June 2024 and 18 December 2024 as his evidence-in-chief. He was cross-examined by Mr Hoar. There was no re-examination by Mr Shattock. The panel had some additional questions for the applicant after which both advocates were offered, but declined, the opportunity to ask follow-up questions.

21. On the second day of the hearing, we heard evidence from Ms Avery and Mr Okoh as well as Ms Jade Read, the applicant’s current social worker. They adopted their respective witness statements as their evidence-in-chief and were cross-examined by Mr Shattock. In accordance with directions issued by the Tribunal on 19 February 2025, Mr Shattock was only permitted to cross-examine Ms Avery and Mr Okoh on the procedure adopted at the age assessment interviews and their evidence in rebuttal of the applicant’s evidence. Mr Hoar asked Ms Avery some questions in re-examination and the panel also had some questions for her. Again, the advocates were given the opportunity to ask follow-up questions, but they declined.

22. The evidence of the applicant and the witnesses is recorded in their witness statements and the record of proceedings and is not therefore rehearsed here except where it is necessary to do so.

The age assessment

23. It is not necessary to set out the full reasons given by the respondent for finding that the applicant was older than he claimed, but the key aspects of the decision are summarised below using the same headings as set out in the analysis section of the report [HB/387]:

(a) Credibility: In the absence of any reliable documentary evidence to confirm the applicant’s age, the assessors took into account his credibility.

i. While not strictly credibility-related, the assessors took into account that the applicant had been described as having an appearance older than his claimed age of 16, specifically some grey hair (earlier in the report described as “flecks” on the sides of his head) and an “established jawline and lack of youthful glow”. Furthermore, the applicant had not grown out of his clothes or shoes during his journey to the UK and, by his own account, he had reached his “adult height” before leaving Afghanistan in August 2021. He also appeared to have facial hair before starting his journey to the UK.

ii. The assessors also drew adverse inferences from what they found to be a “conflicting” account of how he became aware of his age. He had said that his mother would remind him every year of his upcoming birthday, but he could not recall the month or time of year she told him. This, they found, conflicted with his account during the “minded to” session that his mother would remind him before Ramadan, which is a significant event in the Islamic calendar. They also found that his evidence conflicted because on the one hand he said that age was not important in Afghanistan but he also said that age was important for fasting at Ramadan.

iii. They also found that he had first stated that he lost his Tazkira (an Afghan identity document that would include his date of birth) but later claimed it had been burnt. He had also told the assessors that his mother had a hospital document confirming his date of birth but subsequently said his parents did not have any documents confirming his age.

iv. The applicant had also said that his mother would tell him his age every year but also that he had called his uncle to confirm his age while he was in France.

v. The assessors were struck by the “limited information” the applicant had shared with them about his history and his vagueness when talking about his life prior to leaving Afghanistan.

vi. As “human growth indicates a male will reach their full height by the age of 17 ½ years of age” they concluded that he “was at least this age when leaving Afghanistan and is at least 19 years of age” at the time of the assessment.

(b) Physical appearance, interaction and demeanour: While noting that physical appearance alone should not be a determining factor, the assessors took into account that the applicant’s appearance

“is not in keeping with that of other 16-year-old young men they had worked with. His body was fully developed and he had “established facial hair and body hair” as well as “grey hairs which are in keeping with chronological aging”.

His face showed “maturity and lacks the youthful glow”, it was stated. While it was acknowledged that some of the applicant’s aging could be caused by trauma or hereditary conditions, it was found that the applicant had failed to provide any reasonable explanations for the physical signs of aging they had observed.

(c) Documents and observations from others: The assessors had regard to the views of the applicant’s foster carer (who said the applicant was ready for independent living); his former social worker, Roxanne Clark (who, based on the applicant’s appearance, believed him to be in his early twenties); and another former social worker, Blaize Campbell (who also believed the applicant’s age to surpass that of a 16-year-old and “potentially extends beyond the age of 18”).

24. In conclusion, the assessors said that

“it is likely [MSK] was at least 17.5 years of age when he left Afghanistan in August 2021. [MSK’s] probable age could range between nineteen and twenty-two. Having applied the benefit of the doubt the assessors have assigned him the lowest of the age range which is nineteen years of age. The assessors have used the month and date provided to [MSK] on arrival as he has given no indication as to the time of year he was born. [MSK’s] assessed date of birth is 1st January 2004.”

Conclusions

25. For the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in SB, we do not intend to consider Ground 1 independently of Ground 2. Instead, we will consider to what extent, if any, the procedural complaints raised by the applicant lessens the weight we attach to the age assessment report.

The weight to be attached to the respondent’s age assessment

26. We therefore begin by considering the age assessment. We must consider the age assessment on its merits and that there is no presumption that it should be afforded any particular weight.

27. Mr Shattock, however, argued that the age assessment is vitiated by procedural impropriety. The first reason he gave was that no appropriate adult was present at the first age assessment interview, and while the applicant confirmed that he was okay to proceed in the absence of one, the role of the appropriate adult was not explained to him.

28. We remind ourselves that what is fair depends on the particular circumstances of the case: see HAM at [12].

29. There is no legal requirement for a local authority to provide an independent adult at age assessment interviews: see SB at [90]. It is instead an indication of best practice as recommended by the Association of Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS) in their age assessment guidance (October 2015). As the Court of Appeal found in SB, “Whether an interview will be unfair if there is no appropriate adult will depend on a range of factors, which will vary from case to case”.

30. In the present case, Mr Shattock argued that if the appropriate adult had been present, the applicant would have had someone whom he could turn to if he felt distressed and that would have enabled him to give better answers to the assessors’ questions.

31. The interview notes made by Mr Okoh confirm that Ms Avery asked the applicant whether he wanted to proceed with the interview in the absence of an appropriate adult. The applicant answered, “Yes, I have no problem” [HB/303]. Mr Shattock, however, argued that the transcript does not show that the role of the appropriate adult was explained to the applicant and, therefore, his decision to proceed without one was not an informed one. In cross-examination, Ms Avery accepted that a failure to explain the role of an appropriate adult would be contrary to the ADCS guidance and that appropriate adults have an important role to play in age assessments. She also said that an appropriate adult should be provided “wherever possible”. Ms Avery accepted that Mr Okoh’s notes did not record her explaining the role of the appropriate adult to the applicant at the first interview, but she said that his notes began at a particular point in time and therefore omitted things like the assessors introducing themselves to the applicant and offering him water. She said that “in my memory, I spoke about the appropriate adult”. In submissions, Mr Shattock argued that the fact that at the third meeting on 7 November 2023 the applicant had to be reminded who the appropriate adult was supported his assertion that no one had previously explained this to the applicant [HB/339].

32. Mr Okoh’s transcript of the first meeting on 16 October 2023 confirms that the applicant turned up for the assessment at 9:28 am and that his note of the meeting commenced at 10:15 am. We are therefore satisfied that there was a 47-minute window during which Ms Avery could have explained the role of the appropriate adult to the applicant before the session formally began. On balance, we find it more likely than not that Ms Avery, as a social worker used to working with young people and familiar with the ADCS guidance, would have explained to the applicant what the role of the appropriate adult was. While we accept that the applicant did have to be reminded who Dale Williams, the appropriate adult, was at the third meeting, we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this means the role of the appropriate adult had not previously been explained to him. In making this finding, we have taken into account that the appropriate adult had been present at the second interview on 19 October 2023 and introduced himself as “Dale Willams from Appropriate [sic] adult services – here to ensure the process is fair and done well” [HB/321]. We therefore find that it is more likely than not that the applicant had simply forgotten who Mr Williams was during the intervening three weeks. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the applicant’s decision to proceed with the first session in the absence of an appropriate adult was an informed one.

33. We therefore find that the absence of an appropriate adult at the first session did not amount to procedural unfairness. Mr Shattock did not take us to any aspect of the applicant’s answers to questions during his first age assessment interview that he might have answered better or differently had an appropriate adult been present. We also take into account that despite the appropriate adult being present at the second to fourth sessions, the applicant did not need to consult with him at any time and nor did the appropriate adult see the need to intervene at any point. We therefore find that it is more likely than not that it would have been the same at the first interview had the appropriate adult attended. We also take into account that in the absence of the appropriate adult, Ms Avery took appropriate steps to ensure the applicant’s well-being. For example, she asked him whether he was anxious about the process [HB/303]; she told him he could ask for a break or fresh air at any point [HB/304]; she consistently invited him to expand or provide more detail on his answers to questions; and she insisted that he take break during the interview even though he had declined one [HB/309]. Finally, the appropriate adult was present at the final three sessions, including the “minded to” meeting on 7 November 2023.

34. To the extent that it was asserted on behalf of the applicant that the assessors accepted that he suffered from trauma during his journey to the UK and, therefore, it should have been clear to them that an appropriate adult was required, we find that the assertion that the applicant has faced trauma has only ever been raised in the broadest sense and has never been supported by any medico-legal evidence showing that he has been diagnosed with any formal condition or that he has required any treatment for trauma. We do not therefore accept that this was a reason that made it imperative that an appropriate adult attended the first meeting.

35. The second point Mr Shattock raised in relation to procedural unfairness was to do with the way the assessors approached the “minded to” meeting. At para 28 of his skeleton argument, Mr Shattock says that Mr Okoh’s notes of the session show

“that a series of adverse points were simply read out to MSK in a harsh manner, including inappropriate adverse appearance points…without any real attempt to elicit a meaningful response to each point taken against MSK or to reassure him.”

36. We reject that submission. First, reading the transcript we do not accept that it suggests the adverse points were presented to the applicant in a “harsh manner”. The whole purpose of the meeting was so that the assessors could present the applicant with the reasons why they were minded to disagree with his claimed age and they cannot be criticised for the way they put the points to him as recorded in Mr Okoh’s note. Second, as explained above, the appropriate adult was present at that meeting. If there was any legitimate concern in the way the session was conducted, it is reasonable to assume that Mr Wilson would have intervened, but he did not. Third, it is clear that the applicant was given the opportunity to respond to each point raised by Ms Avery. The fact that in some instances she sought to elicit further responses from the applicant and in others she did not does not in our view demonstrate any unfairness on the part of the respondent. The important point is that the applicant, in the presence of the appropriate adult, was given a fair opportunity to reply to each of the adverse points raised by the assessors. How he chose to respond was a matter for him.

37. For these reasons, we find that the procedural unfairness arguments raised by the applicant are not made out and they do not therefore diminish the weight to be attached to the respondent’s age assessment.

38. We therefore turn to consider the contents of the age assessment.

39. First, to the extent that the report relies in part on the applicant’s appearance and demeanour, we are not satisfied that these are weighty considerations. Beginning with appearance, we acknowledge that the assessors and other social workers will have significant experience of working with young people to draw upon. This includes Ms Campbell and Ms Clark, the applicant’s former social workers, both of whom were of the opinion that he was likely older than his stated age. However, physical appearance is a notoriously unreliable basis for determining a person’s age (see, for example, NA v LB of Croydon) and this is not a case where it is asserted that the applicant looks so much older than his claimed age that this can be considered to be a reliable indicator.

40. We also find that little weight can be attached to the fact, accepted by the applicant, that he has some grey hairs on the side of his head. As Mr Hoar submitted, it is not impossible for a teenager to have some grey hairs but it is unusual. However, it does not seem to us to be much less unusual for a 19-year-old to have grey hairs than a 16-year-old (going by the date of the age assessment). That is especially the case here, where there appears to have been some acknowledgement by the assessors that this may have been the result of the stress caused to the applicant on his journey to the UK and that other possible explanations include vitamin deficiency and genetics [HB/372]. We also attach little weight to the evidence that the applicant was shaving before he came to the UK. As the age assessment itself notes, “the presence of facial hairs was not an uncommon feature of adolescent males from his ethnicity” [ibid]. We also find that the applicant having an “established jaw line and lack of youthful glow” [HB/388] are unlikely to be reliable indicators of the applicant’s age and should be treated with caution. To the extent that the age assessment claims that the applicant was “unable to provide any reasonable explanations for the physical signs of aging observed by the assessors and his social workers” [HB/389], as explained above, the applicant did provide stress an explanation for the grey hair. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern what sort of reasonable explanation the applicant could provide to the statement that was put to him during the “minded to” meeting: “You have not provided any explanation that would cause premature aging, emotional or physical maturity and development” [HB/351].

41. Second, we find that limited weight can be attached to the applicant’s demeanour and interactions with others. As with physical appearance, demeanour can be notoriously unreliable as a method by which to gauge a person’s age. The assessors took into account that the applicant had “taken on the role as an “older brother” to other young people in his foster placement” and had “mediated between other young people” during group sessions [HB/387]. We do not, however, find that this is particularly strong evidence that he is older than his claimed age. According to the applicant, he is the eldest of six children and, in the circumstances, it would seem obvious that he would be capable of assuming an “older brother” role and/or be able to mediate with other young people. Neither do we find that the rapid progress the applicant has made at school is a weighty reason to doubt his age. The additional needs plan prepared by the applicant’s school in 2023 records his teachers as describing him as “a studious young man who tries very hard”, “attentive and capable”, someone who “works very hard”, and being “quite capable of work” [HB/261]. Therefore, he could simply be a hardworking and determined student rather than a person with a head start. His rapid progress might be also down to the applicant being a child and therefore better able to absorb and retain new information than an adult.

42. We also find that little weight can be attached to the reliance on foster carer’s comments that the applicant is confident and comfortable around adults as evidence that he is not a child. We note that the foster carer does not appear to have suggested that the applicant was an adult. Furthermore, in contrast, the assessors were also aware that Ms Campbell had commented that the applicant came “across as reserved when interacting with certain adults” [HB/344], therefore the information was inconsistent.

43. Third, with regards to the credibility points raised by the assessors in the analysis section of their report, we find that many of these are not credibility points at all but matters to do with the applicant’s appearance, interactions and demeanour. We have already dealt with these points above. To the extent that the credibility section does raise matters arising out of the applicant’s evidence during the assessment process, the main issues cited are as follows:

a) The applicant gave an inconsistent account of how he learned about his age. The report says that on the one hand, the applicant said that his mother would remind him every year of his upcoming birthday, but he could not recall the month or time of year she told him; but he later said during the “minded to” meeting that his mother would remind him of his age before Ramadan.

b) He had given inconsistent evidence about how he knew the ages of his siblings: he had alternatively said that he learned this information when he was in France and the UK.

c) He had first said that he “lost” his Tazkira on his journey to the UK but later said that it had been burned on the Turkish-Iranian border.

d) He had said that his mother had a document from a hospital confirming his date of birth but later said that his parents had no documents confirming his age and was unable to explain why they did not have this document.

44. Beginning with (a), it is not in dispute that, in Afghanistan, birthdays are not traditionally celebrated and a person’s particular age does not have the same relevance that it does in the West. In that light, it is not implausible that the applicant would have been unaware of his precise date of birth. We note that during the first age assessment interview, when asked how he knew his age when he left Afghanistan (the applicant says he was 14 at the time), the applicant answered, “I have my parents and I asked them” [HB/304]. Later in the same interview, the applicant was asked how he knew his age if he did not celebrate his birthday. The applicant answered, “Parents will tell you that one month later you will be 12 or 13, so that’s the job of parents” [HB/315]. The applicant was also asked the month he born in. He answered, “I don’t think I will be able to work that out. We had a very rough journey. It has affected my memory” [HB/320].

45. At the second interview, Ms Avery asked the following question: “You mentioned that your mum will tell you how old you are about a month before your birthday. Why did she have to tell you how old you are?”. The applicant answered, “Because in Afghan [sic], when people start fasting, start praying. So, for that reason, they remind that they are of this age and you should start fasting? [sic]”. Ms Avery asked the applicant what age he started fasting. “14 years” was his answer [HB/323].

46. To the extent that there may be said to be a discrepancy between the applicant’s answers during the two interviews, we are not satisfied that they are so significant as to cast serious doubt on the applicant’s credibility. His claim during the first interview that he asked his parents for his age and that they would tell him before his birthday and his second interview, when he said that he would be told his age so that he knew when to start fasting are not incompatible with each other. During the “minded to” session, the applicant explained that his mother

“told me that you are bigger now and that you are not 14 anymore that you are 15. The year before you did not fast full but She said next year you will have to fast full month because you will be older [sic].”

47. At paragraphs 6 and 7 of his first witness statement, the applicant says the following:

“6. I know the year of birth because that is why my mother told me. When I was aged 14, my mother told me that I would be 15 years old in the upcoming year, which meant that I needed to start properly fasting during the month of Ramadan.

7. My mother told me I was born during Ramadan. The Islamic calendar is lunar. Ramadan moves through the seasons and is not the same month every year.”

48. We note two things. First, if the applicant was born during the month of Ramadan, which is linked to the lunar calendar and therefore changes each year, it is not implausible that he would have been unable to tell the assessors what time of year his birthday fell. Second, if the applicant was born during Ramadan in 2007, his date of birth must have taken place between 13 September and 12 October of that year and he would therefore be several months younger than the 1 January birth date that he is using suggests. If, as he claims, he left Afghanistan in August 2021, that means that he would have been 13 years old when he left the country and not 14 years old. Alternatively, if the applicant’s year of birth is 2006, he would have been born between 23 September and 23 October of that year.

49. The applicant’s evidence at para 9 of his first witness statement is that his mother informed him “a couple of months” before he left Afghanistan that he would be 15 at the next Ramadan. Ramadan in 2021 must therefore already have taken place: it occurred between 13 April and 12 May that year. If the applicant was 14 at the time of their discussion, that means his mother must have been referring to Ramadan 2022. That would suggest that the applicant was born in 2006 and not 2007 – otherwise, he would not have turned 14 until after he left Afghanistan. It is of course possible that his mother was wrong, or the applicant has misremembered their conversation, and that he was in fact 13 when he left the country. But, for reasons that we discuss below, we find that means it is even less likely that he would have stopped growing before he set off on his journey to the UK. In any event, we are not satisfied that the applicant did give an inconsistent account of how he learned of his age.

50. Turning to (b), the applicant was asked for, and gave, the age of his siblings during the first age assessment [HB/306]. In doing so, he told the assessors that “I did not ask their age when back home. I enquired when I came here”. Ms Avery asked him, “So when did you ask their age, is it recently or when you got here?” The applicant answered, “When I first got here”. He went on to explain why he did that: “When I was interviewed by the solicitors, that was then it was required”. It is unclear when the applicant first spoke to solicitors. However, his answers would mean the applicant must have enquired immediately on arrival because during his Home Office interview on 14 October 2022, four days after he entered the country, he was able to tell the Home Office the ages of his siblings [HB/230]. However, during his second age assessment interview, the applicant was asked how he managed to remember his age during a traumatic journey and he answered, “When I was in France, I spoke with my maternal uncle then he asked my age, and my parents told him of my age and my sibling’s [sic] age” [HB/336]. We are satisfied that there is a clear inconsistency between the two versions of events. This discrepancy was not, however, put to the applicant during the second interview or at the minded to session. The applicant’s first witness statement says at para 39 that, while in France, he called his uncle who told him the ages of his siblings. Ultimately, we find that some weight can be attached to this discrepancy in the applicant’s version of events, and that it damaging to his credibility.

51. With regards to (c), we do not find it to be implausible that when the applicant initially referred during his first age assessment interview to having “lost” his Tazkira [HB/304] that this did not necessarily mean that it had been misplaced. The applicant was not pressed by Ms Avery about how he had lost it, and we are satisfied that it could have encompassed it having been burnt by the Turkish police along with his clothes as he subsequently stated during the second interview [HB/336] and maintains in his first witness statement. We would add that it was not argued on behalf of the respondent that the applicant’s claim that the Turkish police burnt his possessions was itself incredible. We do note that in the witness statement of Ms Erinç Argün Kayim of the Refugee Council, she states at para 16 that the applicant told her in December 2023 that he had “lost” his Tazkira [HB/409]. Again, we accept that “lost” could encompass the document being destroyed by fire. Given that the applicant was not cross-examined about any inconsistency in his accounts, we do not find this to be significantly damaging to his credibility.

52. Finally, with regards to (d), we find that the assessors have misstated the applicant’s answers to questions put to him. The applicant never said that his parents definitely had a document from the hospital confirming his birth. The applicant informed the assessors during the first interview that he had lost his Tazkira and that he would contact his family “back home to see if they have some form of document to show my age and I will let you know” [HB/304]. Ms Avery then asked how many pieces of ID he had in Afghanistan. The applicant repeated that he had lost his Tazkira, which he said was not a birth certificate, and then referred to a second document: “The other one is when you are born in a hospital[,] then there is another document”. Later, Ms Avery asked, “is it likely that your parents have the other documents [sic] from the hospital[?]”. The applicant answered, “I am not sure, but I will ask them”. It is therefore clear from reading that exchange that the applicant did not say that his parents definitely had in their possession a document from a hospital confirming his age.

53. At the second interview, Ms Avery reminded the applicant that he had said at the last session that he would try and contact his family about any documents they might have regarding his date of birth [HB/322]. The applicant answered, “I couldn’t contact them”. Ms Avery did not ask the applicant to clarify why he could not contact his family. Instead, she asked him whether he could contact them before their next session in a couple of weeks. The applicant said, “I cannot be certain”. Again, he was not pressed on his response. Instead, Ms Avery said, “If you can try, that will be great, if not, that’s okay”.

54. At the third meeting, Ms Avery asked the applicant whether he had managed to get any paperwork or documents from his family. The response was, “There are no docs” [HB/339]. Ms Avery asked the applicant whether he meant there were no documents or he had not managed to speak with his family. The applicant said, “I spoke with my cousin, and he spoke with my mother, but they do not have any docs”. Ms Avery did not ask the applicant any further questions on this topic.

55. We therefore find that, first, the applicant had never told the assessors that his family definitely had in their possession a document from a hospital confirming his date of birth; and, second, Ms Avery never asked him to provide an explanation as to why his family did not have this document. We do not therefore find it reasonable for the assessors to have drawn adverse conclusions from this. At para 13 of his first witness statement, the applicant claims that his “family lost the original documents about when I was born when they fled our village when the Taliban took over and we all went to Jalalabad in August 2021”. He further states at para 39 that he has “subsequently” (and he does not make clear subsequent to what) spoken to his mother and she told him that “my original documents about my birth were lost when we left our village. My family have moved around in Afghanistan since I left”. That evidence would appear to contradict the applicant’s earlier claim to the assessors that it was his cousin who told him this. Furthermore, the suggestion that his family had “moved around Afghanistan” appears to be inconsistent with the applicant’s oral evidence that his family have been hiding in his maternal uncle’s house in Jalalabad since the Taliban came to power. However, the applicant was not cross-examined in relation to these points. In the circumstances, we are slow to draw an adverse inference from them.

The applicant’s growth

56. What we find to be more favourable to the respondent’s case is the information provided by the applicant to the assessors regarding whether he grew out of his clothes or shoes following his departure from Afghanistan in 2021. During the second age assessment interview, the applicant was asked a series of questions regarding the fit of his shoes and clothes since he left Afghanistan [HB/325]. The applicant was asked whether he had grown height-wise since he arrived in England. He said that he did not know. The applicant said that he was still wearing the same shoes given when he was in “the hotel” (which is presumably a reference to Home Office asylum accommodation he was placed in on arrival to the UK). He also said that the clothes he was given at the hotel still fitted him. It was made clear to the applicant by Ms Avery that she was referring not just to his height but also his shoulders, to which the applicant answered, “I don’t know about this”. The applicant also told the assessors that he did not recall a time where he grew quickly. Ms Avery asked him whether he recalled a time that his trousers had fitted him but suddenly appeared too short. The applicant answered, “Yes, I mean when you grow up, obviously changes happen”. Asked whether he remembered when he stopped growing and did not need to change his trousers because they remained the same size, he said, “No”. Finally, Ms Avery asked the applicant whether this happened before he started his journey to the UK and the answer was, “I believe”.

57. However, during cross-examination, the applicant said that he did not know whether he stopped growing before he left Afghanistan because he wore different clothes there. When it was put to him by Mr Hoar that he had said during the second interview that he “believe[d]” he had stopped growing before he began his journey, the applicant answered, “I don’t know. I don’t know how I can say this”. Mr Hoar then asked the applicant whether he had grown since arriving in the UK. The applicant answered, “I don’t know whether I have grown or not. I myself don’t realise, but if someone else sees me maybe they would realise”. Mr Hoar put it to the applicant that he would know because he would be bigger or taller and his clothes would no longer fit him. The applicant answered that he was given “different clothes in the hotel and afterwards I was given different clothes, so I don’t know what sizes they gave me”. He said that he had stopped wearing some of the clothes given to him at the hotel when he was in foster care because “they were tight, they did not fit me” and, later, “I believe that the clothes that they gave me in the hotel were small for me in the [foster care] house, but the clothes they gave me in the house fitted me”. Mr Hoar asked the applicant to clarify whether he meant he had grown out of the clothes or whether some of the clothes he was given at the hotel fitted him and some did not. The applicant answered, “No, at the hotel they fitted me. I used those for a few months. After that, they were small”.

58. As Mr Hoar submitted, the applicant had the opportunity to inform the age assessors that he had grown out of the clothes he was given at the hotel in October 2022 during the age assessment interview, but he failed to do so. Furthermore, he had the opportunity to explain that he had in fact grown out of his clothes in either of the two witness statements he had made in support of these proceedings, but he again failed to mention it. Mr Hoar therefore invited the Tribunal to find that the applicant had made up his evidence during cross-examination.

59. We find that the applicant’s claim during cross-examination to have grown out of his clothes since arriving in the UK, having previously failed to mention this during the age assessment interview or in his witness statements, on balance, must be treated with caution and is therefore damaging to his credibility. However, we bear in mind that just because the applicant has not told the truth on this point does not necessarily mean that he has lied about his age and that he may have been seeking to embellish his case.

60. On the basis of the evidence before us, on balance, we find it more likely than not that the applicant had stopped growing before he left Afghanistan around August 2021. Furthermore, as we have explained above, if the applicant is correct that he was born during Ramadan and was 14 years old when he left Afghanistan, he must have been born between 23 September and 23 October 2006 and is slightly older than he claims. Alternatively, if he is correct and he was born in 2007, he would have been 13 years old when he left Afghanistan. The age assessment relies on NHS guidance which says that puberty begins for boys between the ages of 10 and 14 and that by “the age of 17 growth occurs at a much slower rate until full maturity is reached at age 18 or 19” [HB/372]. The assessors also refer to the fact that at the time of the age assessment interviews, the applicant’s height was 5’6”. According to the age assessment, the average height of a 19-year-old male in Afghanistan is 5’5.2” [HB/371-372]. The assessors correctly remind themselves that “human growth can vary” and that they must “use the data with caution”. We also bear that in mind.

61. We accept that it is not impossible that the applicant may have stopped growing at the age of 13 or 14, or that his growth had slowed to a barely perceptible level after he reached that age. Neither is it impossible that, at the age of 17, the applicant would be slightly taller than most adult males in his country. It would, however, in our view be unlikely that by the age of 13 or 14 the applicant had come to close to or exceeded the height of the average 19-year-old male in his country and for this not to have been remarked upon or for him to not have realised that he went through a period of rapid growth before he left Afghanistan, although we do also bear in mind that the average height for a man in Afghanistan is only 5’5.2”. However, on balance, we find it less likely that the applicant would have stopped growing by the age of 13 or 14 and we therefore find that we can attach some weight to these factors when assessing the evidence in the round.

Additional credibility points

62. In addition to the point regarding whether the applicant had grown since leaving Afghanistan, Mr Hoar placed reliance on several factors, including the applicant purportedly giving inconsistent evidence about the number of siblings that he has; which countries he travelled through on his way to the UK and how long her stayed in them; his father’s job in Jalalabad; his account of going to school and working with his father in his home village; and how he lost his Tazkira.

63. We are not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates to the civil standard that the applicant sought to mislead the respondent or other authorities about his siblings. First, it is unclear what the applicant has to gain by not being truthful about how many siblings he has. Moreover, we find that the evidence does not demonstrate on balance that the applicant was more likely than not being untruthful. During his Home Office interview, the applicant said that he had three brothers and two sisters, which he maintains is correct [HB/230]. However, Mr Okoh’s note of the first age assessment meeting records that the applicant said that he had “3 brothers and 1 sister” [HB/305]. On consideration, we find it more likely than not that this is down to a typographical error made by Mr Okoh. That is because on the following page Mr Okoh records Ms Avery asking the applicant the names of his “sisters” plural and the applicant is recorded as providing two names [HB/306]. In that light, we find it more likely than not that the reference in a letter written by East Sussex Healthcare dated 15 December 2022 to the applicant having “Four brothers, all younger than him” is likely down to a misunderstanding by the author or a mistranslation [HB/237].

64. Mr Hoar also argued that the applicant had given inconsistent accounts of the countries he had travelled through on his way to the UK. The applicant gave the following account to the Home Office shortly after his arrival:

“Iran – stayed for 7 months
Turkey – stayed for around 3 months
Greece – I didn’t stay
Serbia – I didn’t stay
Hungary – I didn’t stay
Austria – 4/5 days
Switzerland – I didn’t stay
France – I stayed 7 days in Dunkirk” [HB/231]

65. However, during the first age assessment interview the applicant had said that he stayed in Turkey for two months; Greece for “about 1 month”; Serbia for 10 days; Hungary for two to three days; Austria for two weeks; and France for a month [HB/316-318]. (In oral evidence, the applicant also said that he had been in Macedonia.) We accept that the two accounts are different. However, the journey took approximately 14 months and the two interviews took place a year apart. While one might expect that would mean the applicant’s initial account is the more accurate, we accept that the applicant may have felt discombobulated on his arrival in the UK after such a long journey. It is not therefore implausible that at his initial interview, four days after he entered the UK, that he was unable to give a full account and that he was only able to do so once he had settled into the country and could properly reflect on what had happened. Moreover, it is difficult to see how lying about his journey would be beneficial to the age claim. In the circumstances, we are willing to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt that it was difficult for him to remember the precise details of his journey.

66. Mr Hoar also submitted that the applicant’s evidence regarding what work his father did was implausible. The applicant said during his first age assessment interview that his father was a farmer who worked in the fields near their village but, in the winter, when snow would fall, his father would go to Jalalabad and work in the city {HB/312]. Asked what sort of work his father did there, the applicant answered, “Some kind of work, but I don’t know”. In cross-examination, the applicant said that his father would go to Jalalabad every winter and would come back and visit his family once a month. Mr Hoar asked, “And when he came back, he never spoke about what he did for a job?” The applicant’s answer was, “In my opinion, he was a porter carrying loads, a cart from one place to another place”. Asked if that was his opinion or he knew that his father was a porter, the applicant said, “I think he was doing this. He was doing this and also working in the shops as well, like difficult jobs, carrying big bags and things”. Asked where he had got this information from, the applicant answered, “He was using the word deyalai and the meaning of that in English is porter”. Mr Hoar asked, “So, he said he was a porter?” The applicant answered, “Yes, he said that he was a porter. But in fact I didn’t know what that word meant or what that person was doing at the time. But later I understood”. The applicant confirmed that he had never asked his father what deyalai meant. Nor had he asked any other family members. Asked by Mr Hoar why he told the assessors he did not know what type of work his father did, the applicant answered, “At that time I didn’t know, but now there is a period of time and recently I came to know what it means”. The applicant claimed that he had asked his cousin what deyalai meant prior to the hearing, first saying it was a month prior but then saying that it may have been two or three months ago. The applicant said that he had no curiosity to ask his father what deyalai meant.

67. We are satisfied on balance that the applicant has been deliberately vague about what work his father did during winters in Jalalabad. We do not find it plausible that despite knowing the Pashto word for what his father did that the applicant had no curiosity about this meant and did not ask any family members to explain it to him. The applicant’s unconvincing evidence was underscored by the fact that having claimed that his cousin had told him what the word meant in the run-up to the judicial review hearing, the applicant was able to state that his father’s job also involved him doing “difficult jobs” in shops without ever having asked his father for the details. While it is difficult to see why this would be relevant to the applicant’s claimed age, we are satisfied that it is damaging to the applicant’s general credibility.

68. Mr Hoar also argued that it was unconvincing that the applicant would have given up schooling, which took place a local mosque, aged nine to help his father in the fields. The applicant said that he used to study for an hour and a half at the madrassa and denied in oral evidence that he had lied about how much education he had. Mr Hoar pointed to the applicant’s response to a question during his first age assessment interview asking what work he did for his father. The applicant said, “When my father needed food or something, then I will take food and water for him”. During cross-examination, Mr Hoar put it to the applicant that if he was merely bringing his father food and water, the applicant still had plenty of time each day to attend the madrassa for an hour and a half. The applicant claimed that once he had started studying the Quran he could then do so alone at home. When it was suggested to him that he must have worked hard for his father, the applicant said that the reason he stopped going to the madrassa was that Taliban would take people from them and his father did not want that to happen to him. Mr Hoar suggested that delivering food and water was not really work, to which the applicant replied that after he delivered the food and water, he would stay and help his father in the fields.

69. We take into account that during the age assessment interviews the applicant was not pressed to provide details about why he stopped going to the madrassa or how exactly he helped his father. Therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant’s answers during cross-examination contradicted what he had earlier told the assessors. We do not therefore find that the applicant’s explanations in relation to his studies or working with his father to undermine his credibility.

70. Mr Hoar also relied on the fact that the applicant sought to change his Facebook username on 12 November 2023 which, he asked the Tribunal to note, was only a few days after the “minded to” meeting. According to the unredacted screenshot of the applicant’s profile information page, the applicant did change his username at 13:46 on 12 November 2023 and again one minute later to a third name. Asked by Mr Hoar whether he had changed his username in response to being told by the assessors that they were minded to not believe his age, the applicant answered, “I don’t know, I do not know about that”. We note that the applicant’s original username was his full name with no space between his first and second names. The first change of his username on 12 November 2023 was to “[his surname] Afghan”. He then changed it a minute later to his middle and last names.

71. The applicant disclosed data from his Facebook account in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions and there was no suggestion by the respondent that this disclosure had been incomplete or that the applicant had sought to hide any of his social media accounts. Neither is there any evidence before us that the assessors sought to access the applicant’s social media accounts themselves and found anything damaging to his claim. In the circumstances, we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant sought to change his Facebook username to hide his account from the assessors or anyone else. Had he intended to do so, it seems unlikely that he would have chosen to use his real second and last names.

72. What we find to be more damaging to the applicant’s credibility is that he relies on having been told his age by both his mother and his uncle. Yet for at least several weeks, and possibly months, following his departure from Afghanistan he had in his possession his Tazkira which would have included his official date of birth. During his oral evidence, the applicant claimed that he did not look at his Tazkira after he left Afghanistan in August 2021. When asked whether he had read his date of birth, he provided a vague answer: “I think so”. However, he said that he could not remember what it gave his date of birth as. Having considered the evidence before us which shows that the applicant is someone very keen to learn and acquire new knowledge, and that he is someone who has shown great independence for someone of his age, on balance, we are not satisfied that the applicant would not have looked at his Tazkira at least once following his departure from Afghanistan or, even if he had not looked at it since starting his journey, that he would be unable to remember his date of birth a year later when he arrived in the UK. This, we find, is the strongest point in favour of the respondent’s assessment of the applicant’s age.

Evidence relied upon by the applicant

73. The applicant seeks to rely on the witness statement of Ms Kayim dated 31 January 2024 [HB/405]. Ms Kayim is employed as a children’s advisor in the Age Dispute Project at the Refugee Council. Prior to that, she qualified as a lawyer in Turkey and worked for the UNHCR between 2017 and 2022. According to her statement, she met with the applicant for two hours on 28 December 2023. At para 30 of her statement, she explains that drawing on her “professional experience supporting separated asylum-seeking children” she believes that she “can give a view on [the applicant’s] age”. Ms Kayim’s opinion is “that he is more likely to be a child and that his presentation, behaviour, and the account he has given are consistent with that of a 17-year-old child”.

74. Mr Shattock invited us to place significant weight on Ms Kayim’s assessment. However, we take into account that while she has experience of working with child asylum-seekers for the Refugee Council and UNHCR, Ms Kayim’s training is that of lawyer. It is unclear what, if any, age assessment training she had undertaken. On consideration, we find that we are unable to attach more weight to her opinion, which was formed after a single two-hour meeting with the applicant, than that of the assessors, who are trained social workers and have had far more interaction with the applicant. Furthermore, we note that Ms Kayim’s opinion is based to a large extent on the applicant’s appearance and demeanour which, as we have already explained above in relation to the respondent’s assessment, are notoriously unreliable ways of ascertaining a person’s age.

The applicant’s age

75. We have found this case to be finely balanced. Neither party was able to produce any strong evidence one way or another.

76. We attach some, but not significant weight to the respondent’s age assessment. That is because parts of the conclusion are based on presentation and demeanour, neither of which are reliable indicators of age, especially in a case like this where the delta between the claimed age and assessed age is narrow. Furthermore, of the four main credibility points identified in the analysis section of the age assessment, we have found that little weight can be attached to the criticisms of the applicant’s account of how he learned about his age and whether his parents had a hospital document confirming his date of birth; and only some weight can be attached to the points regarding how he learned the ages of his siblings and his account of what happened to his Tazkira.

77. What we do find to be potentially damaging to the applicant’s credibility is his claim to have forgotten what date of birth was given for him on his Tazkira, despite this document being in his possession for several weeks or months following his departure from Afghanistan. We attach weight to this in favour of the respondent when assessing the evidence as a whole.

78. We also find that the applicant has given evidence before us which we have found to be untrue, including whether he had grown out of his clothes after arriving in the UK and whether he knew what sort of job his father did in Jalalabad. While damaging to his credibility, these points do not necessarily mean that he is lying about his age. We bear in mind that his claim to have grown out of his clothes may have been an unnecessary embellishment intended to bolster his claim; and it is difficult to see how his father’s job is relevant to his date of birth.

79. While we accept that it is more likely than not that the applicant stopped growing at a noticeable rate by the age of 15, we do take into account that, at 5’6”, the applicant is not a tall person. As the age assessment notes, while puberty for boys starts around the age of 10 and 14 and that, by 17, growth occurs at a much slower rate until full maturity is reached at 18 to 19, people grow at different rates and data must be used with caution.

80. On the other side of the scale, we find that the applicant has been broadly consistent with his account that his mother told him his age when he was 14 years old so that he knew that he would need to fast during the next Ramadan when he would be 15.

81. We also note that the applicant appears to have been honest to his detriment during his initial interview with the Home Office. He told the immigration officer that he had come to the UK to claim asylum, but rather than setting out a persecution claim he said that he had come to the UK “for a better future, for better opportunities”; that he would “return to my country after I complete my studies in the UK”; and he had come here “to support my family financially”. He evidently was not a person who had a pre-prepared asylum claim. In our view, while material before us suggests that the applicant has subsequently sought to alter the reason his came to the UK, the information he provided to the Home Office in October 2022 suggests that he was being honest with the immigration officer. If he was honest about why he had come to the UK, it can be inferred that he was also being honest about his age being 15.

82. Having considered all the evidence and taking into account the findings in the respondent’s favour, on balance, we find it more likely than not that the applicant is telling the truth when he claims that he was 15 years old when he arrived in the UK.

83. After careful consideration, we find it more likely than not that the applicant was born during Ramadan in 2006. Otherwise, he would have been 13 and not 14 when his mother told him in 2021 that he would be 15 by the next Ramadan. Noting that Ramadan in 2006 took place between 23 September and 23 October that year, and as we cannot know what the exact day of his birth is, we would give the applicant a date of birth at the mid-point of that period: 15 October 2006.

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